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ABSTRACT
This study undertakes to examine the political thought o f the late Czech 
philosopher and Charter 77 spokesman, Jan Pato£ka. It leads to a consideration o f the 
fundamental problem of contemporary and postmodern theory, the question of a 
metaphysical foundation for our philosophical and political self-understanding.
Pato£ka asserted the common origin of philosophy and politics in ancient Greece 
and maintained that their animating force was freedom, understood ontologically as our 
ability to transcend the merely objective and relative in life and to see human being as a 
being of possibility. He called this insight, embodied in the activity of Socrates, the 
original spirit o f European civilization and the common link between the Greek polis 
and contemporary democracy. Yet the development of science and philosophy since 
Plato, Patoika argues, has failed to remain true to the Socratic insight; instead, 
objectified, or “metaphysical,” versions have arisen that not only betray its essence but 
also contribute to the subordination o f politics to ideology. As philosophy became 
objectively metaphysical, it made itself readily accessible to man and offered him the 
possibility of a firm foundation upon which to justify a system o f politics or ethics — but 
only at the cost o f its spirit o f freedom.
I develop this problem by examining four aspects of Patodka’s thought: his 
relationship to Husserl and Heidegger, his relationship to Plato and Greek thought, his 
philosophy o f history and understanding o f the nature of politics, and his application o f 
this framework to politics in the twentieth century. I conclude that Patodka’s work
v
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describes a mode o f self-understanding, and a mode o f  politics, that does not rest on a 
naive, metaphysical foundation; it is, instead, problematic, yet still provides meaning 
and unity for human beings. Though explicitly anti-foundational, it serves a 
foundational function — it allows men to construct a community and endow it with a 
non-relative sense o f  meaningfulness and ethics. I examine this previously unexplored 
body o f work as an attempt to demonstrate that the postmodern critique of 
foundationalism and metaphysics need not imply the impossibility o f a coherent and 
consistent politics and ethics.
vi
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
The Czech philosopher Jan Pato£ka died in a Prague hospital on March 13,
1977, aged 69. The cause of death was a brain hemorrhage, brought on by a series o f 
exhausting interrogations at the hands of the StB, the Czechoslovak secret police. 
Patocka had been under interrogation for his involvement in a protest, in the name o f 
human rights, against the deceitful rule o f the communist government in 
Czechoslovakia. This protest took the form of a document and was called Charter 77. Its 
purpose was, in Socratic style, to inform the regime publicly of its own hypocrisy, o f its 
failure to abide by the Helsinki agreement to which it was a signatory. The Charter 
admirably accomplished this task, gaining in the process international respect and 
admiration and launching the dissident career of the young playwright Vaclav Havel 
who, just over a decade later, was to assume the presidency o f the newly democratic 
Czechoslovak republic. Without PatoCka’s involvement as a spokesman, it is doubtful 
whether the Charter would have had the effect that it did. Patodka was explicit in 
saying, shortly before his death, that there are things worth suffering for.1 In choosing to 
speak for the Charter, he chose to speak the truth, not merely in private, but in the public 
realm. In acting in this way politically, in speaking truthfully before his own Athenian 
Senate knowing full well the cost involved, Jan Pato£ka, like his model Socrates, 
signaled that there was an unsunderable relationship between politics and philosophy, 
between truth and the realm of our social being. Through his actions as well as his 
words, Patocka made it clear that we must not only be aware of this fact, we must act
1
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according to it. In the work that follows I will pursue the nature o f this relationship as it 
is developed in the work of Jan Patocka. In undertaking an exegesis o f the political 
thought o f this seminal philosopher, I hope to enrich the field of political theory and 
bring a still relatively unknown thinker of substantial importance to the attention of 
political science.
Jan Patocka was a thinker who spoke in one moment as a dedicated classicist, in 
another as a thorough postmodernist. It is conceivable, depending on the texts upon 
which you choose to focus, to defend his work from either perspective. This is in fact a 
temptation for the contemporary reader, to read Patocka as merely a tolerant proponent 
of the side of the theoretical spectrum that one wishes to defend. The temptation is to 
read him, for example, as a moral Platonist who is enough o f a contemporary to pay 
attention to postmodern theory or, alternately, as a committed postmodern who is 
willing to pay lip service to the classics. Both readings, I would like to stress at the 
outset, must be avoided, for they are inaccurate. With this study I will demonstrate that 
the voice o f Jan Patocka is a distinctive one in contemporary philosophy, that his work 
deserves recognition not merely as an alternative reading o f already established bodies 
of work, but as a unique contribution to philosophy and to political theory.
As a Czech in the middle o f the twentieth century, Patodka was literally 
surrounded by German influence, politically as well as educationally. It is not surprising 
to note, therefore, that the context of his work is largely determined by German 
philosophy. Patocka naturally came under the influence o f the towering philosophical 
figures o f the time and place, Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. It is Husserl and
2
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Heidegger, above all others, who account for the specific direction o f his work. As a 
doctoral student in the twenties and thirties, however, Pato£ka was also well read in the 
works of, among others, Brentano, Bergson, Scheler, Koyre, Radi, Ingarden, and
Levinas.2
Although of the age when political developments forced many o f his 
contemporaries to emigrate to the United States, Pato£ka chose to remain in 
Czechoslovakia for the duration o f the National Socialist, as well as the Communist, 
occupations. Among those contemporaries who were able to pursue their work in the 
relative freedom of the West, the names of Voegelin, Strauss, Arendt, and Habermas 
come to mind. PatoCka shares a great deal with these thinkers and can be accurately 
situated in the broad context of the themes which they pursue. He speaks directly, in 
addition, to contemporary thinkers such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Paul Ricoeur 
from France and, from the United States, the postmodern pragmatist Richard Rorty. 
Methodologically, what ties Pato£ka to these thinkers is his engagement with 
phenomenology and ontology, with philosophy pursued through direct, experiential 
evidence combined with an attempt to illuminate the structures inherent to human being. 
Thematically, he shares with many of his contemporaries an interest in the classical 
philosophy and politics of ancient Athens combined with a postmodern interest in the 
problem o f metaphysics and the source, the foundation, o f the shared sense of 
meaningfulness that underlies Western civilization. Yet Pato£ka’s work belongs in the 
context of these other thinkers not only from the perspective o f method and theme; he
3
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belongs with them because o f the significance and relevance o f what he has to say. This 
point, however, will require a considerable effort to establish conclusively.
PatoCka’s work takes its primary inspiration from the goal that Edmund Husserl 
expressed in his last major work, the Crisis o f  European Sciences. As a reaction to this 
“crisis” -- the crisis of rationality related to the increasing dominance of positivism and 
its subordination o f the question o f relevance to one of method or objectivity — Husserl 
sought a renewal o f the spirit that was at the heart of Western culture, the spirit of 
Reason.3 As Husserl’s student during the 1930s, when this theme was formulated, 
Patocka took upon himself the task o f pursuing and clarifying this strand of Husserl’s 
thought — a strand that occupied the German phenomenologist only at the end of his 
life. What Pato£ka realized, however, was that Husserl’s transcendental 
phenomenology, while it proceeded from unimpeachable insight about the importance 
o f the direct experience o f phenomena (as opposed to the more indirect experience of 
phenomena perceived through the anticipatory lenses of theory or ideology), was in 
many ways inappropriate to the task. Husserl’s understanding of reason was still 
anchored in Enlightenment thinking; Patocka wished, in contrast, to renew a classical 
sense of reason, a sense he felt would ultimately conform with the insights of much of 
contemporary philosophy.
Patocka chose, therefore, not to pursue the problem along Husserlian lines, as a 
search for a universal philosophy in the Cartesian tradition. He felt that rationality 
primarily indicated a mode o f living, of examining reality, that had as a model the 
dialectical activity o f Socrates. His was a concrete question, a question of the being of
4
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man in the world and in history. For the development o f this insight Pato£ka looked to 
the work o f Martin Heidegger. Heidegger was particularly important in two ways: first, 
he brought to Patocka a thematic exploration of human being, and second, he stressed 
the importance o f history, o f understanding humanity as situated temporally, 
historically. Husserl had pointed to rationality, the Greek “insight,” as the underlying 
principle o f European civilization. Patocka wanted to renew it as a principle, however, 
not by looking at ancient thought instead of contemporary thought, but with the help of 
contemporary thought. Reason had to be re-understood phenomenologically and 
ontologically, and this meant understanding it — following Heidegger’s critique of 
metaphysics -- in a non-metaphysical sense.4
Husserl and Heidegger, then, profoundly influenced the political thought of Jan 
Patocka. Their work is important to contemporary thought to a degree that many 
political theorists attempt to locate a coherent theory of politics in their work directly. It 
is generally true, however, that these attempts have not had great success. The fact is 
that neither Husserl nor Heidegger lends himself readily to political theory. Yet their 
work is crucial to the contemporary critique of the Western theory that political theorists 
look to as justification for their normative political stances. What is perhaps needed, 
then, is not an attempt to read Husserl or Heidegger as political thought, but an attempt 
to write political thought in light o f their work. This is an appropriate description of 
Patocka’s task; he does not begin from the conviction that he should remain faithful to 
the methods of his German teachers, but that he should develop a philosophy with
5
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political relevance that draws on their insights yet is independent of their frameworks 
and their own problems with reductionism.
German philosophy was not the only influence that made a decisive impression 
on this oeuvre, however. Pato£ka lived in a time and place o f great upheaval and 
conflict. Czechoslovak hopes for political freedom were crushed repeatedly during the 
course o f his life: first at Munich in 1938, then during the occupation by the Third 
Reich, once again with the Communist putsch after World War II, and finally in 1968 
with the Soviet-led invasion in the wake o f the Prague Spring. It is no exaggeration, 
then, to remark as Josef Novak did that “PatoCka’s bibliography is inseparable from his 
biography.”5 To note and take account o f the influence of history, however, is 
something substantially different from drawing the conclusion that Patocka’s work is 
determined by that history, that he is essentially, for example, a “dissident” philosopher. 
To make such a charge is to imply that it is the dissident experience, not the philosophy, 
that is substantive. Pato£ka is not, in this regard, a dissident philosopher. His work does 
not depend upon his historical experience with dissidence; rather, it is the dissident 
experience that is made additionally meaningful through his political philosophy.
Rather than a simple response to external events, PatoCka’s political theory is 
philosophy in the best sense of the term. It realizes first o f all that philosophy, like all 
human achievements, is an historical one, and secondly, that new philosophies do not 
simply replace older ones but are continuous with them. To take these principles 
seriously is to accept the challenge offered by Patodka -- the challenge to reveal the
6
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dialogue and the continuity between the ancient and the new, between the classical and 
the postmodern.
Before approaching the question o f the significance of this material — the 
question of the goal of this study -- a few more words need to be said about the 
disparate nature o f  much o f Patodka’s work. As a result o f the reality o f communism, 
Jan Patocka was only for very short periods able to work and conduct research as a 
university professor. He was also unable to publish much of the work he did 
accomplish. Though he wrote a vast amount in his lifetime, relatively little of it is in the 
form of significant texts to which one can authoritatively point as reflecting a center of 
the philosopher’s canon. As Josef Moural put it in a short essay on this topic, “[t]here is 
too little of finished big works, and too much o f sketches, fragments, lectures for 
various levels o f listeners.”6 Even among works that can be called major, there is a 
variety of topics considered. In addition to his attention to phenomenology, Patocka was 
also a philosopher o f history and, some would also say, a historian o f philosophy.7
There is a question, therefore, about the existence o f a genuine center in the 
philosopher’s work. At least one Czech commentator, Moural notes, has argued that 
there is no “core” to PatoCka’s work, no “project” in any systematic sense. In this view, 
Patocka’s greatness lies in his ability to interpret other philosophers.8 In defense o f this 
position, a former student, the Czech philosopher Ladislav Hejdanek, maintains that 
Patocka did not genuinely pursue phenomenology as the centerpiece o f his 
philosophizing. There are others, however, who make the opposite claim. Moural also 
points to a perspective which holds that phenomenology — particularly the unfinished
7
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projects o f an “asubjective” phenomenology and the theory o f three movements of 
human existence — was in fact the “center of gravity” that determined a basic unity in 
this work.9
While both viewpoints can be adequately defended, Moural appropriately notes 
a third element, “one that is more difficult to identify and describe.”10 This is the theme 
that the editors o f PatoCka’s Collected Works have chosen to title “Care for the Soul.” 
As those editors, Ivan Chvatik and Pavel Kouba, put it, this title indicates “the works 
that concern the position of human being in the world and in history: from the moral 
and religious questions of the individual through the attitudes towards current social and 
political events up to general reflections on the philosophy o f history.”11 These texts, 
which contain political as well as historical reflections, are highlighted by the one work 
that most would agree to call a magnum opus: the Heretical Essays in the Philosophy o f  
History. In pointing towards these works, Moural correctly implies that here, in this as 
yet fully unexplored theme in PatoCka’s work, may be the core, the most significant 
project, o f Patodka’s lifetime of philosophy. It is Moural’s contention, indeed, that the 
theme o f “care for the soul,” which “emphasizes the necessity of radical 
self-clarification to be achieved through historical enquiry,”12 may be viewed as 
encompassing, rather than standing in contrast to, the interest in phenomenology.
Moural places the question of care for the soul within the broader confines of an 
inquiry into historicity, and in this he is at least partly correct. In addition to history, I 
maintain that Patocka is also inquiring into the nature o f politics and the political model 
conducive to human freedom. Philosophy, he argued, is the care for the soul that takes
8
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place within the “care for the polis, for the optimal state.”13 In his brief essay, Moural 
leaves the reader with a challenge to undertake an examination o f Pato£ka’s work in 
light of the theme o f history; this is a challenge that leads to what I consider the “core” 
of Patocka’s work: the question of the “social being o f humans.”14 With this interest, not 
solely in being but in social being, the Czech philosopher incorporates into his study of 
Husserl and Heidegger a Platonically-inspired devotion to the reality o f human beings in 
community — in other words, to politics.
It is this part of PatoCka’s work that belongs under the heading o f “care for the 
soul,” and it is the central focus of this study. It leads, not inwards into the 
methodological questions of phenomenology, but outwards into the world o f human 
social life, the world of political and historical activity. Yet phenomenology remains a 
crucial part o f the equation, for Patodka argued that “the question of human social being 
is also in the first place a phenomenological question.”15 Thus to get at the philosophy 
of history and politics that is at the center of Patodka’s work, one must first work 
through the implications of the phenomenology and ontology of Husserl and Heidegger. 
Only when this is done is the question o f history, that “domain of changing social being 
of humans,” fully illuminated. It is only in history, PatoCka concludes, that the “social 
being o f humans can manifest itself as essentially free.16
Care for the soul thus implies care for the social being o f humans; it is the 
political theme at the center o f the philosophy of Jan Pato£ka. Directed toward the 
social reality of human beings, this work is naturally relevant to the sciences that study 
that reality. Thus it is, in his series of phenomenological lectures entitled Body,
9
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Community, Language, World that Patocka stresses the need o f a  philosophical 
justification for the social sciences. “[F]or all social sciences,” he writes, “the point at 
which they become genuine sciences is penetration through self-illusions, 
self-deceptions, our idols of ourselves. Providing a philosophical foundation for actual 
human scientific disciplines demands that we find access to this situation, not an 
empirical, but a foundational, justifying one.”17
Thus setting out his own goal, Patocka brings us to the question of the 
significance o f his achievement. As a student o f Heidegger, it is correct to assume that 
when PatoCka speaks about a philosophical “foundation,” he is not referring to the type 
of “metaphysical” foundation of which Heidegger was so critical.18 Since the critique 
offered by Heidegger and, before him, Nietzsche, the question o f the foundation has 
been at the center o f contemporary thought. It is a fundamental question, and in many 
ways a dilemma, of postmodernism. The notion that theory and philosophy should be 
pursued on the basis o f an objectively transcendental foundation has been discredited. It 
is in light o f this that Pato£ka maintains, along Heideggerean lines, that we are in a 
“post-metaphysical” era or, as others would say, an age o f postmodernism.
The contours o f the postmodern dilemma take form as the question is raised of a 
justification for political and ethical values or norms. Without a solid foundation on 
which to construct arguments and base conclusions, questions as fundamental as those 
of morality and justice lose their anchor. It is a loss that cannot be replaced through 
scientific method; the most elaborate arguments o f utilitarianism notwithstanding, social 
problems inevitably require answers from the realm of morality. The
10
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“post-metaphysical” world, Patodka argues, is grounded in nihilism, a fundamental 
meaninglessness; its apparent options are to commit to a stance of ethical relativism, the 
relativism of all meaning, or to seek a renewal o f metaphysics through anthropocentric 
substitutes for transcendental certainty, such as are offered by teleological philosophies 
of history or eschatological political movements.
This postmodern dilemma is centered, then, in the question o f meaning. If one 
rejects metaphysical meaning, certain meaning that has its source beyond man, then 
there seems to be no recourse but to commit to meaning that is merely relative, meaning 
as a function o f the will of humans. Jan Pato£ka is a postmodern philosopher in the 
sense that he denies what he terms “simply given meaning.” Meaning or knowledge that 
is simply given, as from an objective being or beings beyond human reality, is meaning 
that is naively received. It is meaning that seeks to end the need for questioning, rather 
than encourage it. Yet Patocka is not satisfied with this critique of metaphysics. Human 
life, he contends, is meaningful in a non-relative way.
Patocka’s work, therefore, seeks to respond to this problem of meaning, of the 
foundation of meaningfulness in human life. Because he does not conceive of the 
individual as an independent, disconnected being, but rather as a being integrated into 
historical relationships with the world and with other beings in a social setting, this is a 
question that cannot be abstracted from its political or historical context. Meaning, and 
the sense o f a ground upon which humans can build continuity, is a factor of our living 
truthfully in the world and of our relating to the world, not as a collection of objects, but 
as a whole. What Patodka describes, in his work under the rubric o f care for the soul, is
11
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a foundation for politics and ethics in the contemporary world ~  a foundation that is 
itself non-metaphysical.
In terms of its value for political philosophy, Pato£ka’s work is outstanding in its 
attempt to develop an approach to philosophy and politics that is non-foundational in 
the traditional sense, yet does not abandon ethical insight, such as that offered in 
classical thought by Plato and Aristotle and, in the modem period, by philosophical 
politicians such as the first Czech president T. G. Masaryk. It is this region between the 
two poles o f a rejection of a simply-given, absolute reality on one hand, and the refusal 
to descend into an amoral nihilism on the other that must be explored by political 
theory. An evaluation o f PatoCka’s work is therefore crucial to contemporary political 
thought.
What Patocka offers, however, is not a “solution” either to the problem of 
meaning or of history. To the contrary, he demands a recognition that meaning is not an 
objective constant in human life, it is problematic. What is constant, however, what is 
“absolute,” is the “possibility” inherent in human being. By virtue of an ontological 
reality noted by Heidegger — the fact that, as humans, we take an interest in our own 
being -- we have the possibility to pursue this interest toward an intensification, a 
growth of that being. For PatoCka, this can best be done through an understanding of our 
social being and the possibilities available to it -- the possibilities of freedom and of 
historical action. Here, then, are the concepts that emerge from PatoCka’s philosophy of 
history and politics. It is through active freedom in a social and political setting inspired 
by the model of the Greek polis -- that is, a mode! grounded in the fragile consistency of
12
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a community which accepts the conflict and uncertainty natural to free and equal beings 
— that human life is most fully open to a non-relative meaningfulness.
With this study o f the political thought in the philosophy o f  Jan Patocka, I intend 
to illuminate and evaluate this argument for a retheoretization o f the ground, o f the 
foundations, of Western thought. What is at stake is more than an intellectual exercise, 
for as Patodka clearly points out, the contemporary world, particularly in regard to its 
political realities, is mired in a crisis. We exist in an age with all the characteristics o f a 
technological “super-civilization” that is unable to break its search for meaning free 
from entanglement with the metaphysical remnants o f past theoretical endeavors. 
Modem civilization searches for meaning by seeking a solution to the problem of 
history. It seeks to solve history by mastering it -- through a political or a philosophical 
system so perfect as to preclude the possibility o f an insoluble problem. To do so is to 
seek to end history. “Yet the problem of history,” Patocka is adamant, “may not be 
resolved, it must be preserved as a problem.”19
In order to illuminate the problematic conception of history and politics that 
makes sense of this enigmatic statement, to illuminate the sense o f caring for the soul as 
a primary function o f the polis, I will present five substantive chapters o f analysis, 
appended to which will be a review of the literature on the work o f  Jan PatoCka. Chapter 
Two, the chapter immediately following this introduction, will focus on reading Pato£ka 
as an interpreter of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. Here I will discuss the way 
in which phenomenology, Husserl’s methodology for studying reality “as it appears to 
the ordinary observer or as we encounter it in direct, immediate experience,”20 forms a
13
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
basis for Pato€ka’s approach to philosophy. In addition, I will trace the influence of the 
later Husserl, the author o f  the Crisis o f  European Sciences, on the young Patodka’s 
view of history and the spirit o f the European world. Husserl, however, is only a part of 
the story. PatoCka is not a follower of phenomenology so much as an interpreter o f it, 
and this interpretation is primarily indebted to the ontological insight o f Martin 
Heidegger. Thus I will also review Heidegger’s influence, as well as the way in which 
Patocka takes a consciously different path than Heidegger, a path that leads back to the 
realm of politics rather than outward into the realm of art. Lastly, in Chapter Two, I will 
discuss Patodka’s own phenomenological contribution: a phenomenology o f three 
movements in human life that become the theoretical basis for his work in philosophy 
o f history.
The influence o f Husserl and Heidegger is undeniably important, but it is not in 
this contemporary theory that Patodka finds his greatest inspiration. Consciously 
departing from Heidegger in this regard, Patodka looks to the classical thought o f Plato 
or, more particularly, the figure o f Socrates as epitomizing the approach to philosophy 
he wishes to emulate. This Socratic approach, however, is viewed through 
Heideggerean eyes. Thus in the third chapter I will consider the philosopher’s relation to 
Greek philosophy. Here a number of important texts stand out. First is the series of 
lectures entitled Plato and Europe, which present the thesis that the care for the soul, as 
Patocka understands it, is the “spirit” of European life, a spirit that has been made 
progressively opaque in the course o f Western history. In the same vein is the important 
essay “Negative Platonism,” which gives a clear account of Patodka’s reading of
14
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Socratic activity as non-metaphysical and develops a distinction between the figure of 
Socrates and the later work of Plato. This chapter will be crucial, therefore, to 
establishing the feasibility of the attempt to, in effect, combine classical theory and 
symbolism with contemporary critique.
The fourth chapter will shift to the philosophy o f history that, as Josef Moural 
pointed out, belongs within the context of the theme of caring for the soul. Patoika’s 
philosophy o f history is contained, for the most part, in the first three o f his Heretical 
Essays in the Philosophy o f  History. I will discuss these chapters with the aim of 
uncovering both the controversial nature and the intent o f the contention that history can 
be said to have a particular beginning, coinciding with the origin of both philosophy and 
politics in Greek antiquity. This review of the meaning o f history in Patocka’s work will 
lead naturally to a discussion of the site of historical activity (the polis) and its 
characteristics (freedom and a recognition of problematicity). This chapter will 
conclude, then, with an introduction of the theme of politics in this work.
I will turn, in the fifth chapter, directly to a consideration of politics, starting 
with a review o f some of Patocka’s other political texts and concluding with an 
examination o f the final two of the Heretical Essays, in which the social and political 
reality of the contemporary world is subject to significant critique. The aim of Chapter 
Five, entitled “Politics and Ethics in the Twentieth Century,” is threefold. First, it is to 
bring out the details o f Patocka’s analysis of contemporary civilization and its 
technological character. This analysis culminates in the striking and controversial essay 
“Wars of the Twentieth Century and the Twentieth Century as War,” with which
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PatoCka concludes his Heretical Essays. I will demonstrate, with a look at not only this 
essay but also a number of lesser known essays written at the same time, that there is a 
fundamental consistency in Patodka’s writings, even if  those writings are marked by 
drastic shifts in tone and metaphor. The point to be stressed is that, even as Pato£ka 
shifts from a Platonic style stressing care for the soul to a more Nietzschean style in his 
discussion o f war and conflict, he is not undergoing a change in his philosophy. The 
challenge for readers, as I noted earlier, is not to read this thinker as you wish him to be, 
as, for example, a Platonic moralist whose talk of conflict is inexplicable. Rather, as I 
will seek to show, Pato£ka occupies a nontraditional space in philosophy. His 
understanding of care for the soul is not one that leads to a transcendental harmony; care 
for the soul is rather a difficult process that involves conflict and requires a willingness 
to sacrifice.
The second aim of this chapter is to illuminate the attributes o f the individual 
who is genuinely able to care for his soul, the individual who exemplifies the 
self-understanding characteristic of a historical and political actor. This individual, 
whom Patodka calls a “spiritual person,”21 is neither a typical politician nor a 
“Guardian” in the sense of Plato’s Republic. Rather, he or she may be a member of any 
profession. What is important is the person’s willingness to accept a “problematic” life 
and to speak truthfully in the public realm. In this way, Pato£ka emphasizes, the 
“spiritual person” of whatever profession is nonetheless political.
My third aim, in Chapter Five, is to introduce an essential element o f Patodkan 
politics: the element o f ethics and morality. PatoCka’s final writings, which came in
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defense of Charter 77, stress the “moral attitude” o f the spiritual person and of the 
political state to which he belongs. Moral sentiment, it is argued, is sovereign over both 
the individual and the state. Patodka’s political thought thus culminates in a 
commitment to a certain unconditionality o f ethical comportment. Yet this position 
leads to a potential objection. How is it possible to require an unconditional ethics if one 
is committed to a critique of metaphysics? Can postmodern critique be applied to 
political theory without dissolving into ethical relativism?
With these questions I return to the central theme o f this study and of PatoCka’s 
political theory, the problem o f the foundation. I will conclude this study with a sixth 
and final chapter that focuses on an exploration of this theme. It is, in Patodka's terms, a 
problem of the meaningfulness o f human reality. The world as a whole is the 
meaningful context o f  our lives, yet it is not an abstract, metaphysical objectification.
To the degree that this can be demonstrated persuasively, and Patocka attempts to do so 
using phenomenological analysis, then the essential ground for politics and ethics takes 
on an alternate form, one that contrasts distinctly with the variety o f forms given to it in 
the technological, as well as the pre-technological, eras.
Pato£ka’s philosophy, I contend, is an internally consistent and convincing 
alternative to political theory that styles itself as either “postmodern” or “classical.” It 
most certainly belongs in the canon of contemporary theory. It is not, however, without 
its shortcomings, and I discuss the project in Chapter Six with a critical eye, noting the 
limits of its perspective and the opposition it is likely to provoke. As an appendix to this 
study, I also include a detailed review of the major English-language literature on the
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work o f Jan Pato£ka. As a scholar whose ability to work and publish was suppressed by 
an authoritarian state, Patodka has not been the subject o f a significant literature outside 
his native land. This has begun to change rapidly in the last decade but, as I note in the 
appendix, the literature (particularly in English) is still limited and not of a consistently 
high quality. I hope to begin to correct this deficiency with this study.
In concluding this introduction, it will be pertinent to note a few of the 
biographical details of Jan Patocka’s life.22 Patocka was bom in 1907 in the town of 
Tumov, in what was then the Czech part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He was the 
third of four boys in a family of modest means but superior education. Patodka’s father 
was a well-known classical philologist with a wide-ranging interest in the literary arts, 
and his mother was trained in opera. Although the family was forced to live modestly 
due to the elder Patocka’s ill health, it is certain that the children were not at a loss for 
education.
The young Pato£ka began a course of study in philosophy at Prague’s ancient 
Charles University in 1925 and was able to gain a stipend, four years later, to study in 
Paris. It was here, at the Sorbonne, that Patocka attended a series o f lectures given by 
Edmund Husserl, the Paris Lectures, that were to develop into the Cartesian 
Meditations. This exposure undoubtedly influenced the Czech philosophy student, 
although it would be several more years before he would work directly with the German 
phenomenologist.
After completing his degree from Charles University, Patocka again sought an 
international fellowship, this time ending up in Freiburg to study directly under Husserl
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and, importantly, also to attend the lectures of Martin Heidegger. The association with 
Husserl was to blossom into a close relationship. Back in Prague in the mid-30s, 
Patocka was instrumental in bringing the renowned phenomenologist to the Czech 
capital to lecture. These “Prague lectures,” from November o f 1935, became the basis 
for Husserl’s last major work, the Crisis o f  European Sciences, which was inordinately 
influential on the direction of Patofika’s career.
In the years that followed, Pato£ka’s world fell apart. Following the Munich 
Diktat and the Nazi invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1938, all non-German universities 
were closed and life became extraordinarily trying. During the war itself, 
Czechoslovakia was spared major battles or destruction. Patoika was able to continue to 
write occasional articles, this despite being forced to work, in 1944, as a tunneler in 
Prague. This last job, for which his academic inclinations did not well prepare him, 
fortunately did not last long. By 1945 the war came to an end and the philosopher was 
finally able to take up a position at Charles University as a full professor.
Once again, however, international political forces were to intrude decisively on 
his career. His return to the university, where he immediately began to fill the needs o f a 
student population starved for instruction, was only short-lived. By 1948 the 
Communist Party was in control o f the government and the forty years of Czechoslovak 
communism had begun. Pato£ka was again dismissed from the university, and this time 
effectively barred from print. For the next fifteen years -- when he was at the age when 
scholars are generally most productive — Pato£ka was reduced to working in archives. 
Actually, his years in archives dedicated to Masaryk and Komensky (Comenius) were
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quite productive. In the first piace, he was able to avoid all involvement with the 
political regime, and in the second, he made use o f the time to produce a tremendous 
amount o f scholarly material on these two Czech thinkers. With the exception o f a 
number of unpublished manuscripts, however, he was unable to pursue his own 
philosophical research interests.23
It was not until the late 1960s that the regime began to liberalize and PatoCka 
was able to return to the university. Again his career took on a second wind and a 
number o f his most significant lecture series, such as the Body, Community, Language, 
World lectures, were delivered to appreciative students during this period. The 
liberalization o f the Prague Spring was also short-lived, however, and the Soviet-led 
invasion of 1968 crushed the hopes and dreams o f open-minded Czechs in devastating 
fashion. The blow to the psyche of Czech intellectuals was unimaginable. Many had 
genuinely believed that they were entering a period that would be truly free and just. 
Their bitterness and inner conflict was intense, and some of this is reflected in the tone 
of the underground “apartment seminars” that Patocka held during the 1970s.
The invasion, o f course, meant the end o f Pato£ka’s career at the university. He 
was ‘prematurely’ retired in 1969 and again barred from print. But this did not stop him, 
now that he was a retiree, from pursuing his philosophical and pedagogic ambitions. 
Patocka continued to lecture to students in the 1970s, but this time illegally in 
underground seminars held surreptitiously in the private apartments o f willing 
individuals. The Heretical Essays in the Philosophy o f History were written during this
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period and published privately as samizdat, with carefully guarded copies typed, retyped 
and circulated for willing students.
For Patocka, these activities meant that he was pursuing the two things that 
mattered most to him: philosophy and education. For the authorities, however, it meant 
dissidence. Many o f Pato£ka’s students or admirers during this time, such as the young 
playwright Vaclav Havel, were willing to voice opposition to the regime and take the 
consequences for it. Thus it was in 1977 that Havel, along with a number of other 
dissident intellectuals, decided to issue a protest under the name of Charter 77. For the 
document to carry weight, however, they needed the support o f a recognized and 
respected figure. Although he was hesitant, Jan Pato£ka, at the age of 69, accepted that 
role. It was to be the role that brought him international fame, and cost him his life. It 
was, however, a role entirely in keeping with his political philosophy.
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CHAPTER 2
“CONCRETE HUMANS IN T H E IR  CORPOREAL WORLD” : AN 
INTERPRETATION OF HUSSERL AND HEIDEGGER
For those familiar with the philosophical traditions associated with Edmund 
Husserl and Martin Heidegger, the first inclination upon encountering Jan Pato£ka is to 
view his work as a modification of their, more original, theses. To some extent this is 
justifiable, for the Czech philosopher is most definitely a student o f Husserl and 
Heidegger, and his work is built upon conceptualizations worked out by these two 
thinkers. The road to an understanding o f Pato£ka’s philosophy leads through both 
Husserl and Heidegger. Yet to conceive o f Patodka as primarily a “Husserlian” or, 
alternately, a “Heideggerean” thinker is to miss the main thrust o f his thought, the most 
original aspect o f his philosophy. Patocka’s approach to philosophy is not determined, 
in the end, by the methodology of either thinker -- neither by strict attention to 
phenomenological method nor by complete immersion in the ontology of being and 
understanding. His attention, as he describes it, is directed to the human experience of 
reality as a whole. In indicating the “whole” o f reality, Pato£ka wishes to place 
particular emphasis on one area that is not served particularly well by Husserl or 
Heidegger. Through his philosophy, he wishes to illuminate human social and political 
reality. Patocka’s interpretation is geared toward the uncovery o f a ground for the being 
of humans in society. As a result, it is necessarily disloyal to the thought o f his teachers. 
While drawing insight from both, he purposefully chooses not to follow either too 
closely.
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Pato<Ska’s intent is to bring the insights o f Husserl and Heidegger into direct 
contact with the social sciences. This requires, as he admits with reference to his 
philosophy o f history, a bit of heresy. An examination o f PatoCka’s reliance on these 
two thinkers will demonstrate that he does not apply their work so much as he interprets 
it. Developing a philosophy that speaks to being in its concrete, social activity means 
that Patocka cannot simply follow the framework o f either thinker. He must pursue 
phenomenology on the level o f its insight, rather than on the level of its method. This 
means, for example, that he engages with the whole Heidegger, both the early analyst o f 
Being and Time and the later thinker who looks to poetry, world and earth. This is not a 
quirk in PatoCka’s approach, it is a necessity.
As a starting point for this study o f Jan Patodka and political theory-, I must 
examine the nature of his relationship with the two contemporary figures on whom his 
work relies most heavily. I will show how, through analysis and interpretation of both 
German thinkers, Patodka is able to develop a philosophy that brings their work to bear 
on an understanding o f contemporary political reality. As Patocka understood his task, 
he was taking their work in a direction that it was meant to go -- although neither 
philosopher took it very far in that direction himself. Though Patocka is a 
phenomenologist and an adherent of many of the ontological insights explicated by 
Heidegger, he is more o f a critic o f the two philosophers than a follower. He does not 
deny the validity o f their insights, but refines their thought and takes it in directions to 
which it, as originally presented, was not appropriate. The fact that Patocka is neither
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simply a Husserlian nor a Heideggerean thinker makes his work politically relevant 
where theirs has largely failed to be.
The basic logic of Patodka’s critique of Husserl and Heidegger concerns the 
being of humans in the world, inevitably implying human action in community, i.e., the 
relation of humans not only to their consciousness, but to their bodies, their 
communities, and their world. As Patodka himself describes it, this philosophy is one of 
“concrete humans in their corporeal world.”1 It is a world in which human movement is 
“shared” movement and the being of humans is historical and social — and thus, 
political. PatoCka’s “phenomenological philosophy,”2 seen in this light, forms a 
consistent and coherent basis for his more explicitly political writings. The story of 
Patocka’s philosophical achievement begins with his association with Edmund Husserl.
Husserl
Professionally, Pato£ka was most closely connected to Husserl, with whom he 
worked as a young man. He began his association with the German phenomenologist in 
1929 when, as a student concluding his studies at the philosophical faculty of Charles 
University in Prague, he was able to spend a year on an exchange program at the 
Sorbonne in Paris. Husserl, at the time, was at the Sorbonne to deliver his Paris 
Lectures, which became the basis for his famous Cartesian Meditations. It was during 
this lecture series that PatoCka was first introduced to Husserl, albeit only briefly.
The association with Husserl began in earnest, however, in 1933, after Patocka 
had completed his doctoral work and was in Berlin on a grant from the Humboldt 
foundation. While studying Greek thought in Berlin under Jacob Klein, the suggestion
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was put to him to relocate to Freiburg, where he might be closer to Husserl and might 
also hear Martin Heidegger, with whom Klein had studied. Patodka promptly addressed 
a letter to Husserl in Freiburg asking to be sponsored and, to his surprise, received a 
warm invitation. Husserl let Patodka know that he thought of him as a fellow 
countryman -- Husserl had been bom in Moravia, in the present-day Czech Republic — 
and conditioned the invitation only with the requirement that Patodka come free of 
“preconceived philosophical convictions.”3
The experience o f 1933 in Freiburg was singularly influential in terms o f the 
development of Patodka’s phenomenological philosophy. Here his working relationship 
with Husserl began, and it was here as well that Patodka was first able to hear 
Heidegger, who was at the height of his fame after the publication of Being and Time. 
Patocka worked most closely in 1933 with Husserl’s assistant, Eugen Fink; he 
developed, during this period, both a deep appreciation for the aims and methods of 
Husserlian phenomenology and a critical stance towards many of the presumptions 
upon which it rested. Fink, also of independent mind when it came to the philosophy of 
his teacher, seems to have encouraged the younger Czech in the latter, even encouraging 
Patocka to consider Heidegger’s critique o f phenomenology. Ultimately, Patodka did 
just that and it was, as Ivan Blecha put it in his 1997 work on the Czech thinker, 
“[precisely this location between Husserl and Heidegger and the attempt at a specific 
synthesis of the motives o f both sides that later helped Patodka to find a distinctive 
place in phenomenology.”4
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Despite his working mainly with Fink, a close relationship between the young 
Czech and the elder Husserl did develop. This relationship advanced in the years 
following the Freiburg stay, with Pato£ka even being invited to spend Christmas with 
the Husserls in 1934. More important for Patodka’s philosophy, however, was the 
progression of their professional relationship. The high point o f the association 
undoubtedly occurred in 1934-35, when Husserl was laying the groundwork for his last 
major work. The Crisis o f  European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. It 
was the content o f this work that was to act on Pato£ka as a springboard for his lifelong 
pursuit o f philosophy. Husserl’s first public expression o f the themes of the Crisis came 
in a letter he sent -- in lieu o f  a personal appearance — to the World Philosophical 
Congress of 1934, held in Prague. At Husserl’s request, the letter was read to the 
Congress by Jan Patocka, and it represented Husserl’s answer to the request o f the 
Congress for comment on “the mission of philosophy in our time.”5
A more significant presentation of the themes o f the Crisis, however, took place 
a year later, also in Prague, and also as a result o f action by Patocka. In November of 
1935, the young Czech hosted Husserl for a series of lectures to the Prague Circle, the 
Cercle philosophique de Prague pour les recherches sur I 'entendement humain. The 
content of these lectures, entitled “The Crisis of European Sciences and Psychology,” 
became the basis for the larger work, the first parts o f which were published a year later 
in 1936.6 The more well-known “Vienna Lecture” was actually a precursor to the 
Prague lectures, taking place in May of 1935.
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The Crisis o f  European Sciences
While Patodka is a critic o f many of the assumptions upon which Husserl bases 
his phenomenological texts, his philosophical career was nonetheless significantly 
determined by the themes outlined in Crisis.1 Patodka was distinctly influenced by his 
close association with Husserl in the mid-1930s, and it is this association that provided 
Patocka with a raison d'etre for his philosophical career. Husserl’s Crisis was an 
incomplete work, an introduction to a new expression of the phenomenological outlook. 
Nevertheless, Patodka found in it themes that resonated, that had the potential, if 
correctly analyzed, to lead philosophy back to itself, that is, back to a consideration o f 
existence as it is concretely experienced. Patodka’s career is, to a large degree, a 
detailed critique, elaboration and exploration of themes that were o f concern to Husserl 
at the end o f his life.
Primary among these themes is the “crisis” of European rationality. The 
perception o f a pervading sense o f crisis in Europe at this time was evidenced by the 
increasing popularity o f the Existenzphilosophie of Jaspers and Heidegger, of early 
existentialism.8 Husserl strongly opposed this movement as a solution to the problem -- 
considering it a form of antirationalism; he did admit, however, as David Carr puts it, 
that Existenzphilosophie had “given needed expression to something real: a deeply felt 
lack of direction for man’s existence as a whole, a sense of the emptiness of Europe’s 
cultural values, a feeling o f crisis and breakdown, the demand that philosophy be 
relevant to life.”9
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Accepting the relevance of this diagnosis, Husserl proposed a philosophical 
approach to the problem that seemed quite unlike his earlier work: he proposed a 
historical approach that sought to uncover the guiding principle behind philosophy 
itself. This was not an antirationalistic endeavor, he emphasized; it was rather its 
opposite. It was an attempt to rescue rationalism from the decline to which it had been 
subject with the rise of natural science methodology during and after the Age of 
Enlightenment.
The argument, encompassing a critique of scientism and positivism, claims that
the stunning advances in the natural sciences led to the summary dismissal of the
methods of the humanistic sciences as mere subjective reflections on the
“unconditionally universal elements and laws” of nature itself, which could only be
truly accessed by the development of the exact sciences.10 The methods of the exact
sciences, then, came to be seen as the exclusive mode of access to what became the
basis of reality -- the “unconditionally universal” idealizations of the hard sciences. In
this situation, lived experience is merely a subjective reflection o f that reality, often
distorted and innaccurate. This transfer of ontological validity to the constructs of
science is at the root of what Husserl called the crisis of Western rationality."
Rationality in the West had gone astray, but this did not necessitate an antirational
solution. As Husserl put it in his Vienna lecture,
I too am certain that the European crisis has its roots in a misguided 
rationalism. But we must not take this to mean that rationality as such is 
evil or that it is of only subordinate significance for mankind's existence 
as a whole. Rationality, in that high and genuine sense of which alone we 
are speaking, the primordial Greek sense...still requires, to be sure, much 
clarification through self-reflection; but it is called in its mature form to 
guide [our] development. On the other hand we readily admit (and
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German Idealism preceded us long ago in this insight) that the stage of 
development o f ratio represented by the rationalism o f the Age o f 
Enlightenment was a mistake, though certainly an understandable one.12
The renewal o f reason required an examination o f its origin and its status as the guiding
principle o f European life. This examination needed to proceed historically, and it
needed to refer directly to the origin o f philosophy in Greek antiquity.
Husserl argues that in order to understand the crisis o f Europe, the very concept
of “Europe” must first be understood. Europe, he writes, is indistinguishable from its
spiritual telos.13 It is “the historical teleology o f  the infinite goals o f  reason,” and it has
its birthplace in ancient Greece. In other words, Europe begins with and is defined by
philosophy, in the original sense of the word. Philosophy, the ‘ piimal phenomenon o f
spiritual Europe,” is distinct from the philosophy o f other civilizations by virtue of
essential differences.14 “[OJnly in the Greeks do we have a universal (“cosmological”)
life-interest in the essentially new form of a purely “theoretical” attitude, and this as a
communal form.”15 In distinguishing this “theoretical” attitude as something new, he
contrasts it to a “natural” attitude that is prior to the theoretical.16 With the concept of
the “natural” attitude, Husserl is describing a pretheoretical, or pre-philosophical
perspective on life in which things are accepted as simply given. The breakthrough of
philosophy, he says, came with the adoption of a theoretical attitude towards human
existence that amounted to a skeptical interrogation o f simply given knowledge. This
was the beginning o f explicit self-reflection in Western thought and the essence of
rationalism. The downfall o f Europe has been a result of its estrangement from this
essence, its hope for escape from this crisis contingent on its ability to renew this “spirit
of philosophy.”17
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Like Husserl, Patodka was convinced o f the reality o f a crisis, or degradation, of 
European rationalism. He saw Husserl’s diagnosis of the problem as relatively sound; 
the German philosopher’s prescription for solving it, however, was not. The centrality 
of the theme o f the crisis to Patodka’s philosophy, as well as his certainty as to the 
inappropriateness of the Husserlian approach, are clearly demonstrated in two, quite 
distinct texts -- one from the beginning, the other from the end, o f his career. The first 
text, entitled “Masaryk’s and Husserl’s Conception of the Spiritual Crisis of European 
Humanity,” comes from 1936, when Husserl was still involved in the writing of the 
Crisis and Patodka was in close contact with him. The second text represents a lecture 
given in Warsaw in 1971 entitled “Edmund Husserl’s Philosophy o f the Crisis of the 
Sciences and His Conception o f a Phenomenology o f the Life-World.” Despite the gap 
of 35 years, both texts reveal a similar critique: a fundamental disconnectedness in 
Husserl from the substantiality of the concrete world, which is a world o f action and a 
world of “good and evil” represented, in the earlier article, by the Czech 
philosopher-president T.G. Masaryk.
In this first essay, Patodka notes that both Masaryk, a “civilizer and an 
organizer,” and Husserl, a “contemplator,” are convinced of the debilitating effect on 
European society of a “protracted spiritual crisis.”18 Their approaches to the problem are 
drastically different, however, and it is evident from the text that, though the young Jan 
Patodka takes much inspiriation from both, he sees the need for a third approach that 
avoids their mistakes. Masaryk’s failing stems from his theology, founded in an 
“objectivistic conception o f God,” which he appended to an understanding of
32
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
philosophy based on Descartes. Although Patodka could not agree with Masaryk’s
combination o f  theology and Cartesianism, he was nevertheless an adherent of the
solidity of Masaryk’s ethical and political stances, the practical nature of his thought.19
While the intellectual foundations were untenable, he concluded, the goals were
consistent with human reality; the chore was thus to uncover the authentic foundations
for the moral and political posture exemplified by T.G. Masaryk.
Husserl, in contrast, follows “a purely theoretical path” — “that of analysis and
reflection, without regard for practical questions, striving solely for clarity and precision
of philosophical results.”20 This theoretical philosophy, pursued with exacting rigor, is
Husserl’s prescription for a solution to the crisis of rationality -- a return to philosophy
in its essence, guided by phenomenology. As Patodka points out, however, there is a
certain weakness in this disregard for the practical, just as there is intellectual weakness
in Masaryk’s adherence to a practical religiosity:
A man o f action, like Masaryk, expresses himself in his active 
conception of faith; a man o f uncompromising intellectual consistency, 
like Husserl, might find that it interferes with his work. Perhaps we 
might say, paraphrasing one o f Masaryk’s well-known sayings, that the 
German is weak in his strength, the Czech is strong in his weakness.21
The Masarykan stress on individual action, on “personal decision which does not follow
from theories or rest on arguments,” represents an attempt to provide answers to
genuine problems of human existence, problems which Husserl’s philosophy does not
address, “though it can perhaps serve as the ground on which such answers can be
built.”22 In this early article, Jan Patodka is convinced of two things: the need for a
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solution to the crisis o f European humanity is indeed real, and the best approach to such
a solution will draw upon a combination o f practical and theoretical considerations.
By 1971 and the time o f the Warsaw lecture, the critique o f the Husserlian
approach had been elaborated in detail; the basic insight o f 1936, however, remained
intact. Patocka is even more convinced, after the passage o f three and a half decades,
that Husserl’s “diagnosis” of the root o f the modem condition as the ascendency of
scientific method over all else is relevant. The essential foci remain rationality and
responsibility: as the essential ingredients o f philosophy, these make up the core of a
“life in truth,” the symbolic goal of Patofika’s philosophy. He neatly summarizes, in the
Warsaw lecture, this essential core of Husserl’s concerns:
We might formulate Husserl’s thoughts on philosophy, science and 
rationality roughly as follows. Science is genuinely a science ~  rationally 
grounded and internally clear knowledge — only as long as it remains in 
close contact with philosophy, which is its starting point and its 
foundation. Philosophy is nothing other than a life (dedicated to thought) 
which responds to the call for a fully responsible thought. An attitude of 
responsibility is one which makes its opinions conform to its intuitions 
o f the matters themselves, not inversely. We can see that only such a 
responsible attitude makes possible the life in truth which is the essence 
of philosophy and of every science that has not lost touch with it. Life in 
truth, in turn, is rationality. This life in truth, as the characteristic bios, is 
what the ancient Greeks had founded as an ongoing tradition whose 
meaning is always capable of being rediscovered and o f being renewed 
and enriched thanks precisely to the possibility of being rediscovered.23
Modem science, however, had abandoned responsibility by proposing a universal
systematization o f scientific method. The result was a “crisis” o f rational civilization.
The same science which increasingly makes life possible “at the same time strips life of
all higher reasons for living, leaving us alone in the face of the chaos of instincts and of
traditions devoid of any but merely factual cohesion.”24 The granting of special status to
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the methods o f natural science has facilitated a debasement o f the spiritual aspects of 
life, rendering it increasingly empty.
Despite the perspicacity of the diagnosis, the solution proposed was not 
persuasive. The basis o f Patodka’s critique concerned the degree to which Husserl’s 
“natural” world was a purely theoretical construction, disconnected from the 
concreteness o f practical human action in the world. As Husserl described the “natural” 
world, it led to a “metaphysical outcome” that was “unsatisfactory” and “in the end 
disappointing.”25 Husserl described this “natural” world not as a substantial world, but 
rather in terms o f a great transcendental intersubjectivity, meaning that the world could 
only be conceived o f as a collection of all of the subjective perceptions o f individual 
consciousnesses. The end result was a world deprived o f  all independence o f being. This 
necessitated a detailed critique and a thorough revision o f the concept.
Husserl’s approach to philosophy, which sought a “postulate of philosophy as an 
absolutely apodictic science,”26 revealed that his conception o f rationality, or reason, 
was determined, not so much by the Greek understanding o f reason to which he pointed 
-- expressed in the differentiation of the concept of “intelligence,” or nous27 — but rather 
by a more modem, Cartesian vision of reason and knowledge. Patodka knew that reason 
did not lead to apodicticity, to certainty, and so he took over Husserl’s goal by shifting 
the direction o f its inquiry. He was to examine, in his career, not only the ontological 
work o f Martin Heidegger, but also the Platonic theme o f  rationality as a component of 
caring for the development of the human soul. In this way, Patodka not only moved
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beyond Husserl, he also managed to remain faithful to the understanding o f reason 
expressed by the Greeks rather than to that characteristic of the modems.
Nevertheless, PatoCka’s close contact with Husserl during the decade o f the 
1930s was certainly critical in determining the direction o f his philosophical career. 
Husserl’s basic goal from The Crisis o f  European Sciences — a resuscitation of the 
concept of reason via a turn to history and a reconsideration of the origin o f philosophy 
in ancient Greece — was taken on as a central aim by Pato£ka as well. Yet Pato£ka did 
not simply follow his teacher in an application of the principles he had laid down. He 
sought a more complete understanding o f the content o f reason than that offered by 
Husserl. This led him, in the end, to secure his own place in philosophy by moving 
away from Husserl and developing a phenomenological and ontological philosophy that 
embraced many of the insights of Martin Heidegger and applied them to the social being 
of man.
The Insight of Phenomenology
Prior to developing an ontology, however, Patocka was a dedicated student — 
and critic — of phenomenology. His commentary on Husserl is by no means limited to 
his writings about the Crisis; he also wrote extensively on phenomenology and the 
phenomenological method, writings which in themselves justify PatoCka’s inclusion on 
a list o f the century’s significant philosophers.28 Though a critic o f many aspects of 
Husserlian phenomenology, Pato£ka nonetheless considered himself to be a 
phenomenologist.
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Patodka agreed with Husserl that the goal of phenomenology was to grasp 
phenomena without distortion, to attempt to see things as they are. This did not mean 
seeing and describing things as they are ideally, or “in themselves,” but rather as they 
genuinely appear to us in our experience, for only in this way could we avoid the 
mistake o f perceiving things as we believe them to be, rather than as they are. As he 
wrote, “for Husserl the reflection on phenomena means delving into the way things 
present themselves to us in our ordinary experience/’29 This is by no means something 
obvious, as Patodka explains in rather tortured language, further paraphrasing Husserl: 
the difficulty, he writes, “is that we frequently think we see and know what in reality we 
only think, that we do not know how to see what we see, that intermediate links 
insinuate themselves between the seen and our knowing and must be systematically 
removed.”30 This task of seeing things as they genuinely appear, undistortedly, is the 
broad goal o f phenomenology; it is the goal of reflecting upon the world and upon 
human affairs as they truly are, rather than as we may perceive them abstractly, or as we 
may wish them to be.
In the academic year 1968-69, Jan Patodka delivered a series o f lectures at 
Charles University in Prague that belong among his most original contributions to the 
study o f phenomenology. Entitled Body, Community, Language, World, this text 
(compiled from notes taken by his students and translated into English by Erazim 
FCohak) offers as clear and coherent a picture o f his revision o f the approaches of 
Husserl and Heidegger as can be found. Patodka begins the lectures by making it clear 
that the philosophical course he is pursuing is phenomenological, rather than
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metaphysical. He argues that metaphysics, “which constructs philosophy as a special 
scientific system,” is the very opposite of phenomenology. “Phenomenology examines 
the experiential content of such theses; in every abstract thought it seeks to uncover 
what is hidden in it, how we arrive at it, what seen and lived reality underlies it.”31 For 
philosophy to claim intellectual validity, it must resist the temptation o f the scientific 
system and remain committed to human experience.
The phenomenology pursued by Patodka, however, is not to be confused with a 
repetition o f the technique o f Husserl. This point is made in the first o f his lectures on 
the Body, Community, Language, World problem: “[b]y phenomenology we shall not 
mean the teachings of Husserl. What we have defined as phenomenology — learning to 
think and see precisely (how to read, how to articulate what we see) -- is always present 
in philosophy.”32 Patodka’s approach to philosophy is not primarily a method. It is 
rather a thematic attempt to clarify the experiential essence o f philosophy. 
Phenomenology as Patocka pursues it is a means to place distance between the art of 
human self-reflection and the metaphysical baggage that has accumulated around 
philosophy as practiced in Europe for more than two thousand years. Patocka’s 
interpretation, which rejects the subjective element o f Husserl’s work and instead 
pursues problems related to the corporeality of the body and the “movements” of human 
beings within the world, is less an abstract theoretical venture than an application of 
theoretical insight to the concreteness o f human experience. This, he was convinced, 
also was characteristic o f the Socratic pursuit o f truth. It is in this sense that ontological
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phenomenology, meaning primarily the insights o f Husserl and Heidegger taken
together, is inherently linked to the world o f  ancient philosophy. As he explains it.
Phenomenology left the greater part o f the whole modem tradition 
behind, but this ontological phenomenology goes to the very beginnings 
o f our European tradition o f thought, because it shows that ancient 
philosophy is already ontology which hinges on the problem o f truth — 
but this was not taken sufficiently deeply by it.33
Jan Patocka sought to pursue phenomenology in a different way than did either Husserl
or Heidegger. He called it a process of doing phenomenology over again from its very
roots.34
This is not meant to imply that Patodka ignored the method o f phenomenology 
which Husserl elaborated in his earlier work — to the contrary. Patocka wrote 
extensively on Husserl and took his early work with the utmost seriousness. His 
numerous publications and scripta on this topic stand by themselves within the narrower 
field of phenomenological studies. A thorough examination of these texts, however, is 
beyond the scope of this study. Here I must be content with only a brief overview o f his 
critique of Husserl, and that primarily within the scope of the broader theme: the degree 
to which Patocka’s phenomenology is a form o f political philosophy.
The Critique of Husserl and the Concept o f the “World as a Whole”
The phenomenologist Erazim Kohak has characterized Jan Patocka’s 
Introduction to Husserl s Phenomenology as a “major philosophical achievement.”35 
This book, also derived from a lecture series delivered at Charles University at the end 
o f the 1960’s, is, as Kohak points out, more o f an in-depth interpretation o f Husserl than 
an introduction. In it, Patodka offers a detailed review and critique of the methods o f
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Husserlian phenomenology; in his other lecture series o f that time, Body, Community, 
Language, World, he presents an outline o f his own revision of that phenomenology. Of 
the elements of phenomenology Patodka chooses to revise or reconceive, none are more 
central than the concepts o f the “natural world” and the “world as a whole.”36
Patocka’s first philosophical work, presented in 1936 for habitation as full 
University Professor and entitled “The Natural World as a Philosophical Problem,” 
began with the following sentence: “The problem o f philosophy is the world as a 
whole.”37 This question of the world does not concern the physical world, the planet, but 
rather the whole that is the context and constant background of our lives and experience. 
The question of our understanding and relationship to this whole is key to the 
philosophical undertaking, for no human action or experience can take place absent the 
world. Following Husserl, Patodka was convinced that “[o]ur individual experience 
always presupposes a context preceding it.”38 This context, this prior whole, determines 
the meaningfulness of the particularities which are contained within it, for particulars 
become meaningful only in the context o f the whole which defines them.39 What 
Patodka calls the “world as a whole” is a  concept crucial to phenomenological 
philosophy. His conception of this world, however, is distinctly different from 
Husserl’s. To get at the heart o f this difference, and to grasp Patodka’s understanding of 
our perception of the world, I must first review certain elements o f Husserl’s 
understanding. Here Erazim Kohak’s explanation in his “Philosophical Biography” is 
helpful.
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For both Husserl and Patocka, human perception is more than the mere noting of 
particulars with which we come into daily contact. When we perceive an object, we may 
do so not merely as we see it, from one side or from a certain angle, but as we know it 
to be. We also perceive it categorially, as a complete whole and an invariant structure 
greater than the limited access of our particular perspective — this is something Husserl 
refers to as ‘'eidetic intuition” and Patodka translates as “perception of the universal.”40 
In effect, then, we are able to perceive more than is actually present before us. Patocka 
describes this experience when he writes that “far more is present to me as real than 
what is actually given: whatever stands in some relation to the self-given is also actual. 
Things beyond our senses are present to us.”41 For Patodka, significantly, the perception 
of things “beyond our senses” is not an abstraction. Such things are also experiential, 
they are actual. We are not limited to that which is directly given in our ability to 
perceive reality.
Husserl’s approach to our experience of objects as reality focuses on the act of 
experiencing in the human consciousness, the mode in which the object is given to us in 
consciousness. As we consider objects, we can never forget that we are experiencing 
them in a particular, perspectival manner. Husserl concludes from this that, in fact, no 
objects are truly independent of our experiencing of them in our consciousness. The 
very existence of objects, and of the world itself, is relative to the positing of them by 
the subjective consciousness. This, in simplified form, is the achievement of Husserl’s 
early work: the grounding of objectivity in the subject.42 Husserl is seeking to 
demonstrate with his phenomenology “that the objectivity of the object is thinkable only
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if  we start out from the subjectivity o f the subject.”43 It is here that Pato£ka centers his
critique of Husserlian phenomenology.
For Husserl, not only are individual objects of perception grounded in the
subject’s relation to them, so also is the collective totality of those objects — the world.
As Kohak explains, “the world o f material objects [in Husserl] is no more than a
product of acts of synthesis of perspectival views, and so always dubitable, contingent,
not absolute.”44 For Patocka, however, this is entirely insufficient; not only the objects
o f the world but also the world as a whole are indubitably actual and irreducible to
subjective consciousness. While Patodka agrees with Husserl that the world should be
understood not metaphysically but phenomenologically, -- as “a phenomenologically
given universal rather than a constructed, abstract one”45 -- he is unable to accept
Husserl’s derivation of that universal from human subjectivity. Pato£ka recognizes the
world as a whole as fundamentally autonomous, as an element of reality with which the
human being must interact in a dialectical relationship. Whereas with Husserl the drama
o f perception proceeds within the human consciousness, for Patocka we must admit to a
certain autonomy for the world as a whole which precedes the particularities o f
perception. The world itself can never be perceived as a particular, it exists via a
nonperceptual givenness that is itself a condition for the perception of particulars. The
recognition of the world as a whole is also a condition for a type of human action that
bases itself, not upon the particular needs o f a given moment, but upon the overall
situation of human being within the cosmos. As he describes it:
The nonperceptual, prevenient givenness of the whole is then the basis o f 
special modes o f human comportment not directed at particulars, at the
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resolution o f particular situations or at one-sidedly oriented measures 
within the world, but o f modes in which man comports himself with 
respect to the whole as such.46
These modes of comportment, as we shall see, are essential to the conduct of life in
philosophical and political truthfulness — what Pato£ka calls “life in truth.”
Patodka thus borrows from Husserl’s original conceptualization of the world as a
phenomenologically given universal, but rejects the reduction o f that world to the
subjective consciousness. Pato£ka’s construction is less a matter o f pure
phenomenology in the Husserlian sense, and more relative to a broader, philosophical
perspective on the situation of man in his concrete context, his culture, his community,
his history. Yet Patodka remains committed to avoiding the trap o f abstracting a world,
he wishes to proceed phenomenologically. He also wishes, as we have seen, to proceed
asubjectively, that is, to avoid Husserl’s reliance on subjectivity as the ultimate “ground
of certainty.”47 What, then, of the concept o f the “world as a whole”? How is it
delimited, and how does it use phenomenology to avoid a fall into abstract
metaphysics?
In the early chapters of Body, Community, Language, World, Pato£ka offers a 
description of the world o f humans that differentiates further, beyond the simplicity of 
the world as a basic “context.” In fact, the context description is seen to be more 
appropriate for animals than for humans. Animals live in immediate relation to their 
context, to what interests and affects them immediately. Humans, by contrast, 
constantly place themselves into situations beyond the immediately given -- they project 
into the past, the future, into imagination, into possibility. They do this, however,
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without escaping from their corporeal situation in the present. “For us humans, what is 
immediately present in each moment is also a focus of other possibilities, of partial 
worlds and so on. What is characteristic o f us is our variety of possibilities, a freedom 
from the present, from the immediately given.”48 Human orientation is not limited to its 
immediate context, as it is for animals. Our living, Patodka writes, with its ability to 
transcend the immediate, is a living in a world, not simply a context. In our experience, 
the human world is not a subjective entity; it is autonomous and concrete. Yet this does 
not imply that it is limited to our immediately given physical context. The world is both 
a concrete reality and the setting for our projection into possibility beyond the 
limitations of the given.
Although the whole is conceived as a unity it is necessary that there exist variety 
within it, a variety o f different landscapes within which the human being can project 
himself and pursue possibilities. Patocka designates these landscapes using the 
phenomenological concept, or metaphor, of “horizons.”49 They represent a way in which 
the unity of the whole is preserved while permitting the exploration of particular 
possibilities, of variety, within it. The horizon, as Pato£ka defines it, “is something that 
circumscribes all the particulars o f a given landscape, its visual part, but transcends it.”50 
It is that which we cannot see yet know to be present at the edges o f that which we can 
see — the ultimate context o f our perceptual landscape. It is the presence o f that which is 
not directly present before us, but which is only anticipated, suggested by experience.51
Human beings do not live only among things immediately present before them. 
They also live in horizons, “amid possibilities as if they were realities.” The essence of
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life in horizons is the fact that such a life is not directed inwardly, but outwardly. Man 
does not live inwardly, directed towards himself; instead, he aims outwardly, towards 
horizons, towards possibility and, as Pato£ka wants to emphasize, towards the world. To 
live in this way, to live in horizons, is to “broaden actuality immensely,” and it is 
“typically human.”52 Horizons, which demarcate the particular landscapes of the world, 
do not imply an escape into a metaphysically transcendent reality. To the contrary, they 
point to our living, not in ourselves, but among things — they point towards our living in 
the world. “The projection into the world never ceases, we never live in ourselves, we 
always live among things, there where our work is, living in horizons outside ourselves, 
not within.”53
With his explication of human consciousness as horizonal, o f humans as beings 
that project outwards from themselves into the world and its possibilities, Patocka is 
beginning to sketch out his revision o f phenomenology. Already, the direction of this 
revision is clear. It is directed towards the concrete and experiential elements of human 
life and action in concreto, in the world. The thrust of PatoCka’s critique is to suggest 
that philosophy, if it hopes to remain consistent with experience, cannot avoid the 
fundamental situatedness of humans within a concrete world and, as we shall see, a 
concrete community. It is what Erazim Kohak has demarcated as potentially Patodka’s 
“great contribution to phenomenology”: the recognition of what Patocka termed the 
“hardness of reality.”54 The movement indicated here is from philosophy as a theoretical 
venture towards philosophy in the concrete context of human life in the world, of 
human political life.
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It remains to consider, however, the concept of the world as Pato£ka presents it. 
In what way is it to be understood, if neither as an objective entity nor an abstract 
metaphysical construction. PatoCka’s explanation is phenomenological; the world can 
be described only as it manifests itself to us. This is to say that it cannot be described as 
a “thing.” It appears, rather, as a framework, anticipated as a whole, and “in this 
anticipation it is not given as a  reality, it does not appear, it is not itself a phenomenon: 
it is what phenomenalizes.”55 In this sense it can be understood neither as a reality 
relative to my subjectivity, nor as objective reality — it is rather in the form o f an 
interval, something “in-between” the two that “cannot be understood in terms o f things 
themselves.”56
In the final analysis, the whole will resist concrete definition because it does not 
manifest itself as a thing whose limits or boundaries are able to be firmly grasped. The 
whole as Patocka wishes to express it is the reality o f our being, and as such is only 
available to us in glimpses, in particulars. “Reality is never revealed to us as a whole,” 
Patocka writes. “In understanding the whole we encounter particulars but the 
understanding of the whole, o f being, conceals itself in understanding particulars.”57 
Patocka’s conception of being, here, is inherently connected to human striving within 
the world and influenced, as we shall see, by Heidegger. Thus the limitations of the 
Husserlian framework are, in the end, dissatisfying. Husserl’s approach by means o f the 
phenomenological reduction is overly speculative, rather than reflective.58 For Patocka, 
human striving within the world is grounded in the “vital act” o f reflection; human
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existence is “an existence on the way to itself, seeking itself, understanding itself, that
is, understanding its possibilities.”59
Understood in this way, the Husserlian reduction is less relevant, while the
concept of the whole becomes even more important. The whole is the context of this
human striving; it is, in a sense, its foundation. Though it cannot be wholly grasped
analytically, it clearly exists experientially, as the foundational constant supporting the
myriad possibilities and directions o f human lives. Patodka goes so far as to say that it
provides us with an “objectival meaning,” though, he would wish to be clear, not in the
metaphysical sense of a supreme being or Idea:
Even though we might not be able to analyze the structure of this 
antecedent whole, set it clearly before us, it is present in the functioning 
references, in the phases of dealing with things. It leads us from moment 
to moment, it allows us to deal with the same, to have before us an 
objectival meaning constant in diverse operations (emphasis mine).60
Here the whole is understood in terms o f its ontological significance: it is the necessary
backdrop for our individual reality. The diverse operations which individuate us and
through which we come to understand reality are united in their common participation
in the whole. Humans belong to this whole, but in a special mode, that of human beings,
who are uniquely capable of comprehending the presence of the whole that is the
backdrop of their existence and of relating to it in our actions and understanding o f
particulars. This is in fact definitive o f our being as humans:
It means that humans by their living single themselves out of the whole 
in an explicit relation to it and that their most intrinsically human 
possibility -- that of existing in a human way -- lies in their 
understanding this specific trait, that humans are capable of encountering 
being as things are not.61
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In this relation to the whole, this “openness” to being, lies our essential humanity and 
the font of our ability to pursue possibility.
Patocka has replicated, to some degree, an ancient conception o f humanity as 
existing within a cosmos-like62 whole comprehensible in its order though not graspable 
in its entirety. We exist within it as individual beings, united in our singular ability to 
grasp the uniqueness of our situation, and defined as human by our pursuit of such 
understanding, by our vital reflection. Though the conception of the whole is by no 
means new, Patofika pursues an approach to it that can justifiably claim to be. It is an 
approach grounded in phenomenological experience, pursued not along the lines of 
Husserlian subjectivism, but rather with an emphasis on our concrete surrounding -- the 
world, both in its particularites and as a whole. The world as a whole is not an objective 
entity. It does, however, exist as an experiential constant in human life. In this sense it 
can be said to make up part of the ground of human existence. It is not a metaphysical 
foundation for human life, however, for it is neither posited as an objective entity nor as 
an ethical guide-post for our human decision-making. Patocka wishes, above all, to 
avoid constructing a foundation in metaphysics. The question of ethics and 
decision-making is a relevant one, however, and demands exploration. The concluding 
chapters of this study, therefore, shall explicitly explore the questions o f ethics and 
politics and their relation to the theme of the “world as a whole” as a non-metaphysical 
ground for a life of praxis.
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The “Natural” World 
Whereas most phenomenologists seem to focus on Husserl’s earlier, explicitly 
phenomenological work, I have already noted that it was the concerns of the later 
Husserl that most strongly influenced Patocka, namely, the themes o f the Crisis texts. In 
these writings, Husserl aimed towards a resuscitation o f European rationalism by 
turning back to the very beginnings o f that rationalism: to the pretheoretical “natural 
attitude” of what he called the Lebenswelt, or life-world, and to the development o f the 
“theoretical attitude” in philosophical thought. Understanding the life-world was crucial 
to the task of recovery from the “crisis” wrought by the progressive and unreflective 
domination of the methods o f natural science over human life. Patoika’s interest in a 
life-world, or what he called the “natural” world, stemmed from these sources in 
Husserl.63 As Patocka put it in his 1967 article, “The ‘Natural’ World and 
Phenomenology,” the philosophical concern with the “natural” world “is the effort to 
render problematic once more the unquestioned way in which we are governed by the 
metaphysics of science and technology (or, better, of technoscience). The purpose of 
that problematization o f the obvious is to liberate our vision.”64
For Husserl, the life-world was something of an abstract conceptualization. It 
was the “pregiven world,” the world in which objects were “straightforwardly intuited”; 
it was the world as it would have been prior to the arrival o f science.65 Patodka once 
again appreciated Husserl’s insight, but felt that the concept as it was worked out was 
untenable. He spent a considerable amount o f time on the idea o f the “natural” world, 
both in his early work (e.g., in his habilitation thesis) and again in the last decade o f his
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life. Patocka lays out the details o f his revision o f the “natural” world in two articles 
from his later period, “Edmund Husserl’s Philosophy o f the Crisis of the Sciences and 
His Conception o f a Phenomenology o f the ‘Life-World,’” his Warsaw Lecture from 
1971, and “The ‘Natural’ World and Phenomenology” from 1967.
The thrust o f Patoika’s critique of the life-world follows the pattern o f his other 
critique. Husserl’s conception is overly theoretical, divorced from the tactile realities of 
human existence in the world. Husserl conceives of his life-world in terms of pure 
intuition o f objects while Patoika sees it as the setting for human life in its 
concreteness, in its activity.66 In his Warsaw Lecture, Patodka refers to Husserl’s 
concept as a form of “phenomenological metaphysics” that is “in the end 
disappointing.” It is, he continues, conceived as “a product of the common 
achievements (Leistungen) of subjectivities for whom this world is nothing but a 
commmon link devoid o f any genuine substantiality.”67 A conceptualization o f this kind 
might, he admits, be appropriate as a means o f analyzing certain aspects o f scientific 
inquiry. But what o f actual human practice, of, for example, human politics and life in 
community? Can a Husserlian subjectivity “show us a positive way for reason to follow 
so that it could found not only a new science or a new foundation for science, but a 
genuine human praxis?”68 To this end, PatoCka is convinced, is required a more human 
conception o f the “natural” world, a conception grounded in the world in which we live.
The problem with Husserl’s life-world is that it is abstractly posited as a 
quasi-metaphysical entity, a site independent o f the “historical contingencies” of human 
development. Patocka, however, is clear to recognize that man is at all times an
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historical being, even in those cases where he chooses to act ahistorically. The thematic
exploration o f the “natural” world in Patodka’s work is not to be understood as a search
for a hypothetical “state o f nature,” but rather for the mode of self-understanding that
governs when we live simply and without reflection. It is not a search for humanity
prior to or abstracted from civilization, but simply prior to the development of
self-reflective theory, of self-interpretation as the basis for community. The “natural”
world reflects the most elemental movement of human existence; it is a cornerstone of
our self-understanding.
For Patodka, this must be a w'orld of an active order, a world in which one could
say that humans live. This is the crux of his disagreement with Husserl. As he explains
it in his Warsaw Lecture, Husserl’s life-world focuses on the “perception” or
“observation” of objects by intuition;69 the fundamental concept is that o f perception.
For Patocka, however, the world as an active order is centered more around an “I can”
than an “I perceive.” It is based on this understanding that the ‘natural’ world can
justifiably be called a world o f good (and of evil.) Experientially, the world comes to us
in these terms, not in terms of intuition o f objects.70
From this viewpoint, the “natural” world can be understood entirely 
naturally: it is a world where we can live, live in a community in which 
we can find a place and be accepted, enjoying the protection which 
enables us to take on the concrete tasks o f defense and of struggle against 
what threatens us in the context o f humans and of things alike. It is the 
world of embodied living beings who work and struggle, who approach 
each other and draw back, living in mutual respect; who communicate 
with the world of others by word and understanding; who relate to this 
existence in its totality and so also to the world as such.71
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With this analysis, PatoCka transforms the Husserlian “natural” world from an 
abstraction into a concrete conceptualization of a basic, pre-reflective mode o f human 
existence that can be applied to human history. Pato£ka’s view o f the “natural” world 
becomes, as we shall see, a key component of his phenomenology of three human 
“movements” as well as his philosophy o f history.
The Influence of Heidegger 
The significant influence of the the work of Martin Heidegger upon Patocka’s 
philosophy is undeniable. Though his association with Heidegger was negligible — he 
attended a few of his lectures in Freiburg in 1933, but never studied directly under him 
— Patocka felt that the German philosopher’s ontological perspective was one o f the 
great accomplishments of the twentieth century. The controversy surrounding 
Heidegger’s politics has doubtlessly contributed to the eagerness with which many 
interpreters of twentieth century philosophy make use of the labels “Heideggerean” or 
“anti-Heideggerean” in describing contemporary philosophy. This tendency is certainly 
present in interpretive work on Patocka, whose texts are replete with Heideggerean 
concepts. Analysts seem to consider it o f the highest importance to demonstrate that 
Patocka either is or is not a Heideggerean thinker.72 As I argue in my review of the 
literature (see Appendix), however, this approach is not helpful if you want a genuine 
understanding o f this material. Pato£ka is a student o f both Husserl and Heidegger who 
draws on many of their conceptualizations; yet he is also a critic in both cases, making it 
inaccurate to label him simply a Husserlian or a Heideggerean thinker. In this study I 
start from the assumption that he is neither “type” o f thinker, but an independent mind
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whose variations on the themes of German phenomenological and ontological 
philosophy take it in an innovative direction.
As is the case with Husserl, Patodka’s critique o f Heidegger leads toward a 
self-understanding of human existence as political existence, as solidly grounded in the 
concreteness o f life in the world and in community. It is, as PatoCka makes clear, a 
critique arising from the contention that Heidegger’s philosophy is not fully appropriate 
to an understanding of man in his concrete, corporeal existence — an existence that 
relates not only to his self-understanding, but also to the concrete realities o f his body, 
his community, his language, and his world. It is only this broader understanding, which 
does not sunder but rather emphasizes its ties to classical Greek philosophy, that will 
enable the development o f a conception o f man relative to his pursuit o f Life in a 
community, a polis.
The previous paragraph notwithstanding, it is clear that Pato£ka felt that the 
insights o f Heidegger’s ontological philosophy were essential, although perhaps not 
entirely sufficient, to the development of a philosophical understanding o f  the existence 
of “concrete humans in their corporeal world.”73 In many crucial respects, they proved 
for him far more appropriate than Husserl’s work towards the development o f this 
understanding. Not the least o f those respects was the emphasis Heidegger placed on the 
importance o f history, and the role o f freedom and responsibility therein. Pato£ka also 
considered history to be essential to the proper pursuit o f phenomenological analysis. It 
was evident to him in this regard that Husserlian methodology was insufficient, reliant 
as it was on the concept o f an ahistorical, disinterested spectator (as the locus o f
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perception).74 Heidegger, however, rejected Husserl’s ahistorical subjectivity and 
concerned himself instead with the relationship o f man to his being, an inherently 
historical relationship that manifests itself in human freedom and responsibility. As 
Patocka put it in his Heretical Essays on the Philosophy o f  History, explaining his 
preference for Heidegger over Husserl in this regard: “Heidegger is a philosopher o f the 
primacy o f freedom and in his view history is not a drama which unfolds before our 
eyes but a responsible realization o f the relation which humans are. History is not a 
perception but a responsibility.”75 Here, but not only here, the historico-ontological 
work of Heidegger was to provide for Patocka a means of getting closer to his goal of 
understanding human existence not in the abstract, but in the concrete.
Primarily, however, it was the above-mentioned relationship of man to his own 
being, as Heidegger pursued and elucidated it, that most captured and held Patodka’s 
attention. Patocka’s movement in the direction o f Heideggerean ontology cannot 
accurately be traced chronologically. Though his use of language inspired by Heidegger 
is more apparent at certain times than at others, his overall concern is to integrate it with 
his work on themes drawn from Husserl. To charge to the contrary -- that Patocka’s 
philosophy is at certain times Heideggerean, at others Husserlian or humanist — is 
effectively to deny that Pato£ka has a philosophical direction independent o f his two 
teachers.76 But Patodka does pursue such an independent direction, and he consciously 
attempts, not a synthesis o f the two thinkers, a straightforward combination of their 
work, but an interpretative variation that will stand apart from the work o f either 
German philosopher. Thus there is no trepidation in admixing Heideggerean concepts
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into a Husserlian phenomenological framework. Judged strictly from the perspective of 
either of the two elder philosophers, this attempt may seem at times untenable. But to 
appraise in this manner is to fail to appreciate the Czech philosopher’s attempt at a 
unique perspective — one informed by a radically different set o f cultural and political 
circumstances than in the case o f Husserl or Heidegger.
The Ontological Insight 
It is in his series of university lectures from the 1970s entitled Body, Community, 
Language, World that Jan Patodka makes his most concerted effort to elaborate an 
original interpretation of phenomenological philosophy. It is an interpretation that, as 
we shall see, is specifically directed towards an application to the human, or social, 
sciences. To this purpose, the ontological insight of Heidegger, the sense that man is 
‘interested” in his own being and, in fact, accomplishes that being rather than simply 
lives it, is an essential component. This insight forms the core o f a perspective on 
human existence as an activity rather than as an entity or thing. For Heidegger, the 
fundamental question o f philosophy is the ontological question, the question of our 
being. Humanity is uniquely constituted in that it alone takes an interest in its own 
being, and it is this phenomenon that prompts the revival of the ontological question 
originally asked by the pre-Socratic philosophers. This non-indifference to our own 
being, as Patocka explains in his Heretical Essays, is thus both the starting point and the 
condition for understanding the phenomenon o f being; it is the condition for “the right 
understanding o f the significance of phenomenology in general.”77
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A proper phenomenological approach to human existence, then, requires an
appreciation for its interestedness, for the fact that it does not act objectively, but
interestedly. As PatoCka puts it in Body, Community, Language, World:
Such a being [as man], concerned with its own being, cannot in principle 
be grasped in its distinctiveness by observation. A mere observing look 
can never capture this active nature o f our being for ourselves, its 
interestedness, its interest in itself.78
Implicit here is a prioritization o f this aspect o f the Heideggerean approach over the
Husserlian approach, and Pato£ka borrows explicitly here from Being and Time to do
so.79 He reiterates the basic Heideggerean standpoint when he asks whether “human
experience by its very nature [is] something essentially different from what can be given
in object experience? That is a question which Husserl never raised.”80 We can come to
understand our own being, not through object experience, but only through an
examination o f how we live that being, how we create it. “[LJiving means
accomplishing our being. So it is not the case that we first are and then do something;
our being takes place entirely in that doing.”81 Our mode of access to being is thus
relative to the way in which we live, not merely to the way in which we understand
ourselves theoretically.
It is evident that Patodka is not satisfied with the theoretical posture of a
“disinterested spectator,” and Heidegger is helpful in this regard. The theoretical nature
of Husserl’s work and his background in mathematics and Cartesianism make his
methodology suitable to a philosophical foundation for the hard sciences. Patocka,
however, is interested in a philosophical foundation for the social sciences, including
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politics, and to this end the ontological themes of Heidegger are invaluable. An
approach to the social sciences cannot rest on the empirical, on the simply observable:
Husserl's phenomenology would do as a philosophical foundation for the 
natural sciences.... Social sciences, though are sciences because they 
uncover something about personal and social reality that we cannot learn 
by simple introspection. Social sciences normally appeal to mere 
empirical data. However, they need also a philosophical foundation in 
order to locate their fundamental problem.82
The study o f humanity, the subject o f the social sciences, is not marked by the clarity
which the empiricist assumes. Human being, human existence in the world, is not a
clear and transparent phenomenon, and this represents a problem for those who would
study it.
The problem itself arises in the human disciplines as we penetrate to a certain 
aspect of ourself which is clear to us in one sense and not in another. For that 
reason, for all social sciences, the point at which they become genuine sciences 
is penetration through self-illusions, self-deceptions, our idols of ourselves. 
Providing a philosophical foundation for actual human scientific disciplines 
demands that we find access to this situation, not an empirical but a 
foundational, justifying one.83
It is by a phenomenological philosophy, founded not upon Cartesian principles but upon
ontology and geared towards an understanding of human movement in the world, that
Patocka hopes to penetrate through the delusions that confound our scientific attempts
to grasp social and political reality. One of the greatest of those delusions is the belief
that man is an objective creature whose motivating impulses are clearly evident in his
outward bearing. It was Heidegger rather than Husserl who resisted this presumption,
arguing that there is an element of “concealment” that must be considered. By taking up
this phenomenon thematically, Heidegger's work had an advantage over Husserl's and
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so became a model for Pato£ka’s pursuit. “In virtue of that,” PatoCka wrote, Heidegger’s 
phenomenology “can become the philosophical foundation o f human science.”84
The subject o f Patodka’s debt to and interpretation of Heidegger is a vast one. 
The present work must limit itself to a few, basic points. Patodka is convinced that 
human existence requires consideration of the human’s interaction with his world, the 
things in it, and the multitude of possibilities created by that interaction. This interaction 
is definitive o f not only man’s life, but also his very being. The being of humans, which 
Heidegger denotes as Daseirt, is distinquished from other beings not only because it 
takes a thematic interest it itself, in its own being, but also because it is self-constitutive 
via its pursuit of the possibilities open to it. Pato£ka seeks to explore the possibilities of 
human being in a way that is concrete, and not speculative or abstract. As he put it, 
“When Heidegger says that existence is something that in its very being relates to its 
being, it sounds metaphysical and speculative. We shall show, however, that it is 
something that can be exhibited descriptively.”85 This is PatoSka’s task in regard to 
Heidegger’s philosophy, and also his challenge generally.
Patoika proceeds in this manner in his interpretation o f both Husserl and 
Heidegger, taking philosophical constructs and judging their validity against the 
experience of human beings living in a historical world. In this sense Patocka explicates 
his philosophy in a different way than did either of the two German philosophers -- the 
specter of the concreteness o f our lives, o f the world and its objects, o f human relations 
and politics, is always present.
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Finitude and Other Heideggerean Themes
Patocka appears directly to follow Heidegger nowhere more explicitly than in
his focus on the essential finitude of human life. The Heideggerean notion of finitude, of
“being-towards-death,”86 is a central theme in Patodka’s writings. As Patodka uses it,
however, it takes on a different significance; the resulting concept is one applicable, not
only to the self-understanding of the existential individual, but also to the community,
to actual political and historical life.
Patocka was strongly influenced by what he called Heidegger’s
“phenomenology o f finitude.” In contrast to Husserl, in whom even the finitude of our
relation to the world can be suspended, the Heideggerean view claims that finitude
“penetrate [s] the very content of our being so deeply that it constitutes the fundamental
content o f our being in all its moments and expressions.”87 It is not simply that humans
are finite, for all living beings share that trait; it is rather in our awareness o f and
relation to our own death that humans exhibit a certain uniqueness. We have noted that
Patocka has set for himself the task of exhibiting phenomenological and ontological
concepts descriptively and experientially. This requires that he discuss them in terms of
their effect on human life. He does this with the concept of finitude in his Body,
Community, Language, World lectures:
Finitude is not easily described though we can say what must belong to 
it. Human beings are always threatened; in all their acts they deal with 
their limitations. Humans are not delimited like stones or like animals 
who are not aware o f their own perishing, humans know their limitations, 
are constantly relating to their own finitude as to their own being, caring 
for and looking after their needs.88
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Our awareness o f our finitude, and our acceptance o f it, directly colors our pursuit o f the 
activities and possibilities o f life. Heidegger even grounded the definitive activity of 
reflection in the finitude of being human.89
The crucial element in Patocka’s application o f this concept to social being is his 
contention that the Heideggerean stress on finitude shares something with the Platonic 
melete thanatou, the “learning to die” of the Phaedo. That sense is grounded in the 
notion that, in order to care for life, to live authentically, one must care for death and not 
attempt to evade it. In Heidegger, Pato£ka finds particularly relevant the discussion o f 
the attitude o f “everydayness” that characterizes “they” who effectively deny the 
certainty o f death. Denying death, o f course, is tantamount to fleeing from it; the 
Platonic philosopher, in contrast, “overcame death fundamentally by not fleeing from it 
but by facing up to it. This philosophy was melete thanatou, care for death; care for the 
soul is inseparable from care for death which becomes the true care for life.90 The 
Platonic conception o f “care for the soul” as the base component of the truthful life, is 
thereby brought into direct relation to the insight o f Heidegger. Patocka places the 
Socratic “care for the soul” on the same page with Heidegger’s “being-towards-death.”
In doing so, he brings Heidegger into contact with the Platonic focus on the construction 
of community.
This merging o f two conceptions o f finitude does not exhaust Patocka’s use of 
the theme, nor his application of it beyond the limits o f the Heideggerean analysis. In 
his Heretical Essays, Patodka makes the theme central to his analysis o f the politics of 
war that is prevalent in the twentieth century. Here, in the final chapter entitled “Wars o f
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the Twentieth Century and the Twentieth Century as War,” the near-continual warfare 
of the first half o f this century is analyzed in terms o f finitude. Resistance to human 
finitude, in the form o f the promise that victory in war will protect us from death, 
becomes a means to justify ideological warfare. Life becomes the highest value, so 
much so that humans are objectified and their deaths rendered anonymous in its pursuit. 
The target here is political ideology, the systematization of life in the name of an idea, 
as, for example, the idea that mere life is more significant than free life. The refusal to 
face death, to care for it, to understand its function as a pole o f life that is essential in 
determining our finiteness, all o f this Patocka finds immediately present in the political 
conflagrations of the twentieth century. A solution to these crises, as with the crisis of 
modem science noted by Husserl, lies in the ability to see human life as a whole, and 
that requires a recognition o f death as the ultimate possibility o f that life. As he explains 
it, “we relate to death as the ultimate possibility, the possibility o f a radical 
impossibility of being. That impossibility casts a shadow over our whole life yet at the 
same time makes it possible, enables it to be a whole.''’ Relating to death “does not mean 
thinking about death. It means, rather, rejecting that way of life which would live at any 
price and takes mere life as its measure.”91 Patocka’s explication o f finitude has laid a 
Platonic stress upon a Heideggeran theme and applied it directly to human social being, 
exhibiting its effect descriptively, in terms of its concrete effect upon human life.
The theme o f finitude has been examined in some detail because it is a 
Heideggerean theme that is fundamental to Patocka’s work, and also because it is 
representative of the way in which the Czech philosopher applies the work of
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Heidegger. The use o f Heideggerean themes, however, is determined by the fact that 
Patocka is not, in the end, a Heideggerean thinker. Pato£ka’s critique o f Heidegger is 
exemplified by the fact that, while the Czech strongly felt the intimate connection 
between philosophy and politics, Heidegger, at least after his disastrous foray into 
politics in the 1930s, completely abandoned it. Before examining the basis of this 
critique in more detail, let me first note a few of the other Patockan themes that draw 
from Heidegger.
PatoCka makes use of another central theme in Being and Time when he speaks 
of “care.” For Heidegger, the notion of “care” (Sorge) is definitive of the being of 
Dasein and implies a concern and solicitude in terms o f our relations to beings in the 
world.92 Patocka embraces the Heideggerean analysis, but attempts to add to it the sense 
of care present in the Socratic dialogues — that of caring for the soul by nurturing it and 
attuning it towards the eternal. Implied in the Socratic version is the necessity of choice 
— the individual choice of whether to pursue care for the soul or whether to deny it. Yet 
Patocka is not consciously abandoning the Heideggerean for the Socratic here, he feels 
that the two concepts are related. Heidegger’s use of care, as Jacques Derrida has noted, 
certainly invokes, as Patocka contends, something of the concern and solicitude 
signified by the Platonic melete thanatou.93
In appealing to the Socratic sense o f care, Patocka is nevertheless trying to 
remain faithful to another Heideggerean theme, the critique of metaphysics. Socrates, as 
he argues in the essay “Negative Platonism,” which I will discuss shortly, acts in such a 
way as to reject metaphysical knowledge, even as he speaks in metaphysical symbols.
62
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Pato£ka is with Heidegger in excluding metaphysics, but he does not agree to exclude 
the wisdom o f Socrates in the process. Other Heideggerean themes figuring in Patocka’s 
philosophy include the question o f the essence of technology -- directly related for 
Patocka to the dominance of metaphysics over Western civilization — and the 
Heraclitian notion o f conflict, or polemos, as not only a unifying factor in human 
existence, but one with a certain ontological priority. With each of these themes,
Patocka draws directly upon Heidegger. Yet in each case, the emphasis and application 
is distinctly different, pointing to a political philosophy that is primarily concerned with 
human being, not in existential abstraction, but in the concrete context o f life with other 
beings, life in community.
The Critique of Heidegger
To complete this overview o f the importance of Heidegger to the thought of Jan
Patocka, it is necessary to clarify what so far has only been implied -- the critique of
Heidegger in Pato£ka’s work. Although Pato£ka makes significant use o f concepts
pioneered by Heidegger, he does so with a view towards a quite different picture of
human existence. He questions openly, in fact, whether the “fundamental ontology” of
Heidegger is, in itself, appropriate to that which Patocka seeks: an understanding of
man in his relations to community and history. He asks, in his essay “Cartesianism and
Phenomenology,” whether the Heideggerean approach to human existence via an
exploration o f Daseirt, is “also adequate to serving as an ontological projection of a
science or sciences o f man?” “Certainly,” he continues,
a fundamental ontology makes possible an understanding o f human life 
both in its fall into nonhumanity and in its moral outreach; but is what it
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offers a sufficient basis for a philosophy o f man in community, in 
language and custom, in his essential generativeness, his tradition, and 
his historicity?94
Patocka concludes that, in and of itself, it is not. Though Heidegger took the
philosophical study o f humanity in directions previously unexplored by modem
thinkers, there is nonetheless a sense o f reductiveness in his work. He is so deeply
immersed in ontology that the experience o f humans in the world is often eclipsed. This
perception is summarized succinctly in a short essay entitled simply “Heidegger,” in
which the respective faults of both Heidegger and Husserl are compared.
Perhaps it’s possible to say that Heidegger’s philosophy suffers from the 
opposite sickness than the philosophy of Husserl. The latter lacked the 
understanding of the ontological sphere, it was however able to analyze 
the mass o f ontic phenomena, which revived great interest in psychology, 
sociology, etc. of the post-war period. Heidegger’s philosophy 
distinguishes anew the ontological sphere, however it doesn’t find its 
way back to anthropology.95
For Patocka, an authentic philosophy of mankind must examine “all o f that to which 
human life has access,” all aspects of life given to humans in the form o f experience.96
Thus broadly characterized, I can briefly examine several specific points of 
contention with the Heideggerean focus, discussed in Pato£ka’s Body, Community, 
Language, World. In this work, Pato5ka stresses the need for phenomenology to take 
account of our corporeity, meaning not only the simple fact o f  our existing in a body, 
but also the connection it implies between humans and objects within and o f the world. 
This marks a point of contention with the Heidegger of Being and Time, for whom 
everything is centered in our relation to ourselves. “Existential philosophy, for instance 
the early Heidegger,” Pato£ka writes, “defines existence in terms of self-relatedness.”97
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It is an account that stresses our relation to our own being, rather than our relation to the 
things around us. Yet the things around us are inherently relative to our being. The 
simple fact that we exist in a corporeal body means that we relate to things, and that 
relation is not insignificant. It is, rather, analogous to our self-relation. Pato£ka explains 
as follows:
What is characteristic o f Heidegger’s analysis o f being in the world is 
how little space is devoted to the concrete phenomena involved, for 
instance to the phenomenon o f corporeity. Heidegger’s entire analysis 
takes place in the dimension o f the moral struggle o f humans for their 
own autonomy. Only by the way does Heidegger recognize that the 
struggling being is a corporeal one, without explicating it. Yet precisely 
in the course o f that explication does it become apparent that our relation 
to things is fully analogous to our self-relation, that it is a continuation of 
our life in the body. It is not something sharply different from the way 
we live in our body, relating to ourselves.98
Our relation to ourselves, our self-understanding as autonomous entities, therefore, is
not the sole factor that is constitutive o f our being. Because o f our corporeity and the
nature of our lives as played out in communities, we relate to other beings, both objects
and persons, and we relate to the world that is their context. These relations are part of
our being, they enable our successful self-relation. In order to actualize that
self-relation, Patoika writes, our personal being “must go round about through another
being. We relate to ourselves by relating to the other, to more and more things and
ultimately to the universe as such, so locating ourselves in the world.”99
This relating to the world and its contents is characteristic of all living beings,
even those who are not imbued with self-understanding. It is characteristic not only of
adult humans, but of children and o f animals as well — all relate to the world in a
similarly harmonious way; this is a fact o f their living. In Heidegger, however, the focus
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is exclusively laid on the mode o f self-understanding, as if it were exhaustive o f our 
existence. Here, Patodka argues, “Heidegger is leaving something out, setting it aside.
.. .the elementary protofact o f harmony with the world is the same for humans, children, 
animals. That can only mean that in human living not everything is given solely by 
understanding, as Heidegger would have it.”100 In the adult human the mode of 
understanding may be dominant; but this does not mean that the modes of humanity that 
are prior to understanding simply cease to be of importance. In fact, human activity may 
partake of different levels o f being, including the animal’s and the child’s prelinguistic 
mode, relating simply and directly to the world. “[0]ur human existence in a (working, 
pragmatic) world,” Patodka writes, “presupposes the existence o f the childish and of the 
animal-like within us.”101 The mode o f understanding pursued by Heidegger does not 
exhaust human reality. The direct relation to the world o f the child and the animal 
belongs to what Pato£ka calls the first movement of being human, and is contrasted with 
modes o f human movement through work and philosophy.
I have already noted that what is characteristic o f man is the variety o f 
possibilities present to him. The location of the self in the world, the world o f objects 
and the world of human beings, is largely determinative of the extent o f these 
possibilities. We become aware of our possibilities not as we delve deeper into 
ourselves, but as we become involved in something other than ourselves, as we interact 
with other beings. Our becoming involved in the world “is at the same time the 
movement in which we become embodied in something other than ourselves, become
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involved, become objective. This becoming involved in what originally we are not but 
what we become reveals our possibilities to us.”102
For Patoika, the realm o f our involvement with the world in this particular 
sense, that is, in the sense o f involvement with other beings and with the situations 
presented by this interaction, is the political realm. Our politics — our understanding and 
organization o f our relations with and among the community and our relations to the 
objects o f the community such as laws — can never be a matter o f indifference to the 
philosopher. Our being is, as Pato£ka notes, a “shared being,” and it is on this point that 
Heidegger’s analysis is insufficient: “ .. .for Heidegger the dimension of shared being 
(that the thrust toward the world always involves being with others) plays a minor role; 
it is mentioned but not adequately analyzed and made concrete.”103
The final point o f criticism has to do with the way in which Heidegger portrays 
our relation to the world. For PatoCka, it is a fundamentally positive relation. It is for us 
to understand, not to escape. And this, PatoCka notes, is distinctly different from the 
Heideggerean conception of our relation to the world as a “fall.”
Heidegger understands the relation o f existence as a fa ll into the world.
Existence must fight its way out o f the world, must be liberated from it 
by carrying out a certain ‘purification.’ The fall consists o f the important 
phenomenon that we fall into things, devote ourselves to them, and 
thereby objectify ourselves.... Liberation from the fall into the world is a 
liberation from this objectification, a return to existing in the strong 
sense, as distinct from mere being.104
The possibility o f  human objectification is real for Pato£ka as well, but he does not
consider it to be an inevitable result of our “fall into things.” Our existence in the world,
in human community, can be the source o f our self-understanding, not only o f our
67
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
self-alienation. “Herein our conception is fundamentally different” from Heidegger’s, 
PatoCka continues, “The relation of humans to the world is not negative in that way but 
rather positive, it is not a self-loss but the condition o f the possibility of 
self-discovery.”105 The thrust into the world is for humans the positive opening up of 
possibility, o f  the possibility for positive development, but also for negative alienation 
and distortion. Thus the proper understanding of human action in the world, via the 
human or social sciences, is directly relevant to our philosophical understanding o f our 
existence.
A Phenomenology of Movement
Beyond what has already been noted in the discussion o f Husserlian 
phenomenology, that is, the pursuit of an “asubjective” phenomenology with a focus on 
corporeity, Patodka makes his most original contribution to phenomenological 
philosophy by developing an understanding o f human existence in terms o f three 
movements. An approach to philosophy via movement is certainly nothing new,
Patofika admits, but two factors contribute to the uniqueness of this attempt. First, it is 
understood “independently of the dichotomy between subject and object,” and second, it 
represents an attempt to combine the Aristotelian concept of dynamis with the modem 
analysis of existence that understands life “as possibilities in a process of realization.” 
While the first factor refers to the insufficiency of modem attempts at interpreting 
human movement in objective terms as simple locomotion (the foundation o f 
technology), or in subjective terms via the psychological approach of Bergson; it is the 
second factor that reflects the core of Patodka’s philosophy.
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It is the focus on the corporeity o f our existence that leads Pato£ka to movement, 
for our awareness o f ourselves as bodily is an awareness o f our mobility. Our 
experience is that o f corporeal beings, and thus of beings in motion. We live in the
s
world by engaging with it, by involving ourselves and by realizing our possibilities 
through our actions. “We realize possibilities only by moving, by being physical. Every 
realization takes place ultimately through movement.”106 This understanding of human 
movement is not o f something that we carry out, that we choose to do when it suits us.
It is rather that we are movement, it defines us in the world. Like Aristotelian energeia, 
this movement “is a realization of remaining possibilities.”107
Pato£ka takes the Aristotelian conception of life as movement and the realization 
of potential as his starting point and inspiration, though he does not accept it 
unqualifiedly. It is Aristotle’s objectification o f movement, his “making it into 
something that requires an objective bearer to make its dynamic aspect possible,” that is 
problematic. The notion of an “unmoved object” presupposed in Aristotle’s account as 
the foundation for human movement and unity, is discarded by Pato£ka as 
metaphysical.108 Instead, the hope is to understand existence non-metaphysically. In this 
way Pato£ka is led again to Heidegger, and to the similarity between Aristotle’s 
dynamis as the realization of potentialities, and Heidegger’s view of life in terms of the 
realization o f possibilities. “Let us try to compare this Aristotelian conception of 
movement with the modem conception o f existence. Let us try to understand existence 
as a movement, from the standpoint of movement.”109 The key, as we have noted, is our 
“lived corporeity,” the notion that human life is a bodily existence as well as a noetic
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one. Life is a process that is integrated into the world itself; it is not only in the world, it 
is o f  the world. Heidegger’s understanding o f existence, therefore, does not exhaust the 
possibilities o f existence. “To understand existence as movement means to grasp 
humans as beings in and o f the world. They are beings that not only are in the world, as 
Heidegger tells us (in the sense of understanding the world), but rather are themselves a 
part of the world process.” ' 10
In addition to the notion of being as active and in motion, Patodka also adopts 
from Aristotle the conception of a hierarchy of being. This is the notion that being, 
understood and expressed in terms o f its activities, its motion, has a hierarchical 
structure, with activities such as comprehension, understanding and knowledge at the 
highest level. This is not to say that these represent the highest human values as such, 
but that their pursuit by humans is the highest form o f human activity, the most fully 
human activity. This insight is crucial to the diagram of human existence which Pato£ka 
presents -- one composed o f three movements or “vital lines” o f human life. These 
movements are arranged hierarchically, but not as a ladder o f values. Rather, all are 
movements in which humans participate naturally; the primary possibility o f human 
life, though, the possibility to achieve understanding and truth, is to participate most 
fully in the highest level, the authentically human movement o f existence.
Though Patocka sets off from Aristotelian philosophy in his reliance upon the 
concept of movement, the tripartite framework o f existence which he presents has a 
Heideggerean foundation. The structure which Heidegger presents in his analysis of 
existence, as Patocka understands it, is the structure o f care: “a project in a given
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situation which brings us into contact with things.” The three-fold structure of care 
implies a situation that encompasses the past, a projection into the future, and a presence 
in our contact with things. In this way “the things with which we deal and which we 
modify are revealed.” It is a basic structure o f three divisions, and it serves as a model 
for Patocka’s own interpretation o f three movements. In Patocka, however, the structure 
is not understood as a “trinity o f undifferentiated moments but rather as a trinity of 
movements in which our life unfolds.”111 He thus proposes three movements o f human 
life that effectively represent an Aristotelian hierarchy of being — one structured, 
however, around activities drawn from the insights of Heideggerean philosophy. In the 
Body, Community, Language, World lectures the three movements are described as 
follows:
1. the movement of sinking roots, of anchoring — an 
instinctive-affective movement of our existence;
2. the movement o f self-sustenance, o f self-projection — the movement 
of our coming to terms with the reality we handle, a movement 
carried out in the region o f human work;
3. the movement of existence in the narrower sense of the word which 
typically seeks to bestow a global closure and meaning on the regions 
and rhythms of the first and second movement.112
In the Heretical Essays, the three movements are described in a more metaphorical, less 
Husserlian manner: there they are referred to as the movements of acceptance, of 
defense (of life), and of truth.
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Jan Patodka argues that human existence partakes in each o f these three
movements, although to varying degrees. Our life “takes place in a polyphony o f three
voices.”" 3 While characteristics of one movement may appear in an other, it is more
broadly the case that the assumption of one movement suppresses the previous. The
most fundamental movement, the one common to all humans which acts as a center for
human life, is the first movement. This is the movement in which humans simply accept
their situation, are in harmony with the world, and anchor themselves in it by accepting
it as given. It is, Patodka writes, the acceptance o f the entire world as if it were a
mother’s lap -- an instinctual, prereflective acceptance."4 In this movement we sink
roots into our surroundings, and we accept our dependence upon another for safety and
warmth. It is an instinctive-affective movement that provides us with our center in life.
The affective movement does not submerge us into the world as into a 
purposive, practical milieu but rather as into an all-embracing context o f 
landscapes which address us in a certain wholeness and a priori make it 
possible for humans to have a world, not only individual entities.... it 
bears within it a central vital core, a core of vital warmth which is not 
only an addition to the being of what surrounds us but a condition of the 
being of our life."5
This movement reflects an acceptance of the cosmos without reflection; we are at home 
in it but it is necessarily characterized by a lack o f self-understanding."6 It is also a 
situation in which the human does not exert control over his situation. He is therefore 
completely subject to contingency, to chance and fortune.
This mode of life is broken up by the second movement of life, however. This is 
the movement in which we come into contact, and come to terms, with the things that 
are present in our world. Here we extend our existing into things and work to preserve
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and reproduce our lives. With this movement we ensure our physical continuity; “this is 
the sphere in which we primarily live.”" 7 This is also the sphere of what Patodka calls 
self-surrender, for when we work we surrender ourselves to the burden o f living, the 
necessity o f prolonging life via our labor. Here, and particularly in the contrast between 
this movement and the third, the work of another contemporary philosopher comes 
directly into play. Hannah Arendt’s work on the movement from the sphere of the 
household to the sphere of the polls in The Human Condition provided Pato£ka with a 
thesis upon which he based much of the philosophy of history found in his Heretical 
Essays."6 As I have argued, Patodka’s approach to phenomenology and to Husserl and 
Heidegger was influenced by his desire to broaden the scope o f this philosophy to 
encompass humanity in its communal and political activities. Thus the 
phenomenological interpretation o f existence as movement draws upon a fundamental 
distinction first noted by Arendt between the movement of labor and the movement of 
freedom in the polis. This second movement o f existence is the movement in which we 
defend our lives by accepting the burden o f work. Here we bind ourselves to that life 
and to the Earth which provides us with the opportunity to work."9 “This is a realm,” 
Patocka writes, “of the average, o f anonymity, o f social roles in which people are not 
themselves, are not existence in the full sense (an existence which sees itself as 
existence), are reduced to their roles.”120
In the first two movements of existence, humans do not exist in the fullness of 
their potential because they are bound to the Earth. “The third movement is an attempt 
to break through our earthliness.”121 It is the human movement through which we
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achieve some distance from all particulars and so attain a view o f that which we could 
not see before, a view of the whole. The third movement is the movement o f truth and 
of existence in the true sense. In the first two movements we are bound to life and so 
our finitude cannot be considered reflectively and taken into account. We see life, not as 
a whole, but as a series o f moments, lacking an overall conception. Shaking our 
bondage to the Earth, to things, and coming to terms with our finitude leaves us free to 
see our life as a whole. “The Earth preoccupies us too much, leading us to live within 
our individual preoccupations, so that ultimately we would not need to see our finitude, 
our life as a whole. Therein precisely consists the rule o f the Earth over us.” By pointing 
to the desire to shake this rule, to disturb it, Pato£ka is not implying an attempt to escape 
our human limitations. It is not an attempt to rise above our humanity and dominate it as 
a superman, it is rather the opposite — to recognize our finitude and to come to 
understand that our existence is not exhausted by its material aspect. In doing so, we 
pursue a fundamentally different movement o f life, a movement o f truth, a “living in 
truth.” The third movement is an attempt at breaking free, but “[w]e do not conceive of 
the attempt at breaking free as a grasp at mastery, at seizing power, it is not a will to 
domination but an attempt to gain clarity concerning our situation, to accept the 
situation and, by that clarity, to transform it.”122 Pato£ka finds historical examples of this 
“breaking free” o f the bondage of the Earth, interestingly, in the Buddhist metaphor of 
the quenching o f thirst and in the Christian attack of self-centeredness.123
With his phenomenology of movement, Pato£ka has approached philosophy 
from a perspective grounded in the simple conviction that the essence o f human reality
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cannot be abstracted from its concrete elements, namely, the fact that we are corporeal
beings, objective creatures in an objective world. On the basis o f this understanding
Patocka was able to interpret existence as a series of movements, of three vital lines
that, in addition to describing the ways in which humans exist, also help to define the
actual content o f that existence: human history. History and politics are never far
removed in Patocka's writings, and this for good reason. His approach to philosophy, as
I have tried to show in this overview of his phenomenology, attempts to demonstrate its
connectedness to history and politics. The pursuit of a phenomenology o f  movement,
which is attempted by a combination o f ancient and modem philosophy, Aristotle and
Heidegger,124 serves to illuminate this fundamental connectedness. The three
movements of being human can bring us to understand ourselves historically and
politically, as we shall see in the following chapters. “Only by starting out from these
three fundamental lines,” Pato£ka writes,
from understanding how they presuppose and negate each other 
mutually, can we, after analysis, achieve a certain insight into the way in 
which these three strands (two movements governed by the Earth, a third 
breaking free o f it) make up the overarching human movement we call 
history.125
Body, Community, Language, World, therefore, though its subject is phenomenology, 
concludes with an explicit appeal to history.
History and politics, in the end, are to be interpreted in terms o f the concept of 
living in truth. This concept has its foundation in Patocka’s phenomenology, in his 
understanding of the way in which people encounter and perceive the world. The 
essence of this encounter is the perception o f the world, not as merely a collection of
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particular entities, but as a whole in itself. In this sense Pato£ka sees his understanding 
of the world as more radical than Heidegger’s because it focuses not only upon our 
encounter with particulars, but also on our encounter with and interest in the world as a 
whole. It is only through this conscious encounter, Patocka argues, that people can live 
in truth.
Humans are the only beings which, because they are not indifferent to 
themselves and to their being, can live in truth, can choose between life 
in the anxiety of its roles and needs and life in a relation to the world, not 
to existing entities only.126
Seeing beyond the particular, the attachment o f our lives to the material, is the
fundamental step in the movement o f truth. Only in the light o f this distance do things
appear as they are. Nowhere is this more true than in the realm o f politics, as is made
evident in the Heretical Essays in the Philosophy o f  History.
Patocka further demonstrates his concern with the movement o f human history
by concluding Body, Community, Language, World with something of a political
critique. He notes that phenomenology, as he has pursued it, touches upon “something
that all modem humanism neglected, what that humanism lacks.”127 This is the notion of
“nonindifference to being,” that we become human only insofar as we perceive our
being as something to which we must pay attention, something which challenges us as it
presents itself to us as not simply given, not simply human. Rather it is approachable via
a movement (the third) that we can attain only through that nonindifference, only by
responding to the challenge, the responsibility of accomplishing our being. Humanism,
by contrast, “thrives on the idea that humans are in some sense the heirs o f the
absolute,” o f a reality that is given as a gift rather than achieved. The result is the belief
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that humans “have a license to subjugate all reality, to appropriate it and to exploit it 
with no obligation to give anything in return, constraining and disciplining 
ourselves.”128 Here Patocka provides a link to his analysis o f metaphysics and its role in 
the development o f Western civilization, and in doing so connects his 
phenomenological work with his political concerns.
Conclusion
Patocka’s phenomenological work certainly deserves a more complete and 
informed analysis than can be offered here; it is an attempt to transform significantly 
contemporary phenomenological philosophy, and that not simply by a synthesis of 
Husserl and Heidegger. He aims to be faithful to the core assumptions of 
phenomenology and so to experience, yet still to take account o f human existence in its 
active, corporeal, and communal aspects. The phenomenology that I have described 
here is the ground upon which this philosophy will proceed as it engages contemporary 
history, politics and the question of the telos o f European civilization.
Husserl and Heidegger are criticized for a lack o f applicability to the human 
sciences, to the sciences o f concrete human activity. The reality of the world and our 
understanding o f it can neither be reduced to the subjective consciousness nor to 
Heideggerean ontology. The world and our existence within it -- existing not only in the 
world but as part o f its vital processes — are also determinative of our being and cannot 
be left out of any investigation of reality. This situation, that we relate to things as well 
as to ourselves, is the foundation upon which the process o f achieving our potential, our
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being, takes place. It is also the ground upon which Patocka takes issue with both
Husserl and Heidegger.
The social sciences, because they deal with humans that are not indifferent to
their own being, are distinct from the natural sciences. Yet our understanding of
ourselves is neither given in objective clarity nor objectively accessible. It is obscure,
and is only uncovered as we participate in life actively and as we reflectively examine
ourselves and the way in which we live.
The point is the essential primacy of practice. At the very 
protofoundation o f consciousness, of thought, o f the subject, there is 
acting, not mere seeing. That explains why there is so much opaque, 
obscure, in our clarity. Such a being, concerned with its own being, 
cannot in principle be grasped in its distinctiveness by observation.129
As an approach to social science, then, Heidegger’s philosophy had a distinct advantage
over Husserl’s by reason o f its assumption o f nonobjectivity and self-concealment.130
Yet this assumption, this ontological perspective, did not complete the picture. As a
fundamental ontology, it did not sufficiently pursue the human relation to things that is
analagous to our relation to ourselves. Human being is an interaction o f the interested
human, not only with his own being, but with the objective world, the world of
individual objects and the world as a whole.
I have argued in this chapter that Patodka’s work is marked by an interpretive
application o f the work o f Husserl and Heidegger to problems that superseded the scope
of their own philosophical visions. It is this interpretive approach to the German
philosophers that not only leads to the uniqueness o f Pato£ka’s work, but also blunts the
edge of the most likely criticism to be levied against him by followers o f Husserl or
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Heidegger -- the question o f consistency. While Patoika’s negative analysis of the 
shortcomings of the work of Husserl and Heidegger is relatively clear, several aspects of 
his positive application o f their thought are much less so. Foremost among these, and 
the subject o f the following chapter, is the use o f this contemporary German philosophy 
to analyze and emulate the classical thought and symbolism o f Plato and Socrates. 
Patocka’s is a philosophy that emulates the Socratic while proceeding along the lines of 
the Husserlian and Heideggerean. Pato£ka is convinced o f the compatibility of not only 
Heidegger and Husserl, but also of Heidegger and Socrates.
While Patodka’s specific relationship to Greek philosophy will be dealt with in 
succeeding chapters, it is nececessary here to note only that that relationship, that belief 
in the relevance of Platonic thought, was basic to his thought. His interest in the whole 
of human reality led to an unwillingness, an inability, to overly restrict himself 
methodologically or theoretically. To portray adequately the reality of man in 
community, Patocka had to draw upon Socratic metaphor and insight, just as he had to 
approach Husserl, or the early and the late Heidegger, in a way that many will find 
inconsistent or questionable.
In terms of his phenomenology, the primary questions concern Patocka’s use, 
not only of Heidegger alongside Husserl, but also of the early and the late Heidegger 
almost interchangeably. In regard to the former, I have made the point that it is 
inappropriate to label Patoika as either a Husserlian or a Heideggerean. His work is 
based on insights drawn from both, yet resists the argument that it is simply an 
extension of the work of either one. Pato£ka’s approach, as he expressed in Body,
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Community, Language, World, is to demonstrate that those elements o f Heideggerean 
philosophy o f which he makes use are not speculative, but can be “exhibited 
descriptively.” By this he means that the terminology o f ontological phenomenology 
can be spoken of in terms of its clear relation to our experiential reality -- it can be 
described in terms to which we can relate concretely, not speculatively. His use of 
Heideggerean philosophy, therefore, is intended to be judged not against the 
conclusions at which Heidegger arrived in his own explication o f that philosophy, but 
against the experience o f “concrete humans in their corporeal world” which Pato£ka 
describes as his starting point. The same logic applies to Patodka’s use of Husserlian 
and Greek philosophy.
There is little sense, then, in trying to judge whether in the end he is most 
fundamentally with Husserl or Heidegger or Plato or Socrates. He uses all o f them in 
ways that could be arguably inconsistent if one were to judge from the standpoint o f the 
particular conclusions reached by any one of these philosophers. In terms o f the 
difference between the early Heidegger of Being and Time and the later Heidegger — the 
well-known Kehre or ‘Turn” in his work -- Patocka’s attitude is revealing. He mixes an 
insightful understanding o f the change in Heidegger’s thought with a refusal to respect 
that change as fundamental, as effectively requiring the reader to choose between two 
Heideggers.131 Instead, Patocka draws upon both the early and the late Heidegger, 
placing analytical concepts drawn from Being and Time next to the metaphorical and 
poetic language o f the later, post-war Heidegger. PatoCka’s focus, as I have noted, is not 
with ontology as an exclusive science. His interest is the reality of the active human in
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the social world, and as a result he finds it not only accceptable, but necessary to take 
Heidegger as a  whole. Both sides of Heidegger’s corpus, his rigorous analysis of being 
along with his poetic emulation o f the “saving power” that is attendant to the essence of 
technology,132 are relevant to the degree that the philosophy reflects human reality and 
can be “exhibited descriptively,” can be described in terms of our experience of that 
reality.
This approach, for students of philosophy committed to methodological
consistency, has been perceived as inconsistent. Erazim Kohak and James Dodd, for
example, the translator and editor of the recent editions of Pato£ka’s works in English,
both of whom approach Pato£ka from the perspective o f phenomenology, have spoken
of what they see as inconsistency. Kohak, largely because he reads the Czech
philosopher as Husserlian, sees an “evident tension in Patocka’s thought between his
Husserlian and his Heideggerean heritages.”133 James Dodd, in his introduction to Body,
Community, Language, World, sees a similar problem. The phenomenology, he points
out, is problematic for the philosopher grounded in methodology; it asks of the reader a
willingness to set aside prejudices bom of an analytical heritage. As Dodd puts it,
[tjhere is too much of a sense that the conceptual ground has not been 
prepared enough, that the force of these descriptions o f human life rely 
too much on the commitment of the readers (and, originally, the 
listeners) to engage faithfully in the effort of “seeing” what it is that 
Pato£ka is endeavoring to put into words.134
Dodd is correct here; Patodka is convinced that human experience at times exceeds our
analytical abilities. The resort to evocative forms of symbolization is not only
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acceptable, it is necessary. Thus for a Husserlian, Patodka’s phenomenology must 
disappoint on methodological grounds.
For the phenomenological purist, then, Pato£ka is something o f a problematic 
figure. Both Kohak and Dodd argue that he has not completely succeeded in his task, 
that the tensions have not been ironed out, the contradictions cleared up, the “conceptual 
ground” fully explicated. But rather than exhibiting a discriminating understanding of 
Patocka’s work, these conclusions tend to prevent, rather than assist, us in seeing the 
intent and the full impact of this philosophical body of work.
But the story o f PatoCka’s philosophy does not end with his interpretation of 
phenomenology and Heideggerean ontology. Also at the heart o f his work is the figure 
of Socrates. It is to Greek philosophy and Socrates that I will turn in the following 
chapter in order, not only to understand Patodka’s broader philosophical aims, but also 
to illuminate the foundation for the connection — inherent in this work -- between 
philosophy and politics. As I have sought to explain in summarizing the Patodkan 
critique of Husserl and Heidegger, the test o f philosophy must always be reality as we 
encounter it on the ground, so to speak — in the interactions of an objective and 
corporeal creature with an autonomous world and the concrete objects within it. This 
implies, as the rest o f Patodka’s philosophical work bears out, the need for a focus, not 
only on the self and the relationship of the individual to his or her own being, but also 
on the relationships most fundamental to active man, the relationships with one’s 
community and one’s history.
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not. Hence the title ‘Europe’ clearly refers to the unity o f a spiritual life, activity, 
creation, with all its ends, interests, cares and endeavors, with its products of purposeful 
activity, institutions, organizations.” Ibid., 273.
14Ibid., 276. Pato£ka explains Husserl’s position in his Warsaw lecture o f 1971: 
“As Husserl sees it, what makes Europe special is precisely the fact that reason 
constitutes the central axis o f its history. There are numerous cultural traditions, but 
only the European places the universality o f evidence -- and so o f proof and o f reason ~  
at the very center o f its aspirations. The vision o f living in truth, o f living, as Husserl 
has it, responsibly, emerged only in Europe, and only here did it develop in the form of 
a continuous thought, capable o f being universally duplicated and o f being deepened 
and corrected through a shared effort.” Patocka, “Edmund Husserl’s Philosophy of the 
Crisis of the Sciences and His Conception of a Phenomenology o f  the L ife -W o r ld in 
Kohak, ed. Jan Patocka, 223.
15Husserl, Crisis, 280.
l6This version o f the ‘natural attitude,’ as David Carr points out, was a distinctly 
different approach than was taken in Husserl’s early phenomenology. It is clearly 
“something other than the ‘natural attitude’ of Ideen, Vol. I.” Carr, translator’s 
introduction to Crisis, ibid., xxxix.
I7Husserl, ibid., 299.
l8Jan Patocka, “Masaryk’s and Husserl’s Conception o f the Spiritual Crisis of 
Europe,” in Jan Patocka, 146.
,9On Pato£ka’s critique o f Masarykan philosophy, see, e.g., “An Attempt at a 
Czech National Philosophy and its Failure,” transl. Mark Suino, in T.G. Masaryk in 
Perspective: Comments and Criticism, Mili£ tap e k  and Karel Hruby, eds. (Ann Arbor: 
SVU Press, 1981).
20Patocka, “Masaryk’s and Husserl’s Conception...”, 154.
2'Ibid.
22Ibid., 155.
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26Patodka, “Cartesianism and Phenomenology,” in Jan Patocka, 315.
27See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI. 6, trans. Martin Ostwald (New York: 
Macmillan Publishing, 1962), 154-55.
1%The Collected Works o f  Jan Patocka (Sebrane spisy Jana Patocky) in Czech, 
presently being published by OIKOYMENH Press in Prague, has allocated three 
volumes for PatoCka’s phenomenological writings.
29Patocka, “Cartesianism and Phenomenology,” in Jan Patocka, 293.
30Ibid„ 294.
3'PatoCka, Body, Community, Language, World, 3.
32Ibid., 4.
33Patocka, “Martin Heidegger, myslitel lidskosti: Improvizovana uvaha po 
zprave o Heideggerovd smrti” (Martin Heidegger, a Thinker of Humanity: An 
Improvised Reflection upon the News o f Heidegger’s Death), Filosoficky Casopis 43, 
no. 1 (1995): 3-5.
34Patocka, “Autoruv doslov k Francouzskemu vydani prirozeneho sveta” (The 
Author’s Postscript to the French Printing o f The 'Natural' World’), in Prirozeny svet 
jako filosoficky problem (The Natural World as a Philosophical Problem), (Prague: 
Ceskoslovensky spisovatel, 1992): 256.
35Kohak, “Philosophical Biography,” in Jan Patocka, 83. See also, Jan Patocka, 
An Introduction to Husserl's Phenomenology, trans. Erazim Kohak, (Chicago and 
LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Press, 1996).
36Patocka’s discussion of the ‘whole,’ it should be noted, draws from Husserl 
rather than Heidegger.
37Pato£ka, Prirozeny svet jako filosoficky problem, 13.
38Patocka, Body, Community, Language, World, 165.
39Ibid.
40See Kohak, “Philosophical Biography,” 86.
4'PatoCka, Body, Community, Language, World, 36.
85
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42Kohak notes that: “The grounding of (mathematical) objectivity in the subject 
is the achievement of Husserl’s Philosophy o f  Arithmetic, the transcending o f an 
arbitrary psychologism that of Logical Investigations.'’’1 “Philosophical Biography,” 88.
43Patocka, Introduction to Husserl's Phenomenology, 102-103.
44Kohak, “Philosophical Biography,” 92.
45Ibid.
46Pato£ka, “The ‘Natural’ World and Phenomenology,” Jan Patocka, 253.
47“Asubjective” phenomenology, a term borrowed from Eugen Fink, refers to 
Patocka’s desire to move beyond the Husserlian “quest for a ground of certainty in 
subjectivity,” as Erazim Kohak describes it, and towards an asubjective meaning o f the 
whole. See Erazim Kohak, “Philosophical Biography,” pp. 6-8 and 83-97. Corporeity is 
the explicit subject of Body, Community, Language, World, in which Pato£ka extends 
the work on corporeity of, among others, Merleau-Ponty (Phenomenology o f  
Perception). See, e.g., Body, Community, Language, World, pp. 47-50.
48Patodka, Body, Community, Language, World, 33.
49Edmund Husserl had used the concepts of the “horizon” and the “world” in his 
Crisis writings, for example, in his Vienna Lecture: “Now natural life can be 
characterized as a life naively, straightforwardly directed at the world, the world being 
always in a certain sense consciously present as a universal horizon, without, however, 
being thematic as such.” Husserl, “The Vienna Lecture,” in Crisis, 281.




54Kohak, “Philosophical Biography,” 100. The phrase “hardness of reality” is 
found in Patocka’s Body, Community, Language, World where it is used in reference to 
the “grandiose optimism” of Hegel’s philosophy, which, though it did not “mask the 
hardness of reality,” understood the sorrows of life as mere stages on the way to a final 
peace {Body, Community, Language, World, 74).
55Patocka, Body, Community, Language, World, 166.
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“ Ibid., 166-167.
57lbid., 168.
58On the concept o f the phenomenological reduction, see Edmund Husserl,
Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. W.R. Boyce Gibson 
(London: Collier MacMillan Publishers, 1962), 101-103. The details o f Patocka’s 
response to Husserl’s position can be found in his Introduction to Husserl's 
Phenomenology, 87-106.
S9Pato£ka, Body, Community, Language, World, 165-166.
“ Ibid., 165.
6lIbid., 170.
62Coming to the conclusion of his discussion o f the whole in Body, Community, 
Language, World, PatoSka asks if  there is not a sense here of rehabilitating an ancient 
idea: physis as arche, which “rules in all particulars.” This is an understanding first 
expressed in ancient fragments of Anaximander, o f  the whole in which all individuals 
come into being and perish. Ibid., 169.
“ Because the term “natural” world is somewhat ambiguous in English (though 
not in Czech), I will follow the example o f Erazim Kohak and emphasize its specific 
connotation with quotation marks. In PatoCka’s usage, the “natural” world does not refer 
to the world of nature (prirodnl svet) but rather to the world as it presents itself to us 
naturally, or simply, without our having reflected on it or studied it at all -- the 
prereflective or “pretheoretical” world. This meaning is adequately rendered in Czech 
by the term prirozeny svet; English, however, has no equivalent and is limited to the 
term “natural” world. For Kohak’s explanation o f the same, see “Philosophical 
Biography,” 22-23.
“ Patocka, “The ‘Natural’ World and Phenomenology,” 245.
65Husserl, Crisis, 121, 123.
“ This has been noted by several commentators. Paul Ricoeur noted in his 
introduction to the Heretical Essays that while Husserl’s “natural” world was 
pre-scientific, Patodka’s was pre-historical, meaning that while the former thought 
theoretically, the latter had a significantly more concrete notion in mind. Erazim Kohak 
concurred with this diagnosis, writing that while the “natural” world was a “pre-human, 
neutral epistemological datum” for Husserl, whereas for Patodka it is “ab initio a human 
world, a world o f moral subjects living, again ab initio, in a network o f moral relations,
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having to make decisions and to bear responsibility for them.” Erazim Kohak, “The 
Crisis o f Rationality and the ‘Natural’ World,” Review o f  Metaphysics 40 (September 
1986): 91.
67Patodka, “Edmund Husserl’s Philosophy of the Crisis,” in Jan Patocka, 233.
68Ibid., 237.
69“By intuition here we need to understand a rational insight in the Husserlian 
sense, that is, the primordial presence o f the intended object before the mental gaze o f 
the subject.” Ibid., 232.
70Patocka writes that, “The Husserlian demand o f the primordial givenness, the 
delving beneath all that is derivative to the primary source, takes from the world as a 
corelate [sic] of an intuition presenting things themselves..., toward a world that is first 
of all one of good (and of evil) and that, in virtue of this, deserves to be called the world 
o f actual human existence.” Ibid., 235. Patodka’s conception o f good, in this context, 
interestingly combines elements from Aristotle and Heidegger. The good is that towards 
which all things aim, yet it is not a metaphysical entity but rather described in terms of 
Heidegger’s discussion of das Worumwillen, or that “_/br the sake o f  which” we act. See 
Ibid., 234-235. See also Heidegger, Being and Time, I. 3, pp. 118-122; I. 5, 184-187; I. 
6, 235-240.
7'Ibid., 236.
72Raymond Klibansky, for example, stresses the point that, in his opinion, 
Patocka’s path is “totally different” from Heidegger’s. Even Richard Rorty and Erazim 
Kohak, both o f whom are respected as sober analysts who recognize the influence of 
both Husserl and Heidegger in Patodka’s work, cannot resist voicing some opinion in 
the matter. Interestingly, while Rorty concludes that “[i]n the dialogue between Husserl 
and Heidegger, then, Patocka is mostly on Heidegger’s side,” Kohak comes to the 
opposite conclusion: considering Patodka as a whole, he says, it is the Husserlian strand 
that is “dominant.” See Raymond Klibansky, “Jan Patodka,” in La 
Responsabilite/Responsibility, eds. P. Horak and J. Zumr, (Prague: Filosoficky ustav 
CSAV, 1992), 17-35; Rorty, “The Seer of Prague,” 37; Kohak, “Jan Patodka’s Search 
for the Natural World,” 137.
73Patocka, Body, Community, Language, World, 73.
74See Patodka, Heretical Essays in the Philosophy o f  History, 45-46.
75Ibid„ 49.
76One commentator, Avezier Tucker, for example, argues to this effect, dividing
88
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Patocka into a Platonic humanist and a Heideggerean reactionary, depending on the 
situation. Erazim Kohak as well, though to a lesser degree, reads Patocka in terms o f his 
Husserlian and his Heideggerean leanings. See Appendix.
77Pato5ka, Heretical Essays. 46.
78Patocka, Body, Community, Language, World, 97.
79On the self-interestedness of Dasein, see the Introduction to Heidegger’s Being 
and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, (New York: Harper and Row, 
1962).





85 PatoCka, Body, Community, Language, World, 31. Czech, like German, allows 
for the easy distinguishing o f “being” (Sein in German or byti in Czech) from “beings”
(Seiende or jsoucno). This is a problem in English that some seek to solve by rendering 
Seiende as “existents” or “what-is.” I find these solutions to result in less rather than 
more clarity, thus I prefer to render Sein or byti traditionally, as “being,” and to translate 
the various forms of Seiende or jsoucno as “a being,” “beings,” or, if the situation 
requires, “beings as a whole.” Ralph Manheim, the translator o f  the Yale University 
Press edition of Heidegger’s An Introduction to Metaphysics, argues that this solution, 
while essentially accurate, is to be avoided because it inevitably results in confusing 
formulations such as “Being is not a being.” I must disagree with his conclusion. In the 
end, if one hopes to read Heidegger and his students there is no alternative to 
developing a familiarity with the terminology sufficient to render such constructions 
comprehensible.
86Heidegger’s “existential analysis o f death,” or “being-towards-death,” can be 
found in Being and Time, II. 1, 246-260.
87Pato£ka, “Varna Lecture: The Dangers of Technicization in Science according 
to E. Husserl and the Essence of Technology as Danger according to M. Heidegger,” in 
Jan Patocka, 334.
88Pato£ka, Body, Community, Lanaguage, World, 73.
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89Ibid., 176.
’‘’Patodka, Heretical Essays, 105.
9'Ibid., 153.
92See Heidegger, Being and Time, I. 6, 191-200.
93 Jacques Derrida, The Gift o f  Death, 13. That Heidegger does not quote the 
“canonical passage” from Plato’s Phaedo in Being and Time, is, for Derrida, surprising.
94Patodka, “Cartesianism and Phenomenology,” 316.
"Patocka, “Heidegger,” trans. Edward F. Findlay, Report o f  the Center fo r  
Theoretical Study, CTS-98-06 (Prague: Center for Theoretical Study, 1998), 4.
"Patodka, “Filosofie vychovy” (A Philosophy o f Education), in Pece o dusi I  
(Care for the Soul I), 377.









I06lbid., 79. Patodka notes that even inactivity, the holding back of movement, 
also belongs to the movements o f the body.
107Ibid., 80.
108Ibid., 154. Patodka explains his interpretation o f the Aristotelian concept as a
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“radical ization”: “To understand the movement o f human existence, for that we need to 
radicalize Aristotle’s conception o f movement. The possibilities that ground movement 
have no preexisting bearer, no necessary referent standing statically at their foundation, 
but rather all synthesis, all innner interconnection o f movement takes place within it 
alone. All inner unification is accomplished by the movement itself, not by some bearer, 
...objectively understood.” Ibid., 147. For Aristotle’s concept o f the “unmoved mover,” 
see, for example, Metaphysics 3.8. 30-31.





IUPatocka, “The ‘Natural’ World and Phenomenology,” 264.
“5Patocka, Body, Community, Language, World, 149.
“6Ibid., 150.
“7Ibid.
" 8See Patodka, Heretical Essays, 23. See also, Hannah Arendt, The Human 
Condition, (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 29-49.
"9It is important to distinguish the concept o f the “Earth” from that o f the 
“world,” described earlier. Here Patodka is using the notion of the Earth in a 
quasi-Heideggerean sense. It is not the literal earth, but rather the “unshakable ground” 
to which our movement relates. It is the referent of our movement, that which does not 
move when we do, that which is firm. The Earth symbolizes the power our corporeal 
nature exerts on and over us. For the Heideggerean perspective, see “The Origin o f the 
Work o f Art,” in Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (San 
Francisco: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993), 171-175.
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123Ibid., 160-161.
,24Pato£ka writes that he follows Merleau-Ponty in his analysis of corporeity as 
the basis for a critique o f Heidegger, and “On the basis o f this criticism we 
demonstrated the possibility o f interpreting existence as a triple movement. That we did 
using both an ancient and a modem idea. The modem idea was Heidegger’s, that life is 
a life in possibilities characterized by a relation to our own being; we project that for the 
sake of which we are, that fo r  the sake o f  is the possibility o f our life; in the world a 
totality o f possibilities is always open to us. The ancient idea -- Aristotle’s definition o f 
movement as a possibility in the process o f realization, not motion in Galileo’s sense.” 







13'In the course of an underground seminar delivered on the occasion of the 
publication o f the Der Speigel interview shortly after Heidegger’s death, Patodka gives 
his students an insightful description of the difference between the early and the late 
Heidegger. The early Heidegger, he says, works from the conception that "das Sein ist 
das Sein des Seienden ” (Being is the Being o f  beings), while the later Heidegger would 
say that “das Seiende ist das Seiende des Seins ” (beings are the beings o f  Being). In the 
former conceptualization Heidegger stresses that Being must not be thought of as “a” 
being, but rather as the ways in which beings appear, thus stressing the notion that what 
we understand as Being is taken from us as beings; in the latter formulation this 
situation is reversed. Here Heidegger shows himself to be no longer focused on beings 
so much as on their Being. This is the Heidegger o f Holderlin’s poetry, of the four-fold 
of earth, sky, divinity and mortals. See Patocka, “Documenta Philosophiae: Diskuse k 
Heideggerovi,” Filosoficky casopis 43, no. 2 (1995): 218.
l32On the “saving power,” see Heidegger’s evocation of Holderlin in “The 
Question Concerning Technology,” Basic Writings, 333-334.
133Kohak, “Philosophical Biography,” 134.
l34James Dodd, introduction to Body, Community, Language, World, xxxi.
92
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 3
PHILOSOPHY AFTER THE DEATH OF METAPHYSICS: PATOCKA AND
GREEK THOUGHT
As an interpreter of Husserl and Heidegger, Jan Patodka takes up the Husserlian 
goal of a renewal o f rationality in the West and considers it alongside his commitment 
to the Heideggerean critique o f metaphysical philosophy. He seeks to recover the 
insight of the classical conception o f reason, in other words, but without becoming 
entangled in traditionally metaphysical formulations. Contemporary philosophy, 
particularly as expressed by Heidegger, has made a facile reliance on metaphysical 
thought impossible. Neither Husserl nor Heidegger, for example, focuses his efforts on 
the classic elements o f Greek thought. Yet Patodka does not find the twilight of 
metaphysics to signal a  need to abandon classical theory. To the contrary, his work is 
distinguished by its direct engagement with and emulation o f the political theory of 
Plato. The notion, then, is one of classical philosophy sans the explicit element of 
metaphysics. It is, in other words, an interpretation of classical thought as something 
fundamentally other than the positing of a metaphysical reality and the developing of a 
means of grasping it through the pursuit of dialectical reasoning. In this chapter I pursue 
the question that distinguishes Patodka’s work from Husserl's and Heidegger's: the 
question o f a non-metaphysical interpretation o f Socrates and Plato. To the extent that 
the legacy o f Nietzsche and Heidegger requires that Platonic thought be abandoned, 
there is little hope for a genuine philosophy of politics and ethics. As Patodka interprets 
it, however, the essence of classical thought is not defined in contrast to contemporary 
critique, but rather integrated into it.
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The center o f gravity in Patodka’s work, as much as it relies and comments upon 
the phenomenological thought of Husserl and Heidegger, is found in the figure of 
Socrates. Patodka’s philosophy, therefore, is not primarily directed toward a revision of 
twentieth-century phenomenology. It surely attempts such a revision, but as a 
methodological means towards a larger goal, a goal that is as much political and 
historical as it is philosophical. Rather than discard classical thought as hopelessly 
metaphysical, Patocka seeks to examine it anew, to put its spirituality and metaphysical 
formulations to the test o f contemporary critique. These formulations, he is convinced, 
particularly the Socratic injunction to “care for the soul,” continue to be relevant in the 
post-metaphysical age precisely because their essence does not impel us to seek a 
metaphysical foundation for our scientific inquiry into the nature o f reality.
Patodka attempts, then, to reexamine Greek philosophy through the lenses o f 
phenomenological philosophy; his hope is to recover that which Husserl sought in his 
later years, the essential “insight” o f Western rationality that is the epitome o f the 
European ideal o f civilization. This is an insight, though, an understanding o f reason, 
that has become progressively deformed as it has been subject to attempts at 
metaphysical systemization over the past several millenia. The first step on this road of 
deformation was taken by Plato himself, when he expressed the human potential in 
terms of transcending the apparent images of our experience, via the dialectic, and 
reaching the real, the ideal forms of reality.1 What Plato offered in merely symbolic 
form, however, tempered by an assertion of the limits o f human striving, reached a 
culmination in the modem world with the claims o f science, inspired by the aspirations
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of the metaphysical quest, to be the final “key that unlocks all doors.”2 This scientific 
self-certainty, o f course, is emblematic of the “crisis” in the West that Husserl hoped to 
reverse by looking to the origin o f Western rationality — its most elemental insight.
Patodka is convinced, in contrast to Heidegger, that this insight upon which 
Europe is founded is embodied in the figure o f Socrates and represents the greatest 
achievement o f Western civilization. Yet since Plato — and here he is with Heidegger -- 
philosophy has been in decline, a story of insight corrupted. Drawing upon 
phenomenology, Patodka attempts a reinterpretation o f Platonic philosophy. He begins 
with the notion o f reason, the anchor o f Western civilization, describing it not as a 
motionless concept but as an active mode o f living and questioning, a 
phenomenological movement. Yet to symbolize this movement, this fundamental and 
defining activity central to the history of the West, he abandons the language of 
twentieth-century phenomenology and returns to an elemental Socratic injunction: the 
requirement to “care for the soul.”3
Patocka’s response to the Husserlian perception of a  crisis, o f a dissolution of 
the center of Western civilization, is not to create a new philosophy, a new 
understanding o f Man, but reconsider our heritage in a new light. The task he sets for 
himself is to examine the contribution o f classical Greek philosophy to Europe via the 
analytical tools o f the contemporary work o f Husserl and Heidegger. The task of this 
chapter is to analyze the character o f this reinterpretation o f  classical thought. The 
underlying question is whether the classical and the post-metaphysical are at all 
reconcilable, and whether a coherent conception of politics and ethics can result from 
the attempt. Patodka is convinced that the answer to these questions is yes.
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The Czech philosopher’s extensive writings on Plato, Europe and history are the 
heart of his philosophical work; they represent not only the application o f his 
phenomenological interpretation of Husserl and Heidegger, but also his enduring 
conviction that politics and history, as the material upon which civilization is 
constructed, are inherently connected to philosophy. The initial force behind these 
writings, most certainly, was the quest for a renewal o f reason, Husserl’s goal of 
re-clarifying what he considered to be the telos o f European humanity. Whereas 
Husserl’s career was coming to a close as he developed the thesis of the Crisis, making 
it impossible for him to pursue the problem in any detail, Pato£ka’s was just beginning. 
The young Czech, however, did not pursue the question along the lines laid down by 
Husserl, instead he followed his own philosophical leanings. Patocka is attempting to 
reconstruct the dissipated center of Western civilization, but he is by no means 
reinforcing traditional Western philosophy. With Heidegger, he concludes that Western 
philosophy has by and large taken its lead from a tendency first visible in Plato and 
Aristotle: this is the tendency to encapsulate the philosophical insight represented by 
Socrates in a systematic, quasi-objective form. Philosophers since Plato have generally 
pursued philosophy as metaphysics, as the objectification o f a transcendental, 
metaphysical reality. It is this objectification, this cessation o f the essential movement 
and uncertainty of philosophy, this metaphysical systematization criticized by 
Heidegger,4 that is itself at the heart o f the crisis of rationalism. The recovery of 
philosophy, and of the center of Western civilization itself, requires an explication of
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that center that is itself non-metaphysical, and thus heretical with regard to traditional 
thought.
Patocka wrote extensively on Greek philosophy, particularly in his later years, 
when his banishment from University and professional life ended his career but freed 
him to concentrate, albeit illegally, on topics close to his heart yet forbidden by 
communist censorship. He focused most particularly on the Socratic problem of the 
mode of life most conducive to truth, life as care for the soul. This is, o f course, also the 
mode of life reflective of genuine philosophy, and so a characteristically European 
activity — one eclipsed, however, by the progressive domination in western thought of 
metaphysics. Among his numerous lectures and texts on ancient thought, three stand 
out. First and foremost is a series of lectures from 1973 entitled Plato and Europe, 
delivered illegally to dedicated students in private apartments and concentrating 
specifically on this topic. Nearly simultaneous with the preparation for these lectures 
was a book-length text written for publication in German and eventually entitled Europe 
and the Post-European Age. Finally, in another series o f underground lectures from 
1973, entitled “Four Seminars towards the Problem of Europe” and published as 
samizdat, Patodka returned to these topics and, in response to student questions, to their 
relationship to the later Heidegger.3 The theme that ties these works together is the 
notion of “caring for the soul”; this symbol is the epitome of the Greek contribution to 
European civilization, a contribution that grounds that civilization and is the core of any 
claim it may have to universality.
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In the background of each o f these later texts is a seminal article from 1952 
which also requires a closer look. In “Negative Platonism’' Patodka elucidates his thesis 
o f a non-metaphysical “negative” Platonic philosophy rooted in the Socratic dialogues 
and the concepts o f Socratic ignorance and continual questioning — notions that 
implicitly reject, according to Patodka, any “positive” or objective ground for human 
knowledge. Socrates and, for the most part, Plato are characterized as “shakers,” as 
challengers of systematic knowledge rather than propagators of it.
Patodka’s dedication in these works is to the very notion o f philosophy itself. 
Along with Husserl, he defines it narrowly: as the originally European practice of 
self-reflection pioneered among the philosophers o f ancient Greece.6 Rather than an 
attempt to discover and map out a preexisting given truth, philosophy is an activity that 
effects human reality in the course o f examining it. Human reality, then, is not a fixed 
constant. It is variable, dependent largely upon the particularities of the situation in 
which the human being stands. “The situation o f man,” Patodka writes in Plato and 
Europe, “is something that changes when we become conscious of it. A naive and a 
conscious situation are two different situations. Our reality is always situational, so that 
if it is reflected upon, it is already different by the fact o f our having reflected upon it. 
O f course the question is whether it is in this way better.”7 This last comment, the 
question o f whether we improve reality by reflecting upon it, is not meant rhetorically. 
Reflection is an activity with definite consequences, and Patodka feels that these 
consequences are and must continue to be positive for human life. He maintains that 
“philosophical thought ought to have a different sense, that philosophical thought
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should somehow help us in our need.”* Though philosophy is a dangerous undertaking
in terms o f its challenge to authority, its primary effect is positive: reflection has the
effect o f introducing clarity: “[I]n every case a reflective situation is -- in contrast to a
naive situation — to a certain degree clarified, or at least on the path to clarity.”9
Pato£ka’s understanding o f philosophy stresses reflection as the questioning of
that which we suppose to be certain, simple and clear; it is the questioning o f knowledge
received and accepted without reflection. To the extent it succeeds, it necessarily
challenges the everyday certainties o f life; it calls them into question. The early pursuit
of philosophy in ancient Greece was o f this type, Pato£ka argues, and this is crucial to
the very concept o f reason in Europe. Reason does not naively look to authority for
knowledge, it challenges that naivete.
The process o f the conscious breaking through o f everyday certainty, everyday 
mediocrity, which does not ask the question o f what man lives for, was most deeply 
experienced in Greek philosophy, from which all o f our philosophy comes, and one 
o f its greatest masters, Plato, urgently described this process for us in his dialogues. 
He wanted to show that philosophy is not merely the conveying of some doctrine, of 
certain pieces o f information (pieces of information are that which is contained in 
the sciences), but that philosophy is motion, a certain process in the core o f man 
which is connected in its essence with our recoil or rebound from the naively natural 
and limited everydayness.10
In this form, philosophy can be described as the pursuit o f truth and freedom: two
notions that are meaningful only where we actively question knowledge instead of
living as if it were given.
The spirit o f freedom and truth is the Socratic spirit. Socratic activity, and
Pato£ka clearly considers Socrates a historical figure quite distinct from Plato,
exemplifies the phenomenological movement o f truth described in Body, Community,
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Language, World. It is what is elsewhere called a “life in truth.”11 Patodka’s picture of 
Socrates, rather than repeating the traditional understanding, is instead drawn with the 
help o f Heideggerean insights; his is a Heideggerean Socrates. This is particularly 
interesting as Heidegger looks to the presocratics rather than to Socrates for inspiration 
in An Introduction to Metaphysics.I2 The difference is significant, for although the 
influence of Heidegger is clear, there remain fundamental differences that point 
Patocka’s philosophy in an explicitly ethical and political direction, in distinct contrast 
to Heidegger.
Patodka’s approach to Socrates and classical thought is to take seriously the 
analysis of Heidegger, yet to resist following him too closely. When Patodka contends 
that freedom is an essential component of truth, for example, a kinship with the 
Heideggerean essay “On the Essence of Truth” (in which the essence o f truth is 
described as freedom) is evident. Yet Patodka also differs distinctly from the German 
philosopher in how he interprets and applies this point.13 When Patodka speaks of 
freedom, he speaks of it in the fullness of its social and political, as well as its 
phenomenological, implications. Truth is indeed the freedom to “let beings appear,” as 
Heidegger describes it, but it is also a movement of life, a way of living which humans 
have the potential to achieve and which is characterized by an explicitly ethical side. 
Truth is the freedom, not only to let beings appear, but also live freely and humanly, it 
is the freedom that enables the philosopher to stand and challenge naive faith and 
simply given knowledge. “Truth... is an internal battle of man for his essential, inner 
freedom, a freedom which man has in his core not factually, but essentially. Truth is a
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question of the truthfulness o f man.14 In this conception, truth is as much a matter o f the 
way in which man lives in the long term as it is a product o f the authentic disclosure o f 
beings in a particular moment. This is a significant point o f contrast, for it emphasizes 
truth as a mode of being, a way of life with an implicit moral element.
Plato and Europe
In Plato and Europe, the work most often held up as emblematic o f Patodka’s 
abiding morality, the following claim is made: “I believe that it is perhaps possible,” 
Patocka writes, “to venture to put forward the thesis that Europe.. .arose out o f care fo r  
the soul, TES PSYCHES EMPIMELEISTHAI. This is the embryo out of which grew 
that which Europe was.”15 This is the thesis o f Plato and Europe, and it is a direct 
response to the concerns raised by Edmund Husserl in his late writings on the Crisis o f  
the Sciences. Yet Plato and Europe, which consists of a series o f private lectures from 
the year 1973, is far more than just an attempt to respond to Husserl. Along with the 
Heretical Essays in the Philosophy o f  History, Plato and Europe and its accompanying 
texts represent the high point o f the political philosophy that had been progressively 
developing in Jan Patodka’s thought. Here the question is not philosophy in the abstract, 
but in the concrete setting o f its relation to European history and civilization. The 
problem of Europe, Patodka concludes, is a spiritual problem. It is the problem of the 
“care for the soul.”
The Plato and Europe lectures are the centerpiece o f the many illegal apartment 
lectures given by Patodka during the 1970s, via which he was able to continue to 
philosophize even after he was “retired” from the university by its communist
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administrators. This was the period of “normalization,” a particularly disheartening time 
in Czechoslovak history as the government ruthlessly snuffed out all trace o f the 
freedoms enjoyed in the reformist period o f the late 1960s. Plato and Europe responds 
to this despondent situation as Patodka is explicit in seeking “hope” for the future in his 
reflections. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that these lectures were merely 
dissident texts with the primary aim of offering hope to students discouraged by 
communism; they were in fact broad philosophical reflections directed towards 
civilization in the West as a whole. The distorted ideology o f Czechoslovak 
communism was itself a manifestation of the crisis o f the West, and Patodka intended to 
examine the roots o f that crisis.
These lectures, as their title suggests, establish a connection between Greek 
philosophy and European civilization. They claim that Europe is distinctive by virtue of 
its historical assumption o f the standpoint of classical Greek philosophy, the standpoint 
o f reason, as a guiding principle. The decline o f Europe, both in the narrower sense of 
the loss of its geopolitical dominance and in the broader sense o f the crisis o f  reason 
affecting the West as a whole, is a consequence of its misunderstanding of this 
principle. Its hope for the future, which is a universal hope to the extent the concept of 
reason and its manifestations such as political democracy are considered to be 
applicable to mankind generally, depends on its ability to renew its heritage. Patodka 
felt that the phenomenological philosophies o f Husserl and Heidegger were necessary 
aids in the pursuit o f this goal, although not by themselves sufficient. They were crucial, 
however, to an understanding o f care for the soul in a contemporary context.
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Interestingly, it was often the case that the students to whom Patodka lectured were 
more interested in pursuing the Heideggerean and phenomenological details than the 
Socratic. Yet Patocka made it clear in these lectures that his abiding focus was Western 
civilization rather than contemporary philosophy, and this focus necessitated an 
exploration of the concept o f “care for the soul.” This was, as he stressed, the essence of 
European reality:
One thing, however, puzzles me, that all of you have only questions on 
phenomenology and Heidegger, etc., but not even one question has come 
having to do with Europe, with that which was my most actual thesis; 
that European reality, in spite o f the two great turning points, consists in 
the concern for and care o f the soul resuming the whole o f antiquity, and 
everything that connects with it.16
The very reality of European civilization, he argues, is tied up in its “spiritual
foundations.”17
At the heart o f these lectures is the sense that an understanding of the European
heritage can positively affect human life, both in terms of the self-constitution o f the
individual and of the ordering o f  the civilization itself. Our Platonic heritage, despite its
damaged reputation, still contains the seeds of an authentic life. Those philosophical
seeds, however, must be understood in relation, not to dreams of a perfect system, but of
what Patodka calls the “hardness of reality.”
[A] further question is whether in that which it would be possible to 
demarcate as the European heritage, there exists something that could be 
credible to us to a certain degree, that could affect us in such a way that 
we could again see hope in a certain perspective, in a certain future, 
without indulging in illusory dreams and without in some way 
underestimating the hardness and seriousness o f the situation in which 
we find ourselves.18
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In accepting the hardness o f reality and assuming responsibility for the formation of the 
soul, humans attest to a mode o f living that is truthful, that is constant and of a higher 
order than material reality. To explicate this argument, a closer look at Patodka’s 
understanding o f Europe and o f the concept of the “care for the soul” is required.
As the dominant geopolitical entity in the world, Patodka argues, Europe has 
effectively ended, its position destroyed during two wars in the space o f thirty years. 
The world has entered a post-european age and it is the role o f philosophy to assist in 
restoring equilibrium -- not by returning Europe to its former position of power, but by 
seeking to understand the path that Europe traveled and how it failed to take up the 
challenge presented by its Socratic heritage. It is a quest, Patodka asserts, that touches 
not merely upon the relationship o f European man to his own history, but of humanity 
in general.
But the question is, when we go towards the roots of the present 
disequilibrium, whether we must not go to the beginnings o f Europe 
itself and through these beginnings ail the way to the very relation 
between man and his place in the world; whether the disequilibrium that 
we observe today is something that has to do not only with European 
man in a particular historical age, but something that today concerns man 
in general in his relation to the planet. I think that it is necessary to 
answer this question positively: it concerns man and his relation to the 
planet. And this is clear precisely today, when Europe has ended. When 
Europe, that two-thousand-year construction which was able to carry 
humanity to a quite new level of reflectivity and consciousness, and also 
power and strength, when this historical reality, which for so long 
assumed that all o f humanity was contained in it, that it is humanity and 
all others insignificant, has definitively ended.19
Patodka explains the decline of Europe as a result of two main factors: disunity and
enormous power. Disunity, meaning the prevalence of numerous sovereign states at
varying levels of development without any higher authority, was coupled with
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enormous power, available as a result o f modem technical and scientific knowledge. 
Both factors, he notes, are specifically modem, for while the disunity o f sovereign states 
in itself is neither new nor negative, it is only in the modem era that this situation occurs 
in the absence of a higher, unifying authority.20 Europe is not a single state, and Patodka 
does not propose to make it one; it does possess a common history and heritage, 
however. The argument in Plato and Europe contends that, more than any other single 
factor, the recognition and philosophical explication o f the heritage o f Europe as “care 
for the soul” has the potential to provide relief from the history of the twentieth century 
as war.21
The lectures o f Plato and Europe point backwards from the contemporary 
disunity to the Greek polis as the foundational moment in European history. The 
spiritual core of Europe is found in the Greek polis; the Roman Empire, and Christianity 
following it, both draw upon that heritage in their attempts to order European 
civilization. In arguing for the singular importance o f the Greek experience, Patodka 
must contend that both the Judaic and the Christian traditions are not independent poles 
of European culture, but derivative poles in that they had first to “travel through” Greek 
thought in order to become what they did for European civilization. Judaism, he argues, 
had to Hellenize itself, whereas Christianity itself is indebted to Athens for the thought 
of the “other world” of justice and pure good.22 Though arresting, this analysis is 
insufficiently backed by argumentation; it is asserted but not defended with historical 
evidence, making it a shortcoming in Patodka’s work.
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What is it that characterizes Greek philosophy in such a distinctive way?
Patocka describes it in terms of a conscious decision to no longer accept life and its 
inevitable decline as simply given, but to challenge it. Greek philosophy, he contends, is 
characterized by the refusal to accept the simple fate o f a world and a life ever in 
decline. It resisted the inevitability o f decline and, in doing so, discovered both the 
“eternal” and human freedom. The battle against the degenerative tendency o f the 
world, the resistance to it, is precisely human freedom; this is what the Greeks called 
care fo r the soul.
The philosophical discovery o f eternity is a special thing. From the point 
o f view of modem natural science it is naturally incomprehensible. But 
what is contained in it? It is precisely resistance, it is a battle against that 
fall, against time, against that entire degenerative tendency o f the world 
and of life. This battle is in a certain sense understandably lost, but in a 
certain other sense not, because the situation in which man is, is different 
according to how he stands in relation to it. And the freedom o f man 
rests — possibly — precisely in this! The Greeks, Greek philosophers, in 
whom the Greek spirit is expressed most sharply, expressed human 
freedom in the following terms: care for the soul.23
With this we have the first hint as to the explicit content o f the concept o f caring for the
soul. The assumption of an attitude o f caring for the soul changes the situation in which
man stands; it enables him to stand freely, but it demands o f him a burdensome
responsibility.
In the second chapter of Plato and Europe, Patodka attempts to demonstrate that 
his concern with Greek philosophy and Socrates is related to his phenomenology. It was 
through Edmund Husserl that he came to be engaged in the pursuit o f the principle upon 
which European life was founded, and it is through Husserlian phenomenology that he 
wished to demonstrate the relevance o f his conclusions. Yet Patodka makes a point of
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recognizing the differences between his work and Husserl’s. He describes his work 
phenomenologically yet also recognizes an essential difference between it and pure 
phenomenology. Patodka pursues, in Plato and Europe, what he calls 
“phenomenological philosophy.” This is a purposeful distinction, implying the 
contention that philosophy properly pursued is inseparable from the social realm, the 
realm of human interaction with other beings and with the things of the world. 
“Phenomenological philosophy,” he writes, “differs from phenomenology in that it not 
only wants to distinguish phenomena as such, but it also wants to deduce consequences, 
it wants to deduce from this metaphysical consequences, that means it asks about the 
relation between phenomena and beings.”24 In other words, Patodka wishes his 
phenomenological philosophy to have a broader aim than just the distinguishing of 
phenomena. It is to touch directly upon issues consequential to the act of philosophizing 
itself, issues such as the relation of the philosopher to society and to the concrete world.
Importantly, however, Patodka attempts to make it clear that phenomenology, as 
a science of revealing, is still appropriate to that at which he aims. This is so because the 
distinguishing of phenomena is for him no abstract venture. It is tied to human 
comportment in the world both in terms of the consequences mentioned above, and in 
relation to the effect on human action of morality, o f the differentiation between good 
and evil. When we decide how to comport ourselves, when we decide how to act in 
relation to good and evil, we reveal ourselves. And that which leads us to decide how to 
act is also revealed. As Patodka puts it,
Just when man does not want to merely recognize, when he wants at the 
same time to act, when he orients himself with respect to good and evil,
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everywhere there something must — this is clear -- show itself to him.
Precisely that must show itself to him which designates good and evil 
and, naturally, because good and evil are something that concern us, we 
must at the same time reveal ourselves to ourselves.”25
It is in revealing itself that something genuinely becomes a “phenomenon,” that is,
something distinguished from a mere being. Phenomena are beings that have been
revealed, or that manifest themselves. They show themselves in truth.26
In the case o f the human being, this is a crucial distinction. Man is a being of
truth, meaning a being who has the potential to live truthfully, to show himself and view
others without distortion. He is unlike other beings in this possibility. Yet this remains
for him only a possibility, not a given characteristic. “Man has, on the basis o f the fact
that he stands between phenomena and mere being, the possibility to either capitulate
andfall into mere being, or to realize himself as a being o f  truth, a being o f
phenomena,”27 The human situation is one that is in-between truth and mere being. Man
has the choice to live as if the objects and equations and given knowledge around him
are exhaustive of reality, but he also has the choice to open himself to the possibility
that phenomena are more complex than they at first appear. The course of human life,
Patocka contends, is determined either by the pursuit of the higher movement or
capitulation to the lower.
The mode of truth, however, the mode of revealing human life as it truly is, does
not deliver man of pain and insecurity. In fact, it may do the opposite by revealing the
basic problematicity o f life. Man is a being in a precarious situation; his world is not
simple and secure, it is fundamentally problematic. Living philosophically, living in
truth, does not solve problems so much as it presents them. The recognition of man as a
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being of truth damns him to a life o f  problematicity as it frees him from bondage to the 
merely material. The consciousness o f man as a being o f problematicity is not new to 
Greek philosophy, however, it is present in myth as well, in the common notion of 
man’s standing in the universe as an insecure one. It was the greatness of the Greek 
philosophers, Patodka argues, not merely to recognize this problematicity, but to infer 
from it a “plan o f life” that was not a curse, but was a form o f human greatness. 
“Everything from insight,” is how Patocka describes it.28 Mankind is not doomed by the 
precariousness o f his existence that shows itself so clearly in, for example, the myth of 
Oedipus. To the contrary, our insight enables us to rise up from out of our situation of 
desperation. As a result of insight, human life is shown to be other than as in traditional 
myth, that is, doomed to a certain futility, to a helplessness in the face of fate, by virtue 
of man’s essential separateness from the realm of the divine.
Insight is the mode by which we apply a philosophical vision to human life. It is 
the mode by which we order our existence in the world, it is our means to create a just 
order out o f chaos. The solution o f Greek philosophy is to show that man, though not 
divine, is not merely an object among others in the world. He is privileged with the 
possibility o f living on a higher level than other beings o f nature, a level approaching 
the divine. Because of this, the Greeks could see that “[m]an would be able, in certain 
circumstances, to make of the human world a world o f truth and justice. The way in 
which it is possible to achieve this,” Patodka concludes, “is precisely the object of 
caring for the soul.”29
109
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The “care for the soul” is recognized as the instrument o f such an action, an 
action that would enable man to live, not as a mere being, but as a being of insight. It 
would enable him to take from his knowledge of living with other humans, for example, 
the “moral insight,” which is itself the “sedimentation and codification” of human 
experience.30 The result is that Patodka believes that Europe is characterized precisely 
by this call to reflection, for only in Europe did this movement from myth to philosophy 
occur. European history, broadly speaking, is the history of various attempts to embody 
institutionally this care for the soul.31
C aring for the Soul 
The process of philosophy is that o f caring for the soul. Yet as I have attempted 
to stress, this process is understood, not by a traditional Platonic analysis, drawing upon 
metaphysical concepts, but through a set o f analytical lenses derived largely from 
phenomenology and the work o f Martin Heidegger. The process o f caring for the soul, 
therefore, must be examined in greater detail, as must its component parts.
The component that first springs to mind, particularly in relation to Heidegger, is 
the active part o f the process, the act of caring. In Being and Time “care,” or Sorge, is 
described as the being of Dasein, as the existential a priori that precedes the situations 
of Dasein?2 Patodka’s concept of care, however, differs distinctly from that which 
Heidegger describes. It is more accurately described, as Jacques Derrida wrote in The 
Gift o f  Death, as a concept that combines the Platonic meaning o f “learning to die,” 
melete thanatou from the Phaedo, and Heidegger’s Sorge?3 Another commentator, 
Avezier Tucker, argues somewhat one-sidedly that the concept is entirely Socratic.
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Pato£ka’s “care for the soul,” he writes, is a Socratic concept in its entirety. Apart from 
stressing the importance of finitude, it “bears little resemblance to Heidegger’s ‘care,...’ 
Patocka’s ‘care’ is far more humanistic and metaphysical.”34 Derrida is the more 
accurate here, however, for although “care for the soul” comes directly from the 
Platonic dialogues, it is read negatively, that is, under the influence of the Heideggerean 
critique o f metaphysics. In his Heretical Essays, for example, the Platonic melete 
thanatou shows the influence of “being-towards-death”: “Another important moment 
is that the Platonic philosopher overcame death by not fleeing from it but by facing up 
to it. This philosophy was melete thanatou, care for death; care for the soul is 
inseparable from care for death which becomes the true care for life; life (eternal) is 
bom of this direct look at death, o f an overcoming o f death.”35 PatoCka’s aim, in 
responding to the Husserlian call for a phenomenological rediscovery of the European 
spirit, is to combine in his interpretation of “care for the soul” the traditional concern for 
ethics integral to Greek philosophy with the liberating aspects o f the contemporary 
perspective. Heideggerean influence is undeniably present in this interpretation of 
Socratic philosophy, and it is also reflected in the attempt to pinpoint the elusive nature 
of the second component of “care for the soul”: the soul itself.
In his discussion of care for the soul, however, PatoCka appears to contradict his 
own stated aim to avoid metaphysics by making use of concepts that are clearly 
metaphysical in content, as, for example, the notion of the “soul.” In common 
understanding, the soul seems to be nothing other than an objectification of a 
transcendental concept -- the embodiment of something that is beyond objective reality
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so as to make our way in the world more secure, more full o f  answers. Following 
Heidegger, Patodka would be expected to eschew the use o f such terms. Yet he argues 
emphatically that the adoption of a non-metaphysical stance with regard to philosophy 
does not necessitate the abandonment o f metaphor and symbolism that is traditionally 
considered metaphysical — insofar as those symbols reflect human reality. The notion o f 
the soul, or to be more specific, the Greek soul, is an example o f such a symbol. It is 
incumbent, then, to inquire into the content of this concept.
Patodka begins by noting that philosophy from its Greek beginnings defines the 
soul as that in the human being which is capable o f truth.36 This, however, is merely 
descriptive. It is more instructive to understand the Greek soul in terms o f the essential 
element o f philosophy: human understanding. And so Patodka writes in a text from a 
series of seminars dedicated to the problems of Plato and Europe that “[w]hen thinking 
begins, the most it is possible to say is that on one side here stands the world, like a 
collection o f everything which is, on the other side stands the philosophizing man with 
his ability to understand that which is the world. This ability to understand, this is called 
soul, in the Greek conception. This is the original understanding, that, on the basis of 
which man has the ability o f truth and o f individual truths.”37 The soul is thus defined in 
terms of an ability, a human characteristic that looks beyond the simply material in 
human reality.
Soul is the characteristic of man that gives him the ability of truth. And truth, as 
I noted in my discussion of phenomenology, is a function of what Patodka terms the 
“movements” o f human life — it is the highest of those movements.38 In this way it can
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be said that both the soul and the truth that it can effect are directly relative to action, to 
human movement. This is nowhere more to the point than in considering the activity of 
human decision-making. In one o f his post-WWII lectures on Greek philosophy at 
Charles University, Patodka noted that the meaning of the soul in ancient Greece 
changed with Socrates. Human fate came to be seen as an internal phenomenon, relative 
to our decision-making, rather than an external one over which we have no control. 
“With Socrates,” Patodka writes, “the soul is also the bearer o f fate. But it is inner fate, 
the inner lot o f man. The soul decides for itself and has a power towards this end which 
is its alone -- the recognition o f truth, the strength o f distinguishing good and evil.”39 
The soul acts upon us in those moments when we must decide, when we encounter the 
possibility o f exerting control upon our own fate by refusing to give in to the weight of 
events as they come at us. It acts upon us by recognizing truth, and by differentiating 
between good and evil. This, however, is not a given characteristic. It exists for man as 
an inherent possibility, one available to him only if he pursues it via caring for the soul. 
It comes, also, at a price, for the decision to act based upon recognition o f good and evil 
is the decision to accept the burden o f a life that is no longer simple and instinctive, but 
problematic.
Why, then, would one choose to care for the soul, why would one choose to 
distinguish good from evil and thereby problematize life? The answer, Patodka argues, 
lies in the relationship of the soul, via its movement, to being. It is with a fundamental 
ontology, rather than a metaphysics, that this conception of the soul can be understood. 
In other words, to understand the soul one must not think of it as an entity, a thing, but
113
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
rather as the locus o f our relationship to our own being. The soul is the centerpoint of a 
hierarchy of being in Patodka’s work. It is the ability to understand our own being, a 
figurative point from which we may move either toward a growth o f our being (which 
would be a movement towards “good”), or towards a loss o f being (evil). Care for the 
soul is in this way emblematic of Patodka’s non-metaphysical approach to classical 
theory.
At the center o f Patocka’s interpretation of phenomenology, as I noted in
Chapter One, is the concept o f movement. According to Plato, the defining
characteristic o f the soul is its self-movement; the soul is defined by its motion.40 But
motion towards what? The human ability to recognize truth and good is not a given
characteristic but a possibility that the human must pursue in his being. The motion of
the soul, therefore, its basic function, is tied to the development o f our being — a
development that is expressed either in terms of a heightening, an expansion, o f being,
or a degradation of it. PatoCka explains his notion in his discussion of care for the soul
in Europe and the Post-European Age:
In the ontological-cosmological representation o f reality care for the soul 
consequently reveals itself as a theory of motion, like Phaedrus’ AUTO 
HE AUTO KINUN [that which moves itself]. On the other hand it is 
possible to formulate care for the soul itself, from this point of view, 
more precisely: the soul is that which defines itself in the direction of its 
being and that which consequently directs itself either towards legitimate 
growth, towards a growth of being, or on the contrary towards decline 
and a loss o f being: the soul is an indicator o f the main arteries o f 
being.41
The soul, as I have noted, has a differentiating function, and these arteries of being that 
it indicates run parallel to the human categories o f good and evil. In distinguishing these
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avenues, the soul helps to distinguish that which is good, for the good exists as that 
toward which we aim when we develop our being, when we heighten it by the act of 
reflection.
In this, then, its most fundamental role is manifested even more 
markedly. The soul is that which has a sense of good and evil. The soul 
can exist only when good exists, for its basic motion is motion in the 
direction of good, but on the other hand good itself has meaning as the 
goal and vanishing point o f everything only at the point where there 
exists motion. Only insofar as there exists something that can heighten its 
being by motion towards the good is good operative, meaning it is 
(exists). The soul thus not only makes possible a conception o f the 
overall hierarchy of being in the sense of good, i.e., a teleological 
conception, but it is at the same time a justification of good, it gives an 
answer to the question (which even Nietzsche expressly asked), why 
choose good and not evil, why truth and not (the possibly more practical) 
seeming.42
We choose good, in this explanation, not because it is an eternal and concrete value in 
and of itself, something that we can grasp and hold on to, but because our motion 
towards it represents a heightening o f our being.
As Patocka explains it, good itself is no concrete object, it is neither simple nor 
unambiguous. Because it is not a concrete, static category, knowledge o f good (and evil) 
is also subject to ambiguity, to a lack o f clarity. This truth, Pato£ka notes, is found even 
in pre-philosophic myth and tragedy.43 Oedipus, for example, represents the painful 
ambiguity of knowledge of truth. Through philosophy and myth we try to see the world 
as a whole, to see it in truth; in doing so, however, we see that there can be ambiguity in 
matters of good and evil. As human, we see the world only in perspectives. It is 
revealed to us in parts. “The world is given to us as a whole, but that doesn’t mean that 
it isn’t given to us perspectivally and that it’s given everywhere in its fullness....it is a
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fullness from a certain point o f view. The world.. .is revealed to us necessarily 
perspectivally.”44 With this phenomenological argument -- it is phenomenology that 
reveals to us the fact that, because we encounter objects in a series o f (one-sided) 
perspectives, our access to them as a whole is not achievable objectively — we cannot 
but be convinced of the tenuousness of any claim we have to overall knowledge. Access 
to truth is, instead of an objective process, a factor o f our reflection and insight, or what 
Husserl referred to as intuition.45 Such is the case, as well, with the world as a whole, 
along with the ability to distinguish between good and evil. “Clarity,” Patodka notes in 
his discussion of Oedipus, “is the domain of gods. Into it man strayed and in it man 
wanders.”46 Man is not a creature o f divine knowledge. He is ignorant o f the most 
important things, but he is possessed of the potential for insight, as the Greeks 
discovered. His mode of access to knowledge and to good is through his ability to care 
for his soul, and so to increase his being, to be more fully human.
Caring for the soul occurs via movement that reveals to us our possibilities as 
human beings, and thereby lays a foundation for our choices, our actions. It is the 
movement of European philosophy, Patodka argues, and it reveals that the soul is in 
motion between two fundamental possibilities, two levels of being. The first is the level 
o f DOXA, or opinion, the second that o f reflective insight. The soul has the possibility 
to embody either of these two degrees o f being.
Care for the soul is thus at the same time a discovery of two fundamental 
possibilities o f the soul, two regions in which it moves. The soul o f 
everyday intercourse with things and people in naively accepted 
solidarity is the soul o f uncertain immediacy, its environment is 
intrusive, binding, but uncertain, diffuse, it wavers without solid outlines 
and limits: it is the soul proper to DOXA. Opposite to this is the soul of
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questioning examination o f the reflective spirit, persisting in solid 
outlines, purity and exactness.47
The movement o f the soul is movement between these two possibilities. This, in itself,
Patoika argues, is the action o f philosophy. It is not an action that is or can be justified
objectively, its success is not determined by quantitative results. Rather, its goal is unity
in man by the formation o f the soul in solid outline, a soul that is certain in the
consistency of its reflective insight.
The soul caring for itself is thus in motion from uncertain immediacy to a 
determining reflection. In this motion is philosophy, and this motion is 
reality. Philosophy is hence comprehended and achieved by action; there 
does not exist any “objective” proof o f philosophy, as there are objective 
proofs of mathematical theorems which do not concern our being, do not 
have an influence on it and are independent o f it. In this motion consists, 
on the other hand, actual philosophizing; for that reason its cause cannot 
be erected on anything on the earth, nor hanging from the sky, but takes 
place in the soul in the form of sparks which maintain themselves.48
The soul is the locus of the action o f philosophizing — philosophy as care for the soul.
Philosophy is thus defined, via Patocka’s reading of Plato, not as the custodian
of the soul on its journey to a final truth, but as the action of directing the continual
movement of the soul by a process of thinking through questions, or “thinking
questioningly.” Patodka thereby arrives at the final element o f care for the soul: its
effect on our activity. One cares for the soul, then, by a philosophical process directed
by the putting of questions. “Care for the soul generally takes place by thinking
questioningly .”49 The form of philosophy indicated by care for the soul is one of
thought-directed motion, continual and without a concrete goal. It “leads man towards a
goal only in the sense that he keeps always in his mind that he continually persist.”50
The goal itself does not exist in any concrete, achievable form. The existence of such a
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goal would contradict the urge to investigate itself; it would instead become an urge to 
find. “[I]n the acceptance of investigation,” Patodka notes, “is a concomitant certainty 
that there does not exist any end.”51
Care for the soul, understood in this way, is the origin of the philosophical idea 
that is independent of systems.52 This characterization of a philosophy inherently 
resistant to any attempt to systematize it, to capture its essence in a replicable plan of 
action, seems to imply, however, that it could only with great difficulty serve as a stable 
foundation upon which human action and politics could be based. This is, in one sense, 
true. Philosophy cannot provide the stability and safety of a concrete, consistent and 
unmoving ground under our feet. But, and this goes to the heart o f Patodka’s argument 
for a philosophy o f politics, this does not preclude all solidity, all sense of continuity or 
consistency. The argument for a phenomenological philosophy o f movement, based on 
an interpretation o f Socrates as a quasi-heretical figure who aimed to shake the 
foundations of Greek society rather than set them in concrete, does not condemn the 
philosophical endeavor to a conclusion that is nihilistic or a form of postmodern 
relativism. It does not mean that we are unable to speak of ethics as anything other than 
relative to a situation or to our will. Patodka argues precisely to the contrary.53
What this philosophy does preclude is the summation of life into a simple 
“truth” based on evidence that is “given” to us in a seemingly self-evident manner. “The 
reflecting Socrates, who refutes all those who assume that they have the truth, 
concentrates his attack especially on those who assume that they can deduce new rules 
of life from that which is present, from that which is self-evident and given. Just the sort
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of rules of life, as that which says it is good to care for one’s own welfare at all cost.”54
Yet this Socratic “attack” is not directed toward a critique o f all solidity in human life.
To the contrary, its exposure o f the naive and the unreflective is directed toward an
illumination of that which is truly solid and lasting.
In a very real sense, the concept o f the soul and our care for it can act as a
foundation for human comportment. It gives enduring and unified form to that part of
our being which directs our movement and activity. By the thinking that is at the center
of Patocka’s view of philosophy, we engage in a process o f “the inner formation o f the
soul itself, formation in something uniformly solid and, in this sense, existing — exactly
because it is engaged in thinking.” Through the process o f care, he continues,
the soul first comes to be what it can be, i.e. a unity, not contradicting 
itself, excluding and exorcising all possibility o f dispersing in 
contradiction, and thus does it come to dwell in the end in something that 
lasts, that is solid. And in the end, everything must be founded upon that 
which is solid. Upon this is founded our conduct as good men, and upon 
this also our thinking is founded, because only that thinking which 
reveals that which is solid, reveals that which is.55
The solidity achieved by caring for the soul consists neither o f an objectively derived
system based on material elements, nor of a simple, divine being upon whom we can
fall back when we are in doubt. It is, rather, a ground for our conduct based on the fact
that our very being is taken up and formed, unified, by the process that is most distinctly
ours as human beings: the process o f “thinking questioningly” that leads to
understanding. The soul that does not engage in this inner questioning is at the mercy of
the waves of delight and distress that go hand in hand; the soul that does gains a solid
form against this fate. Care for the soul is an effort to “stand solidly in the tempest of
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time,” to give to our being a sense of solidity and a connection to that which is not 
subject to the caprice o f fortune and fate. And on this basis, it is an effort to find a 
consistency in our humanity such that we can direct our own comportment in a way that 
transcends time.
Metaphysics and “Negative Platonism”
Yet to be discussed is perhaps the most important element o f PatoSka’s 
interpretation o f Greek philosophy. This is his critique o f metaphysics, which is the 
pillar upon which he constructs his interpretation o f Plato, Europe and philosophy. The 
basis of the critique, which he calls a “negative Platonism,” is an argument that the 
Socratic “care for the soul” is something fundamentally different from the metaphysical 
Platonism from which Western philosophy and science took its lead and to which it has 
been indebted since Plato. The Pato£kan critique takes its lead from Heidegger, but 
whereas the Heideggerean attempt at a post-metaphysical philosophy rejects Platonic 
writings -- including the ethico-political arguments o f the Socratic dialogues — in favor 
o f the work o f the pre-Socratics, Patodka focuses on the figure o f Socrates. The Socratic 
dialectic, he argues, represents the motive core of philosophy; it is the living essence of 
what later became metaphysics. “Negative Platonism” is a post-metaphysical approach 
to Socrates and Platonism, and it is one of the major achievements o f his career. The 
thesis of “Negative Platonism” is found in an article o f the same name (along with 
several accompanying texts), stemming from the 1950s.56 Though these articles were 
not published during Patodka’s lifetime, they represent the philosophical ground upon 
which his later interpretation of Europe, history and politics was able to proceed.
120
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Pato£ka notes at the beginning o f “Negative Platonism” that there seems to be a 
common consensus in philosophical and intellectual circles that the “metaphysical phase 
of philosophy has come to an end.” Metaphysics as philosophy is said to be fatally 
unclear, a “surpassed, obsolete science,” and little more than a “secularized theology.”57 
If a careful analysis is undertaken, however, it can be shown that those philosophies that 
trumpet the death of metaphysics most loudly — positivism and Hegelianism, for 
example -- merely take over, rather than dispense with, the fundamental question of 
metaphysics, the question o f the whole. These philosophies lead to an integral 
humanism that, rather than discarding the problem of the whole, absorbs it into its own, 
anthropocentric perspective on human reality. In spite o f all the resistance to the forms 
that metaphysics traditionally assumed in history, this modem humanism “continues to 
operate within the matrix set down by this tradition, precisely as a militant opposition to 
it.”58
O f what then, PatoCka is prompted to ask by the shortsightedness o f the modem 
perspective, is or was metaphysics actually comprised and how does it relate to 
philosophy as such? Exactly what it is that is supposed to have died is unclear, he 
argues, because the question itself has yet to be posed adequately.59 An examination of 
metaphysics begins with the pre-Socratic “protophilosophy,” for, though we lack a good 
history o f earliest philosophy, it is clear that here an as yet undifferentiated theory began 
to take shape. This theory took on a form distinguishing itself from other forms of 
inquiry with the philosopher whom Pato£ka calls “the last representative o f this 
primordial form of thought”: Socrates.60 In recognizing Socrates as a “representative”
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of protophilosophy, Pato£ka is making an argument that is crucial to distinguishing his 
work from Heidegger’s. Rather than follow Heidegger back to the pre-Socratic thinkers 
and so dismiss the insight o f the dialogues, Pato£ka argues that Socrates is a distinct 
figure, one needing to be considered separately from the core of Platonic writings. The 
figure of Socrates, whether or not a historical reality, is distinct in that he represents and 
personifies the “philosophical protoknowledge” which offers a pre-metaphysical and 
ontological insight into reality.61 Socrates is not to be understood as the tradition sees 
him, as “a mere introductory chapter o f Platonism.” Socrates is not a witness for the 
humanism that ensued from the classical tradition of metaphysics; to the contrary, he is 
opposed to it.62
While separating out Socrates for special consideration, PatoCka agrees with 
Heidegger that Plato is the founder of metaphysics. His thesis departs from Heidegger 
with its conviction that the Socratic dialogues and their depiction of the polis and the 
role of the philosopher in it is too insightful to be disregarded. Despite this difference, 
Patocka claims to remain in basic agreement with the approach to metaphysics of which 
Heidegger is a representative -- termed the “new” critique of metaphysics. Unlike 
humanist philosophy with its attempt to negate metaphysics and deny the relevance of, 
as in the case of positivism, questions about human reality not grounded in quantifiable 
fact, this “new” critique recognized the deadening effects of metaphysical 
systematization without negating the genuine insight into humanity, at the core of the 
human desire to look beyond the given, to search for the whole.63 PatoCka’s own
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perspective on metaphysics, notwithstanding its distinctness from the Heideggerean
critique, also claims to reflect this approach. As he puts it,
[t]he purpose of these reflections is now to show that this new way of 
overcoming metaphysics, unlike the older attempts, does not limit itself 
to mere negation and does not impoverish humans by taking away any 
essential aspect o f their being,... For that very reason, this new way can 
understand even metaphysics itself, taking from it, in a purified form, its 
essential philosophical thrust and carrying it on.64
It is not a simple rejection of metaphysics that Patodka is after, but a genuine
understanding of its internal history, its experiential essence and the way in which it
abandoned that essence in attempting to capture it in a system.
Plato is the creator o f metaphysics, yet still he “remains rooted in this
premetaphysical soil”; he shows this through his focus on and description of Socrates.65
The story of metaphysics that Patodka traces thus begins with the form o f knowledge
represented by Socrates, contrasted to that later developed primarily by Plato and
Aristotle. Socratic knowledge, of course, is commonly described as Socratic ignorance,
or, as Patodka notes, as “learned ignorance, that is, as a question.”66 Socrates continually
challenges his interlocutors through questions — questions that skeptically analyze
assertions based on finite knowledge. The finite, earthly knowledge o f particulars
commonly thought to constitute wisdom is shown to be faulty and insufficient. It is
knowledge that relates only to things directly present, and so neglects to relate to the
whole. While the Socratic mode of questioning directly concerns life as a whole, it is
unable, in keeping with its skeptical nature, to capture the essence o f that whole in
words. This, Socrates knows, is a human impossibility, and he unveils this reality as
“one of the fundamental contradictions of being human, that between the relation to the
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whole, intrinsic to humans, and the inability, the impossibility o f expressing this 
relation in the form o f an ordinary finite knowledge.”67 This self-understanding is 
characteristic o f the figure o f Socrates. As Patodka reads him, however, Plato took steps 
beyond the limits of the Socratic model. He did so by laying out a plan for, and setting 
as a goal, the transcendence o f this situation of fundamental uncertainty. In doing so, in 
formulating a conception o f ideal forms and considering a means to reach them, Plato, 
charges Patocka, laid a groundwork for the development of a form o f knowledge that is 
not uncertain and intangible but objective.
The “premetaphysical soil” mentioned above is far from a secure foundation. 
Through questioning, Socrates casts into doubt the naive security o f those with whom 
he speaks; he acts so as to “shake” the simple foundation upon which they thought they 
stood safely. He conceives o f life as a question without a simple answer — an inherently 
unsettling formulation. In contrast to this approach is metaphysics: “[t]he essence of 
metaphysics as Plato, Aristotle, and Democritus formulated it consists in offering an 
answer to the Socratic (or pre-Socratic) question, one which the philosopher seeks to 
derive from the question itself.”68 Plato, as Patodka describes him in this article, took 
that step by describing philosophy as not only as a movement transcending the sensible, 
but as one seeking to reach the transcendent Being. It was a movement from the 
“apparent” to the “real” that took place via a dialectical process, a system by which one 
sought the unconditional, the indubitable.69 Patodka locates this movement towards a 
metaphysics first in the Platonic conceptualization o f the Ideas and then in the 
presentation of a conceptual systematics, a dialectic “that permitted an ascent from the
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sensible to the suprasensible as well as a descent in the opposite direction.”70 This was, 
Patocka argues, “the first adumbration of a positive (rationalistic) metaphysics” that not 
only contributed to a philosophy o f metaphysics, but to positive science as well, 
offering a paradigmatic example of a “conceptual systematics” from which Western 
science took its lead.71 It was a movement towards a positive form o f knowledge distinct 
from the negative, skeptical approach of Socrates. What was ignorance becomes a form 
of knowing, “a true knowledge more secure than anything on earth and in the 
heavens.”72
This development changes the face of the fledgling project o f philosophy at its
very outset. Both Plato and Aristotle, Patodka notes, moved from a conception of the
Idea as “rigorously transcendent” to a consideration of “mundane, astronomic
hierarchies.” The results o f this movement towards ideal being, towards an absolute
form of knowledge and a solid, stable foundation upon which humanity can rest and
from which it can take comfort, are summed up by Patodka in no uncertain terms:
Finally, human comportment, the meaning of human life, too, receives 
its formation from ideal being. The integrity of human life is broken.
Man becomes one of the beings ruled by ideas; ethics and politics as a 
grand unity take on the task o f discovering the inner ideal law of a 
humanly perfect life. Thus all these metaphysical disciplines, bequeathed 
to us by the inspired protooriginators and preserved for us by a long 
tradition, manifest the fundamental substitution of a transcendent, 
nonexistent Being for the perennial existents [beings], a substitution 
bound up with the crucial conception of what-is [beings as a whole] as 
perennial. Thus the living force of transcendence is replaced by an image 
of reality which may be harmonious, “spiritual,” but is rigid and lifeless; 
so in place of the living reality of Socrates' struggle against the 
degeneration o f life we now have the imitation of the eternal world of 
Ideas. The absolute claim o f truth now appears guaranteed by an 
invincible conceptual system and actualized in the form of the perfect
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state. The Idea, the source o f absolute truth, becomes at the same time 
the source of all that is and of all life within it.73
Politics and ethics reflect this substitution o f the static for the motive, the concrete for
the intangible, as much as does philosophy itself. The striving for the perfect state, for
perfection on earth, is directly related to the positing of what is essentially a concrete
and eternal world of Ideas, the notion being that no activity is more worthy of man than
the attempt to replicate that perfection.
Despite his critique o f Plato, Pato£ka’s goal here is still to illuminate a
“Platonism.” What Plato has done is to conceptualize a ground, a soil, from which
metaphysical thinking could spring. He did not construct a  philosophy that could stand
solidly on that ground. There is much in the Platonic corpus to make clear that the
metaphysical problem had not in any way been resolved, and Patodka recognizes this
fact clearly. It is for this reason, in the end, that he shifts much o f responsibility for the
project of metaphysics onto the shoulders o f the more systematic and scientific
approach taken by Aristotle. It is Aristotle who becomes the standard, the
“philosopher,” who inspires Western philosophy as well as science. The result is that
“the attempt to build a science of the absolute, objective, and positive whole crowds out
all other motifs and becomes the point of contention for the next two millennia.”74
Modem humanist thinking, as I have noted, tended to replicate anthropologically
the goal o f “a global understanding of the whole” embodied in metaphysics even as it
decried metaphysics itself. It was not until the relatively recent, twentieth-century
attempts to dominate social reality on the basis of a radical humanism, however, that
this form o f thought, newly emboldened by advances in technology, came to its fully
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mature form.75 Modem politics, which Pato£ka describes as embodying a “rule of
Force,” is grounded in this anthropocentric transformation o f metaphysics.76
At the heart o f  Socratic teaching was an experience o f freedom that Patodka
seeks to illuminate. It began with the oracle’s injunction to “know thyself.” In the
understanding o f  logical positivism, Patodka points out, this would mean looking only
to “external experience” to fulfill this requirement. The injunction itself, however, urges
us to understand, not only the experience we have, but the experience we are.77 In the
case o f Socrates, the experience that we are is the experience o f freedom. Socratic
knowledge (or ignorance) is absolutely free; the philosopher frees himself from the
material and objective limitations to which his interlocutors remain bound and can thus
master them in the course o f the dialectic.
He could not be that masterful contestant if he were not wholly free, if he 
were bound to something finite in heaven or on earth. Socrates’ mastery 
is based on an absolute freedom; he is constantly freeing himself of all 
the bonds o f nature, or tradition, o f others’ schemata as well as o f his 
own, of all physical and spiritual possessions. That is an immensely 
audacious philosophy.78
It is a philosophy characterized not only by its audacity but by its freedom. This is the
experience articulated by the character of Socrates in the dialogues. It is “negative” in
the sense that, rather than positing some positive content, it takes on “the negative
character of a distance, of a remove, of an overcoming o f every objectivity.”
Establishing a distance from the concrete and positive objects o f the world enables one
to view them, for the first time, in the context o f the whole.79 The experience of freedom
enables one to make decisions from a perspective o f some remove, which is a
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perspective o f clarity. In articulating this “negative” experience o f transcending the
objective realm through freedom, Socrates does not enter into metaphysics.
Patodka contrasts what he has described as a “positive” Platonism with his own
interpretation of Socratic freedom, a freedom that presumes a gap, or a “fundamental
separation between Ideas and our reality” that in no way seeks to, or is able to, be
bridged. This is what he calls “negative Platonism,” a non-metaphysical interpretation
of Platonic philosophy that will serve as a basis for a more authentic approach to human
experience. Negative Platonism bases itself, not on metaphysics, but on the historical
experience o f human beings:
The interpretation o f our human experience, the experience of historical 
beings, is something in principle different from metaphysics. While 
metaphysics discovers a new universe, taking it as its starting point and 
transcending it, the interpretation o f experience discovers, uncovers, 
sheds light on this, our given life-world, uncovering what had been 
hidden in it, its concealed meaning, its intrinsic structure, its internal 
drama.80
Negative Platonism, Patodka maintains, is an approach to mankind’s historical reality 
that is neither metaphysical nor an anthropocentric humanism. It is not, however, a 
rejection of the experience of transcendent reality. To the contrary, Patodka seeks to 
“preserve” this experience -- the abiding essence within metaphysics to which 
traditional metaphysics refers. Humanity’s yearning for a transcendent reality is not an 
irrational folly, and the goal here is to understand this desire and to explain its source in 
human experience — to explain why “the human spirit returns to metaphysics ever 
again,.. .in spite o f its being indefensible, even meaningless from the standpoint of 
objective rationality.”81
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Negative Platonism presents itself as a philosophy that is in the “precarious 
position” of not having anything to lean against for support. It is an attempt at 
understanding Western philosophy that affirms the experience of transcendence, but not 
as a distinct realm with positive contents. It argues that, in a certain sense, humans are 
subject to both a degree o f relativity determined by context, and certainty determined by 
the truth of man’s search for something that transcends his own particular objective 
context.
[Negative Platonism] preserves for humans the possibility o f trusting in a 
truth that is not relative and mundane, even though it cannot be 
formulated positively, in terms of contents. It shows how much truth 
there is in man’s perennial metaphysical struggle for something elevated 
above the natural and the traditional, the struggle for the eternal and the 
supratemporal, in the struggle, taken up ever again, against a relativism 
of values and norms — even while agreeing with the idea o f a basic 
historicity o f man and of the relativity o f his orientation in his context, of 
his science and practice, his images of life and the world.82
Negative Platonism interprets and affirms ancient philosophy in light of the insights of
twentieth-century phenomenology and phenomenological ontology. It is not a “new”
philosophy so much as an attempt to understand what we have, what makes up the fiber
of European civilization.
The Idea, The Good, and the Truth
Patocka’s philosophy, despite the appeal to Socrates, proceeds from a 
contemporary philosophical perspective. Yet it relies on the language of classicism, a 
reliance that leads one to question whether a claim for a non-metaphysical philosophy 
can be sustained while one speaks of a “life in truth” and a movement towards “good.” 
Patodka insists that these symbolizations are intrinsic to philosophy by virtue of their
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reflection of the human experience of reality, yet his own philosophical perspective 
precludes the argument that they refer to objective essences, that they are in any way 
concrete or tangible. While contemporary theorists are often willing to dismiss any text 
that relies on such terminology as hopelessly traditional, Patodka wishes to persuade us 
that these concepts can and must be understood nontraditionally, that is, 
non-metaphysically. If  he is unable to do so, his own work will not succeed: it will face 
cursory dismissal by postmodern thinkers at the same time as it is viewed with 
suspicion by traditionalists for its reliance on Heidegger. The text o f “Negative 
Platonism” presents an example o f this mode o f interpretation as it examines the 
concept of the “Idea” in some detail, demonstrating that it can be understood differently 
than the historical understanding o f the Platonic Idea. Along with the “Idea,” I will look 
at Patocka’s use o f the concepts o f the “good” and “truth.”
Patodka’s concept of the Idea, based upon but carefully distinguished from that 
of the Platonic Idea, is prominent in Patodka’s early work. Already in 1946, in an article 
entitled “Ideology and Life in the Idea,” the concept is presented as something 
fundamentally nonobjective, as a symbol to represent the essence o f the philosophical 
perspective. Significantly, it is presented as inherently connected to politics, with both 
Socialism and Fascism described as degradations o f the logic o f the Idea into ideology. 
The Idea, Patodka writes in this short essay, is that of human freedom.83
It is not until “Negative Platonism” in 1953, however, that Patodka makes a 
concerted effort to explain this conclusion, that is, the conception o f the Idea that does 
not refer to any tangible object. He again seeks help from Heidegger, here, referring to
130
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the Greek term chorismos, used in Heidegger’s An Introduction to Metaphysics to refer
to a separation between ideas and reality. In Patodka’s understanding, which leads to a
distinctly different conclusion than Heidegger’s, chorismos does not refer to the kind o f
separation or gap one might imagine. It is not a gap between two realms of objects, a
gap that begs to be bridged:
[cjhorismos meant originally a separateness without a second object 
realm. It is a gap that does not separate two realms coordinated or linked 
by something third that would embrace them both and so would serve as 
the foundation of both their coordination and their separation. Chorismos 
is a separateness, a distinctness an sich, an absolute one, for itself.84
Chorismos denotes an insuperable distance between reality as it is directly present to us,
as objective and tangible, and transcendent reality. It is, one might say, the sense that we
are not limited to the objective, that our being can reach beyond the objects of our
present vision and broaden its experience o f reality. It implies the sense offreedom that
is inherent to all spiritual experience:
the mystery o f the chorismos is like the experience of freedom, an 
experience o f a distance with respect to real things, of a meaning 
independent o f the objective and the sensory which we reach by 
inverting the original, “natural” orientation o f life, an experience o f a 
rebirth, of a second birth, intrinsic to all spiritual life, familiar to the 
religious, to the initiates o f the arts, and, not least, to philosophers.85
Chorismos, then, is a symbol o f freedom. It is also the symbol of the Idea, for the Idea is
not an object, present or transcendent, but instead the very notion that one can free
oneself from the power of objectivity.
The understanding o f transcendence as Patodka is developing it here is crucial as
well to the contention that man is a historical being. In thinking historically, one is
projecting beyond the present into the past and, perhaps, the future. Historical man
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escapes the bonds of the present and brings into relevance a present that, so to speak,
does not exist because it is past. The historian, as well as man as a historical being, is
capable o f distinguishing between that which is present and that which is no longer
present. This is, Patodka argues, the very power o f freeing oneself from the present that
is implicit in the Idea. “A historical being,” he writes,
leans on the past, using it to open up the horizon of the given, with its 
help overcoming the given and the present. He can do that, however, 
only if the power of dissociation is available to him, the power o f 
dissociation from mere givenness and presence, the power o f liberation 
from the purely objective and given -- in Platonic usage, that is, the 
power o f the Idea.86
The essence o f the Platonic Idea, then, is akin to the freedom to reach beyond the given 
to embrace even that which is not there in front of us. This understanding o f freedom is 
applied politically as in both the aforementioned critique of ideology and, as we shall 
see in the following chapters, in a broader critique of the pursuit of politics as a 
technology, as a political program that abandons freedom for the surety achieved when 
one restricts oneself to manipulating the given.87
In phenomenology, a thing in general or “as a whole” is necessarily 
transcendent to its perception.88 Patodka’s phenomenological philosophy draws 
significantly upon this insight; it argues through the lens of classical Greek philosophy 
that European civilization is, or was, characterized by the recognition that life is fully 
human only to the extent that it can recognize those values, that sense o f the whole, that 
explicitly transcend the objects of our present perception, our simply given experience 
— that we refuse to allow ourselves to be captive to the materially, directly given. This 
insight is, according to Patodka, encapsulated in the notion of the Idea. “Thus the Idea,”
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he writes, “is the pure supraobjective call o f transcendence.”*9 It is in no way an object
but rather a “deobjectifying power”90 — the singular human ability to perceive the
transcendental and to act upon it, thereby preserve the possibility o f a life in truth.
Patodka contends that his analysis o f the Platonic Idea is crucial to his
application of philosophy to the social and political realms. The Platonic Idea developed
so as to present itself to man positively, as an absolute ideal in which he can participate.
It became something obtainable and mankind, uniquely capable o f obtaining it, was thus
challenged to demonstrate this uniqueness by dominating his world. Understood in this
way, “positive” Platonism urged man to conceive o f himself as a being without limits, a
being capable of anything, unrestricted. This is precisely the self-understanding,
Patocka argues, that has resulted in a politics of force, in “the twentieth-century as
war.”91 Because of its importance, the relevant text deserves to be cited at length:
The Idea, as we understand it, is not the power of absolute objectification 
— as the historic Plato’s Idea promises to be. As the absolute object,
Plato’s Idea is a challenge to man to place himself at the center o f the 
universum and to dominate it, the way he finally does dominate the entire 
intelligible and sensible cosmos through the Idea, through participation 
in the ideal universum. This tendency of Platonic metaphysics did not 
have its full effect and flowering in Plato’s own philosophy or in 
antiquity and the Middle Ages since there it was still blanketed by the 
overall mythical or theological orientation o f the men of the time.
Modem metaphysics, however, with its anthropologism and its will to 
total supremacy of men over object beings, with its naturalism, 
constructivism (technicism), and will to power represents the full 
unfolding of a tendency which is potentially present already here. By 
contrast, Platonism as we here interpret it shows forth not only man’s 
dignity but also the limits he cannot transcend. It approves the rule 
humans are instituting over object being but shows that man’s calling is 
not so to rule but to serve. It shows that there is something higher than 
man, something to which human existence is indissolubly bound and 
without which the most basic wellsprings o f our historical life dry up.92
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Here, in the early 1950s and in a text inspired by a critique o f positive metaphysics, we 
have an example o f the very language later used by Patodka to justify the grounds upon 
which the human rights protest Charter 77 was founded — language appealing to 
something that is “higher” than both man and his government, something that limits 
man morally and reigns in his desire to rule. Whereas in the texts o f Charter 77 Patocka 
appears to be speaking in metaphysical (Kantian) terms, urging the communist 
government to bow down before an objective morality that stands over them, here in 
“Negative Platonism” and throughout his discussion of “care for the soul” he is adamant 
in declaring that his negative Platonic philosophy is inherently “deobjectifying.” This 
philosophy rejects the notion o f a higher objectivity, a higher Being that defines our 
limits for us. It is instead the power o f transcendence that limits us, the power o f our 
ability to transcend the present, objective realm, to see beyond objectivity altogether and 
thereby take account o f the inherently nonobjective world as a whole. With this 
argument, to which I will return in the following chapters, the groundwork is laid for an 
explicit approach to human ethics and, indirectly, to politics.
In addition to the concept o f the Idea, the reader also encounters the terms 
“good” and “truth,” used in ways that appear metaphysical. Yet Patodka makes clear 
that they are to be understood not as objective values or entities, but in terms o f the 
movements of life and the openness to the world as a whole that are at the center of 
Patodka’s philosophical perspective. In “Eternity and Historicity,” a work from the 
1950s belonging to the cycle o f “Negative Platonism” texts and only recently published 
in Czech, Patodka notes that the Socratic question concerns the “good.” What, if  any,
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content, we have to ask, is contained in this concept? In asking after the good, Patodka
contends, Socrates is seeking the “single, universal fundamental goal of human life.”93 It
is an intense and specific question that has, regrettably, lost its relevance over time.
Now it is commonplace to hear one ask in the broadest terms about the meaning of life;
but this is a far cry from the question posed by Socrates. How, then, should the original
question be understood?
This question in its original Socratic intensity means: what is the goal in 
life which is not itself directed as a means to any other goal? Where is 
the unity to which it is possible to subordinate one’s whole life to the end 
and without exceptions? And to this question Socrates himself has no 
positive answer, he rather admits that he does not know.94
For the philosopher, there is no positive answer to this question. What we do receive
from Socrates, expressed through his actions, is “care for the soul.” This becomes, then,
the Socratic answer to the question of the good, of the goal o f life. “Philosophy as the
care for the soul is the Socratic answer to the Socratic question.”95
The good as care for the soul is not a positive answer to the Socratic question,
for care for the soul is not a positive, objective thing, but rather a human movement
directed toward a growth in human being itself. There is no reference to an objectivity
situated in the heavens or on earth. The good as care for the soul refers instead to a mere
possibility in human life, yet it is a possibility that is solid and intrinsic to human
existence. As I noted earlier, the existence of the good as the goal of movement is
meaningful only insofar as there is such movement, only insofar as, by moving towards
the good, something is effecting a heightening o f its being.96 In this regard, it is quite
clear that the good is no solid object or value, existing and unchanging regardless of
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human attention or indifference to it. It is inherently related to human action, to a 
turning o f the human and a movement that is not arbitrary or related to our desires, but 
is a result o f the active nurturing of the soul, the upward formation of our being. This 
reflects the reality o f our soul, that it not only is, but must also be cared for or formed.
This process o f caring for the soul, of moving towards the good, is something 
the human being must undertake in his or her own life. It cannot be encapsulated in a 
few simple rules for living; life is not, as the Sophists understood it, a technical 
problem. It is not possible to live well in the same way as it is possible, say, to be a 
good shoemaker.97 And so, “for this reason Socrates also cannot in his own sense 
preach, as (based on misunderstanding) Xenophon's Socrates does; for Socrates does 
not have any dogma which he could recommend to people, and no positive moral 
teachings which could be translated into recipes for life; his work is to wake people to 
their own being, to their own essence.”98 As formulated by traditional metaphysics, the 
good receives objective form such that it can indeed be translated into dogma or 
“recipes” for living. But for Patodka the good has no such form. Instead, it takes shape 
as people are awakened to the possibilities of their lives, as they come to be aware of the 
potential of their humanity. Socrates moves toward the good as he wakes himself and 
wakes others to their own being.
Negative Platonism, just as it rejects objectified versions of the Idea and the 
good, also rejects an objectification of a single, eternal truth. The contours of that 
“negative” Platonic version of truth are discussed in a companion article to “Negative 
Platonism” entitled “The Problem of Truth from the Perspective of Negative
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Platonism.” This essay begins with a description of the problem o f truth, which is said
to be “from the beginning the basic question o f philosophy,” and the various ways in
which it has been interpreted in the modem world.99 It concludes that the problem not
only has not been solved, it has not even been adequately framed. In framing the
question from the point o f view o f negative Platonism, Patodka notes that truth is “finite
truth,” in that it is “the truth o f a finite being.”100 Finite truth is revealed to finite beings
in the course of history, in the problematic process o f making sense out of human life.
Truth has a foundation, however, just as the human ability to make sense o f life
is not an arbitrary work of man but is grounded. This foundation, which Patodka
describes not as “finite” but as “absolute,” comes to man in his relation to the Idea. Our
relation to the Idea, recalling “Negative Platonism,” is our relation to the ability o f man
to distance himself, or free himself, from the hold o f objective beings. This relation to
the Idea is the relation of truth, and thus a further formulation o f the concept results:
“truth is that which frees man and that which is therefore far from being a work o f man,
to the contrary, it forms man.”101 Though truth is finite, it is not a creation o f man. Truth
is embedded in human freedom, and the call o f freedom is a call to truth. Only through
free action, Patodka explains, can we hope to see things clearly and thus act truthfully in
relation to them. Freedom is not a guarantee o f truth, but it is nevertheless its source:
Freedom, which forever withdraws us from objectivity and by whose 
power we always exist partially beyond the reach of reality, which is thus 
at the source of the most varied illusions and errors, is nevertheless also 
the source o f all truth; for without it there is no distance towards reality, 
and so also clarity about it, except for the immediate functioning of 
instinctive signals and conformative reactions.102
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The call o f truth, then, is first a call to freedom. It also represents, though, an openness
to the possibility o f error. It is an invitation to uncertainty and is therefore grounded in
risk. Metaphysics, to the contrary, attempts to provide life with the certainty that it
otherwise lacks. It gives to mankind a transcendent foundation that is objective and so
acts as a palliative to the anxiety we are heir to as human.103
In contrasting his own perspective with that o f metaphysics, Patodka comes to a
further attempt to narrow the understanding of truth. It is not and can never be
something solid and simple, requiring neither deliberation nor decision. Truth is not
something we can easily get hold of, and even less something that we can carry around
with us in security. Rather, it is an elusive and disproportionate component of our active
lives, present when we act in freedom, when we “turn” from error and decline and begin
an ascent in our lives.
From the fact that truth is disproportion -- that it’s never given and, if 
passively received or spontaneously offered in ready form, can never be 
other than a treacherous fa ta  morgana — results the unstableness and 
precariousness of truth. It cannot actually “be” — it is nothing defined, 
definite (only in the form of its always relative and inadequate 
expression), but is rather defining. We always lag behind truth, always 
guiltily, and it exists for us only in the form o f a turn [my emphasis], an 
attempt at focusing, in the form of a reaction against the mistake, error, 
decline, into which we are absorbed in our original passivity.104
The truth o f metaphysics claims to be present whether we are active or passive, whether
we reach out and seek it or not. Thinking non-metaphysically, truth is seen as relating to
our own activity and movement in life, to our actively seeking a heightening of our
being. Truth is not a defined and given constant, but neither is it simply a matter o f our
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arbitrary will. We do not create truth, but are formed by it, just as we are formed by our 
relationship to freedom.
Patodka’s search for good and truth without recourse to metaphysics is an 
exceptionally difficult, some might say impossible, task. In the final chapter of this 
study, after a consideration of the politics o f this philosophy, I will consider Patodka’s 
attempt in greater detail. With regard to his phenomenological treatment o f Greek 
philosophy, however, one important objection must be dealt with immediately. This is 
the objection that Socrates cannot and should not be distinguished from the later 
Platonic corpus, that he, too, was engaged in plainly metaphysical speculation about 
good and truth. The substance o f this objection argues that Patodka’s “negative” 
Platonic interpretation of Socrates is misplaced, for Socrates was in fact searching for a 
new and undiscovered good that underlies all relative goods. With his insistence upon 
moral consistency and a “life in truth,” this objection goes, Jan Patodka represents the 
same metaphysical lineage that he claims to be circumnavigating. Focusing on Socrates 
instead of on Plato as a whole does not acquit one of the charge of being metaphysical, 
for the line o f demarcation between them is a false one (or at least Patodka does not 
succeed in drawing it convincingly). Socrates, and so also the Patodkan theory based 
upon his mode of understanding, is engaged in a search for an undiscovered “other 
world” that must be considered a metaphysical construction.
Responding to this critique, Patodka defends Socrates and thereby his own 
interpretation. Socrates is simply not engaged in such an abstract venture. He is 
concerned not with discovering something new, such as the metaphysical essence of
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good, but rather something old: the meaning o f the concrete good with which we deal in 
our daily lives. The critique, Patodka writes, “misses that which Socrates really wants 
and to which he dedicates his untiring activity. Socrates’ question first gets its true 
meaning at the point when it is not a question seeking after something new, but after the 
true sense of the old, after the true meaning of all the good which has always occurred 
in life.”105 Socrates is seeking, in this conception, an understanding o f phenomena that 
he knows must be transcended in order to be understood. The transcendence that 
Socrates effects is a skeptical one, contrary to the assumption of the critical view that it 
is and must be a transcendence toward a metaphysical foundation. It is achieved by 
establishing a certain distance from the particular and material aspects o f the 
phenomena and examining them in that light. In that process, the object of 
contemplation will be viewed freely and without distortion, and so will be more open to 
human understanding. Socrates does not seek a new good, but the meaning of the good 
that we encounter in daily life.
The Socratic mode o f life leaves us with uncertainty, but it does not leave us 
aimless. Socrates is not searching for a new certainty in the heavens because he knows 
that such a search, rather than increasing our self-understanding, instead distorts it. He 
argues that in place of that metaphysical certainty there is a human consistency 
grounded in the way in which we act and the way in which we interrogate reality. 
Rejecting metaphysical certainty is a vital decision, for it appears to leave us defenseless 
and without security, but in actual fact it offers us a unity and a security of a different, 
particularly human form.
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Socrates consequently refutes presumed certainty and at the same time 
invites a persistence, a continuity in this fundamental decision o f vital 
importance. This work points toward an unheard o f inner unity and vital 
concentration: so that even when there isn’t a positive, general and 
content-related answer, still the question itself, if  abided to, as untiring 
activity effects in man that after which he asks.106
Rather than destroying continuity, this skeptical mode of being opens us to a life that is 
truly human, for it is a life that aims toward an ever-increasing understanding o f itself 
and its world, the natural world with which it interacts. And it is this “ inner unity” and 
“continuity” that forms the basis for action geared toward the establishment of ethical 
and political order in human life, as we shall see in the following chapters.
Patodka’s defense against this critique, which is an interpretation o f the person 
of Socrates based on the Platonic dialogues, is convincing. The alternative to which the 
critique o f this position leads, setting up a dichotomy between metaphysics and 
non-foundationalism such that the only available options with regard to truth and the 
good are abstract constructs on one hand and a total relativism on the other, is 
impermissible. If our own experience of reality is a guide there must be an alternative 
approach, and Patocka’s phenomenological interpretation of Greek thought makes 
precisely this attempt. The larger question o f foundationalism, however, o f the need for 
some concrete basis upon which to make moral judgments and of the ability of 
phenomenological insight to respond to this dilemma, must be examined even more 
explicitly in Patodka’s work. So it is to politics and history that we must turn, following 
Patodka himself, to seek some conclusion to this philosophical and political story that 
moves agilely between and among contemporary phenomenological and ontological 
philosophy and ancient Greek thought.
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I have sought to show, in this chapter, that the character o f Patodka’s 
interpretation of classical philosophy, expressed most directly in his formulations o f 
care for the soul and negative Platonism, is such as to offer a compelling, contemporary 
alternative to the rejection o f classicism in much o f the thought influenced by 
Heidegger. PatoCka’s engagement with Greek thought is a positive engagement, despite 
the fact that it takes place in an anti-metaphysical context. What it shows is that there is 
a distinct difference between the essence o f metaphysics, the impulse to transcend the 
objective, and the systematization of metaphysics that abandons its own essence and 
takes on an objective form itself. The figure of Socrates, far from representing as 
Nietzsche would have it the degradation o f philosophy, is the epitome of this difference.
Pato£ka shows that philosophy, the quest for reason in the full light of its 
classical symbolism, not only is possible in the wake of metaphysics, it takes on its full 
meaning only when it rejects a facile reliance on metaphysics in favor of a return to the 
negative insight and uncertainty of life as care for the soul. This classical symbolism, in 
turn, is shown to refer to an ontological self-interestedness, to a movement toward a 
heightening o f one’s being and a realization o f its possibilities. It is a forward 
movement, yet not a movement toward a concrete, transcendental goal. Human 
movement toward the good is, in PatoCka’s formulation, movement in total ignorance of 
any final goal. And yet it is characterized by a consistency, a degree of certainty that the 
results o f a mode o f living that examines reality rather than accepts it as given will be an 
increase, not a decrease, in harmony and excellence. As Pato£ka puts it, “[o]n the basis 
o f this ignorance o f the final goal, which explicates itself in continual questioning and
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examination, there appears the possibility of a just life, harmonious and concentrated; 
there appears a life with an avoidance o f mistakes, a life as it should be, a life with its 
specific arete, its perfection.”107
In Chapters Two and Three I have set forth the groundwork on which Pato£ka 
will attempt to engage the reality o f human historical and political existence. It is via his 
interpretation of the phenomenological and ontological work of Husserl and Heidegger 
and his application of this interpretation to classical thought and the figure o f Socrates 
that Patodka is able to offer the philosophy of history and politics that is found in his 
Heretical Essays on the Philosophy o f  History and other late writings. It is with this in 
mind that I will proceed, in the following chapter, to an analysis o f Patodka’s 
philosophy o f history and its focus on the institution of the polis and the place o f ethics 
therein.
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C H A PT E R 4 
A PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY AND A THEORY OF POLITICS
Despite international renown as a phenomenologist, the most influential and 
significant work in the corpus o f Jan Patocka is his 1975 collection of Heretical Essays 
in the Philosophy o f  History. Distinguished by what the French philosopher Paul 
Ricoeur has called a “sense of grandeur7’ and a “dense beauty,”1 the Heretical Essays 
have been translated into more than a half dozen languages and are also the most widely 
recognized of Patocka’s numerous texts. They represent the culmination of his mature 
philosophy, aiming at an understanding o f human reality in which history, philosophy 
and politics merge in mutual interdependence, each relating inherently to the other to 
form a perspective on being and society that constitutes the Czech philosopher’s most 
important contribution to philosophy and political theory.
With his essays on philosophy o f history, Patocka makes two fundamental 
contentions: first is that the emergence o f the Greek polis, and o f politics, constituted a 
“breakthrough” in human history, an event that conceptualized human freedom and 
marked the first time that humans were presented with the possibility of acting in a truly 
historical manner. In this period, in this simultaneous rise o f politics and philosophy, the 
spirit of Western civilization was bom. Secondly, the Heretical Essays trace the course 
of history in the West as a series of developments that represent the abandonment o f the 
possibility presented by this breakthrough. The present state o f the European world, as it 
is vividly described in his final two essays, is characterized by the prevalence o f a 
desire, not for a genuinely historical life, but for a life that offers a solution to the
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problematicity and vicissitudes of history. With the analysis o f history and politics that 
is the capstone of these essays, Patocka attempts to provide philosophy and politics in 
the West with an alternative to its present predicament; he seeks to present the 
possibility o f a recovery, in light o f the insights of postmodern thought, o f a mode of 
politics that reflects the spirit and heritage of life in Europe. It is a mode o f being, 
however, that modern civilization has steadily resisted.
Patocka’s analysis of the contemporary world, which I shall discuss in more 
detail in Chapter Five, points above all to difficulties related to the void of meaning that 
has been increasingly predominant in human life since the twilight o f  traditional forms 
of metaphysics diagnosed by Nietzsche. We live, he argues, in a post-metaphysical 
world, yet we remain human beings who cannot exist for long in a situation of pervasive 
meaninglessness. The norm of contemporary life in the West is the basically nihilistic 
worldview o f mathematical natural science, in contrast to the transcendental 
metaphysics o f the past. In light of the dominance of this view, it is natural for humans 
to seek options that are meaningful (i.e., full of meaning). The twentieth century has 
been marked by the rise and fall of one such option after another. Politically, the human 
urge for metaphysical certainty and meaning has manifested itself in political or 
philosophical systems that amounted to secularized versions (often radical) of 
metaphysics “in which humans or humanity step into God’s place.”2 Yet these 
movements, despite their pervasiveness in particular regions, have not succeeded in 
gaining support worldwide.
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There are also countries, particularly those with liberal democratic traditions, 
that have been able to resist the urge to transform the realm of politics into a substitute 
for metaphysical meaning. Yet this alternative, it is argued, does not represent a solution 
to the problem. Political formulations grounded in the nihilistic assumptions o f the 
natural sciences — formulations that order humans as one would material objects — do 
not satisfy the desire for meaning. They do not consider humans as individuals, but as 
roles (even “equality” is a role!)3 As such, it appears that both the natural meaning of 
pre-philosophical societies and the given meaning of traditional metaphysics have been 
overcome, and nothing has been left in their place but political radicalism as a substitute 
for meaning, or the conviction that we can live full and complete lives on the basis of a 
natural scientific methodology that views human beings in neutral, material terms.
Neither approach, Patocka contends, responds to the needs of human social being. The 
politics of radicalism offers humans false meaning, while the scientific approach avoids 
the question of meaning altogether and thereby prompts individuals to seek either 
substitutions for meaning or an escape from the question altogether. Theories that 
discard the question of meaning are as insufficient as the positive meaning of 
metaphysics they seek to replace.
God is dead, yet the material nature, producing with lawlike necessity 
both humankind and its progress, is no less a fiction and it has the special 
weakness that it includes no mechanism that would restrain individuals 
in their individual effort to escape and make themselves at home in the 
contingent world as if no one were to come after them, having their little 
pleasures of the day, their pleasures o f the night.4
The United States, perhaps above all, lacks a mechanism to “restrain individuals” in
their pursuit of substitutes for transcendental meaning or, perhaps more problematically,
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their pursuit o f means to “escape” the question o f meaning altogether. The particular 
dilemma o f the contemporary world is that, since Nietzsche and Heidegger, the 
destruction o f metaphysics has not led to an understanding o f history or o f meaning.
Patocka’s aim with his philosophy of history and politics is to respond to this 
dilemma with an approach to meaning and politics that is not traditionally metaphysical, 
but responds to the void of meaning that prompts men to choose either substitution or 
escapism. Nietzsche was right in his description of the nihilism o f the modem era:
“Thus the diagnosis of European society of the nineteenth century as nihilistic sums up 
all the crises o f the time: the political and the social crises are rooted in a moral crisis.”5 
What is needed is an understanding of meaning in human life and its relation to 
historical action. This would provide, not only the possibility of a political solution, but 
also a means to alleviate the ethical anomie of contemporary life.
Patocka argues, in the Heretical Essays, that a philosophical understanding of 
the human being and his interaction with the world must contain, at its core, a 
philosophy o f history. The elemental fact of historicity means that an analysis of human 
activity can be successful only once the implications o f that historicity have been clearly 
defined. The fact that human being is historical being, however, does not mean that all 
human activity is historical. Humans do not act historically insofar as they live only in 
order to put food on the table and to keep from dying. As they create a politics, 
however, in order to discuss issues of greater significance than the mere preservation of 
life, they epitomize historical action. Patocka’s political thought, then, from his 
reconceptualization of human freedom to his understanding o f the polis as an
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institutionalization o f freedom — can be grasped only through an analysis o f his 
philosophy o f history.
Rather than an attempt to solve the question o f history, Patocka’s work seeks to 
understand it as a problem. Understanding problematicity, therefore, is crucial to the 
incorporation o f freedom into everyday activity as well as to our prospects for a 
recovery from the political reality o f “the twentieth century as war.” As long as we 
continue to misunderstand history by seeking to solve it we will continue to rule 
ourselves in an essentially arbitrary or accidental way. It is in this sense, then, that 
Patocka concludes that the “chief possibility” o f our civilization is the “possibility of a 
turn from accidental rule to the rule o f those who understand what history is about.”6
In order to arrive at a coherent sense of Patocka’s political theory, then, it will be 
necessary to begin with human historicity and the specific content o f the Patockan 
understanding o f history. From here I can proceed to the thesis, drawn from Edmund 
Husserl, that history in the specific sense has a particular “beginning,” and that this 
beginning coincides with the origin of the science of politics. It is in the emergence of 
the Greek polis, Patocka contends, that freedom and problematicity come to be first 
revealed as themes o f human existence. From this origin of politics in freedom I will 
follow Patocka as he traces the progressive estrangement of both politics and philosophy 
from their essential beginnings. This discussion of history will bring us not only to a 
new conceptualization of the basic content o f politics and its roots in historical action, 
but also to a consideration of two further problems: the crisis o f politics in the twentieth 
century (Chapter Five), and the more fundamental problem o f the foundation that 
underlies our self-understanding as human beings (Chapter Six).
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The Basis o f Human Historicity
It is important to note, as Erazim Kohak does in his philosophical biography, 
that Patocka was a historian of ideas in addition to a philosopher. He wrote extensively, 
for example, on two o f the greatest figures in Czech political and philosophical history: 
Jan Amos Komensky (Comenius), and T. G. Masaryk.7 It would be a mistake, though, 
to conclude from this that Patocka was interested in recording the history o f thought in 
any sort o f objective, historicist manner. In the first place, it is clear that to a large 
degree, the extensive work done on Comenius and Masaryk was more a product of 
circumstance than the fulfillment o f a genuine desire to create a historical record of 
these thinkers. Under the Czechoslovak communist regime, Patocka was repeatedly 
denied the right to work, teach or publish in his chosen specialty, and was grateful to 
find somewhat meaningful employment and opportunity to publish as an archivist at the 
Masaryk Institute and then, after that was dissolved by the authorities, at the Comenius 
Archive of the Pedagogic Institute in Prague.
Patocka was, in all respects, a philosopher o f history. His approach was 
distinguished by a clear and unambiguous critique o f the study of history as a search for 
an objective order or for governing natural laws. The objective order o f history offered 
no clue to human meaning, this despite the fact that human meaning occurred explicitly 
within the order o f history. Patocka focused on history, but he was no historicist. Nor 
did he believe that history could usefully be studied in compartmentalized form, as, for 
example, the isolated study of “economic history” or the “history of philosophy.” Such 
studies, he wrote, offered us “so little satisfaction” as to make us aware o f  the need “to
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widen our perspective.”* History, as Patocka understands it, cannot be observed 
“objectively” as by a disinterested observer; the recording of events and the keeping of 
annals, therefore, does not constitute the writing of history.
A proper understanding of history is essential to philosophy because the human 
being is inherently and continually a historical creature. Historicity is a condition of his 
being, demonstrated in his most basic activities. One of those activities that 
demonstrates historicity is speech ~  the use of language. Throughout his work, Patocka 
consistently claims that individuals are not open to the possibilities of their lives until 
they overcome the hold which the world of things — the material, objective world — has 
upon them. In “Negative Platonism,” it is the human ability to communicate via 
language that proves to be crucial to our effectively dealing with this world o f things, 
thereby preserving the possibility of rising above that world. The central point is that in 
language we not only respond to things, we anticipate them. In doing so, we 
demonstrate our ability to transcend the given present.9 Through language we can move 
beyond the limits of the present, making language “thus a history, not a structure given 
once and for all.” “This historicity,” Patocka continues, “of the structure of language, 
however, is possible only because humans are not fixed in their relation to sense 
data. ..because they are ‘free.’”10 Through language we confirm a freedom with regard 
to sense objects; we show that we can create a certain “distance” from things and, in 
doing so, transcend the immediate necessity of their hold on us. In language we project 
temporally beyond the present moment and object. “Here we become aware that every
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assertion, and so also language as a whole, presupposes the temporal horizon intrinsic to 
man, a horizon o f ongoing experience.” 11 This is the horizon of our historicity.
It is not only language that demonstrates our historicity, however. We are also 
historical by virtue of the fact that, as Heidegger notes, we are interested in our own 
being and we reach out in seeking to form it, to give it substance. This is an historical 
act, for history is not simply defined by the events which take place before our eyes, but 
also by our engaging in those activities that are most fully human — in other words, by 
pursuing a heightening o f our own being. Here the influence o f Husserl and Heidegger 
on Patocka’s philosophy of history demands attention even though, in the end, it is 
evident that the Czech pursues a different course than either of his German teachers.
Although it is Husserl to whom Patocka is indebted for inspiring a focus on 
European history and its central axis of “the idea of rational insight and life based on it 
(i.e., a life in responsibility),” it is only with the help o f Heidegger that he is able to 
work out the specifics o f a philosophy o f history that avoids an extreme subjectivism.12 
The influence of both Husserl and Heidegger is evident even in Patocka’s earliest 
writings. For instance, in his very first essay on the subject of history, the 1934 piece 
entitled “Some Comments Concerning the Concepts o f History and Historiography,” the 
focus on an understanding of human freedom as the crucial element to our historicity 
betrays an early study of Heidegger -- specifically, as Erazim Kohak notes, o f the first 
division of Being and Tim e13 This emphasis did not characterize all o f Patocka’s early 
work on history, however, for in another article written just a year later the emphasis on 
Heideggerean themes is entirely absent. Instead, “Some Comments Concerning the
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Concept o f a ‘World History”’ from 1935 begins by expanding upon the critique of the
positivistic approach to history mentioned in the earlier article. What is described in
1935 as a “naive historical positivism” that reduces history “to whatever can be
objectified,” is more reminiscent of Husserl’s critique of the “misguided” rationalism of
the European sciences in his “Vienna Lecture” than of any Heideggerean theme.14 The
political direction in which Pato£ka takes his reflections in this article is, as we shall
see, also quite non-Heideggerean.
The different lines o f thought evident in these early essays are reconciled only
40 years later, in the Heretical Essays on the Philosophy o f  History. Here the
relationship between history and phenomenology is explicitly dealt with, and the
relative merits of the Husserlian and Heideggerean approaches directly compared.
Patocka compares Husserl and Heidegger on the question o f history because he is
convinced that history is crucial to the pursuit of phenomenology. Although it might
seem that phenomenology as Husserl first elaborated it was primarily concerned with
static phenomena, Patocka notes a shift in interest in Husserl’s work toward the motive,
the genetic element o f phenomena. This shift is evidence, he argues, for the importance
of historical analysis to phenomenological philosophy.
In the course of his intellectual career, Husserl increasingly stressed the 
genetic over static analysis, as well as the role o f passive genesis, the 
genesis of all presumably merely given components o f lived experience 
in internal time consciousness. Everything that is static points to a 
genesis and so to history. Thus history is the deepest content level which 
phenomenology can reach” (emphasis added)15
Yet Husserl’s approach to history, though it points in the right direction, cannot be
considered genuinely historical. This is so because it bases its understanding o f “deep”
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phenomena on the perspective of an impartial subjectivity, a “disinterested spectator.”
Claiming a disinterested status, it betrays “a subjectivity that is fundamentally
ahistorical in our sense o f the term.”16 Heidegger, in contrast, resists the attempt to
establish a disinterested perspective as the basis for an understanding o f being. His
analysis is therefore historical where Husserl’s fails to be.
By contrast, Heidegger’s conception is historical, not only in the sense 
that phenomenological analysis leads to a definite genesis but most of all 
in rejecting the disinterested spectator as a presupposition of 
phenomenologizing. Instead, it focuses on an interest in being as the 
starting point and the condition for understanding the deep phenomenon, 
the phenomenon o f being.17
We act historically in those moments when we demonstrate that we are human, that is,
in those moments when we take an interest in and actively care for our humanity, our
being, our soul.
Patocka considered the methodology pioneered by Heidegger to be “better suited 
to serve as a starting point for philosophizing about history,” for it was grounded in the 
understanding that we are interested in our own being, and it sought to investigate the 
problems of freedom and responsibility that accompanied it.18 In this, Heidegger’s work 
would help to shed light on the nature of historical action where Husserl’s was unable 
to. Patocka, then, is quite explicit in making use of Heideggerean themes in the 
Heretical Essays. He notes as much in the second of his essays, but also makes clear 
that the deductions he derives from his study of Heidegger are entirely his own. “The 
reflections that follow,” he writes, “will attempt to explicate several problems of older 
and contemporary history in light of motifs taken over from it [Heidegger’s 
philosophy]. The author alone, to be sure, must bear responsibility for his deductions.”19
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The particular influence of Martin Heidegger is evident in these essays on the 
philosophy of history. Despite the common motifs, however, it would be incorrect to 
assume — as does, for example, Aviezer Tucker — that Patocka of the Heretical Essays 
has become what one might call a “Heideggerean.” By this Tucker means to say that 
Patocka, while he may have been a Platonic ethicist in Plato and Europe, veered 
towards a pessimistic attitude of Heideggerean relativism in the E s s a y s This, 
however, is simply not the case. Patocka explicitly attempts to keep his use of 
Heideggerean motifs consistent with his assumption of an ethics that firmly rejects 
relativism and nihilism. Ethics and the need to assure concrete freedom within a 
political setting are of significant concern to Patocka throughout his career, and he finds 
that, not only is it possible to reconcile these themes with Heideggerean philosophy, it is 
necessary to examine them in its light; only in this way, he argues, can we hope to 
comprehend the unique situation in which the human being finds himself.
While Patocka begins from Heideggerean motifs, as noted, he proceeds to make 
“deductions” from them for which he alone is responsible. The general tenor of these 
conclusions, with their emphasis on concrete political and ethical comportment, could in 
fact be said to often run directly counter to the Heideggerean approach, which exhibits a 
distinct lack of interest in these elements of human life. In contrast to Heidegger and to 
many of his followers (the seminal figure o f Hannah Arendt excepted), Patocka 
attempts to show a consonance between Heideggerean onto-phenomenological motifs 
and the type of philosophy developed by Socrates, with its emphasis on both truth and 
morality and its setting, not in a secluded forest hut or a distant Academy, but directly in
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the center of human society ~  in the polis. In the explication of Patocka’s philosophy of 
history and politics to follow, it will be readily apparent that, even as the Czech 
philosopher continues to make use o f Heideggerean concepts, he derives from them 
conclusions as to the relationship o f politics and philosophy that are uniquely distinctive 
and quite removed from the arguments generally proffered by the cadre o f 
contemporary Heideggerean philosophers.
A Philosophy of History 
Patocka’s interest in history was first o f all directed at distinguishing it from 
mere historiography, from the simple recording of events. Action was truly historical, 
he argued, when it established a continuity with the future by virtue of its grounding, 
not in the instinctual desire for self-preservation, but in the characteristically human 
potential for self-reflection and freedom. We act as historical beings simultaneously 
with our reflective consideration of the possibilities open to us as human beings. The 
epochal moment for the Western world came with the development of philosophy. 
Philosophy marked a turning point in human self-understanding; it marked the 
development of a mode of activity that was explicitly self-reflective and skeptical of 
simply-given knowledge. By invoking a claim to reason, men gave up the surety of 
simply-given knowledge in favor o f a problematic, but characteristically human, 
approach to life. From this point onward one could speak o f events relating, not merely 
to the desire for self-preservation, but to the possibility inherent in a being who is 
interested in his own being. It marked the beginning o f the mode o f human activity to 
which Patocka is referring when he speaks o f “historical” activity.
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As I indicated in Chapter Two, the influence o f Edmund Husserl’s Crisis o f  
European Sciences was inordinate on the development o f Patocka’s philosophy, and this 
is nowhere more true than in regard to his philosophy o f history. Although the Czech 
philosopher does not follow Husserl in the latter’s insistence on a subjective 
transcendental phenomenology, he does adopt the basic outline of history that Husserl 
controversially proposes in Crisis. Patocka’s adoption o f that outline, with its positing 
of a “prehistory” and a “history proper,” is somewhat surprising; it appears, on the 
surface, to be superficial and counterintuitive. Looking beyond the surface, however, 
one finds a carefully differentiated concept of history and an argument that is cogent 
and well defended. History in Patocka’s account does not refer to human activity as 
such, but to that activity made possible by our ontological self-awareness. History is 
primarily determined by the depth of the relation of the human to his own being.
Patocka’s philosophy of history, then, has a Husserlian framework but an 
ontological core. In the early chapters o f the Heretical Essays, this framework is 
discussed in detail and the relevant concepts analyzed in terms of their ontological 
significance. Before proceeding to discuss the core o f this work, however, some 
significant difficulties presented by Husserl’s framework need to be considered. In the 
first place, as I explained in Chapter Three of this study, Husserl’s speculative 
philosophy -- and this includes his philosophy of history — suffered from the lingering 
influence of Cartesian philosophy, resulting not only in an inappropriate subjectivism 
but a misguided hope that one could methodologically transform philosophy into an 
“apodictic” science.21 This latter aspect is particularly problematic, for it seems to imply
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that Husserl’s framework for history is tied to the very dream of absolute knowledge 
against which the Heideggerean critique is directed. Patocka, however, makes it very 
clear that not only does he not follow Husserl in this pursuit, but the very idea of such 
an apodictic certainty is impossible in philosophy. He refers directly to Husserl when he 
writes that:
Philosophically it is not possible to preserve (i) the postulate of 
philosophy as an absolutely apodictic science, or (ii) the idea that a 
transcendental idealism...would either correspond to this idea or could 
guarantee to the world the meaningfulness which the struggle against a 
merely factological science and against a privately subjective philosophy 
of mere world views demands. (In particular, it cannot resolve the 
question o f truth and of transcendence.)22
Philosophy does search for a meaningfulness that is neither “privately subjective” nor
“merely factological,” but it is vain to hope to overcome these problems via a
philosophical search for apodicticity. Philosophy does not lead to absolute certainty.
A second problem, which I will discuss in more detail shortly, has to do with the
apparent reduction of all of human history to the European experience. This trait, in
light o f the ever-increasing awareness of non-westem cultures and the content of their
cultural and intellectual traditions, does represent a weakness in Patocka’s work that it
may be hard for many readers to overcome. It is not, however, the most important
element of this philosophy.
The central point of Patocka’s philosophy of history represents a clear response
to the deficiencies o f Husserl’s work. History is redefined, in the Heretical Essays, in
terms of a fundamental ontology. The recording of events is not history; events are
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historical only insofar as we are interested in them because they have a lasting effect on
us. History, Patocka writes,
is meaningful or meaning-related only when someone cares about 
something, when we do not have before us sequences merely observed 
but rather ones which can be understood in terms o f an interest in and 
relating to the world, of an openness for oneself and for things.23
Only with the addition o f a fundamental ontology can Patocka propose Husserl’s outline
of history as a starting point. The understanding gained by the ontological analysis
forms the basis o f Patocka’s philosophy; the analysis o f the relation o f history to the fact
of the rise of the Greek polis provides the basis for a theory of politics.
Patocka’s philosophy of history incorporates two major elements: first is the
question o f the origin o f history and what it signifies for Europe, and second is an
analysis of the content of historical action and its importance for our self-understanding.
The content of history is human activity in and for freedom. Historical activity
incorporates the realization “that there are possibilities of living differently than by
toiling for a full stomach in misery and need.” It is in this sense that history as Patocka
strictly defines it is directly tied to the outburst of civilization in ancient Greece: “The
Greek polis, epos, tragedy, and philosophy are different aspects o f the same thrust
which represents a rising above decline.”24 This thesis, as we shall see, when applied to
the social being of humans in light o f the insight of contemporary, post-metaphysical
theory, constitutes a wholly new approach to the question o f the foundation of politics.
Husserl and Eurocentrism 
Apart from its Heideggerean influences, Patocka’s philosophy o f history is also 
distinguished by a further Husserlian element that bears discussion at the start, for it
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represents a weakness inherent to this line o f thought. It is the notion, again drawn from
Husserl’s Crisis texts, that not only the particular history being discussed, but the very
concept o f history itself, is essentially Western. In the Heretical Essays, Patocka
describes the Husserlian account quite explicitly. “Edmund Husserl,” he writes,
speaks o f European history as a teleological nexus whose axis is the idea 
of rational insight and life based on it (i.e., responsibility). In his view, 
this teleological idea distinguishes European culture from all others; at 
the same time, the idea of a life in reason, the insight-ful life, singles out 
Europe from among other cultures as the essential among the contingent.
Insight and reason are the “inborn” idea of humanity as such; thus the 
European spirit is at the same time universally human. European culture 
and civilization are universally valid; the others only particular, however 
interesting they may be.25
Patocka recognizes that, on its face, this seems a somewhat naive form o f rationalism;
nevertheless, he ascribes to its main point, that “history,” as he will define it, is
primarily a European phenomenon and central to the brand of phenomenological
philosophy that he is pursuing.26 The reason behind this conclusion, simply stated, is
that true history is directly related to the emergence o f philosophy, the study of reason,
which is itself a Greek, or European, phenomenon. It is assumed that the world or, as
Patocka puts it, the “whole of beings,” is uniquely able to reveal itself, to manifest its
own nature, through the “process o f philosophizing” traceable to the Greeks.27
The key elements here are first o f all the claim that the European spirit, reason,
is universally human and second, that it is only via philosophy as it developed in Europe
that it can become manifest to us as a theme o f our existence. Reason, one may grant, is
indeed a concept that coherently describes the quest for understanding definitive of
human existence. Further, it can be argued convincingly that the European heritage,
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particularly the heritage o f ancient Athens, is an unparalleled attempt to uncover the 
nature o f this quality, an attempt that resulted in social and political institutions 
dedicated, not to the preservation of the household, but to imbuing human affairs with 
the quality of reason. The account of Husserl runs into trouble, however, with the 
following assumption: that European philosophy is not only the best, i.e., most highly 
differentiated, account o f human rationality, but it is the only account that in any way 
points towards the experience of reason. The philosophical thought of non-Westem 
cultures, the argument goes, simply did not achieve a conceptualization of reason as the 
essential human characteristic, and so is necessarily secondary in comparison to Europe. 
This conclusion, however, appears to be based upon merely a superficial glance at 
non-Westem or mythical achievements and a dismissal the content of those 
experiences.28 Such a superficial glance is decidedly insufficient.
The question at hand is not one of comparing contemporary European 
civilization with non-European, however, Europe, too, has failed to embrace its own 
heritage and has lived largely under the influence of metaphysical transfigurations of 
essential reality. But in European history, at various moments, history (as Patocka 
defines it) has broken out and the heritage of insight and care for the soul has again been 
reflected in human actions. The quest with respect to the non-European world must be 
to examine other cultures with an eye towards similar moments, albeit in different form. 
Following Husserl, Patocka fails to extend his search beyond the limits of the European 
experience. A claim of universal validity, however, as both Husserl and Patocka present 
it, demands at a minimum a more wide-ranging exploration.
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There is, therefore, an element of reductionism in Patocka’s presentation and
reliance on Husserl’s attempt at philosophy of history. Yet the Czech philosopher is not
so naive as to ignore the implications of his reduced scope of history. He defends this
scope by arguing that the insight which defines European civilization has but a single,
genuine pole — and that is philosophy.
Commonly it is said that European culture, or whatever you call it, has 
two poles: the first is the Judeo-Christian tradition and the second is 
antiquity. In my view, as I have tried to characterize it, Europe stands on 
a single pole, and that is so because Europe is insight, Europe is life 
founded on insight.
This pole, o f course, is that o f Greek philosophy; the Judeo-Christian tradition, though
certainly essential to Europe, had its effect only after it had been Hellenized:
The Judaic, which is of course enormously important in the 
Judeo-Christian tradition, had to Hellenize itself, had first to travel 
through Greek thought, in order that it could become that which it is for 
Europe. Christian dogmas are spoken about, but Christian dogmas 
nevertheless justified  themselves. Christian dogmas were not merely 
myths. And the thought itself of the other world, the other, just world, 
and of the deity who is a deity of pure good, this is nowhere other than in 
Plato, it is there fo r  the first timeP9
Although the argument in outline does have a certain cogency, it is insufficiently
defended by historical research. The research required, no small amount, was most
likely well beyond the realm of possibility given the sharp restrictions placed upon
Patocka’s academic freedom. This is regrettable, for such research would greatly
strengthen the conclusions reached without necessarily contradicting the main thrust of
the argument — that the contribution to humanity offered by Greek philosophy is indeed
unique, and in no way more so than in its use as the ground upon which to construct
social and political institutions. It is perhaps here, in the confluence o f philosophy and
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political freedom, that the Greek, or European, heritage is most unique and, perhaps, 
most universal. The promise of this historical epoch, however, remains undelivered, 
even (if not especially) in Europe. It is Patocka’s hope that, by uncovering its roots and 
reexamining them through the powerful and penetrating lenses provided by 
contemporary philosophy, he can encourage or effect change, not only in the way 
mankind lives, but in the way it organizes itself politically.
Prehistory and the Beginning of History 
Despite the attention that has been paid to the Husserlian and Heideggerean 
influences in Patocka’s work, Patocka’s conception o f history was not limited to what 
he learned from his two teachers. In “Some Comments Concerning the Concept o f a 
‘World History’” from 1935, for example, Heidegger is not mentioned and his influence 
seems negligible; instead, Patocka’s own concerns come to the fore: namely, a 
prominent concern for the specificity of history and its relation to the concrete world. 
This article introduces a concept of history as present, not in novel events or 
occurrences, but in actions that reflect continuity, actions o f “more than individual 
significance in which we participate when we sense a community of interest with 
something that has been.”30
The perception of continuity manifests itself in terms o f perceived “primordial 
forces” that seem to govern our lives. In speaking o f historical “forces,” Patocka realizes 
quite well the apparent contradiction with his own dislike o f historical abstraction; he 
notes that “we are, to be sure, expressing ourselves abstractly and we could lead the 
reader to an error, compromising, in a sense, the historicity of these concepts.” But he
169
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
makes clear that none o f the “forces” o f which he speaks stands outside o f the stream of
history or is “given prior to history, so that it would constitute, so to speak, an
extrahistorical explcmans o f history.”31 Rather, these are historical commonalities that
are actual only within specific historical formulations. Among the forces that Patocka
has in mind are several that determine our political existence; with this explicit, early
acknowledgment a tone is being set that will determine the course o f his philosophy of
history and politics in contradistinction to the work o f Heidegger in particular.
Among the examples o f such primordial forces let us cite the desire to 
govern, capable o f broad variations, leading both to imperialistic 
expansion and to lawful affirmation of the civil society in a state.
Another such force is what is often called the “spirit,” that is, the 
conscious relationship of a human to his own world in the forms of 
philosophy (and science), o f art, wisdom, religion. Every such force 
stands in the polarity of the individual-social tension, it is both a matter 
of the individual and of the society, though in most diverse gradations 
and relations.3-
The “individual-social tension” at the heart o f the concept o f politics is, in Patocka’s 
explanation, something to which humanity is inherently subject in its very historicity. 
The relation o f the individual to society even affects the human desire to understand 
oneself and one’s situation in the world and cosmos. In this early article on philosophy 
of history, Patocka’s conviction as to the relationship o f politics and philosophy is 
clearly evident. It is a conviction that remained with him throughout his life, and it 
illustrates the basis for the claim that his work is often best understood as political 
philosophy, making it quite distinct from that o f his more illustrious instructors.
This political emphasis is reflected in Patocka’s introduction to the specifics of 
his philosophy o f history in Chapter One o f the Heretical Essays, in which he offers a
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further critique o f Heidegger’s approach. Heidegger, he claims here, is deficient in 
lacking a viable perspective on the whole of the world in which we live, the “natural” 
world. His perspective is limited to a single mode o f comportment within the world: the 
mode having to do with the thematic understanding o f being. But, Patocka writes, “the 
‘natural’ world, the world o f human life, can only be comprehended as the totality o f the 
fundamental modes o f human comportment.” Heidegger focuses on the “fundamental 
philosophical question of the meaning o f being,” but neglects the other modes that do 
not deal with this explicitly.33 Human comportment is always a type of movement, but 
only one human movement is explicitly oriented to the theme of its own openness, its 
own manifestation. This is what Patocka elsewhere called the “movement of truth,” and 
it is, he contended, only a part, albeit an important one, o f overall human movement. 
Other movements or modes of comportment have to do with our rooting ourselves in 
the world and in our protection and preservation o f that world. “Only an examination 
and a comprehension of the mutual relations of all these movements,” Patocka 
concludes, “would provide a picture o f the natural world, the Lebenswelt, the world of 
human life.”34 An understanding o f human existence in its fullness, encompassing 
politics, requires such a picture o f the “natural” world if it is to be accurate. Without it, 
the possibility is raised that crucial questions, questions of the political tension between 
the individual and society, will be set aside if one focuses, as Heidegger, solely on the 
thematic question of being. There is the additional risk that, instead of being ignored, 
politics may come to be considered a mere handmaiden o f the greater question of being,
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opening the door to its misuse as a means to an end, a means justifiable in light o f that
end.
The “natural” world, however, is not the world o f human history. History, rather 
than representing an “organic extension” of the “natural” world, represents instead a 
radical disruption of it.3S Whereas human life is composed of multiple movements, 
human history, with its appeal to a continuity transcending the individual, is expressed 
via the movement of truth. Patocka’s definition o f “history” is thus far from 
conventional. The making of history occurs when we are able to rise above mere life, 
that is, above a life of service to our physical needs. The degree to which we are able to 
differentiate, therefore, between a life whose sole aim is to continue living and one open 
to a greater range of possibilities, is one factor by which it is possible to distinguish a 
historical life from a life that is unable to transcend the “natural” world.
This is not the only means by which we can make this distinction, however. 
Patocka writes that we can also speak of the “natural” world “in a somewhat different 
sense,” as the “world prior to the discovery o f its problematic character.”36 Referring to 
the world as preproblematic, Patocka is contending that the “natural” world -- which we 
noted earlier was a world in which humans lived simply, that is, intuitively and without 
self-reflection -- is one of pregiven meaning. It is a world in which meaning comes 
simply and directly from tradition and from the gods who stand over humans and rule 
them. Thereby the world is reliable and meaningful for humans; it is also, however, 
unreflective and thus unproblematic. “The basic framework for the possibility of such 
natural dwelling on earth is to exist unproblematically.”37 In the sense that the ultimate
172
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
goal here is merely to live, there is a way in which such a life resembles that of animals 
— but only to a point. As humans, the possibility is always present to problematize life, 
even if that possibility is hidden and unlikely to break forth. The world described here, 
the preproblematic world, is also, according to Patocka, a “prehistorical” world. In it, 
we do not attempt to differentiate between life and meaning as it is simply given to us 
and the possibilities o f life and meaning available to us through reflection.
At this point in Chapter One o f the Heretical Essays, Patocka begins to draw 
upon the work o f Hannah Arendt, a philosopher who was instrumental in focusing his 
attention onto the sphere o f  politics. “Here,” Patocka writes, “we need to attempt to take 
up, phenomenologically, the analysis o f ‘practical, active life’ carried out by Hannah 
Arendt and inspired by Aristotle’s distinctions between theoria, praxis, and poeisis .”38 
Arendt’s investigations were crucial because, unlike Heidegger’s, they took account of 
those aspects o f human existence not exclusively concerned with the Heideggerean 
theme of unconcealment ~  namely, those concerned with the practical, active life. They 
reinforced the broad outlines of Patocka’s own critique o f Heidegger, and offered 
support for the Czech’s intuitive sense of the importance o f the realm of politics.
The key Arendtian distinction for Patocka was between work and action, 
between the household and thepolis, and it greatly helped to clarify the distinctions 
Patocka had already drawn between the realm o f the “natural” world and that of the 
Socratic realm o f freedom.39 Arendt’s influence is reflected in both the phenomenology 
of movement and the philosophy o f history being developed in the Heretical Essays. In 
terms of human existence, it is work that is our inescapable fate; it is, Patocka writes,
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our “fundamental mode o f being in the world” because, as human, as living, we are 
constantly exposed to an inescapable need to consume to which work is our response.40 
We work in order to keep ourselves alive. Work, therefore, reflects our bondage to life. 
It also, however, presupposes a possibility of freedom, for as we come to resent the 
impositions of our work, as we perceive it as a necessary imposition upon us, so we see 
that there are possible periods in which we need not work. “The world in which the 
bondage of life to itself takes place on the basis of a concealed freedom,” Pato£ka 
writes, “is the world o f work; its proto-cell and model is the household, the community 
of those who work to assure their sustenance.”41
In concluding that work, the “fundamental” human mode of being, reflects a 
bondage of life to itself, Patocka is saying that insofar as work is the center o f our 
existence we do not live historically. The civilization constructed around work, whose 
model is the household, is not historical — it is prehistorical. Work, Patocka argues, is 
“not only a nonhistorical factor but actually one working against history, intending to 
hold it at bay.” The great civilizations of the ancient world, in their devotion to the 
continuance of life, were, in this sense, great households, and were entirely 
prehistorical.42 Work, o f course, does not disappear with the rise of history; it is merely 
the case that historical eras are defined by their self-conscious attempt to seek 
something in life beyond the simple continuance o f the biological functions guaranteed 
by work. Here, the unconventionality of this philosophy o f history is evident. History 
does not have to do with past occurrences simply, nor with their recording through 
writing or historiography. The relating of events and the keeping of annals may reflect a
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prehistorical understanding of existence if they take place within an era or civilization 
based upon the household and geared simply towards the maintenance of life.
With the advent of Greek and Roman civilization both Patocka and Arendt 
recognize that the rule of the household undergoes an important change. In place of the 
household, a public sphere arises and offers the citizen a new possibility. This is the 
thesis to which Arendt points, and from which the Heretical Essays take their impetus: 
“that the house ceases to be the core o f the world as such, becoming simply a private 
domain alongside and juxtaposed to which there arose, in Greece and Rome, a different, 
no less important public sphere.”43 With this development a space is opened up for free 
action, for political action. This is the twin beginning of philosophy and politics and, 
Patocka contends, also the first time that humans begin to consciously act so as to 
challenge, to question and to reflect thematically upon the uniqueness of their situation 
in the world. They begin, at this time, to act historically. Patocka’s goal in these essays 
is to demonstrate that the essence o f human freedom and possibility, that is, the 
realization that humanity could break the chains of its bondage to the order of work and 
the household and live freely, first began to take form with the development of the idea 
of the polls. “Starting from this thesis,” he writes, “we shall, in what follows, endeavor 
to demonstrate that the difference is that in the intervening period [between the 
replacement of the civilizational model of the household with that of the polis] history 
in the strict sense had begun.”44
In this way and with the help o f Arendt, Patocka advances his thesis as to the 
development of the mode of action that deserves to be called historical. In doing so,
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however, he must delimit as nonhistorical all those millennia o f human experience that
fall outside of the rather narrow band of the European experience. Philosophy, politics,
and history, then, are specific modes of human being, not to be understood in general
terms. They are all human phenomena, however, and so remain in essential contact with
the “natural” world o f human existence and the nonhistorical movements o f humanity.
Yet they also represent a significant break from that “natural” world. The nonhistorical
mode of life, Patocka has suggested, can be spoken of as “natural” for it is
fundamentally non-reflective, non-questioning. It accepts world and community  “as
something simply given, something that simply manifests itself’ in the interplay o f gods
and mortals.45 The break to which both Arendt and Patocka point comes about when
humans decline to accept their situation as simply given, when they, in the terms of
ontological phenomenology, begin to thematically explore the question of why the
world and its contents manifest themselves as they do.
To uncover what is hidden in manifestation entails questioning, it means 
discovering the problematic character not o f this or that but of the whole 
as such, as well as o f the life that is rigorously integrated into it. Once, 
however, that question had been posed, humans set out on a long journey 
they had not traveled hitherto, a journey from which they might gain 
something but also decidedly lose a great deal. It is the journey of 
history.46
The journey of history begins with inquiry into the world as a problem.
The phrase “the beginning of history” refers to the beginning of an epoch; it is a 
beginning Patocka locates in ancient Athens, when a thematic approach to ontological 
understanding first came to light. While the phenomenological movement of truth that is 
characteristic o f historical periods did exist in ancient, non-Greek empires organized on
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the model o f the household, such empires lacked the “explicitly thematic orientation 
characteristic o f a historical epoch.” Instead, these civilizations saw life as something of 
an “ontological metaphor” with the world of nature standing for and symbolizing the 
being that was its foundation.47 With the development o f philosophy and politics, 
however, a rupture took place from which, at least for European man and his 
descendants, there was no turning back. Life opened itself up to the possibility that labor 
and work were not the only opportunities available.
The Polis in History
In addition to Arendt’s thematization o f labor, work and action, she further
contributes to Patockan political philosophy through her political interpretation o f the
Heideggerean emphasis on the polis. Patocka follows Arendt in the realization that, it is
not only the development of philosophy that is crucial to the mode of free action, but
also the institutional model of the polis. The polis was the location in which a
philosophy of freedom could concretely manifest itself; it represented the opportunity
for the self-aware citizen to reach forth, to no longer merely accept but to actively risk
and strive. The polis was both the means to and the symbol o f a new human possibility
that announced an historical era: the possibility to initiate rather than simply accept. It
was also, inherently, a foundational model for democracy — an institution unthinkable
on any basis other than the equality o f citizens.
This new human possibility is based on the mutual recognition o f 
humans as free and equal, a recognition which must be continuously 
acted out, in which activity does not have the character of enforced toil, 
like labor, but rather of the manifestation o f excellence, demonstrating 
that in which humans can be in principle equal in competition with each 
other. At the same time that means living fundamentally not in the mode
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of acceptance but of initiative and preparation, ever seeking the 
opportunity for action, for the possibilities that present themselves; it 
means a life in active tension, one o f extreme risk and unceasing upward 
striving in which every pause is necessarily already a weakness for which 
the initiative of others lies in wait.48
The polis, Patocka argues, was a place in which men could act historically. They could
live in awareness o f the insights opened up by philosophy, consciously abandoning a
nonhistorical culture o f passive acceptance for a life in active tension. Patocka sees the
rise of the polis and o f politics as an attempt to incarnate freedom into active human
life. It is a turning point in the course of human development for it offers to man, for the
first time, a concrete setting in which to act freely and self-reflectively, to act
historically. For these reasons the rise of the polis is connected to what Patocka
unabashedly calls “the very beginning o f history in the proper sense of the word.”49
Patocka recognizes in these pages that he is dangerously close to engaging in the
very speculative historiography that he has from the start condemned. He recognizes
that the rise o f the polis was a gradual process and can be neither localized — traced to a
particular few individuals — nor attributed to an ideal dedication to human welfare.
“These reflections,” he says, “should not be understood as an idealization of the Greek
polis, as if it arose from the spirit o f selfless devotion to ‘the common good.’”50
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the polis is morally neutral. In both Plato and
Europe and Europe and the Post-European Age, Patocka points to a certain “moral
insight” tied to the care of the soul that originated with the Greek polis. He does not
claim, however, that this took the form o f a supra-historical event of some kind, an
event that somehow stands above history, as, for example, an instance o f revelation. The
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origin of the polis and its moral insight was an historical event in the sense that, just as 
human history reflects the moral relations inherent in periods of growth and decline, so 
“moral insight is nothing other than the sedimentation and codification of this 
experience ”51 The polis, entailing the recognition of its citizens as free and equal, gave 
concrete form to this sedimentation of moral experience.
The emergence of the polis, then, was an event of epochal significance. In it is 
incarnated the spirit of the Western world, a spirit which, Patocka maintains in 
following Husserl, has a significance that is universal. It is the spirit o f human 
possibility:
Here, in very specific conflicts on a modest territory and with minimal 
material means is bom not only the Western world and its spirit but, 
perhaps, world history as such. The Western spirit and world history are 
bound together in their origins: it is the spirit of free meaning bestowal, 
it is the shaking of life as simply accepted with all its certainties and at 
the same time the origin of new possibilities of life in that shaken 
situation, that is, o f philosophy. Since, however, philosophy and the 
spirit of the polis are closely linked so that the spirit of the polis survives 
ultimately always in the form o f philosophy, this particular event, the 
emergence of the polis, has a universal significance.52
Despite his attempts to defend his conclusions from the charge of historical idealism, it
is arguable that Patocka overreaches in proclaiming the Greek polis to be the origin of
“world history as such.” As I have already noted, Patocka’s account lacks the
comparative investigation of non-Westem experience minimally necessary for such a
claim to be accepted.
These essays are indeed heretical in regard to history, for they abrogate the
conventional understanding in its entirety and replace it with an understanding of
history as activity that concretely reflects the insight of philosophy. These are essays
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about philosophy and about the origin o f a particular conceptualization o f the role of 
politics. Yet this conceptualization, a Western one, concerns a matter applicable to all 
humans: the question of freedom. For this reason and despite Patocka’s overly narrow 
definition of history, the content of these essays remains profoundly significant for 
human beings and their political institutions. It remains to follow the thread o f these 
reflections to their conclusion, and from there, judge both their coherence and their 
relevance more fully.
Two Elements of Historical Life: Freedom and Problematicity 
As we move towards a conceptualization o f the realm of politics as the site of 
philosophical action, we increasingly come into contact with two concepts that form the 
basis for Patocka’s conclusions: the concepts of freedom and problematicity. Action on 
the Socratic model is action grounded in freedom and a recognition o f problematicity. 
The two are, in fact, mutually interdependent.
Freedom
The concept of freedom, we will recall, is central to the non-metaphysical stance 
of Patocka’s negative Platonism.53 In that article, freedom is defined in terms of our 
ability to transcend the realm o f objectivity. This transcendence, however, is not 
transcendence toward any thing, in the sense o f a transcendent Idea or Being, but rather 
transcendence over and away from those things or objects that exert a hold upon us. In 
the Heretical Essays, Patocka expands upon and clarifies this conception, noting that 
transcendence, not intentionality, is the “original trait” of a life that differentiates itself 
from those things that have no concern for their own being, things that “do not exist for
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their own sake nor have any ‘for the sake o f  — or have only a glimpse o f it, as animals 
might.”54 The element o f transcendence is a human element, differentiating us from 
things and animals.
In transcending the material and the objective, we do not move away from the 
world, but towards it. The transcendence o f humans is always towards, not the things of 
the world, but towards the world as a whole, and the foundation of our transcendence is 
freedom. Here again, in grounding this human attribute in freedom and not in reason, 
Patocka must recognize a debt to Heidegger: “transcendence towards the world, 
however, is originally not given by the activity o f thought and reason, as it was for 
Kant; its foundation, rather, is freedom.” And it is Heidegger who is recognized as the 
philosopher o f freedom for it is he who first views history not as a series o f independent 
events but as, in Patocka’s words, a “responsible realization” o f our humanity. “History 
is not a perception but a responsibility.”55 Our responsibility is to be fully human, and to 
do so requires that we examine our lives, that we pose the question of our own being. In 
posing questions in this way, in acting with both responsibility and freedom (for 
questioning after being is predicated upon that transcendence o f the objective realm 
definitive o f freedom), we are immediately faced with the realization that the world is 
not as simple and unproblematic as we may have thought it to be. Questioning, by its 
very nature, shakes the certainty of all that we once took for granted as given. 
Responsibility, Patocka contends, extending Heidegger’s analysis, “presupposes not 
only an understanding for being but also a shaking of what at first and for the most part
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is taken for being in naive everydayness, a collapse of its apparent meaning to which we
are led... in the explicit posing of the question of being.,,S6
Here, however, Patocka takes the analysis in a new direction, a direction that
Heidegger did not pursue. Although freedom and historicity remain the fundamental
concepts, they are set into the context o f the social realm. Patocka’s understanding of
our being, unlike Heidegger’s, has a decidedly practical element to it: it concerns our
social existence and our concrete attempts to order it. This analysis, then, does not
repeat Heidegger’s, as we shall see by tracing its movement toward, not merely a
consideration o f the polis, but a consideration of the polis as a model for a politics of
freedom and equality.
Freedom is indispensable to the quest to understand our situation in the world
and to live in truth. It has another characteristic, however, and that is risk. It requires
both a distancing o f ourselves from the objects of the world and a recognition that, in
doing so, we open ourselves up to the risk o f error and to problematicity in life.
Freedom is therefore a daunting prospect, Patocka declares, but one essential to our
living as fully human beings. He writes that
[fjreedom thus means risk; it means the continual possibility o f error and 
it means the necessity for deciding; it means the hardness of 
contradiction, the need to decide about it as if we were sovereign, and at 
the same time the impossibility of sovereignty; it means thus anxiety 
before (the apparent) void into which man is set by his limiting 
position.57
The possibility o f error, the hardness o f contradiction, the necessity o f decision -- all are 
elements distinguishing a free and responsible life from a life which is ruled by myth 
and a hierarchy of simple, given meaning. These are elements that form a necessary
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backdrop to a life of freedom, and therefore to those forms of democratic organization
that attempt to incarnate that freedom into government.
The way in which Patocka speaks of freedom, however, may lead to the
objection that its experience is an elitist, existentialist adventure available and relevant
to only a certain few individuals. These individuals, in declaring their freedom, would
raise themselves above the common needs and restrictions of mankind, becoming free
of traditional authority. In this case, freedom would be something not universal but
limited; it would be of little importance to the mass o f humans subject to a daily
struggle for subsistence. Yet this impression is counter to Patocka’s intentions and
would represent a misreading of his analysis. He attempts to explain that freedom,
though experienced to different degrees by different people and perhaps understood
thematically only by a few, is yet profoundly relevant to all. He writes that “[t]he
experience o f freedom, it is true, is less common than passive experience, but freedom,
or, better, the possibility of freedom, is something relevant to humans as such.” “We can
also say,” he continues, “that every human has some experience o f freedom,” even if he
does not encounter it in the context o f an overall understanding.58 It is clear, though, that
certain humans experience a great deal more freedom than others, perhaps even to the
extent that some may be completely unaware of the very possibility o f a free life. But
does this make freedom a relative privilege for the few? Patocka argues emphatically
that it does not. The possibility of freedom, he says, is available to all and is the ground
for our humanity as well as our dignity.
Freedom is not an aristocratic privilege, rather, it is relevant and valid for 
all; without it human would not be human. Human dignity stems from it
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also, even when humans are not aware o f it, not from the putative fact 
that “Man” is the most powerful among the animals.59
Our humanity is a result, not o f being merely the strongest o f many forms of animal life,
but by being essentially different from animal life. The foundation o f that difference is
the possibility o f freedom, which itself is contingent upon the human possibility of
comprehending our place in the world and understanding the ground o f our freedom,
understanding our being as human.
Patocka’s conception of freedom does not reduce to a form o f existentialist
individualism. Rather, it is developed as a specifically social — or political — concept,
presupposing a responsibility not only to oneself but to one’s society. In a text entitled
“The Philosophy o f Education,” based on pedagogical lectures given in 1938-39 and
only recently published for the first time, Patocka reflects on human freedom in a more
concrete context, discussing the responsibility which accompanies it. The fundamental
freedom of life, he says, that of “[d]eciding about one’s life, about its meaning and its
depth, rests in our hands, in the hands of every individual, he cannot be in any way
delivered of it.”60 This responsibility, however, though it must be assumed by the
individual alone, does not play itself out in isolation. Though its source is the self, its
purpose is not self-serving. “Does freedom mean,” Patocka asks, “ . ..a life exclusively
fo r oneself! Complete freedom means life out of one’s self, in truth about one’s self, but
not only fo r  one's se lf alone.” The weight of responsibility accompanying freedom
extends beyond the individual to society. “The free man then realizes this relation of his
own actions to society as a necessarily assumed relation and experiences it as a feeling
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of responsibility ,”61 And that responsibility to society, I might add in conclusion, 
implies a concomitant responsibility to the just authority and law of that society .62
Problematicity
“Problematicity as a theme in Patocka’s work is treated most thoroughly in a 
text based on apartment lectures from the 1970s. This text, entitled “The Spiritual 
Person and the Intellectual” and intended to comment upon and accompany the 
Heretical Essays, refers directly to the problems introduced in the Essays and helps us 
to read them in the context of Patocka’s lifelong philosophical and ethical concerns. 
Whereas the Essays, particularly the last, resort to a use of metaphor and symbol that 
can confuse or put off the first-time reader, “The Spiritual Person and the Intellectual” 
serves to remind us of the essential Socratism o f the themes under discussion. Here we 
return to what Patocka maintains is a Socratic notion of philosophy as recognition o f the 
essential problematicity of life. The Socratic individual does not live so as to avoid the 
problematic. To the contrary, he lays himself open to all of the experiences — including 
the problematic — that we are naturally heir to.
The experience of problematicity, it is argued in “The Spiritual Person and the 
Intellectual,” is a common human experience. We are all confronted, at some point in 
our lives, with situations in which our simple beliefs, our self-evident understandings, 
are shattered. “Those experiences, which show us that this whole way of seeing the 
world as self-evident and assumed is something that disappoints, something open to 
negative outcomes, these experiences are rare; they are rare but, in the end, everyone 
encounters them in some way or another.”63 It is not simply the encounter with such
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experience, of course, that is crucial. It is our response to that encounter that marks the
decisive movement.
The experiences to which Pato£ka refers are variable, from those common
moments when we come to realize that the people around us in whom we believed are
themselves flawed and live in contradiction, to those more devastating tribulations
associated with disaster, death and political upheaval. What these experiences are
common is that they show us that our life, which we thought so obvious and logically
ordered, is in fact neither.
All of them show at once that life, which appeared so obvious, is in 
reality somehow problematic, that something doesn’t correspond, that 
something is not in order. Our original attitude is that it is in order, that 
all of these small unpleasantries, disagreements and incongruences have 
no significance and that it is possible to get over them.64
The subject of Patocka’s reflections in this essay is the individual capable o f facing up
to this contingency, to this problematicity in life. The ability or courage shown by this
individual, that o f the willingness to resist coloring reality via reductive thinking, is the
same quality first noticed by Plato when he sought to distinguish the virtuosity o f a
Socrates from that very different, technical virtuosity o f the Sophists. It is, Patocka
argues, not a question of occupation, but a spiritual quality. Thus he will refer to the
Socratic individual as a “spiritual person,” this despite the fact that such phrases are out
of fashion in the modem world.6S
The Socratic way of life, properly understood, is one that accepts reality as it
appears, in unadulterated form -- in all its uncertainty and problematicity. This implies a
way of life that does not hide from negative experiences, but relegates itself to their
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inevitability; the spiritual person “lays himself open to these very things and his life
consists in being in this way exposed.”66 This way o f life, first exemplified in the figure
of Socrates but then overshadowed by a descent into a Platonic metaphysics o f the Idea,
is a free and self-reflective way of life. The price of this freedom, however, is high. The
spiritual person must relinquish the safety o f the solid ground under his feet. He or she
must accept the responsibility to “live in no way on solid ground but on something that
moves; to live without an anchor”57 This is life, not as a fulfillment of a plan, but as a
journey or a quest; it is a life of unceasing movement seeking understanding.
The court o f final appeal, here, is neither a supreme Being nor an objective
science or methodology, but one’s own fragile humanity and reason. Accepting this
understanding, however, humanity does not emerge to find itself lost at sea without
either anchor or rudder. Life is not futile or aimless, but supported by the fact that
self-understanding, expressed through philosophy, is itself a foundation that supports
even as it must refuse to set its framework in concrete to give the appearance o f solidity.
Philosophy problematizes in order to dispel the illusion o f a secure foundation in favor
o f one that reflects human reality. The foundation it uncovers, however, must itself be
recognized ever again as problematic.
Essentially, all of philosophy is nothing other than the development of 
this problematicity, in the way that great thinkers have grasped and 
expressed it. The battle to extract out of this problematicity something 
that emerges from it; to find a solid shore, but to again problematize that 
which emerges as that shore.68
The notions of freedom and problematicity relate not only to a politics of freedom, but
to the philosophy itself. Living in truth, living not as a sophistic intellectual but as a
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spiritual person, requires the openness to reality that philosophy — epitomized by the 
Socratic perspective — attempts to capture.
The Greek experience is of such importance to Patocka because it represents, not 
only the emergence of philosophy, but also the simultaneous emergence o f politics. In 
the rise o f political life on the model of the polis, in the rise of a public space where 
citizens can debate the conditions of their existence within a framework o f equality, the 
same uncertainty, problematicity and uprootedness define the conditions of existence. 
Political life is not a passive, accepting life, it is life characterized by a reaching forth, a 
“ life unsheltered.” “Such life,” Patocka writes, “does not seek to escape its contingency, 
but neither does it yield to it passively.”69 Political life on the model of the polis 
demands initiative of its citizens. It demands that they abandon a life of acceptance for 
one of outreach. In moving to the model o f the polis the old myths upon which the 
household-based society was held together are let go. As Patocka puts it, “nothing of the 
earlier life o f acceptance remains in peace; all the pillars of the community, traditions, 
and myths, are equally shaken, as are all the answers that once preceded questions.”70
The life o f freedom in the polis, the life envisioned in Socratic philosophy and 
described again by Hannah Arendt as the life o f action, is one in which metaphysical 
anchors are untied and discarded. We uproot ourselves from the soil of myth and 
tradition, meaning, not that we simply reject it, for much in myth and tradition is 
reflective o f truth, but that we abandon it as a crutch to which we turn for simple 
answers when life presents us with difficult problems. In this way we confront our life, 
we assume responsibility for it. Patocka writes o f political life as “life in an urgent
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time.” “This constant vigilance,” he continues, “is at the same time a permanent 
uprootedness, lack of foundation.” It is a life that is confronted by its own 
precariousness and finitude. Only in facing it can a truly free life unfold.71 The 
recognition o f problematicity is, at the same time, a rejection of all such systems, gods, 
and methods that would “save” us, that would deliver us from problematicity. To 
assume freedom and recognize problematicity is to act as a human being. “Without 
aspiring to the superhuman, [life] becomes freely human.”72
The concepts o f freedom and problematicity and their relation to history were 
introduced, in this discussion, in regard to their analysis in Heidegger. What I have 
shown, however, is how Patocka applied those concepts not only to the way in which 
we reflect on our own being thematically, but also to the way in which we “carry out” 
our being. Our “carrying out” of our being, our “comportment,” is defined by Patocka 
as “our practical dealing with the practical things o f our surrounding world.” He 
considers it not only the most visible component of our being, but also the best point of 
entry for a penetration to its depths.73 Our relations to things and to other beings in our 
practical dealings with them reveal our relation to the whole which is determinative of 
our being. Heidegger is a model for Patocka only to a certain point. Whereas Patocka 
pursues the questions of freedom and problematicity through an analysis and 
understanding of our comportment in the realm of politics, along Socratic lines, 
Heidegger takes a course that leads him, not in the direction of politics (excepting his 
ill-fated adventures with National Socialism), but rather explicitly away from it.74
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Philosophy of History and Politics
Philosophy and politics, Patocka concludes in the Heretical Essays in the 
Philosophy o f History, are inseparable; the care o f the one implies and necessitates the 
care o f the other. The thesis o f the co-dependence o f politics and philosophy makes 
Patocka a political philosopher in the truest sense of the term.7S To justify this claim, 
however, I need to examine the links between what Patocka defines as philosophy and 
what he understands as authentic politics. Two points are relevant in this regard. First, 
Patocka contends that the historical emergence o f politics occupies a special position in 
relation to philosophy — it is more closely connected to philosophy than either religion 
or art, for example. And second, he concludes that it is the simultaneous and 
interdependent rise o f politics and philosophy that is responsible, in the end, for the very 
emergence o f the possibility of history itself.
The relation of politics to philosophy occupies as central a role in Patocka’s 
philosophy as it did in Plato’s. Although the role o f politics becomes the subject of 
explicit analysis only in his later work, it is present as an embryonic theme throughout 
his career. Even the earliest essays contain evidence o f the centrality o f politics. In a 
1933 essay on political Platonism, for instance, Patocka writes that, while the 
philosopher is never exactly a politician, “his activity in the world is based on the 
philosopher possessing a political idea.”76 The philosopher must be active, and this 
activity cannot be understood as exclusive of the issues related to the organization of 
society.
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In Plato and Europe it is the “care for the soul” that is the subject of
investigation. Even here, however, the centrality o f the political is never neglected. Care
for the soul, I noted in Chapter Three, symbolizes the insight derived from Greek
experience and embedded in the European consciousness as its spiritual principle. What
has not yet been noted is the way in which care for the soul has a particular, tripartite
structure. In Europe and the Post-European Age, which is a more concise discussion of
the themes o f Plato and Europe, Patocka bases his chapters on each o f the three
elements: care for the soul as an expression o f an ontological arrangement, care for the
soul as care for the polis, and care for the soul as self-understanding and self-control. It
is the second o f these perspectives that concerns us at the moment.77 Care for the soul as
care for the polis restates the notion at the center o f Plato’s Republic, that the order of
the city naturally reflects the order o f the individual soul.78 Thus caring for the soul
requires that one act with constant reference to the political — that one care for the polis.
Patocka’s most explicit discussion of the connection between politics and
philosophy takes place, however, in the notes he appended to his Heretical Essays. Here
he directly addresses the special status o f politics, a status concordant with that of
philosophy. Patocka begins these notes by asking himself a series of rhetorical questions
about his attribution of such preeminent importance to the development o f philosophy
and politics in the ancient Greek period, questions which he proceeds to answer in his
own defense. After first questioning the status given to philosophy over, for example,
poetry and art, he asks of himself:
[furthermore, is it not as unfair as inconsistent to attribute a special 
importance to politics in relation to philosophy, to declare philosophy
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and politics in nearly the same breath to be the founders o f history 
strictly speaking when in terms o f collective social influence we might 
be far more justified in attributing that role to religion, which, as in the 
case o f Israel, clearly had the decisive word in the formation o f the 
bearers o f history, such as nations?79
His answer, o f course, is no. Patocka makes his point clear in these comments: politics
and philosophy together constitute the foundation of history; they represent a mode of
being that is o f greater importance to the creation of history than is religion. How is this
so? Politics, in its proper form the epitome of the social being of man, presents him with
the most direct means to express the freedom and the active striving that represent the
highest level of human movement, the movement in which the variety o f possibilities of
man qua man are examined and pursued. The original point of politics is freedom, and
freedom is the greatest of human possibilities.
Politics, then, as conceptualized and epitomized in the mode o f Socratic
philosophy, occupies a higher position in relation to philosophy than either religion or
art, for original politics has as its purpose the transmission of philosophical insight to
humanity as a whole in its most fundamental mode — the mode of its social being.
Politics presents us with the possibility to strive for and live a free life. It connects the
spiritual life to praxis while religion and art can only symbolize that spirituality.
The reason for this special position o f politics is that political life in its 
original and primordial form is nothing other than active freedom itself 
(from freedom, for freedom). The goal of striving here is not life for the 
sake o f life (whatever life it may be) but only life for freedom and in it, 
and it is understood, that is, actively grasped, that such a life is possible.
That, however brings this original politics into a wholly different 
proximity to philosophy than that of religion and art, however great their 
importance in spiritual life. If then spiritual life is the fundamental 
upheaval (shaking of immediate certainties and meaning), then religion 
senses that upheaval, poetry and art in general depict and imagine it,
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politics turns it into the practice o f life itself, while in philosophy it is 
grasped in understanding, conceptually.80
While philosophy has as its goal the understanding of human being, politics, as Patocka
is trying to clarify it, “turns it into the practice of life itself” This conceptualization,
strongly influenced by Hannah Arendt, attempts to define politics in distinct contrast to
those minimalist contemporary understandings that see it as merely a means to the
organization of labor or allocation of resources.81 For Patocka, politics reflects our
essential humanity, embodied in the ultimate human possibility of freedom. For this
reason, it can never be an arbitrary exercise. Freedom is available to us only in a setting
modeled after the essential core of the Greek polls, a setting that provides for a
“community of equals.”
We have sought to show that the invention of politics does not simply 
coincide with the organization o f work on a foundation of religion and 
power. That is the source of empires, but not of politics which is possible 
only with the conception of bestowing meaning on life out o f freedom  
andfor it, and that, as Hegel said, cannot be brought about by a solitary 
one (a ruler, the pharaoh) being “conscious of freedom.” Humans can be 
that only in a community of equals. For that reason, the beginning o f 
history in the strict sense is the p o lish
Karl Marx was wrong in declaring politics the organization of work on a basis of
religion or power, and he was even more wrong in positing an abstract dialectical
structure of relationships governing human history. The Heretical Essays have
demonstrated this point. Politics is far more significant than modem political theory
makes it out to be.
It is not only Marxism with which Patocka takes issue, however, it is any 
philosophy grounded in abstraction rather than the genuine experience o f phenomena. It
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is the grounding of these philosophies in the abstract rather than in the concrete that is 
the root o f their weakness. Patocka’s position is clear: “We need to philosophize on the 
basis of phenomena and not of hypothetical constructs out o f principles." This means 
we need above all to remain faithful to experience. “What,” he continues, “does 
phenomenon mean? Phenomenon is what we see, what is present in our experience,... 
Thus the question of human social being is also in the fust place a phenomenological 
question.”83 This reliance on the themes o f phenomenology, above all, attests to the 
conviction that it is experience that must guide theory, and never the reverse. For this 
reason a study o f history, the terrain of human experience, is inherent to philosophy. 
And the study o f history in these pages leads to the conclusion that the history cannot be 
defined as the general recording of events and facts, but must refer specifically to those 
human activities geared towards a thematic understanding or expression of that which 
defines our humanity.
Let me turn now to a consideration of the reliance of Patocka’s view o f history, 
not only on a philosophy of freedom, but on a politics of freedom as well. History, 
Patocka argues, first becomes possible on a broad scale with the common emergence of 
philosophy and politics. The importance o f this common historical event consists in that 
it sets in motion an earthquake of sorts — its rise effects a “shaking” o f the foundations 
of earlier civilizational models, foundations built up upon naive and absolutist 
understandings of meaning. The assumption of the responsibility inherent in this 
shaking presents us with manifold possibilities, albeit merely human ones. As Patocka 
puts it, “history arises from the shaking o f the naive and absolute meaning in the
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virtually simultaneous and mutually interdependent rise o f politics and philosophy. 
Fundamentally, history is the unfolding of embryonic possibilities present in this
shaking.”84
The rise of philosophy and politics, conditioned upon the understanding that true
meaning is never as simple as an objective fact, opens up for man the possibility to be
free. A free existence, again, is one that distances itself from metaphysical constructs as
well as from upon the most basic instinct of the natural world, the simple will to live.
Humanity has the possibility to be ruled neither by a “system” — o f gods or of
dialectical forces — nor by a bondage to the simple will to live that is characteristic of
the natural world. The conception of history that Patocka has sought to impart is
grounded in the recognition o f this possibility. The rise of philosophy and politics, he
contends, first bring this possibility into the center o f human life — via the creation of a
setting for these pursuits in the Greek polis. This perspective is reflected, and perhaps
adequately summarized, in a passage from an article about the politics and philosophy
of the Czech president T.G. Masaryk which I will cite in full:
This curious fact [that philosophy, precisely defined, exists only in 
societies arising from out o f Greek thought], it seems to me, depends 
exclusively on the historical nature o f philosophy. Philosophy, thinking, 
by its emergence creates history, that unique impact on the overall 
activity o f mankind. Only by means o f politics and philosophy, those 
two closely related expressions of freedom, did man become historical in 
the real sense o f the word, i.e. living not just naturally, simply using what 
was available, what could simply be affirmed, but by what always, 
though unseen, accompanies human life, seemingly as marginalia, but 
what in truth is the precondition of all human life and behavior. History 
arises when people in a certain insignificant region o f the earth cease to 
live for life and begin to live in order to conquer, for themselves and 
those who share their will, the space for their recognition, the space for 
freedom. That is politics in its original definition: life from freedom and
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for freedom. But freedom is equivalent to a space for thought, i.e. the 
realization that freedom is not a thing among things, that free existence 
stands on the border between what exists and what cannot be called 
existing, since it frees man from the dependence on things in order that 
he might perceive them and place himself outside of them, understand 
them and his own position among them.85
This “heretical” philosophy o f history, which speaks of politics in the same breath as
philosophy, is the basis for a theory of politics.
The notion of politics that Patocka envisions, I should add in conclusion, is not
one that ignores questions o f political order. Although he does not pursue political
theory in the sense of a blueprint for political organization, Patocka’s philosophy is
directed towards the more practical side of politics in a way that Heidegger’s, for
example, is not. While one may argue that the Heideggerean conception o f the polis is
not political, no such claim can be made for Patocka. Richard Rorty, for example, has
noted that, while Heidegger was uninterested in the difference between democracy and
totalitarianism, Patocka was clearly concerned with the “connection between philosophy
and the ideally free and happy community.” This was a connection, Rorty continued,
that “repelled Heidegger.”86 Not so Patocka: “care for the soul,” the Czech philosopher
concluded, “is possible obviously only in a well-ordered community.”87
It is the model o f the well-ordered polis, then, a community o f equals held
together by philosophical insight, that responds directly to philosophy as care for the
soul. Jan Patocka’s life and career, however, did not play out in such a community. He
began his studies amidst the experience o f a crisis in contemporary thought and pursued
his career through a succession of devastating political upheavals and periods of
totalitarian repression. He saw, in the world of the twentieth century, a predominance of
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extreme views. Patocka sought, in his political philosophy, a recovery o f principles 
exemplified for him in a particular institutional model and a particular mode of living. 
European politics and philosophy had become wedded, by the arrival o f the twentieth 
century, to a pervasive nihilism that people sought to overcome through political 
movements -- movements promising a secularized version o f the metaphysical certainty 
they had enjoyed up until the twilight o f traditional religion and metaphysics.
Europe, Science, and Metaphysics 
In the previous chapter’s discussion of metaphysics and “Negative Platonism,” it 
was noted that the influence of metaphysical thinking was crucial to the conquest of 
nature via the progressive development o f science and technology. The movement from 
Greek thought to the thought of the scientific Enlightenment was not, o f course, a rapid 
or direct step. Between the two lies a vast period of time during which both scientific 
and philosophical thought were subsumed within the dominant perspective o f European 
Christianity. A significant part o f the philosophy of history that Patocka outlines in his 
Essays is dedicated to tracing a continuity in European thought tied to a basic 
metaphysical framework. The positing of an absolute and objective Idea was an event, 
he charges, that affected not only the development of Christianity but also the 
development of science and, in its wake, a scientific or objectivistic understanding of 
politics. Patocka outlined this argument first in the 1950’s with “Negative Platonism,” 
but then again in greater detail in the 1970’s with the third of his Heretical Essays. it is 
this latter text that contains the details o f his thesis and the profound effect that it had on 
his understanding of contemporary politics and its shortcomings.
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Light and Darkness
In Chapter Three o f the Heretical Essays, Patocka characterizes both the positive
potential o f genuine philosophy as well as its decline into metaphysics via a
metaphorical description o f events that reverses the conventional symbolic meaning of
“light” and “darkness.” Philosophy, he argues, had offered to man a new vision of
eternity in the concept o fphiisis, the eternal and imperishable genesis and perishing of
all that there is. Implicit in this concept of nature and the cosmos was a sense of
mystery, an image of a darkness out o f which the light o f the dawn o f the cosmos and its
order is bom. There is, in this image o f a dark night, a sense o f the transcendent mystery
of human reality that is positive, for out of it order and meaning are created. Like
philosophy, however, this sense of the metaphor o f darkness was soon to be eclipsed by
the human desire for certain meaning, for foundation in objectivity.
However, just as the life of the free polis was granted but a short time to 
unfold in its free daring, fearlessly aiming for the unknown, so also 
philosophy, aware o f its bond with the problem o f the polis and sensing 
in the germ already its perils and perishing, was led by a striving for a 
definitive and new bestowal o f meaning to see in that darkness only a 
lack o f light, the night as a waning of the day (emphasis mine).88
The transition that Patocka is describing here is one away from a philosophy that
responds to being, found by Heidegger in presocratic philosophy but by Patocka in the
example of Socrates, who remained linked to his predecessors, and towards a
metaphysical philosophy that substitutes an objective absolute for the mysterious
uncertainty o f reality. With the certainty of an absolute all is sunshine and light and the
symbol of darkness, o f a tentative mystery, is reduced to a negative counterpart. The
symbol o f darkness, which is prominent in the sixth of the Heretical Essays and
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certainly contributes to the controversial tone o f that essay, is considerably clearer when 
seen in this context, for it is evident that Patocka uses it to symbolize the element of 
problematicity inherent to the free polis and to the care for the soul.89 This uncertainty, 
this darkness, is the origin of light; to ignore its generative properties and attempt to 
negate it as one grabs for clarity is, in Patocka’s imagery, an attempt to deny one’s 
humanity.
Christianity and Metaphysics 
The rise of Christianity in the Roman Empire was an event of world-historic 
proportions, and one not unrelated to the change in philosophy and the decline of the 
free polis that it followed. In the Patockan analysis, there is a continuity between the 
formulation which set into motion that change -- the Platonic Idea as an “other” world — 
and the Christian conception of God. The development of Christianity from out of 
Judaism was contingent upon the inheritance of a conceptual formulation from Greece. 
As he puts it, “[d]ivine transcendence, whose conceptual foundations undoubtedly do 
not lie in Israel’s treasury of ideas, is an inheritance of the ‘true world’ formulated once 
by Plato and transformed theologically by Aristotle.”90 The Christian conception of the 
human relationship to a divine and transcendent God, in what is unfortunately a 
somewhat superficial account given in broad strokes, is described as a response to the 
perception that even metaphysical philosophy could not deliver the certainty it 
promised. Though in a sense it sought to do so with metaphysics, philosophy still could 
not provide humans with clearly intelligible and positive meaning. In faith, however,
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“God’s word addressed to humans and the response to this word,” positive meaning was
guaranteed and along with it a means to face human misery without utter resignation.91
Christianity, while it did not allow man to understand God in perfect clarity,
offered the security of a reciprocal relationship in faith, a new community to replace the
loss of the polis. That community, grounded in a metaphysical relationship rather than
in freedom, nevertheless offered a genuine meaningfiilness and sense o f equality.
Thus the question of meaning is resolved positively by dismissing 
philosophy and by countering scepticism with the word from an 
otherwise inaccessible “true” world. On this basis there grows a new 
community and a new way o f coming to cognitive terms with the totality 
o f what-there-is. It is a new community, which, to be sure, is no longer 
simply the work of humans but in which humans do participate freely. It 
is not only a community of humans with each other, a mutual recognition 
in which they guarantee each other a spiritual perpetuation in the 
memory of glory. It is, rather, a community o f humans with God who is 
their eternal memory and the perception of their essential spiritual being.
It is a community in which, for all its hierarchy, all humans are equal 
before the face of the ultimate “true” reality; in which they are thus true 
fellow participants in a meaningfiilness which they did not create but 
which they are called to bring about.92
Christianity offered a positive meaningfiilness and a community that could withstand
the tribulations of human life in the world, including those o f despotic political regimes
in which equality was denied. Equality, after all, was an integral part o f the human
compact with God and thereby guaranteed on a higher level.
With the rise of Christianity, as with metaphysics, a foundation for human life
and understanding is achieved and with it the sense of security that accompanies the
feeling of solid ground under one’s feet. This understanding and security provided man
with another attribute previously held in check by the inherent uncertainty o f freedom. It
provided him with daring. The foundation provided by the metaphysical basis of
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Christianity left man free to pursue “all speculative daring” without fear of a fall into
meaninglessness.
Here, then, we need to grasp the new place and significance which 
metaphysics assumes in the complex of Christian faith and doctrine...
The significance o f metaphysical thought and metaphysical 
inquiry...becomes that, within the framework provided by faith and 
guaranteed thereby, it is possible to some extent to come to understand 
what faith offers. Rational cognition thus reaches transcendent goals 
without fear o f going astray, while on the other hand we can devote 
ourselves to all speculative daring without being led to the regions of 
scepticism where meaninglessness lurks. Reason as the natural organ for 
the understanding o f truth loses its place of pride in life, but we might 
claim that this loss is at the same time a gain: for it gains firm 
foundation, certainty, and with it daring.93
The “speculative daring” to which Patocka refers was exemplified, in Western history,
in the scientific quest for knowledge and control of nature.
Science and Metaphysics
The development o f science, it was noted earlier, was a process also contingent
upon the ascendency o f metaphysics over a philosophy o f freedom. In the analysis of
Patocka and others, it was a specific characteristic o f the Christian assumption of
metaphysics that humans were set above nature in such a way that it, in effect, became
theirs to rule and control. One of those cited by Patocka as a source for this line of
reasoning is Karl Lowith. Lowith, Patocka notes, cited a relationship between the
Christian view o f nature and the modem crisis of meaning epitomized by nihilism.94 It is
a relationship upon which Patocka builds in his own analysis of science and the
foundation of meaning in the modem world.
According to [Lowith]..., another Christian source of nihilism is the 
relation to nature as a reservoir of objects given to humans to rule and 
care for. The idea which first meant care for things entrusted to humans
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turned in the modern age into a doctrine o f domination and exploitation 
of the treasury o f nature with no regard not only for nature itself but for 
future humankind as well.
More important, however, is that for the Christians nature need 
not be that concrete reality within which they are submerged and to 
which they belong as to one of the fundamental loci o f the epiphany of 
its mystery but rather, at least since the age of nominalism, an object of 
judgment and speculation. Nature is not given and evident but rather 
distant and alien, to be formed by the means o f our psyche. The locus of 
meaning and being is God in God’s relation to the human soul: nature is 
the locus o f cold, abstract reflection. Thus with regard to nature modern 
humanity builds not on antiquity,.. .but rather on the Christian mode of 
regarding it with a cool distance and distrust.95
The view of nature as something to be examined, controlled and exploited, when
combined with the “speculative daring” with which man is imbued when he is secure of
a foundation of meaning, was in turn instrumental in the development and progressive
advancement of natural science. Nature, no longer something autonomous with which
we interact, began to be considered a formal object, an object of natural science
investigation.
Christianity, then, positively influenced the development o f the very thing that
would challenge its supremacy in the world. The scientific worldview would not only
overthrow Christianity on the European stage, it would dethrone it with an appeal to a
nihilism, a refusal to recognize beings other than those explicable by science. The
success of mathematical natural science, Patocka explains,
... becomes the source of a new, soberly audacious view o f the whole o f 
reality which recognizes no beings other than those at which we arrive by 
such mathematical reconstruction o f the world o f the senses in which we 
naturally move. Thus, with the help o f the Christian conception of 
meaningfulness and nurtured by Christianity, a new conception o f reality 
grew in the womb of the Western European society.96
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This new conception of reality, unlike the conception it gradually replaced, did not look 
for a sense o f meaningfulness. In fact, it became inevitable that the success o f the 
sciences would increasingly make irrelevant the very notion of a non-scientific source 
of meaning.
The transition from a theocentrism to a scientific anthropocentrism, however, 
does not mean that Western man has rid himself of the longing for truth or meaning. 
This longing persists in the anthropocentric age, and manifests itself in movements that 
offer, on a secular or scientific level, the same certainty of meaning once offered by 
Christianity.
European humanity has become so accustomed to this Christian 
conception o f the meaning of history and of the universe that it cannot let 
go of some of its substantive traits even where fundamental Christian 
concepts such as God the creator, savior, and judge have ceased to be 
significant for it, and that it continues to seek meaning in a secularized 
Christian conception in which humans or humanity step into God’s 
place.97
In these “secularized” formulations of metaphysics meaning and ultimate clarity is 
provided, based either on the infallibility o f method as in the natural sciences and 
positivism, or, more perniciously, as when the formulations concern supposed social or 
historical forces, on the promise of a redemptive end in a political movement or a 
philosophy of history that explains itself in terms of logical sequences. It is possible, 
particularly with the latter type o f formulation, that whole societies may be drawn into 
an anthropocentric metaphysical scheme. Most such schemes, like Comte’s “Cult of 
Humanity,” will not be successful, but there is also the possibility that societies may: 
“by force and defiance seek to enforce meaning where ex datis there can be none, as in 
the case of Marxism. Not Marxism as a teaching, as a critical social science, rather, as
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the ‘sacred’ doctrine o f new, restructured, and aggressive societies, exploiting the
corroding scepticism of the old.”98 In addition to Comte and Marx, Patocka points to
Hegel and Sartre for the metaphysical nature o f their philosophical programs. Nietzsche,
though often praised for his diagnosis of the problem, also reflects the fallacy of the
anthropocentric solution to the lack of meaning. In fact, Patocka writes, the
phenomenon o f the “secularized Christian conception” is actually “an unwitting
example o f the Nietzschean contradiction embodied in the prescription that if there is no
meaning, we need to create it ‘by imposing an order on the portion o f the world within
our reach.’”99 Thus the phenomenon o f the secularization o f metaphysics is present in
politics and science as well as in speculative philosophy.
In the modem scientific perspective, which now dominates even the social
sciences, the human is often considered as little more than “an organism maintaining a
metabolic exchange with its context and reproducing itself.”100 In this case, Patocka
notes ironically, it is as if man has reverted to a situation characteristic of prehistory, a
bondage o f human life to itself.
Thus it seems as if the whole movement o f history, after all the drive for 
absolute meaning in politics, in philosophies o f a metaphysical cast, in 
religion that probed as deeply as Christianity, ended up where it began — 
with the bondage of life to its self-consumption and with work as the 
basic means of its perpetuation.101
In truth, however, this comparison does not do justice to the age of prehistory. It may
seem as if the nihilism of modernity has something in common with the period prior to
philosophy, “[y]et it is not so,” Patocka contends. “Prehistoricity is not characterized by
a deprivation o f meaning, it is not nihilistic like our times. Prehistorical meaning may
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be modest, but it is not relativistic.”102 A pervasive meaninglessness is Dot a 
characteristic o f civilization founded on the model o f the household; it is rather a 
consequence o f the human desire to replace human meaning, problematic meaning, with 
a certain truth. When certain truth turns out not to be compatible with scientific inquiry 
and skepticism, the result is a descent into nihilism.
A Recovery
This question of meaning is a problem for the contemporary world, and nowhere 
more so than in the realm of politics. The lack o f a center of meaning in  the wake of the 
decline of metaphysics is not merely a sociological problem (though Patocka notes that 
the whole discipline of sociology basically grew up out of the perceived need to 
understand the pathologies specific to modem man), it is a political problem. Politics, 
Patocka wrote, turns the subject matter of philosophy into the practice o f  life itself; and 
in the post-metaphysical world, the practice of life has taken its lead from the void of 
meaning left by the decline of metaphysics.
The human need for meaning has not evaporated in the scientific era. To the 
contrary, insofar as traditional forms o f meaning are no longer available or convincing, 
then the search for meaningful substitutes becomes increasingly prevalent. Patocka’s 
analysis o f the modem world implies that metaphysics has been replaced in the realm of 
politics by two things, neither of which are satisfactory. The choices open to man are: 
first, as 1 discussed above, the philosophical systems or political movements that aim to 
provide a substitute, on the level of the secular, for metaphysical meaning and certainty. 
On the other side o f the coin, however, are the liberal-democratic political systems that
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manage to evade this temptation by grounding themselves in a scientific materialism 
that avoids the question of meaning altogether.
In the fifth “heretical” essay, Patocka deals with the question o f the “decadence” 
or “decline” of the contemporary world, by which he means not its failure in the realm 
of morality, but its loss of contact with “the innermost nerve of its functioning,” the 
self-awareness that comes with an understanding of history and the care for the soul. 
The options open to “post-metaphysical” man, he concludes, encourage this decline, for 
they resolutely avoid, after the decline o f metaphysics, a genuine and open approach to 
the question of meaning. Whereas scientifically-grounded liberalism seeks to avoid the 
question o f meaning (such that the citizens o f modem democracies delve ever deeper 
into orgiastic forms of “escape” from responsibility for meaning), radical political 
movements do even worse in offering false, secular “substitutes” for a lost sense of 
meaning and certainty.
Patocka’s philosophy of history and politics is a concrete response to a situation 
he feels is one of crisis. The rediscovery of history in the active pursuit of freedom, the 
epitome o f which was the historical founding of the polis as a site grounded in the 
rejection o f given meaning and the acceptance of the problematicity o f merely human 
meaning, is directed to this end. This philosophy o f history and politics is a response to 
the twin philosophical and political problems of the contemporary world: the problem 
of scientific nihilism on the one hand and objective versions of metaphysics on the 
other. He is not the first to suggest a solution to this perceived crisis, but his approach is 
unique in finding, in European history, a conception of freedom and a view o f the soul
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that neither limits itself to the human and avoids the meaningfiilness o f the whole within
which humans exist, nor turns that experiential whole into an objectified being or goal
that can offer a certainty o f meaning not available to authentic humanity.
Dostoyevski proposes Byzantine Christianity, Nietzsche an eternal return 
o f the same as the solution to the crisis. Yet the very foundation of 
Christianity, the rediscovery of eternity, presupposes a repetition of 
something which once was real at the very beginning of the European 
era: the soul as that within us which is related to that unperishing and 
imperishable component o f the whole which makes possible truth and in 
truth the being not of a superman but of an authentically human being.103
Patocka’s philosophy o f history and his analysis o f the polis aim at this “repetition” of
an insight that was alive at the beginning of the European era. It is not a repetition in
any common sense, however, for it an option to us only now, after the insight of
contemporary thought has renewed the possibility o f our access to it.
In order to concretely consider the feasibility o f a politics integrated with an
understanding of history, Patocka must first examine in greater detail the condition of
the contemporary age that makes his work an imperative. He must also describe the
content o f that politics and defend its problematic conception of meaning. In the
following chapter, I will take up Patocka’s view of politics in the twentieth century and
its shortcomings, and will outline in concrete terms the type of philosophical politics he
envisions as our only authentic alternative. I will conclude by examining the role — and
the form -- of ethics in the politics that emerges from this philosophy o f history and the
soul.
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CHAPTER 5 
POLITICS AND ETHICS IN THE TW ENTIETH CENTURY
In the last two o f his Heretical Essays in the Philosophy o f  History, Pato£ka 
turns from the development of a philosophy of history to an application of its principles 
in the contemporary world. We see, in these essays, an expression o f the political side of 
his philosophy. Although Jan Patodka became known as a dissident in Czechoslovakia 
in the 1970s, his political philosophy cannot accurately be characterized as “dissident” 
philosophy. Its focus is not resistance and its relevance is not limited to periods of 
ideological repression. The ground of Patodka’s political dissidence is a form o f 
political morality and commitment to truth. Politics must be subservient, he argues in 
Charter 77, to something that transcends it and holds it accountable. What on the 
surface may resemble a commitment to a straightforward metaphysics o f morals, 
however, is something quite other. Metaphysics as the foundation for politics is 
precisely what Patoika wishes to avoid. PatoCka’s philosophical outlook, as we have 
seen in the preceding chapters, is grounded in an understanding o f human historicity and 
problematicity that explicitly denies the possibility of a simple metaphysics. There is an 
unambiguous moral element to the political philosophy o f Jan PatoCka, an element that 
he claims is the product of, rather than in conflict with, his ontological philosophy of 
history.
In this chapter I will examine Patoika’s political texts -- including the final two 
and most radical of his Heretical Essays — with the aim o f coming to grips with the 
political and ethical implications contained therein. It is PatoSka’s belief that an
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understanding of human ontology and human historicity, as he has developed these 
concepts, will lead the individual to a mode o f comportment that is inherently truthful 
and ethical. And it will do so in a way that avoids the pitfalls of metaphysics. This 
behavior on the part of dedicated individuals, by extension, provides the greatest 
possibility for the genuine improvement of not merely political societies but Western 
civilization as a whole. It would represent a recovery of the spirit o f rationality in the 
West that had its origin in Greek philosophy and was alluded to by Husserl in his work 
on the crisis o f the European sciences.
The texts in question, not merely the final two Heretical Essays but also texts on 
the spiritual basis of political activity and the competition in Europe among various 
manifestations of modem “supercivilization,” reveal not only Patodka’s understanding 
of political ethics but also his personal relationship to the tumultuous political scene in 
Central Europe during this century. These texts will also lead us to an examination of 
his experience with communism and his decision to act as a dissident, culminating in his 
fatal involvement with Charter 77.
Pato£ka and Politics
In the contemporary world, Pato£ka argues, governance has the character of an 
“accidental rule.”1 It is not a rule infused by an understanding of either man or history — 
but by a misunderstanding. Such misunderstanding is reflected not only in the politics 
of totalitarian movements, but also in the more conventional politics of the scientific 
age, where the individual is often reduced to a mere role and conceived of as a “force”
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rather than a human being. “The question,” Patodka writes, “is whether historical 
humans are still willing to embrace history.”2
Embracing history means understanding human historicity; it means 
understanding freedom and transcendence and accepting the problematicity inherent in 
human life. It involves an openness, not only to the things of the world, but to the world 
as a whole that transcends those particulars. Modem civilization has as yet failed to 
embrace history in large part because it continually seeks to solve it, to end its fatal 
uncertainty and contingency. “Modem civilization suffers not only from its own flaws 
and myopia but also from the failure to resolve the entire problem o f history. Yet the 
problem of history may not be resolved, it must be preserved as a problem, (emphasis 
mine)”3 An age that reduces understanding to a mathematical equation cannot hope to 
understand history as a problem that is not subject to a solution. Rather, contemporary, 
technologically-oriented civilization views history as a problem to be solved, and 
humans as forces to be manipulated to this end. The recognition of history — of human 
life as problematic, and o f man as a historical being ~  is precisely what technological 
civilization denies. Problematicity and contingency are viewed as something to be 
overcome and controlled, rather than recognized.
In the last two o f his Heretical Essays, Patodka explores the effect o f these 
phenomena on the twentieth century. His aim, after diagnosing the situation and its root 
causes, is to consider the variety o f responses available to the individual. The hope for a 
simple solution has already been rejected — it is contrary to the very nature of human 
historicity. Accepting this fact, however, is a difficult prospect requiring considerable
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struggle and fortitude. Again following Plato and Socrates rather than Heidegger or 
Husserl, PatoCka locates hope not in history or in society, but in the individual, the 
“spiritual person” who is able to recognize and accept problematicity. Only through 
such people does the possibility exist for a “metanoesis,” a “turn” o f the civilization as a 
whole.4
Though Pato£ka requires that “spiritual people” act politically, he is not 
suggesting a system of rule on the order of Plato’s Republic. It is not a question of 
placing them in the position o f guardians or rulers. In contemporary society they already 
occupy positions o f  importance: they may be engineers or artists, writers or clerics, 
perhaps even political leaders. The question is not one o f their becoming politicians, but 
o f their acting politically — their acting publicly and in mutual recognition so as to lead 
society towards the understanding of history that is presupposed by the existence of a 
historical civilization.
The question of Patoika’s political writings is not a simple one; there is a 
genuine lack of secondary source material on the subject. Yet contrary to the contention 
of Erazim Kohak, who argued that “Jan PatoCka, after all, had never been a political 
activist or, for that matter, even a political philosopher,”5 the Czech philosopher both 
expressed himself politically on many occasions and consistently made explicit the 
underlying relevance o f his philosophy to politics. The relevant essays appear, not 
merely in his dissident phase, but throughout his career; in order to grasp the core of my 
disagreement with Kohak, to grasp Pato£ka as a “political” philosopher, I must examine 
these texts carefully.
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Europe and Existentialism in Pato£ka’s Early Work 
The course of Pato£ka’s career was heavily influenced by the events of his time 
— of this there can be no doubt.6 The first of many decisive turns of history for Patocka 
and the Czechs occurred when the glory o f the first independent Czechoslovak Republic 
under Masaryk was confronted with the rise o f Adolph Hitler and National Socialism, 
followed shortly thereafter by the betrayal o f the West at Munich and the Nazi 
occupation o f the Sudetenland. Like Husserl in his Crisis lectures, Pato£ka expressed 
his critique o f this approaching storm in terms o f resistance to an attack on the 
philosophical spirit o f Europe. The young Patodka was greatly inspired by the elder 
philosopher’s rejection o f this “irrationalism” and his call for a rebirth o f Europe 
“through a heroism of reason.”7 Unlike Husserl, however, the young Czech saw 
something in the Existenzphilosophie of Jaspers and Heidegger that did not conflict with 
his search for the rational spirit of Western thought. In many of his texts of the thirties, 
these influences combine to produce a philosophical approach that, while recognizable 
as that of a young man -- characterized by a sense of philosophy as heroic resistance and 
a rejection of all naive “leaning on an absolute power” for support* — nevertheless 
projects a basic continuity with his more mature work.
Characteristic of these texts, for example, is a strong critique of religion and an 
exhortation o f a life in “amplitude” over a life in “balance.”9 He also takes issue, 
significantly, with T.G. Masaryk’s condemnation of what he called “titanism.”
Titanism, as Masaryk saw it, was equivalent to Dostoyevsky’s understanding of 
“nihilism as a deification of man, enthroning man in place of God as the highest
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lawgiver.” Whereas “Dostoyevsky speaks o f  nihilism, Masaryk speaks of titanism.”10 
This critique, though, is decidedly not in favor of nihilism. Rather, he criticizes 
Masaryk's oversimplification of the problem into one of subjectivism versus 
objectivism, o f modem subjectivism versus the idea of an objective reason in God. For 
the young Pato£ka, Masaryk’s formulation is over-determined. It implies that “man’s 
striving to give meaning to his life” is tantamount to Titanism, and that the man who 
does so, who “gives up the moral crutch o f an external command” and denies his 
dependence on “salvation from without,” inevitably finds himself in a “blind alley.”11 
Patocka rejects the deterministic nature o f this conclusion. In fact, he argues, the 
subjective “titanic” approach may actually uncover the “germ o f a solution” in its 
rejection of an absolute and objective foundation in God.12 The alternatives are not as 
clear-cut as Masaryk’s dichotomy between a nihilistic subjectivism and a moral 
objectivism would suggest. Above all, Pato£ka wants to examine human existence 
through the concepts of man and the world, never through a notion o f a concrete, 
transcendental being who picks us up when we stumble. For Pato£ka it is the world as a 
whole and our relation to it that transcends man and forms the context for our striving. 
Thus he issues an apology of sorts, contra Masaryk, for the philosophical “titan” willing 
to reject facile objectivism.
There is a dangerous element to this quasi-existential posture, of course. It could 
be argued that Patodka comes close to titanism in the nihilistic sense to which 
Dostoyevsky refers. Such a conclusion, however, would be inaccurate. The curious mix 
in these early texts of what Erazim Kohak described as “existentialist passion with 
utmost scholarly rigor,”13 manifests instead a  tension between a youthful, existentialist
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urge to reject traditional philosophy and a Husserlian urge to renew European reason. 
Although PatoCka’s early writings are distinctly characterized by this heroic conception 
of philosophy, yet they are not essentially existentialist, and certainly not nihilistic, 
texts.14 While Pato£ka recognized and appreciated in existentialism its critique o f 
traditional thought and its diagnosis of crisis, his own prescriptions called for a  
reflective renewal, rather than a rejection o f the spirit o f European philosophy and 
politics.
Pato£ka rejects neither “European culture” nor the Nietzschean critique o f that
culture. He wants to learn from Nietzsche and the theme o f the titanic resistance to the
gods. This is so because Pato£ka’s conception o f philosophy demands a quasi-titanic
courage, a willingness to forego an absolute foundation for our ethical and social being.
Yet he does not wish to follow Nietzsche into his nihilistic conclusions. Never does he
succumb to the ultimate danger of placing oneself in the position reserved for God --
that is, the Nietzschean recourse to the superman. In 1934, the young Patocka
characterized the key difference in his own approach to philosophy as follows:
As Christianity by consecration, as Buddha by dissolution into the 
universal, as socialism by the vision of a future society, so Nietzsche 
wants to redeem life through the Superman. Could philosophy ultimately 
mean that there is no salvation in life?15
Patocka does argue that life cannot be saved, but by this he means that it has no recourse
to an objective savior, neither to an absolute being nor to a system that will bring
progressive perfection. The lack of a savior, however, does not mean an ultimate
nihilism and does not subordinate morality to will to power. As Husserl contended,
Western civilization need not be abandoned; it must merely be understood once again in
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relation to its nucleus in the ancient Greek concept of reason — the nucleus o f the 
concepts o f philosophy and politics, democracy and the polis.
The degree to which Patodka defends the essential spirit o f European 
philosophy, even in his early years, is evident in a 1939 article entitled “European 
Culture” and aimed against the rise o f National Socialism. Here the universalist spirit 
that defines European civilization is defended against the romanticism evident at the 
core of National Socialism. That nationalistic romanticism, Pato£ka clearly saw, 
represented a serious threat to the progress in democratic governance associated with 
Western politics since the Enlightenment: that free people could govern themselves with 
voluntary self-discipline. The rise o f National Socialism showed, in fact, that that 
principle “in and o f its e lf was not enough to overcome international tension.16 The idea 
of the Enlightenment was not itself the idea of Europe; it reflected some aspects of that 
spirit, but obscured others. In this very brief text, PatoCka refers only superficially to a 
“contemplative aspect” o f European civilization, represented by Greek philosophy. The 
road to the truly universal essence o f European civilization, which offers the best hope 
for overcoming the international tendencies towards political dissolution, must lead 
through this aspect. “If some kind o f cure for the ills of European civilization is to come 
about,” Patocka writes, “a way must be found back to the idea that is a correlative to the 
contemplative, and to recapturing the inner life. The Enlightenment must be revitalized 
on its true, purified foundations.”17 The argument of this essay by no means compares to 
Patocka’s more mature work, but it does illustrate the fact that, beneath the verbiage
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about a heroic “life in amplitude,” Pato£ka remained dedicated to constructing, rather 
than dissolving, the bonds of European civilization.
Patodka’s early conception of philosophy, though somewhat immature and at 
times overdetermined in favor o f a youthful heroism, nevertheless prefigures his 
understanding o f history as the relinquishing of an absolute ground under our feet and 
over our heads. In the years following World War II and the liberation o f the country, 
Patocka returned to the University and focused his energies on filling a desperate need 
for lectures in the basics of Western philosophy. His work from this period consists 
primarily of these collected lectures on the Greeks. His interpretation o f Socrates, Plato 
and Aristotle was to result in his “negative Platonism,” with its notion of freedom as a 
rejection of objectified, metaphysical constructions.
“Supercivilization” and the Question of Socialism 
The period of the 1950s saw Patodka attempt to engage and understand the 
historical epoch in which he lived. This meant dealing with the concrete aspects of 
contemporary, rational civilization. With the end of the second world war, it was clear 
that the traditional form of European civilization had come to an end. Empires had been 
dismantled and faith in traditional models of civilization had given way to a competition 
for supremacy among various forms of rationalist, universal civilizations. Patodka’s 
response to this situation was a thematic consideration of the very question of 
contemporary civilization; he sought to understand whether the modem variety 
represented just another civilization among civilizations, or whether it was something 
fundamentally different, a form o f “super-civilization.” This question meant that he
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would have specifically to take up the two dominant versions o f modem civilization, the 
socialist versus the liberal democratic.
It was in this period that Pato£ka wrote one o f  his most explicitly political 
essays, concluding in it that the current civilizational epoch was one unlike any other ~  
it was an epoch o f rational “super-civilization.” This article — an unfinished piece 
entitled “Supercivilization and Its Inner Conflict” — is a fascinating example o f political 
philosophy, containing some o f Patodka’s most explicit analysis of the theory behind 
contemporary western civilization. In it, Patoika attempts to expose the essence o f 
contemporary civilization, paying particular attention to the conflicting possibilities it 
offers. It is a consideration o f the very concept of modem civilization undertaken, as 
Ivan Blecha notes, from within one version of it.18 Pato£ka contended, in summary, that 
the concept, or idea, of modem civilization, characterized by its commitment to 
universalism and faith in a “heightened rationalism,” was o f a different order than with 
civilizations of the past. This “supercivilizational” order manifested itself in the 
superiority o f the sciences and the reduction of philosophy to a question o f  method.19 
The bulk o f the article, however, is not simply a description of the supercivilization, but 
an analysis of the ongoing conflict among different versions of it. Pato£ka not only 
offers an insightful look at what he calls “radical supercivilization,” which is the 
embryo of totalitarianism,20 but he contrasts it with a similarly insightful analysis of the 
alter ego o f modem totalitarianism, the liberal democratic order that is a more moderate 
version o f supercivilization.
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Modem supercivilization, Pato£ka argues, is distinguished by “moderate” and 
“radical” forms, exemplified in liberal democratic and totalitarian political regimes 
respectively. While the former is consciously self-limiting, concerned with questions o f 
means rather than o f goals, the latter, the “radical” supercivilization, seeks a form 
analogous to the idea of a “universal church.”21 It is radical supercivilization, Patodka 
contends, that is geared towards the totalizing o f life by means of rationalism; it seeks a 
new center, “from which it is possible to gradually control all layers all the way to the 
periphery.”22
Pato£ka sees numerous examples o f radical supercivilization in recent history;
he cites, for example, the Cult o f Reason and the French Revolution, Comte, Marx and
Engels, and also the British utilitarians Bentham and James Mill. Characteristically
present in these movements is not only a rationalistic universalism, but also a sense that
they can provide the means to life’s fulfillment. Historicity loses its force in their
movements, for they lay a claim to the whole o f time:
Supercivilizational radicalism also reconstructs the ancient concept of 
kairos, the entirety o f time, o f course no longer in the form o f religion, 
but o f religious-political salvation; a “time for” action, for a great, 
decisive work, a “day” of freedom and definitive accounting, the 
decision o f which is given specifically to that delegated, so to speak 
characteristically chosen, committee o f elected theocrats.23
In this experience there is also a quasi-mystical component of radicalism, manifesting
itself in the stress on collectivism, on the totalizing character o f the experience. Radical
supercivilization favors explosive, revolutionary changes in society; in this sense it has
more in common with “the irrational side of man over the reasoning.” Despite this,
radicalism often has an acute sense of moral issues and an ability to appeal to them
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heroically, making it particularly attractive to “young individuals and nations,” to the 
civilization “m statu nascendi,”24
Pato£ka’s analysis of modem radicalism is insightful, but it forms only a part of 
his achievement in this article. What is particularly significant, I think, and what 
differentiates this political analysis of modernity from others, is its analysis not only o f 
radicalism, but also o f moderate supercivilization. In contrast to radicalism, moderate 
civilization conserves the spirit of “rational criticism and construction” by retaining a 
sense of distance from it, that is, by making use of it, but without giving it a dogmatic 
character, without making it the “exclusive principle” o f all life.25 “Supercivilizational 
moderatism is protector to its own rational principle,” Pato£ka writes, “precisely 
because in moderate society there is a great variety of interests, among which reason can 
function as a balancing authority.”26
The moderate form of the rational supercivilization has as its function the 
formation o f political societies that respond to its essence. In contrast to radical forms, it 
seeks to ensure that rule does not issue from the arbitrary will o f particular people or 
decrees, but instead respects human freedom.27 Moderate civilization, however, is not 
immune to the faults o f radicalism; it is always in danger, Pato£ka writes, of slipping 
into the irresponsibility that characterizes radical forms. Yet in its moderate version, 
modem civilization is able to resist the descent into radicalism; its conservation of the 
spirit of reason protects it from the dangers o f dogmatic ideology: “ ...unlike its 
opponent it is not so easily subject to the danger of phrases and hysteria.”28
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The primary values of the universal supercivilization are grounded in freedom 
and in the individual. While the historical roots o f these values trace to ancient Greek 
and Judaic civilizations,29 the emergence of the supercivilization is more directly 
connected to the appeal to individual freedom characteristic o f early liberalism. 
Importantly, however, he does not connect individual freedom to economic forms of 
liberalism, but to the emergence of liberal thought in the realm of religion — the 
Protestant movement in the 16th to 18th centuries for the “religious self-determination 
of the individual before God.” The “modem principle o f freedom,” he continues, “does 
not stand or fall with economic liberalism.”30 An economic, or “atomistic,” liberalism, 
in fact, is not an exemplary but a degenerate form of moderatism, and may impel people 
towards radicalism rather than protect them from it. Thus the crisis of moderate 
civilization, the question of its ability to resist radical influence and preserve its moral 
essence, is simultaneously a crisis of liberalism. It is a question o f whether liberalism 
will proceed along atomistic or positivistic bases, or will recover a more essential view 
of human being. “The crisis of liberalism is the crisis of moderate civilization, but 
liberalism and moderatism are not the same,” Patocka concludes.31 While the concept of 
the supercivilization itself has at its core the question of the individual, this question is 
not adequately reflected in the atomistic tendencies o f liberal individualism.
The principle o f the supercivilization stresses the individual, not by defining him 
as an atom, but by allowing him to distinguish himself in an altogether new way. While 
other societies have distinguished between the levels of the human and the divine, they 
have nonetheless presented them as reciprocally interpenetrating on the same level. The
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modem supercivilization, in contrast, has for the first time made possible a distinction 
between these levels, a distinction “between that which is in the power o f man, a finite 
being, that which is the region o f his positive and subject knowledge and his 
rationality,...and that which is beyond him.” Here two levels are distinguished with the 
understanding that human life extends to both, that the level o f the objective is 
penetrated by something that it is not possible to simply judge, that is not at our 
disposition.32 In this conceptualization, the human individual is understood as distinct 
from the divine, the transcendental, but not as indifferent to it. At this level, as opposed 
to its degenerate form in radical individualism, man is not indifferent to others.
It is the atomistic form o f liberalism, however, that has dominated in the modem 
world. The result, Pato£ka alleges, has been a degree o f crisis in the very concept of the 
modem., rational civilization, leading to an increased temptation towards radicalism. 
Thus Patocka appears as a critic o f liberalism, not with the goal o f destroying it, but of 
rescuing it from its own tendency toward decline. Liberalism needs reform, not in order 
to destroy individualism, but to set it back on its proper foundation.33 The goal is a 
political theory that responds to the individual as a responsible human being, rather than 
as an indifferent atom. Explicitly excluded, here, is the notion that a certain technique of 
societal organization, an institutional engineering, is enough to correct for the 
manifestations o f crisis in modem life. To the contrary, the greater the degree to which 
liberal society is schematized, is reduced to an exportable set o f institutions, the greater 
is the inclination towards the systematization of life itself, and so to a strengthening of 
general decline.34
228
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The analysis in “Supercivilization and its Inner Conflict” thus presents the 
concept o f the universal, rational civilization as potentially positive, but it makes clear 
that, in practice, it has more often than not manifested itself in degenerate form. The 
twentieth century has seen a battle between such forms for supremacy, the battle of 
radical Marxist-Leninist or National Socialist forms of collectivism versus the offspring 
of moderate supercivilization represented by atomist and positivist forms o f liberalism. 
For Patodka, working on the level of political philosophy, the challenge was always the 
same: to explore thematically the roots o f political phenomena and ideology, and to 
uncover a path by which European civilization could recover and renew its 
understanding of and commitment to individual human freedom. Rather than contesting 
a particular regime ~  including, for a time, his own — he explored below the surface, for 
it is only at the elemental level o f the relationship of politics to human being, the level 
of philosophy, that truly effective change can hike place.
One way in which PatoCka’s commitment to the exploration of possibilities may 
have manifested itself was in his critical relationship to his own regime — the 
Czechoslovak socialist government. In the decades after the war Pato£ka led the life o f a 
decidedly nonpolitical philosopher. While it was clear that he rejected the communist 
power-holders in Czechoslovakia ~  he declined a request to sign with the Party even 
though it meant the end of his career ~  he otherwise refrained from political critique, 
even when the Stalinist excesses of the regime were at their worst. PatoCka’s 
relationship to socialism and the politics o f the fifties and sixties may reflect the fact, as
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Ivan Blecha concludes in his study of the thinker, that he was “caught off guard by the 
developments o f the time.”35
By remaining resolutely apolitical and by virtue of the fact that he was “buried 
away” in the Masaryk and Comenius archives, Pato£ka was able to retain his personal 
integrity without the necessity o f direct political confrontation. He seems to have chosen 
to neither throw himself “at all cost into a foolish confrontation with power,” nor to give 
up his principles.36 Yet Pato£ka’s relation to communist politics was not simply a matter 
of avoiding confrontation. He also expressed a degree o f uncertainty about the political 
situation that seemed to occasionally manifest itself, as his former students attest, in an 
apologetic attitude towards the communists. He is reported to have said, for example, 
that “somewhere there must be a reason why their present lie at one time gained so 
much power not only over people, but even in people. Apparently it has its original, 
truthful core.”37
This stance, or perhaps lack thereof, disappointed those o f his students who 
sought a more unequivocal judgment. One of them, the future Rector of Charles 
University Radim PalouS, has gone so far as to attribute to Pato£ka a weakness for the 
“gnostic infection” that had decimated the university authorities. PalouS is referring, 
here, to the concept elaborated by Eric Voegelin to describe the immanentization of 
transcendent reality into an anthropocentric hubris, typical of totalitarian communist 
ideology.38 PalouS argues, in fairly explicit terms, that Pato£ka, though he never let 
himself be “seduced” by the advantages o f joining the communists — he remained “a 
persecuted intellectual” -- nevertheless reflected a “mistaken inclination” towards his
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persecutors by refusing to discount the potential for “some positive social trend” in their
ideology.39
PalouS’s conclusion, it should be noted, is among the more uncompromising of 
the reactions o f Czech intellectuals to this phenomenon. Perhaps more representative is 
the analysis o f Ivan Blecha, who concludes that Pato£ka was “uncertain” about the 
situation and attempted, before condemning the situation outright, “first to understand 
the age from within.”40 Even Radim Palous makes clear that, in the end, it is impossible 
genuinely to fault Patodka. He recognizes that the philosopher, after all, “never bowed 
to idols” and, despite the fact that “he himself ‘suffered under Pontius Pilate,”’ he 
“refused to allow himself an incomprehension out of ressentiment.”41 PalouS, in fact, 
comes to a conclusion similar to Blecha’s: that Patodka consistently sought ~  perhaps, 
in this case, too much so -- to understand fully the phenomena around him before 
issuing judgment. Patodka’s attitude, one might conclude, is representative of the 
perspective symbolized by the Prague Spring o f 1968, that brief period which former 
dissidents often remember with even greater fondness, however bittersweet, than they 
do the events of 1989. In the Prague Spring, Czechs sought to dismantle, not the 
institutions of their communist government or its purported ideal of social justice, but 
the ideological lies and untruths upon which it rested. The goal was to rid the 
government o f its ideological, “gnostic” essence and to introduce freedom in the form of 
a socialism “with a human face.” Czech society was full of the hope — naive, as it 
turned out -- of positively affecting political developments without resort to warfare. 
This was a hope, it seems, that Pato£ka also harbored.
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Charter 77 and Individual Dissent 
Hope for positive reform peaked in the Spring of 1968, and was cruelly crushed 
in the Autumn o f 1968. The Soviet-led invasion o f Czechoslovakia brought an end to 
the Dubfiek reforms and a beginning to what came to be known as the period of 
“normalization.”42 Czech students and intellectuals were particularly devastated by the 
invasion. Once again banned from the University, this became the defining period for 
the development o f Patodka’s political thought. Not only was it the period of both the 
Plato and Europe lectures and the Heretical Essays in the Philosophy o f  History, it also 
marked the Czech philosopher’s explicit incursion into the realm of political action as a 
spokesman and author of Charter 77. Patodka reacted against his banishment — a 
“premature” retirement -- by simply continuing to work. He began to lead underground, 
“apartment” seminars for interested students willing to risk their careers for the sake of 
truth and their studies. There is a palpable sense in his lectures from this period of the 
philosopher responding to the direct needs o f his students, each of whom was seeking a 
reason to continue to hope in the wake of the crushing Soviet invasion. It is the 
individual, the “spiritual person,” to whom Patodka turns in his consideration of history 
and politics in these lectures. In hoping to effect change, to bring about an open and 
moderate form o f civilization, structural reforms were insufficient. The locus o f change 
had to be in the soul o f the individual.
Despite the fact that he risked persecution by holding illegal seminars in private 
apartments, PatoCka remained basically apolitical even into the early 1970s. In 1976, 
however, a dissident movement that included many o f Patodka’s students began to
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coalesce around the fate of an obscure rock group, the “Plastic People o f the Universe,” 
who were being persecuted for lyrics unbecoming the socialist state. The trial of the 
“Plastic People,” who played a style o f music that Pato£ka considered unlistenable, 
nevertheless was to lead the now elderly philosopher into a role with which he was 
unfamiliar -- that o f dissident protester.
Under the leadership of Vaclav Havel and Jin Hajek, a document was proposed 
that would do no more and no less than call to general attention the fact that the trial of 
the “Plastic People” meant that the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic was failing to 
adhere to the Helsinkii Agreement on human rights to which it was a signatory and 
which therefore had the force o f law in Czechoslovakia. Though it took some 
persuasion, Havel and others were able to convince the scholar to take on the role of 
co-spokesman for the Charter. He accepted this role despite the clear understanding that 
he would be subject to persecution, and in the name of a style of music which he could 
not stand. In 1977, at age 69, Patocka began to speak and write as the philosophical and 
moral voice of Charter 77. The Charter was, for all intents and purposes, a moral 
protest in the name of truth.
Patodka’s participation in Charter 77 not only lent the protest -- it was a protest 
rather than a political or human rights “movement” — the respectability it sought, it also 
gave it its first and greatest martyr. The interrogations to which Pato£ka was subject 
after his inevitable arrest were too much for him, and he suffered a stroke and died 
several days later. PatoCka’s premature death came as a result of standing up and telling 
the state what it did not want to hear, that is, the truth. His death in this way suggests an
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analogy to the fate o f Socrates that is both so obvious as to seem cliche, yet so fitting as 
to demand recognition.
The analogy to Socrates is not out of place, for Pato£ka lent to the Charter the 
sense that it was led by a figure committed to truth. His activity on behalf o f the Charter 
was most certainly driven by this commitment. Charter 77 was a reflection of Patodka’s 
philosophical perspective in many ways. It was not, importantly, a political movement 
organized around or representing a competing ideology, it did not advocate the 
overthrow of the government or any particular action beyond the act o f speaking the 
truth. And the truth it advocated was contained in the contention that politics was not a 
matter of technical control but of moral sentiment — that this morality was binding upon 
government because it preceded it. “Humans do not invent morality arbitrarily, to suit 
their needs, wishes, inclinations, and aspirations. Quite the contrary, it is morality that 
defines what being human means.”43
Charter 77 did not represent an attack upon government; it sought to the 
contrary to “strengthen [its] legality.”44 The Charter did so by standing for the simple 
principle of the equality o f citizens before the law. It did not seek to enumerate 
individual rights that would stand above history to insulate the individual from that 
state; rather, it argued that government must respond to the same conviction that 
governs the individual. This was this conviction of the unconditional “sovereignty of 
moral sentiment” over states and individuals45 Charter 77's hope for politics was that 
citizens could learn to act as free and responsible persons, and that government would 
recognize this orientation by respecting the moral dimension o f political life.
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Although his involvement in Charter 71 was a natural outgrowth o f  his political 
philosophy, Pato£ka did not use his position as spokesman to try to bring the 
complexities of his work to a wider audience. To the contrary, he kept his message 
simple. When speaking o f the source o f the “moral sentiment” to which he referred, 
Pato£ka in fact alluded to the analysis o f our obligation to ourselves associated with 
Kant. He spoke of the driving force of the Charter as a “commandment that is higher 
than any political privileges and obligation and which is indeed their genuine and only 
firm foundation.”46 It appears, from this language, that Patodka’s interest lay in 
discovering an unconditional, ahistorical ground for both politics and ethics. This 
assumption, however, could not be farther from the truth.
One might argue that the language o f PatoCka’s texts as Charter spokesman had 
what Leo Strauss would call an exoteric element to them.47 They were intended as 
pamphlets for public consumption. These documents posited a moral sentiment without 
the phenomenological and historical analysis that makes transparent the way in which 
morality is not a product of an ahistorical categorical imperative or other metaphysical 
framework. What appears as an adoption of a metaphysics of human rights is not. I will 
discuss the source o f this morality below in Chapter Six; but in order to determine the 
precise relation between PatoCka’s political thinking -- including his involvement in 
Charter 77 — and his philosophy, I must first examine the concluding chapters of the 
Heretical Essays.
The focal point of Charter 77 was o f course the individual, and the context of 
communist Czechoslovakia o f the 1970s demanded that the individual be prepared to
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sacrifice. Any action in resistance to the ideology o f the regime carried with it the 
certainty o f punishment, it amounted to a  premeditated sacrifice. It is to these 
individuals that Pato£ka is speaking in the last o f the Heretical Essays, showing them 
that their resistance, their sacrifice, in fact draws on the very principle o f rational 
civilization. When the powers that be have co-opted the symbols o f “light” and of “day” 
and have turned them to ideological purpose, the truthful must have recourse to different 
symbols.
The Heretical Essays and the Twentieth Century
With the last two o f the Heretical Essays in the Philosophy o f  History, Pato£ka 
takes up the issue o f the contemporary world and its relation to the problem o f history. 
He does so first in terms of an analysis o f the fundamental character o f the modem age 
(essay five), then by applying that analysis to the major political events o f the century 
(essay six). Though he often relies on a Heideggerean idiom in these essays, a close 
reading demonstrates the consistency of his position. At the heart o f our contemporary 
civilization lies the question o f the individual and the thematic understanding of his or 
her historical being. Here as elsewhere in his body o f work, the self-understanding of 
the individual is symbolically achieved through care for the soul.
The subject matter of the fifth essay is framed as a question, and it again draws 
upon the Heideggerean analysis o f the character o f technology. In what he calls a 
“sketch of the rise o f the modem age and o f its fundamental metaphysical character,”48 
Pato£ka asks the question: “Is Technological Civilization Decadent?” His question, 
however, is not a moral but an ontological one. Having argued that the truly human life
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is inherently historical, meaning grounded in freedom and acted out in relation to being, 
Patodka now seeks to explore the degree to which modem, technological society denies 
this as a possibility. To answer this question, he writes, the first thing we need is a 
“criterion, a standard by which we could judge something decadent or positive.”49 The 
criterion sought, the notion o f “decadence” or “decline,” should be relative, not to the 
question of value judgments, it should not be an abstract value or a moral concept, but 
instead to the very nature o f human life in its basic functioning. A life is positive when 
it functions according to its possibilities as human; it is decadent when it loses contact 
with those possibilities, “when it loses its grasp on the innermost nerve of its 
functioning.”50 A society, a civilization, is considered decadent to the degree it 
encourages such a life.
The thesis of this essay holds that the technological age, by virtue of a general 
reduction of meaning to that which is quantifiable, has increasingly eliminated the 
manifold of possibilities by which humans relate to themselves, to their own being and 
responsibility. This technological age, Patodka contends, is a time unlike any other, with 
science and technology having “swept away -- definitively, it now seems -- 
humankind’s other, older attempts to shape, even to produce their lives.”51 And despite 
objections,52 the progress towards greater and greater production o f  force and mastery of 
nature continues to proceed optimistically. Patodka makes the historical argument that 
the spirit of this modem, scientific rationalism is not a recent phenomenon. Rather, the 
most recent developments can be traced backwards to certain practical tendencies of 
Christian theology, which themselves trace to the influence o f Platonism. The bulk of
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this chapter is made up of Patodka’s outline o f the transition from the foundations of 
authentic historical activity in, for example, epic and dramatic poetry (tragedy), through 
Plato, neo-Platonism, Christianity, the Reformation and the rise o f  modem capitalism 
and science. He sketches a line that is semi-continuous, purporting to show, not the 
uniqueness o f the modem age, but its continuity with the dominance o f metaphysics 
over European life since Plato.
Patodka draws on Heidegger’s analysis of inauthenticity for this analysis — on 
his description of humans relating not to their own humanity but only to the things 
around them.53 In the application of the thesis, modem individualism is shown to be 
merely a facade over an age which actually encourages the individual to identify himself 
with a “role” in society. His freedom is the freedom to choose whatever role suits him. 
Modem civilization thus largely ignores the genuine problem o f the individual — “the 
problem of the human person” — which implies that he or she not “be identified with 
any role they may assume in the world.”54 The individualism o f Western liberalism does 
not respond to this problem; in fact, encouraged by technological progress, it 
increasingly reduces the individual to the status of a physical force. It is for this reason, 
on this ontological basis, that Pato£ka concludes provocatively that the problem cannot 
be reduced to the level o f the political regime, for no contemporary regime-type 
corresponds precisely with the individual freedom to which he is pointing: “the real 
question concerning the individual,” he writes, “ is not at issue between liberalism and 
socialism, between democracy and totalitarianism, which for all their profound 
differences equally overlook all that is neither objective nor a role.”55
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The problem o f modem, technological civilization, then, is that it lays 
ontological questions to one side, it dismisses the Socratic injunction to examine one’s 
self and one’s life.56 The modem individual, in accepting the notion o f the “role” offered 
to him by technological civilization, effectively gives up his own self. He becomes 
disinterested in his own being as a problem and a question, and so gives up his 
humanity. “Being ceased to be a problem,” Patodka writes, “once all that is was laid out 
before us as obvious in its quantifiable meaninglessness.”57 With the loss of the problem 
of being, the self is also lost. Whereas modem civilization increasingly enables people 
to live longer and healthier lives, it does not respond to the principal human need, which 
is “not only to live but to live in a humanly authentic way.”58
To live humanly requires that we relate to ourselves and to the world in which 
we live. Yet industrial civilization threatens to deny this possibility; here a fully human 
life becomes “more difficult because the matrix of its possibilities does not include the 
relation of humans to themselves and so also to the world as a whole and to its 
fundamental mystery.”59 To compensate, the technological world increasingly offers 
means for humans to avoid themselves through the pursuit o f the superficial. Patodka’s 
fifth essay offers extensive analysis o f the problem o f the way in which the “orgiastic” 
increasingly overtakes human responsibility.60
Patodka’s analysis, while decidedly pessimistic, is not despairing. Returning to 
his original question, Patodka concludes that, despite this analysis, technological 
civilization cannot simply be labeled “decadent.” This for two reasons: first, it has 
become evident that the character of the modem age is not entirely o f  its own making,
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but the bequest o f earlier ages. Second and more importantly, and here Pato£ka returns 
to the point made in his 1950s analysis o f moderate “supercivilization,” despite the 
restriction in the scope of certain human possibilities wrought by this age, “it is also true 
that this civilization makes possible more than any previous human constellation: a life 
without violence and with far-reaching equality of opportunity.” So even though this 
goal may yet elude us in actuality, it remains within our potential and brings with it an 
even more significant possibility. The “chief possibility” that emerges with our 
civilization and its potential is that of a “turn” away from the “accidental rule” o f those 
whose aim is to enforce a preconceived meaning, and toward the rule of those “who 
understand what history is all about.”61 In other words, the technological achievement o f 
this civilization, though it supplies increased opportunities for humans to avoid the 
responsibility o f understanding history, also presents, and perhaps for the first time, the 
possibility that those who understand the nature of human historicity and freedom will 
be able to rule. If  we are able to free ourselves from the “struggle with external want” 
on a global or civilizational basis, then humans may be afforded this possibility. Rule 
can transfer from those whose aim is nothing other than to preserve life to those who 
understand that history is not a problem to be solved but one that “must be preserved as 
a problem.”62
While the overall analysis, Patoika admits, stems from insight developed by 
Heidegger, the application of that insight has an original, political quality. The most 
serious consequences of the modem estrangement from the question of being become 
manifest, not in individual psychoses or sociological maladies, but primarily in our
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political existence. From the perspective of states, the quantification o f being has meant 
that humans can be perceived as little more than forces to be manipulated. Force itself 
becomes a metaphysical entity, a foundation through which geopolitical activity is 
realized. “The next and last chapter of our essay about history,” Patodka adds, “will seek 
to show how this is reflected in contemporary historical events and the alternatives they 
present.”63 The politics of the twentieth century, exemplified by the first World War, 
show that a world transformed into a laboratory of accumulated forces is a world subject 
to the release of those forces in uncontrolled warfare.
“Wars o f the Twentieth Century and the Twentieth Century as War”
It is the last o f Patodka’s Essays that generally appears to readers as the most 
striking and “heretical.” “Wars o f the Twentieth Century and the Twentieth Century as 
War” is an examination of the politics and philosophy o f warfare from the perspective 
outlined in the previous chapter ~  the Heideggerean analysis o f beings that have ceased 
to relate to their own being, that have ceased to be interested in their own humanity. 
Instead, they relate to themselves and to others as to particular roles and to physical 
forces. This relation, Patodka argues, is connected both characteristically and causally to 
the devastating warfare, both hot and cold, of the twentieth century. It is important to 
note that this essay, more so than the earlier parts o f the Heretical Essays, is a text 
whose clear context is the struggle of Czechoslovak dissidents against the communist 
regime. While the bulk of the Essays construct and elaborate a philosophy of history 
and human historicity, the final essay draws upon specific aspects of that philosophy 
and applies them to twentieth century politics. The result is a striking essay that, while
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not particularly representative o f either the tone or content o f Patodka’s overall 
philosophy, extends and applies that philosophy without betraying it.
“Wars o f the Twentieth Century,” o f course, is the essay to which analysts point 
when they wish to argue that Patodka may not be the consistent defender of European 
reason that he has appeared to be.64 The reason, quite simply, is what appears to be the 
essay’s evocation of war, conflict and darkness over the values o f peace and “the day.” 
These are the passages that even Paul Ricoeur, an admirer o f Patodka, has called 
“strange,” and “frankly shocking” in their elaboration o f the “darkness and the demonic 
at the very heart o f the most rational projects o f the promotion o f peace.”651 have 
argued in this study, however, that even the most disconcerting o f Patodka’s metaphors 
and analyses do not imply an outlook that differs, in any fundamental way, from that 
presented in Plato and Europe or any of his other works organized around the concepts 
of a “life in truth” and “care for the soul.” In examining the controversial themes and 
metaphors o f the essay we will see that while the tone and idiom is undeniably different 
than the bulk o f Patodka’s work — the contention can be justified that this essay 
overextends its application o f Heideggerean themes to political reality and presents that 
reality in an oversimplified and foreboding light — its basic conclusions fit into overall 
scheme of Patodka’s philosophy. It remains the figure and philosophy o f Socrates, 
extended somewhat with an appeal to the pre-Socratic, Heraclitian theme of conflict, or 
polemos, to whom Patodka looks as a model for philosophical and political activity in 
the polis.
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“Wars o f the Twentieth Century” begins with an examination of the character o f
the first world war, a war that Pato£ka calls “the decisive event” of the century,
determining “its entire character.”66 This war, he writes, was revolutionary, and thus
typical attempts to explain it based on conventional ideas fail to reveal its character.
Underlying the war was a new ideology, a growing Nietzschean conviction that the
traditional faith upon which Europe saw itself resting had imploded:
The shared idea in the background o f the first world war was the slowly 
germinating conviction that there is nothing such as a factual, objective 
meaning o f the world and o f things, and that it is up to strength and 
power to create such meaning within the realm accessible to humans.67
One answer to this perceived lack o f meaning was in science and, in this regard and
appearances to the contrary, it was post-Bismarckian Germany that was the most
revolutionary, for when it is noted that “the democratic states of Europe were also the
most vigorous representatives of Europe’s imperial idea, their claims to democracy
begin to appear as components in their defense of the global status quo.”68 Germany,
though, was leading a revolution toward the enforcement of “the reality o f the new
technoscientific age.” It was creating and enforcing this idea in its pursuit of the
organization and accumulation o f energy and the creative power of its working
masses.69 This was the idea that force was the dominant and necessary feature o f the
modem age.
Germany, o f course, was not the only country moving in this direction, but its 
progress was the most revolutionary, the movement of other countries like France being 
somewhat “humanized by their desire for individual life.”70 The end o f the war brought 
the defeat o f Germany, but not o f its revolutionary aim; that aim was ably taken over by
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Russia, which succeeded where Germany had failed. The Soviet Union was able to 
mobilize its society behind a form of rule based in pseudoscientific rationalism. The 
first world war, Patodka continues, was decisive because it demonstrated that the 
transformation of the world along techno-scientific lines -- into a laboratory o f forces — 
can proceed only with the help o f war, i.e., “acute confrontation,” because such 
confrontation is the most effective means o f releasing the inevitable buildup of forces. 
World War I, then, represented “a definitive breakthrough of the conception of being 
that was bom in the sixteenth century with the rise o f mechanical natural science.”71 
War, it is important to note, has been defined here as “acute confrontation,” for it is not 
merely military combat between nations to which Patodka is referring, but the process 
of confronting and sweeping away all that stands in the way o f the transformation or 
revolution in progress. War, the “acute confrontation” with all of the “conventions” that 
inhibit the release of force, is the means by which the rule o f force actualizes itself. “In 
this process humans as well as individual peoples serve merely as tools.”72
What Patodka is attempting to describe in these pages is a picture of the 
twentieth century primarily drawn from his experience with communist totalitarian rule. 
The Russian Revolution and the resulting decades o f Soviet rule epitomize that picture, 
for they represent the clearest example o f the political incarnation of the “new 
technoscientific age.” The power o f organization and the manipulation of individuals 
become the guiding principles of this rule, which they effect by means of continuing 
warfare.
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After the end o f the world wars, warfare does not come to an end. What ceases 
are the brief, violent conflicts, but warfare against the conventions o f society that resist 
its transformation persists. The new war is “a war that establishes itself as permanent by 
‘peaceful’ means.”73 It is the “war against war,” the war to establish a permanent peace, 
and it progresses by informing people weary of violence and death that the highest o f all 
values is life itself. Only when convinced o f the overriding value o f mere life are people 
willing to play the roles demanded o f them in order to preserve it. It is, essentially, a 
rule of ideology; importantly, however, it is not restricted to authoritarian or totalitarian 
systems, but is present in any movement in which the goal o f peace and mere life is 
given an eschatological significance.
The ideology of Soviet communism was one that promised both lasting peace 
and a new life, though it demanded both the body and the soul o f the individual in 
return. This ideology, of course, was originally considered the most enlightened and 
progressive of political movements. It epitomizes, in this sense, what Patodka calls the 
“forces of the day.” The forces of the day are the forces o f eternal progress; they seek a 
perfect peace and condemn conflict and contingency as barriers to that goal. At their 
most elemental level these forces are not unique to the twentieth century; they can be 
described in eschatological terms as movements aiming towards a “solution” to human 
problematicity: a final peace, an end o f history, etc.. From their perspective, “life, 
especially historical life, appears as a continuum within which individuals function as 
the bearers o f a general movement which alone matters.74
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In violent wars fought for ideology, these are the banners under which we fight 
and die. The second half of the twentieth century, however, enforces the rule o f force 
and technology primarily by peaceful means. Warfare transmutes itself into “acute” 
confrontation with the “conventions” o f the past, “those muting factors represented... by 
respect for tradition, for former ways o f comprehending being which now appear as 
outworn superstitions and a means of manipulating others.”75 The modem understanding 
of the individual as merely a role or a force merges in this century with an eschatology 
o f peace, o f a “better tomorrow.” The pursuit o f  this dream by means o f a nonviolent 
war against non-technological ways of comprehending being, however, combines with 
the hot wars of the first half o f the century to define the century as one, not o f peace, but 
of war.
All of this represented, as Patodka and the Czechoslovak dissidents knew very 
well, a battle against the individual. It was one o f Patodka’s great achievements (and 
partly his purpose) in this essay to reveal a means by which embattled individuals could 
come to realize the significance o f their resistance. Patodka did this through analysis of 
the concept o f sacrifice. In doing so he both justifies continued dissidence and offers 
solace to those whose personal sacrifice is overwhelming. The analysis draws upon the 
writings o f two witnesses to the horrors o f the first world war: the Frenchman Teilhard 
de Chardin and the German Ernst Junger.76 The particular sacrificial experience 
analyzed is that of the front line soldier. The phenomenon o f the front line, which is 
“absurdity par excellence” in its murderous brutality, is such that it has the potential to 
effect a fundamental transformation of human existence. Despite its horror, perhaps
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because of its horror, “in the depths o f that experience there is something deeply and 
mysteriously positive.”77
The paradoxical nature o f this contention rests on the fact that, in most cases, the 
forces that have brought the soldier to the front are the “forces o f the day,” those 
quasi-eschatological visions of a final peace, victory and freedom that accompany and 
justify warfare. Drawing on Teilhard de Chardin and Junger, Patodka argues that the 
experience of the front is such that these visions lose their power over the soldier. He is, 
in the horror and absurdity o f his situation, freed absolutely from the hold of the abstract 
idea or ideology. “The front-line experience...is an absolute one. Here, as Teilhard 
shows, the participants are assaulted by an absolute freedom, freedom from all the 
interests of peace, of life, of the day.”78 On the front line, visions of the day have no 
power over the individual. He instead realizes that these visions do not depict reality, 
but rather a false image of it. Thus, Patodka argues, the experience of the front justifies a 
reversal o f the prevailing metaphors. The symbols of peace and the day do not 
adequately depict our human reality; instead, it is the symbol of the night that responds 
to the mystery and problematicity that is our being. And so, with this in mind, Patodka 
maintains that “[t]he grandiose, profound experience of the front with its line o f fire 
consists in its evocation of the night in all its urgency and undeniability.”79
The front line soldier offers Patodka a clear analogy to the fate of the dissident in 
a communist state. He describes the situation in which, as described above, war has 
been continued by “peaceful means.” “Currently war,” he says, “has assumed the form 
o f that half peace wherein opponents mobilize and count on the demobilization of the
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other.”80 This is the strategy of the rule o f ideology in peacetime — it is to produce a 
state of “demoralization” in its opponents by appealing “to the will to live and to have.” 
The rule of force is accepted as the price one must pay to live well. While a return to a 
front line in rejection o f this state is something difficult to actively desire, Patodka 
argues that there are situations in which it can mean an “immense liberation from 
precisely such servitude” as under communism.81
Thus the notion of being on the front line becomes, for Patodka and his dissident 
students, the symbol for their resistance to the ideology of untruth in communist 
Czechoslovakia. “The front line is the resistance to such ‘demoralizing,’ terrorizing, and 
deceptive motifs o f the day. It is the revelation of their real nature, it is a protest paid for 
in blood which does not flow but rots in jails, in obscurity, in life plans and possibilities 
wasted.”82 Here the reference to the dissident is explicit, for it is he who rots in jails in 
obscurity, sacrificing life plans and possibilities for the sake o f the truth. Indeed, the 
analogy can be extended further to the philosopher himself who, as Socrates testifies, 
inevitably comes into conflict with the city. In this activity, despite its requirement of 
sacrifice, one does attain the freedom that one seeks. The front line is the site o f true 
freedom: “It is to comprehend that here is where the true drama is being acted out; 
freedom does not begin only ‘afterwards,’ after the struggle is concluded, but rather has 
its place precisely within it -- that is the salient point, the highest peak from which we 
can gain a perspective on the battlefield.”83
The narrow focus of this essay notwithstanding, Patodka’s philosophy continues 
to aim at a resuscitation of contemporary western civilization broadly speaking. In this
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regard, the point of the essay is not the presentation o f  a solution but the asking o f a 
question. Patodka recognizes that, despite the devastating wars in this century and the 
multitude o f front line soldiers who have returned from war to help reorganize their 
societies, the effect o f their experiences on society has remained essentially “nil.” Thus 
the question: “How can the ‘front-line experience’ acquire the form which would make 
it a factor o f history?”84 The fact that this experience has, as yet, failed to become a 
factor o f history make it clear that this is not a question with a ready answer. Yet it is a 
crucial question, for it reflects upon the potential influence of philosophy -- which, like 
the clarity gained on the front-line, is bom when one shakes oneself loose from the hold 
o f naive, undifferentiated and unreflective thought -- on history and politics.
Two points are stressed in Patodka’s account. First, it is eminently clear that the 
core o f a solution, to the extent one can be said to be possible, lies in the fostering of 
understanding — of history, o f freedom, of the essence of philosophy that demands that 
one forego the surety o f simply given knowledge and ideology. More concrete, 
however, is Patodka’s second point. The experience described by Teilhard and Jiinger 
does not transfer to society because it is an individual experience. What is needed, both 
in the case o f dissidence in Czechoslovakia in the seventies and in terms o f an approach 
to political action in the modem age generally, is something more than individual 
experience. What is needed is a concerted effort by those who have shaken loose of the 
hold o f ideology, what Patodka calls a “solidarity of the shaken.” “The means by which 
this state is overcome,” he writes, “is the solidarity o f  the shaken, the solidarity of those
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who are capable o f understanding what life and death are all about, and so what history
is about.”85
The goal, then, is twofold. It is first and foremost the general goal o f  philosophy
as Patodka sees it: to “shake” human beings into an awareness o f their own historical
nature, their own possibilities for freedom via the assumption o f a self-reflective stance
and the rejection o f ideology. In the specific context of the problems o f the twentieth
century, this translates to a more specific action — the attempt to make those capable of
understanding willing to accept the sacrifice that is required. In other words, the goal is:
To shake the everydayness o f  the fact-crunchers and routine minds, to 
make them aware that their place is on the side o f the front and not on the 
side of even the most pleasing slogans of the day which in reality call to 
war, whether they invoke the nation, the state, classless society, world 
unity, or whatever other appeals, discreditable and discredited by the 
factual ruthlessness o f the Force, there may be.86
Accompanying this is a second goal, one which Patodka himself helped to realize with
his sponsorship o f Charter 77. This is the goal of concerted action, o f solidarity. In the
context of a communist state in the late twentieth century, it took just such a solidarity
to call the world’s attention to the fate of free thought in Central Europe in 1977.
When both goals are combined, Patodka contends, the effect on political society
can be profound. The effect referred to, however, will not be an explicitly political one,
for the “solidarity of the shaken” is not conceived of as a political movement or party. It
is not a coordinated scheme to wrest power from those who hold it.
It will not offer positive programs but will speak, like Socrates’ 
daimonion, in warnings and prohibitions. It can and must create a 
spiritual authority, become a spiritual power that could drive the warring 
world to some restraint, rendering some acts and measures impossible.87
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The action o f Charter 77, which proposed no political “program” and was not a political 
“movement,” epitomized the goal o f Patodka’s “Wars of the Twentieth Century and the 
Twentieth Century as War.” It was a protest with the goal o f simply speaking the truth, 
which is always the greatest threat to a corrupt government. Though Charter 77 did not 
result in the fall of the communist regime in 1977, the spiritual authority that it 
represented and created, led by Vaclav Havel and other students o f Patodka, was 
singularly influential in leading the “Velvet Revolution” o f a decade later.
In the concluding paragraph of “Wars of theTwentieth Century,” Patodka 
appeals to a different symbol, one that arguably runs counter to the tenor o f his Platonic 
writings — he appeals to the Heraclitian symbol ofpolemos, or conflict.88 Once again, 
his inspiration is Heidegger and his goal to show that the ground o f human reality 
cannot be reflected in a simple, metaphysical structure.89 Heraclitus’ depiction of being 
as polemos is appropriate, Patodka argues, for it reflects the same vision noted 
independently by both Teilhard and Junger in their analyses of the front-line experience 
— a vision of unity attained in the midst o f conflict. Nevertheless, Patodka’s appeal to 
this symbol appears somewhat inapposite for several reasons. First, the symbol of 
polemos, often translated as “war,” seems to contradict the tenor o f the essay, which 
condemns the phenomenon of war in the twentieth century. A second and related 
problem has to do with the appeal to Heidegger, for the use o f the concept o f polemos in 
Heidegger’s An Introduction to Metaphysics is associated, by virtue of both the timing 
of the original lecture and its language, with the German philosopher’s involvement 
with National Socialism. Based on Patodka’s invocation of polemos, therefore, it would
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be conceivable to read this essay as a glorification o f war; this would be, however, a 
misinterpretation.90
It is, in the end, the theme o f polemos, as well as that of the ‘night,’ that stand 
out in this essay, tending to obscure its connection to Charter 77 and the activities of 
Czechoslovak dissidents and human rights activists. These symbols, then, must be 
examined in terms o f the themes they are meant to reflect. Otherwise, it is 
understandable that the effect o f this essay on the reader will continue to be primarily 
one of the “shock” referred to by Ricoeur.
In the case o f polemos, the first point to be dealt with must refer to its translation 
into English. The intent of the symbol as Patodka uses it is to refer, not to “war” in the 
sense of a militarized struggle, but to “conflict.” In conflict, we have a parallel to the 
phenomenon that is at the very root o f philosophy, the shaking o f naive faith in 
simply-given knowledge that is the first step towards an attitude o f self-reflection. 
Polemos cannot be understood to symbolize the wars that have characterized this 
century for, as Patodka went to great lengths to clarify, these wars represented, not a 
struggle to free the world o f metaphysical, ideological thought, but rather a campaign to 
enforce such thought and make it permanent through the rule of force.
In regard to the second point, it is again the case that, despite the inspiration that 
Patodka derived directly from Heidegger, there is a significant difference between the 
two philosophers in the way in which the symbols are used and the impression that they 
leave on the reader. When Heidegger refers to Heraclitus’ use o f the concept of 
polemos, he speaks o f it as the conflict inherent in the process o f history as
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“world-building.”91 His stress is on the “creators” in the nation, who must struggle to 
open up a world. The use o f the Heraclitian symbolism in this manner, coming as it did 
in the mid-1930s, carries with it an association o f German romanticism, a sense of 
longing for a movement such as that described infamously in Heidegger’s Rectoral 
address at Heidelberg: “The Self-Assertion o f the German University.” The association 
is unavoidable and it is difficult to read Heidegger’s invocation o f  polemos and 
“world-building” in this text without thinking o f his involvement with National 
Socialism. In Patodka’s case, the dominant association is precisely opposite. What is 
sought is a concept o f politics that above all else resists the lure o f  a resolution to the 
problems o f history.
For Patodka, polemos is a symbol that neatly expresses the essential 
commonality of politics and philosophy. To be genuine, politics must be free, meaning 
it must struggle with the addiction to mere life and simply-given wisdom that 
characterize pre-historical civilizations in which freedom is not an explicit theme. 
Philosophy, too, is a struggle. That this is in fact the sense in which Patodka understands 
the concept is made clear when he argues that it is only through this struggle that one 
sees into the nature o f things -- “to phronein. Thus phronesis, understanding, by the 
very nature of things, cannot but be at once common and conflicted.”92 The spirit of 
conflict and the struggle for excellence {arete) among equals within the boundaries of a 
city is essential not only to the operation of the polis, but also to the very insight that is 
practical wisdom. “Thus polemos is at the same time that which constitutes the polis and 
the primordial insight that makes philosophy possible.”93 As a symbol it is not
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appropriate to a discussion o f the warfare that regularly raged unchecked in this century. 
Rather than a force that dissipates, it is one that can serve as a foundation for unity and 
wisdom.
Despite this clarification of the concept, it was, and is, entirely possible that one 
could misread this discussion as an evocation o f an extreme standpoint ~  of a 
Nietzschean, or a postmodern, rejection of a moral center to the polis. Conflict can, of 
course, be extended to extremes, and so it was, Patodka told his students, “[fjor 
precisely this reason that the moral side o f conflict is important, as Socrates represented 
it.”94 Even though the concept is pre-Socratic it nonetheless is emblematic of Socrates 
and his dialectical interrogation of reality. It was only with the gradual movement to a 
concrete metaphysics that human struggle was de-emphasized. Neither was it the case 
that Patodka sought to elevate polemos into the kind of extreme symbol that could be 
used as a rallying-cry for resistance and revolution. The concept was intended to reflect 
reality, not to take on the characteristics of a metaphysical guidepost that stood above 
reality. Patodka in fact warned his students against just this sort o f misunderstanding, 
saying in the same series o f seminars that “I did not speak about conflict as about some 
kind of universal guide, to assume something like this is precisely what we must guard 
against.”95 The vision o f Heraclitus is a relevant parallel, then, in the sense that it is only 
through an understanding o f life as problematic, as characterized by a lasting struggle 
rather than a lasting peace, that humans can hope to experience freedom.
Though polemos is perhaps the dominant metaphor that emerges from “Wars of 
the Twentieth Century,” also disturbing is the way in which Patodka subordinates the
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values of “peace” and the “day” to that of “darkness.” This reversal o f metaphors is 
certainly counter to the conventions o f the Western tradition; in Christian and 
Enlightenment symbolism, for example, the symbols o f light and peace are often used to 
illustrate the highest goods.96 Yet Pato£ka’s symbolism is not intended to reflect an 
extreme attitude towards political reality. Rather, the use o f the symbol of the 
“darkness” over that o f “light” or of “day” is meant to reintroduce the notion of 
mystery, o f uncertainty and problematicity, that is an inevitable component o f human 
existence. Darkness, it is noted, is the basic condition out o f which light or knowledge 
first arises. It was with the progressive development o f metaphysics, Patodka claims, 
that darkness came to be viewed as merely an absence o f light, that problematicity came 
to be seen as a condition to be rejected, to be overcome.
In his lecture on “The Spiritual Person and the Intellectual,” from the same 
period as the Heretical Essays, Patodka introduces the idea that the “light o f dawn” does 
not emerge from a void, it emerges from darkness. Knowledge emerges from 
uncertainty, not in the sense that uncertainty is simply the absence of knowledge, but 
that it is a necessary precondition for knowledge to appear that we struggle with 
uncertainty and problematicity and accept them as factors that cannot be avoided. He 
writes:
Doesn’t this suggest that there belongs to the nature o f reality — when we 
take it as a whole, namely, as a reality that shows itself, that is revealed -- 
something that is itself problematic, that is in itself a question, that is 
darkness. This does not mean darkness which is perhaps only our 
subjective ignorance, our subjective lack of knowledge, but rather 
something that is a precondition for a thing to appear in the world at 
all;...97
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The symbol o f  darkness that Patodka uses to such effect in “Wars of the Twentieth 
Century” and elsewhere, then, is a metaphor for his analysis o f human problematicity. It 
is, in addition, a constant reminder that we are finite, that our life is precarious and our 
politics an urgent attempt to maintain order in the absence o f a permanent and stable 
foundation upon which we could rest.98 The concepts o f problematicity and finitude are 
crucial to a unifying theme o f Patodka’s philosophy, the acceptance of responsibility via 
the conscious rejection of metaphysical symbolizations o f an absolute reality. Patodka’s 
outline of an ontological understanding o f  historicity in the Essays is grounded in this 
theme.
In his analysis of the twentieth century and its wars, there is a sense in which the 
text is profoundly personal. “Wars of the Twentieth Century” bears the distinct imprint 
of resistance, o f a call to the enlightened to draw upon unexpected sources in their 
search for a reason — and the strength — to continue in their struggle. It is, in large part, 
a dissident text, by which I mean that the political circumstances surrounding it directly 
relate to the fact that the language of the essay is overdetermined in favor o f dark, poetic 
imagery. Patodka’s argument is directed towards his fellow dissidents. He argues that, 
given the modem condition in which man and society are often held captive by a 
politics of force and a mechanical understanding of human being (exemplified by 
Czechoslovak communism in the seventies), the required posture is one of resistance, 
sacrifice and a hope derived, not from the corrupted symbolisms of the regime, but from 
the more mysterious regions of human reality. Thus the symbols of the regime are 
unmasked as hypocritical, and the notion that one can draw strength and experience
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freedom in the depths o f repression and uncertainty is stressed. Yet precisely what made 
this work effective in its time weakens it when the experience to which it refers fades 
from memory. In this sense, because it clearly refers most directly to the experience o f 
Czechoslovak dissidents in the 1970s, its relevance, at least o f the use of provocative 
imagery, is diminished with the passing of the dissident experience.
Although one could draw a parallel between the experience o f the front-line and 
confrontation between Socrates and the Athenian Senate, the imagery Patodka chooses 
makes this a difficult proposition to accept. Nevertheless, several factors do favor a 
more Platonic reading of this essay. First, despite the imagery, the concepts with which 
the essay concludes are Platonic: first is the symbol o f the “metanoia,” or “conversion,” 
experienced by the philosopher, and second is the symbol o f the Socratic daimonion."  
The former, a “turn” towards understanding characteristic o f Plato’s liberated cave 
dweller, is the most for which the individual may hope, and the latter the closest he will 
come to an actual guidepost for political action.
The importance of these elements, secondly, is supported by an accompanying 
text that belongs to the body o f work on the philosophy of history. “The Spiritual 
Person and the Intellectual,” a transcript of an apartment lecture delivered shortly after 
the writing and distribution o f the Heretical Essays, is explicitly relevant to the 
conclusions o f the Essays. This text, as yet unpublished in English, both complements 
and contrasts with the Essays. Its subject is the “spiritual person,” meaning the person 
indicated in “Wars of the Twentieth Century” as capable of conversion, or metanoia.100 
“The Spiritual Person and the Intellectual” is a distinctly different treatment o f the same
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theme central to “Wars o f the Twentieth Century”: that meaning must be sought, not in 
slogans and promises and ideologies, but in the very fact of our freedom and our ability 
to recognize and come to terms with the problematicity of historical existence and the 
impenetrability o f being.
The Spiritual Person and the Polis
The “spiritual person,” like the front-line soldier, is also a “shaken” individual. 
He is a responsible person. In this essay, however, the characteristic individual is a 
philosopher, or a true intellectual, rather than a soldier. Though it is Socrates who 
exemplifies the “spiritual” attitude, this is not an essay about philosophers. Instead, 
Patodka describes the way in which the term “intellectual” properly describes, not the 
sophist, who o f course may also call himself an intellectual, but the spiritual person who 
is able to understand human reality. The “spiritual” perspective is not restricted to a few 
elite philosophers. With this essay the point is made that the “solidarity of the shaken” 
is not something comparable to the fellowship o f guardians in Plato’s Republic. It is not 
Patocka’s argument that spiritual people should band together as a political party, as a 
concentration o f power, but rather that they should draw from their solidarity the 
strength to assume a leading position in their chosen fields.
This theme, the question o f the role of the spiritual person in the city, makes up 
the broad background of “The Spiritual Person and the Intellectual.” In the sense that 
Patocka imparts to the term, spirituality has all the characteristics of the Socratic mode 
of living. The primary concept, which I discussed in the previous chapter, is that of 
“problematicity.” The spiritual person -- or the philosopher -- not only recognizes that
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human existence is problematic, he is impelled by a commitment to freedom (for others
as much as for himself) to impart this wisdom to the city, and in doing so to contradict
and condemn its naivete and shake its very foundations. The purpose of the philosopher
is to awaken the city to a new possibility, a new ground; in the case o f Socrates and
Plato, this was done by problematizing knowledge, not by simplifying it.
Socrates and Plato were problematizers of life, they were people who did 
not accept reality as it is given, but saw it via a shaking — but the 
consequence of this shaking for them was precisely the possibility o f 
some kind of particular, other life, another direction o f  life, something 
like a new ground on which it is now possible to measure what is and 
what is not.101
The Socratic approach reveals a possibility to live in a new way -- it is the possibility of 
a meaningful freedom. As a philosopher, Socrates cannot be silent about this “other 
life.” He thereby assumes a crucial yet bothersome role in the city; by his activity and 
his questioning he problematizes the traditional foundations of the polis.
Patocka’s reference to the possibility uncovered by Socrates and Plato as a “new 
ground,” brings our attention to the question of the degree to which this philosophy can 
provide a foundation upon which to base a political society. The challenge to 
metaphysical foundationalism is an approach we associate with contemporary 
philosophy since Nietzsche. It is PatoCka’s contention, however, that this challenge -- a 
non-metaphysical attitude -- is characteristic of Socrates and his dialectical questioning 
of reality. Socrates is thereby a figure both ancient and new. Despite the involvement 
through Plato in the development o f metaphysics, the activity of Socrates in the city 
reflects the essence of the critique o f contemporary, anti-metaphysical theory.
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And because Socrates stands solidly, this man who, under the reign of 
the tyrants, at the risk o f his own life, maintains his opinion that it is 
worse to do injustice than to suffer it. and because this man on the other 
hand continually repudiates with his way o f speaking those who presume 
to have knowledge o f the good, meaning that he shakes the prevailing 
certainty upon which the polis lives, and at the same time he himself 
does not say what the good is, but only appeals to people to do a bit of 
hard thinking, to reflect as he does, in order to seek, in order that they 
responsibly examine every one o f their thoughts, -- this means not 
accepting mere opinion as if it were insight, as if it were the insight to 
live based on the authentic examination o f that which is here, which is 
present — therefore Socrates is at the same time a man both ancient and 
new, both merging in one.102
This is the Socrates that epitomizes the spiritual person. His goal is not to create a new
myth for the city, but to shake it loose from the grasp of all mythologizing. Nietzsche
and Heidegger are wrong in failing to pursue what they seem to recognize grudgingly —
that the essence of Socrates is not a facile pursuit of metaphysics, it is a challenge to the
polis to stand free o f all forms o f simply given knowledge and to think responsibly.
As I discussed in Chapter Five, Pato£ka understands philosophy as
interdependent with politics, each informing the other. With “The Spiritual Person and
the Intellectual,” he takes this theme a step further, discussing the consequences of this
interdependence for the individual and for the city. Drawing upon Plato, Pato£ka notes
three choices open to the philosopher. First is the path o f Socrates: “to show people how
things are in reality,” though this means conflict with the city and the likelihood that
one will lose one’s life. Second is the path that Plato chooses — “withdrawal from the
public,” withdrawal from conflict with the city in the hope of creating a “community of
spiritual people” where the philosopher may live and not die. Beyond these choices,
Patocka writes, “the third possibility is to become a sophist. There are no others.”103
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Although one could argue, particularly in light of Patodka’s own history o f
noninvolvement with politics up until 1977, that the second option o f an Academy
detached from the polis is a just one, by this late stage in his career Patodka had
resolutely come to the conclusion that the only choice was the first one, despite the
sacrifice it involved. The second option, in fact, was something o f a false one to the
degree that its goal was to separate philosophy from society. This, Patodka argued in
Plato and Europe, could not be done. “The true person, the philosophical man, cannot
be a philosopher only for himself, rather he must exist in society,.. .in society with
others, because in the end no one wrenches himself loose from this situation.”104 The
goal for the philosopher, implicitly, was to make this society truthful, one in which the
philosopher could actually live.
Society does not easily live up to its possibilities, however. The role o f the
philosopher -- or o f the spiritual person — is not only to explore those human
possibilities himself, but also to move society in their direction. This is, Patodka rightly
contends, a political task. While spiritual activity does not evoke politics in the modem
sense o f the term, it is nonetheless political activity.
The spiritual person is obviously not a politician in the usual sense of the 
word, he isn’t political in the common sense o f the word: he doesn’t take 
sides in the disputes that rule this world — but yet again he is political in 
a different way, obviously, and he cannot not be, for the non-self-evident 
nature of reality is exactly that which he hurls in the face o f society and 
o f that which he finds around him.105
It is not only for its own sake but for the sake o f society that the philosopher is
concerned with declaring the “non-evident” nature o f reality. Yet society, as Plato
recognized in his Socratic dialogues, does not appreciate being shown a vision o f reality
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that is other than the one upon which it rests. Rather than embrace it, the holders of 
power will fight against it, thus the inevitable conflict between the philosopher and the 
city which Plato described. Patodka’s addition to this theme, in his later work, consists 
of an analysis of the political responsibility inherent in the spiritual standpoint. The 
spiritual person is political because he must stand before the “positive powers” of 
government, and “the person of spirit must, o f course, advocate his position.”106
Sacrifice and Responsibility 
For all its surface idealism, this responsibility — as Central European dissidents 
knew well — demands o f the individual a very real sacrifice. It is to Patodka’s credit that 
he appends to his late philosophy an analysis of this phenomenon, the meaning of 
sacrifice itself in its relation to a life in truth. Although I noted above that the proper 
choice for the philosopher was engagement with the city “despite” the sacrifice 
involved, there is a clear theme running through Patodka’s later work to the effect that a 
true sacrifice, even o f one’s own life, provides a benefit to the spiritual person from an 
ontological standpoint that outweighs the suffering. The spiritual person is rewarded not 
despite his or her sacrifice, but through it.
Patodka writes most specifically on this theme in his Varna Lecture from 1973, 
appending a discussion of sacrifice -- which he notes is “mythico-religious” in origin -- 
to a consideration of Husserl and Heidegger on the question o f technicization and 
technology.107 There is something in sacrifice, and perhaps also in the Christianity that 
makes it such a central concept, that counteracts the damage done to the individual in 
the modem world. The notion o f sacrifice implies an understanding that cannot exist in
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a purely rational or technological view o f the world. It implies a recognition that some 
things are higher, of a different order, than others: “A sacrifice for something or for 
someone presupposes the idea of a difference of order between human being and the 
being of things, and within the sphere of the human in turn possibilities of 
intensification or of failing of being.”108 In the technological age, as I have noted, the 
individual (and so also the individual as victim) is reduced to a role, the question of 
being reduced to a mathematical equation. But an examination of the theme of sacrifice 
“points to an entirely different understanding of being than the one exclusively attested 
by the technological age.”109 The understanding of being that Patodka wishes to renew 
in Western thought is one that demands that the individual not reduce human relations 
to technological or economic calculations; living in the truth of this understanding may 
also necessitate the sacrifice of gain or security offered by those calculations. “The 
paradoxical conception here,” he concludes, “is that man gains by a voluntary loss.”110 
Through a comprehension of his sacrifice, a person may recover his being even as he 
loses all else.
When formulating his conception of sacrifice, Patodka refers to the example of 
two Russian thinkers: Alexander Solzhenitsyn and Andrei Sakharov. Their example 
exemplifies the meaning of the concept in two ways. First, their willingness to sacrifice 
helps us understand the content o f “freedom” as an ontological, rather than a physical 
condition. Freedom is not here defined negatively, as in the absence o f restrictions upon 
movement or the avoidance of jail and other threats to a comfortable and safe life.111 To 
the contrary, freedom can be gained even as we voluntarily relinquish certain aspects o f
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it. It can be gained through action that is self-revealing, that makes us aware that we are 
not, and need not be, beholden to the rule of ideology or to the hold exerted on us by 
mere life.
Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov were also important in a very different sense, though, 
one that relates directly to the notion o f the “solidarity o f the shaken.” These two 
Russian thinkers, in many respects, could not have been more different. While 
Solzhenitsyn was a religious man, concerned with continuity, nation and tradition, 
Sakharov “exemplifie[d] an entirely post-metaphysical modernity.” He was, in 
Patocka’s words, a “hypermodem man.”112 In the difference between these two men, in 
the fact that, despite their differences, they would speak and act in a sort o f concert to 
oppose communist oppression, is the essential force o f the “solidarity o f the shaken.”" 3
The common element with Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov, as with the vision in 
Teilhard de Chardin of enemy soldiers in the front-line trenches coming to feel a greater 
solidarity with each other than with the politicians in the rear, was a sense of the truth of 
their own humanity that outweighed any material advantage or dogmatic slogan that 
could be offered to them. Acting upon this sense, rather than upon the advantages or 
slogans, defines what PatoCka means when he speaks o f responsibility. Responsibility is 
not a moral value. It has no abstract content. Nor is it an Aristotelian virtue, responding 
to a sense o f proportion or moderation. Instead, it describes the manner o f  living in 
which one acts in response to one’s own being, as well as to the world perceived as a 
whole. The sense Pato£ka gives to responsibility implies something akin to the Socratic 
daimonion, not offering positive programs but “speaking in warnings and prohibitions.”
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It is a “spiritual authority,”114 but one that originates from our own sense o f being, not 
from a being external to us. As we respond to our being, as we are interested in it, we 
are captivated by our responsibility and we cannot be indifferent to it. In the opposite 
situation, when we try for whatever reason to escape from or forget ourselves or our 
humanity, then we abdicate our responsibility. The responsible attitude is one in which 
we are exposed; sacrifice, as in the case o f Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov, can be a 
responsible act."5
There is also, in Pato£ka’s concept o f responsibility, an element that makes it not 
only an individual event but a communal one. Responsibility and the possibility that it 
may entail sacrifice, as we have seen, mean linking one’s life to freedom. Yet, 
consequent to Patoika’s stress on our social nature, there is the added factor that 
freedom is not simply an individual matter, it relates not only to the individual, but also 
to others. It is in this sense that Pato£ka describes human being, as opposed to mere 
consciousness, as “something capable of accepting responsibility and respecting 
responsibility, that is, the freedom, o f others,...116 We relate inherently to others because 
our being is never an isolated, enclosed entity. It is in the world, of nature, of objects, of 
other beings. Our work, including the work that is our striving for freedom, is never 
pursued for oneself alone. As Pato£ka put it in another context: “Responsibility means: 
it is not only for me, it is also for the other and it has to be for the other, I don’t work for 
myself, I am not free in relation to myself alone, rather I am free in relation to all, I am 
free for the society which supports me.”117
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Responsibility makes sacrifice no longer an individual event, but something 
undertaken for all. There is a parallel to be made to the Christian conception of sacrifice, 
and Pato£ka is not unwilling to make it. Thus it is in his discussion o f sacrifice in his 
Varna Lecture from 1973 that he notes that “Christianity., .placed at the center a radical 
sacrifice in the sense o f the interpretation suggested above and rested its cause on the 
maturity of the human being.” He continued, “perhaps it is in this sense that we need to 
seek the fully ripened form of demythologized Christianity.”" 8 This last comment, 
somewhat startling considering his otherwise unambiguous rejection o f dogma, 
religious or otherwise, brings to mind the objections o f Jacques Derrida as well as a 
question as to what is intended by the term “demythologized.” Derrida, in his essays on 
The Gift o f  Death, argued that the distinction made between conventional Christianity 
and a Christianity “thought through” was largely superficial."9 He felt that, despite a 
rejection of religious dogma and other protestation to the contrary, Patoika’s 
formulation of the problem implied a final recourse to a metaphysical foundation, a 
foundation in an absolute being. Yet Derrida’s analysis does not appreciate, or 
purposely discounts, the depth of PatoCka’s analysis.
Christianity in its dogmatic forms, Pato€ka consistently argued, presents a 
metaphysical foundation for the morality it proposes. Yet many o f its themes, like that 
of sacrifice, undeniably reflect human experience. A demythologized Christianity, then, 
might be one that continued to press its themes and symbolisms yet was delivered of a 
dogmatic reliance on an absolute being that is given and concrete. Patodka does in fact 
seek a non-dogmatic, or experiential, ground for ethical activity — he seeks to ground it
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in phenomenology. This is not, however, equivalent to that which Derrida charges: a 
search for a “non dogmatic doublet o f dogma”120 that amounts, in the end, to just 
another form of metaphysics. Though Derrida does not give him credit for it, Patodka 
makes a serious and concerted attempt to develop a sense of ethics that avoids the 
problems of foundationalism.
Ethics and M orality
Socrates, as I have noted, did not have simple “positive moral teachings” to give 
to people, and this is the model from which PatoCka takes his lead. Yet at the moment 
when he achieves his greatest international renown, as spokesman for Charter 77, 
Patocka introduces a formulation that seems to contradict his “problematic” 
interpretation of reality. He writes o f an unconditional morality, higher than and binding 
on both the individual and the state. At least one analyst, Aviezer Tucker, has stressed 
this language in concluding that PatoCka’s philosophy leads to a positive formulation of 
certain universal human rights. But Tucker’s conclusion is inconsistent with the Czech 
philosopher’s denial o f all metaphysical and supra-historical formulations.121 The 
question to be asked now is whether this critique of metaphysics is not contradicted by 
the appeal to morality of the Charter. Can Pato£ka, in other words, make a coherent 
appeal to a transcendental political ethics without contradicting the tenor o f his own 
philosophy?
PatoCka’s work, in line with the Czech tradition that produced T. G. Masaryk, 
has a clear and unambiguous respect for ethics and morality, particularly in the practice 
o f politics. This is strongly reinforced by his reliance on Platonic language, something
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Heidegger purposefully avoided. The high point o f Pato£ka’s appeal to morality, most
certainly, came with his participation in Charter 77. It is this experience that leads
Tucker to his conclusions about human rights, and it is from this period that Patocka
makes the following statement:
No society, no matter how well-equipped it may be technologically, can 
function without a moral foundation, without convictions that do not 
depend on convenience, circumstances, or expected advantage. Yet the 
point o f morality is to assure not the functioning of a society but the 
humanity o f humans. Humans do not invent morality arbitrarily, to suit 
their needs, wishes, inclinations, and aspirations. Quite the contrary, it is 
morality that defines what being human means.122
Morality is not only crucial to human society, it is actually defining of human being.
Humans don’t invent morality, it invents them.
How can man be defined by morality if it does not exist a priori, over and above
him? While we can agree that, no matter what its source, a moral order should not be
arbitrary, simply suiting our “needs, wishes, inclinations, and aspirations,” the question
of a “moral foundation” that defines us is rather more difficult. The language of the
texts written in defense o f Charter 77, more so than in any other example from his
corpus, seems to imply a metaphysics o f morality. States, he wrote, are subject to
“something unconditional that is higher than they are, something that is binding even on
them, sacred, inviolable.”123
What PatoCka describes as a “binding” force, however, is not intended to invoke
a metaphysical constant -- a form o f knowledge or a commandment. Instead it is
described as a “moral sentiment.” That which is binding on states is not something to
which one can simply point as to an object. It is neither simply relative to an individual
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or a group of individuals, nor does it originate entirely outside of humanity. The source 
of the morality to which Patodka points is human being itself. Pato£ka wishes to 
demonstrate that, if we delve into the question of the possibilities presented by our 
being, particularly the possibility of enhancing it, and if we take account o f the world as 
a whole rather than as a  collection o f particulars, then we will arrive without the help of 
metaphysics at the conviction described above -- the moral content of a life in truth.
“Charta 7T’ (sic), he states, “is an outgrowth of this conviction.”124
This interpretation o f Charter 77 is contested, however, by the claim that 
Patocka’s ethics, in the end, revert to a Kantian formulation. It is a claim supported by 
the author’s own oblique reference. He writes that Charter 77 “does, however, remind 
us explicitly that, already a hundred and eighty years ago, precise conceptual analysis 
made it clear that all moral obligations are rooted in what we might call a person’s 
obligation to himself.”125 The reference is clear: PatoCka associates the moral obligation 
proposed by the Charter with Kantian analysis. Are we to understand, then, that the 
ground for our behavior is a categorical imperative? Is the Kantian analysis the 
non-metaphysical formulation we are searching for?
The answer to these questions is “no,” despite the fact that the way in which 
Patocka describes the moral aspect of Charter 77 does indeed bear comparison to the 
categorical imperative. In fact, Pato£ka was asked by a student about this very point 
during one of his “Four Seminars on the Problem o f Europe,” and his response is 
revealing. Pato£ka says that he considers Kant’s thought to be an attempt to get at the 
root of the problem, to formulate the essential “difference” referred to above -- the
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difference between being and beings, in Heidegger’s language. But there is a problem in 
that Kant’s formulation is “decidedly nonhistorical, it is valid for every person in every 
circumstance the same.”126 It takes the form of a universal formula that stands above 
humanity and history. In this it is certainly easier to explain, to appeal to, but it fails to 
adequately respond to what Pato£ka sees as our historical nature.
In the examples of Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov cited above, Patocka implies that 
the meaning o f their sacrifices is tied to their particular situations. In their circumstances 
they were able to increase their freedom and enhance their humanity (or being) through 
their actions. Their appeal in doing so was not to a universal formula or set o f abstract 
rights, but to a moral sentiment tied to the fact o f their humanity, the fact that they could 
perceive and live truthfully and that such a life would make them more, not less, human. 
As Patodka described it with particular reference to Kant, the action of the Russians 
“does not have to do with some universal formula like the categorical imperative, but 
about something, that only in a concrete historical situation has force and validity.”127 In 
his philosophical writings and seminars, the connection of human freedom and human 
action to history is clear and unambiguous. In his public proclamations in support of 
Charter 77, however, which were intended to be as brief and easily accessible as 
possible, the historical aspect is not made explicit. Instead, it is the concept o f the moral 
sentiment that is stressed. In doing so, PatoSka ran the risk o f being misinterpreted in a 
Kantian light. Yet in the context o f his philosophical work there can be no confusion.
His thought is inherently historical; it does not reduce to a universal formula but stands 
on the basis o f the fact of human historicity.
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Thus we end up with an ethics based in a “moral sentiment” that is both
transcendental — in the sense of transcending the particularities o f our will or desires —
and historical. The realm o f this moral sentiment, this insight, does not exist for us in
concreto. It is there not as a present reality, but only insofar as we respond to it in an
historical situation. Patodka attempts to explain this point, the question o f human
morality, in a consideration of the meaning of the term “intelligence”:
If, then, intelligence in the sense o f free reflection is always bound to a 
moral posture, to choosing between right and wrong, with which is 
connected loss or gain o f the authentic, spiritual “I,” then by virtue o f it’s 
final assumption it is still only a realm into which we penetrate via 
“moral attitude,...” O f the realm into which we grow via moral insight, 
it’s possible to truly say that it is “not o f this world,” because this realm 
does not make itself out, does not determine itself as given and present, 
but rather opens itself such that we hear a certain claim and we respond 
to it.128
We hear and respond in particular situations, and in doing so we move in truth, we 
appeal to a realm that exists insofar as we act to enhance and fulfill our possibilities as 
human beings.
The Nihilist and the Humanist 
In addition to his critique o f Kantian ethics, Pato£ka attempts to clearly 
distinguish his own interpretation from two other possibilities open to modem man. The 
spiritual person, in rejecting metaphysics, is tempted by but must ultimately resist the 
pull o f both nihilism and humanism. In “The Spiritual Person and the Intellectual,” 
Patocka notes that the individual who lives through and accepts problematicity is 
ultimately subject to a cruel fate. There is a cruelty in the seemingly endless skepticism 
to which he must subject the world, for it leads, almost inevitably, to an
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all-encompassing doubt, a negation o f all meaning. The spiritual person is tempted to 
resign himself to “the thought that life and the world are not only problematic, but that 
meaning as an answer to this question not only is not found, but that it cannot be found, 
that the ultimate result is nihil — a self-negation, a self-denial.”129 He is tempted to 
resign himself, in other words, to nihilism.
Yet nihilism is not a solution nor is it the only possible recourse in a world 
where all other idols have been broken. In the concept o f problematicity all is not 
negative and lacking unity. A unified life is possible on skeptical basis, on a basis of 
problematicity: “In the spiritual life it is consequently possible to find unity precisely 
without a solid ground, and it is possible without dogma to overcome this complete 
negativity, negative skepticism, negative nihilism.”130 The spiritual life does not rest on 
a “solid ground,” it admits to no dogma, but its interrogation o f reality does not make 
life subjective or nihilistic. To the contrary, the questioning attitude o f philosophy “is 
something that rests upon the deepest foundations of our life.”131 Unity is possible 
without a unifying doctrine.
This does not exhaust Patoika’s analysis of nihilism, however. He also responds 
to Nietzsche, whose diagnosis of the death o f metaphysics was followed by a search for 
a creative means o f replacing it. In Chapter Three of the Heretical Essays, Pato£ka takes 
up the challenge of those who would embrace nihilism in the wake o f a loss of faith in 
absolute meaning. This was Nietzsche’s solution, to embrace nihilism and accept the 
death of absolute meaningfulness, but to put in place of the latter a creative will to
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power that itself can acquire relative meaning. But as Pato£ka conceives of the
relationship between life and meaning, this must be an impossible attempt:
In its practical unfolding, life cannot rest on a relative meaning which 
itself rests on meaninglessness, since no relative meaning can ever render 
the meaningless meaningful but, rather, is always itself dragged into 
meaninglessness by it. An authentic life in utter nihilism, with the 
knowledge of the meaninglessness of the whole, is impossible, becoming 
possible only at the cost o f illusions.132
While Nietzsche’s diagnosis o f the crisis of meaning is acute, his nihilistic prescription
for the active creation of meaning through will to power is unworkable. One could
persist in an attempt of this sort only be deluding oneself and others, by creating the
illusion o f a meaningful life. Nihilism, then, takes on the form of a dogmatic solution
that is just as illusory as what it hoped to replace: “the theses o f a nihilism so conceived,
however, are no less dogmatic than the theses of a naive unbroken faith in meaning!”133
Nietzsche, in his headstrong confrontation with the loss o f meaning, ends up not with a
liberating freedom but with another form of uncritical dogma.
Nietzsche’s embrace o f nihilism has not been the only option open to people in
the post-metaphysical age, however. Accompanying the very crisis of faith to which the
will to power is a reaction has been a tremendous rise in human scientific knowledge.
This advance in human knowledge, in fact, is one of the primary causes o f the decline in
traditional metaphysics. Humans are solving by scientific means many of the great
mysteries o f humanity. As a predictable result, we have seen a transference o f faith from
superhuman sources of rationality to mundane or simply human sources. Faith is placed
in humans themselves and in their ability to continually progress towards a better and
more knowledgeable future. I am speaking, rather broadly, of what is known as
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humanism. In Patodka’s analysis, modem anthropocentric humanism is discarded, along 
with nihilism, as a solution to the question o f meaning — and for similar reasons.
In two essays that deal with the topic of humanism, Pato£ka speaks of it in two 
forms. The first is a humanism characterized by a general faith in man and progress that 
Patocka terms “harmonism” and associates with some o f the works o f Masaryk. This 
general humanistic attitude “forms the background of the great majority o f moral and 
social thought o f modem humanity,” he wrote in an undated essay from the end of the 
1930s entitled “The Harmonism of Modem Humanists.”134 In his essay “Negative 
Platonism” o f a decade or so later, Patodka is even more specific in pointing to an 
integral humanism with ties to positivism and the conviction that the scientific conquest 
of nature will replace the need for theology. In both cases, PatoCka’s position is clear: 
modem humanism bears the same characteristic markings as the metaphysics it claims 
to be doing away with. It is an elevation of man and his rational abilities to a status 
formerly reserved for the divinities.
In the earlier article, Pato£ka discusses humanism in terms of what he calls 
“harmonism,” the particularly modem conception of mankind based on the conviction 
that internally, man is a harmonious figure with limitless potential for progress. As he 
puts it: “Man in the faith of harmonism is in his essence a happy figure, whose nature is 
meant for uninterrupted growth.135 PatoCka’s critique of this posture is straightforward. 
Far from comprehending man in his essence, this view reflects a transference of faith 
from traditional sources to an anthropocentric conception o f rationality. The result is a 
simplified and distorted picture of human being. “The man o f harmonism is a closed,
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ready being, simple and entirely transparent.”136 Though it was never finished, the point 
of the essay is clear: a harmonistic ethics, an approach to moral problems based on this 
simplified notion of humanity, is insufficient and unable to respond to the complexity of 
human being.
In the more polished “Negative Platonism,” we will recall that Patoika conducts 
an analysis o f the metaphysical roots o f modem scientific rationalism and concludes 
that, rather than overcoming the metaphysical desire for a complete understanding of 
the whole, modem humanism has actually taken over the aspiration in new form. This is 
surprising, on the face o f it, for humanism generally defines itself in opposition to 
abstract metaphysics. Yet in two modem perspectives that both result in humanism, 
positivism and dialectical humanism or Hegelianism, “metaphysics is said to be an 
abstract formulation o f theological ideas which will vanish under the light o f successful 
human conquest of nature, of the resolution of social problems, and o f a reordering of 
human society.”137 Though these approaches certainly differ in other ways, both result in 
a humanism reflecting this conviction.
The very factors intended to bring about an eclipse o f metaphysics, however, the 
scientific “conquest o f nature” and the “resolution of social problems,” themselves 
reflect metaphysical goals. Though they set themselves up in opposition to tradition, 
they still carry on its search for a solution to history. As PatoCka puts it, “ .. .in spite o f 
all its resistance to tradition and to the form that metaphysics assumed within the 
church, within the traditional state, and in their schools, modem humanism continues to 
operate within the matrix set down by this tradition, precisely as a militant opposition to
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it.”138 Modem humanism mirrors the goals o f metaphysics primarily in its faith in the
ability o f rational rule to encapsulate itself into a system that will solve the problems of
humanity. Rather than God, however, man is now at the center. While its positivistic
side restricted itself to the empirical and the objective, trying to develop a “calculus of
utility and well-being,” it was another version, that o f Hegel and dialectical humanism,
that truly represented the high point o f modem, metaphysical thought. With this
systematization o f man and history, culminating in Marx, it
became entirely evident that, in a full working out o f the spirit of 
metaphysics that means man, as historical and as social, placing himself 
in the position once reserved for the gods and for God, myth, dogma, and 
theology were reabsorbed into history and flowed into a philosophy that 
discarded its time-honored name of a simple love o f wisdom in order to 
become a scientific system.139
The humanist dream of devising a rational system perfect enough to respond to all
contingencies and illuminate all mysteries is itself the victim o f the metaphysical desire
for the fullness o f knowledge denied to Socrates. Like nihilism, it severely limits the
way in which we are permitted to view ethics and meaning. While the Nietzschean
nihilist would limit his search for ethics and meaning to that which he can create by the
force of his own will, the anthropocentric humanist would restrict the factors going into
his own understanding to that which he can grasp wholly through his own reason and its
systematic methodologies.
Though one could take issue with Patodka’s characterization o f the broad
category of humanism as reductive or oversimplified, the point would remain the same:
in his search to comprehend the ground of human reality, neither a nihilistic nor an
anthropocentric humanist perspective is sufficient. The rejection of nihilism and
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humanism as means through which to understand human reality, and so human ethics, 
brings us back to our earlier question: if  we must discard not only traditional 
metaphysics but also humanist and nihilistic-romanticist reactions to it, can it be said 
that there is any foundation for ethics at all?
The Foundation o f Ethics 
“Ethics are not built upon metaphysics...;” this is the contention that grounds not 
only Pato£ka’s political thought, but also his concepts o f “care for the soul” and “life in 
truth.”140 Yet, as these Platonic concepts imply, some form of non-relative ethical 
thought is elemental to his philosophy. Pato£ka’s ethics have their source in our 
understanding o f our own being. It is our being and the character of our relationship to it 
that largely determine our lives. Understood properly, human being is something quite 
distinctive from the simple existence o f things, creatures, objects. Human being, as we 
have seen, is most open to its possibilities insofar as it relates, not simply to the contents 
of the world but to the world as a whole. In Patoika’s analysis of those relations, he 
stresses movement as the primary concept.
Conceived o f phenomenologically, human movement was shown to have a 
hierarchical structure. Certain movement, such as that directed toward freedom (i.e., 
historical movement), was instrumental in opening up human possibility; it aimed for 
more than the simple preservation o f life. This movement acted to heighten our being, 
and so could be classified as a higher type o f human movement. It was a “movement o f 
truth,” he explained further, and was exemplified in particular human activities like the 
philosophical interrogation of reality. Another activity that Patodka later demarcated as
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potentially a movement o f  truth, a form of historical action, was the phenomenon of 
authentic sacrifice.
To illuminate the overall point, let’s return for a moment to the discussion of 
sacrifice. With a meaningful sacrifice, a sacrifice that reflects human being rather than 
the being of things, the presence o f a hierarchical structure to being is revealed. 
Meaningful sacrifice, Pato£ka maintains, shows that “there exists something like a 
difference, a hierarchy, a fundamental dividing line. Otherwise all so-called values are 
subjective and relative.141 This is the dividing line between that which is most basic to 
humanity, i.e., our being and our ability to understand our being, and that which 
characterizes things or mere beings. It is a difference that is not relative, but 
fundamental. It is what Heidegger would describe as the difference between being and 
beings.142
In Patodka’s reading, this is the difference that determines the way we act. It is, 
he says, “a difference which is, which manifests itself in two basic manners o f being: 
namely, in the manner o f being of things, which are indifferent to the fact that they 
exist, and in the manner o f being o f man, in whom it is not like this.”143 The key point is 
the latter, that this difference manifests itself in human behavior, in a “manner of 
being.” It is a hierarchical difference that precludes a relativity o f values, but still does 
not exist in such a form that it can be translated into a universal ladder o f values. It is a 
difference that manifests itself, not independently and objectively, but in the course of 
our historical actions. It manifests itself in a “manner of being” which is precisely the 
“moral attitude” described in the Charter 77 texts. Only having established this
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connection can Pato£ka proceed to speak of non-relative human ethics in the context of 
a critique o f metaphysics.
Despite the focus on movement and our way o f being, we are still left to deal 
with what seems to be a metaphysical teleology: Patodka argues that care for the soul 
means movement o f the soul in the direction of good. Yet as I have already 
demonstrated, this classical formulation hides a content that specifically denies 
metaphysics. Care for the soul in its ontological and phenomenological sense is a 
“theory of motion,” and the movement of the soul towards the good is not a movement 
towards an immovable object.144 Instead, both the soul and the good have to be 
understood in terms o f  their relation to each other and to our being. The soul is 
effectively a summation o f the relationship of the individual to being; it is a story of 
growth and decline. It “ —is that which defines itself in the direction o f its being and 
that which consequently directs itself either towards legitimate growth, towards a 
growth of being, or on the contrary towards decline and a loss o f being: the soul is an 
indicator of the main arteries o f being.”145
In indicating these “arteries of being,” these human possibilities, the soul also 
indicates what we call good and evil. Indeed, the soul could not exist without good and 
evil, for without “arteries o f being” how could an indicator o f those arteries exist. Good 
is demarcated by the action o f the soul, but the soul itself is dependent on the existence 
of good. Here, it seems, is a case of circular logic. Its resolution requires an emphasis on 
motion and possibility. We can say there is good not insofar as humans merely exist, but 
only insofar as they live humanly, meaning in the possibility o f the intensification of
279
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
their own being. Pato£ka attempted to express this formulation in a passage from
Europe and the Post-European Age which, though cited earlier, bears repeating:
The soul is that which has a sense of good and evil. The soul can exist 
only when good exists, for its basic motion is motion in the direction of 
good, but on the other hand even good itself has meaning as the goal and 
vanishing point o f everything only when there exists motion. Only 
insofar as there exists something that can heighten its being by motion 
towards the good is good operative, meaning it is. The soul thus not only 
enables a conception of the overall hierarchy o f being in the sense of 
good, i.e., a teleological conception, but it is at the same time a 
justification o f good, it gives an answer to the question (which even 
Nietzsche expressly asked), why choose good and not evil, why truth and 
not (the possibly more practical) seeming.146
So we can, in the end, only speak of the “good” as a foundation for ethics in a very
particular sense. Good is not an independent entity, nor is it relative to our will,
conventions, desires, and so forth. It relates, instead, to our very humanity, the
movement that is our soul. The operative concept, the crucial factor, is our
understanding of being. Being is something that we can describe in hierarchical terms,
as in the classical description o f good, but it is not an objective telos.
It is by virtue o f the ontological character of our humanity -- our interest in our
own being, not simply our humanity as such — that we are able to speak o f ethics at all.
Ethics have their source in this humanity and in our relation to the world as a whole.
Though we cannot speak o f ethics as ahistorical values, we need not revert to the
relativistic conviction that ethics are simply created by human will, or are merely the
product of a historical period. The contemporary dilemma, in many respects, is one of
being caught between two unsatisfactory visions of reality. It is a choice between a
metaphysical foundation for morals or an anthropocentric humanism which, in the end,
280
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
must result in an ethical relativism. Jan Patocka’s work is directed towards an 
exposition of the false nature o f this dichotomy. This is the heart o f his ethical thought; 
what I have presented thus far, however, does not resolve this problem so much as 
introduce it as a problem and indicate the direction in which Pato£ka moves.
PatoCka’s political philosophy concludes in an exposition o f the relation of the 
individual to society. In his case this took the form o f dissent. Yet dissent is not, in and 
of itself, a political value. It is simply the way in which Pato£ka’s commitment to 
politics manifested itself in the given situation. Jan Patodka’s dissent was a form of 
historical action, a manifestation of the mode of living that his philosophy seeks to 
describe concretely. Using the Platonic symbolisms o f  “caring for the soul” and “living 
in truth” PatoCka points his thought in the direction o f a ground for politics in freedom 
and problematicity, and a ground for the political individual in a commitment to an 
ethics that, if understood in relation to the limits o f human existence, must be 
recognized as non-metaphysical.
Patocka’s analysis o f the political reality o f the contemporary world 
demonstrates the degree to which politics in the West has abandoned this ground. The 
means to recovering a politics o f freedom that respects the possibility inherent in the 
human being can be found, if we use Patodka as a guide, in a reexamination o f classical 
themes and symbols through the lenses of contemporary critique. “Care for the soul” as 
“care for the polis” can be retrieved as a guiding principle o f contemporary, universal 
supercivilization only insofar as it can be understood in its essence — purified, if you
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will, o f the metaphysical baggage o f two thousand years. This quest forms the core of 
Patocka’s political thought.
The discussion o f ethics in this chapter, however, points to a larger, more 
fundamental problem that has still not been fully resolved. In the conclusion to this 
study I will analyze PatoCka’s attempt to resolve the problem o f metaphysics by getting 
to its source. If  we accept that there is a moral sentiment connected to humanity that is 
unconditional, then we must admit to an ultimate source for that phenomenon. The 
question o f a source is the question of foundations, and it is the animating question of 
much o f contemporary political theory if  not of all o f postmodernism.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION: FOUNDATIONS AND PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND
POSTMODERNISM
Postmodernism, taking its lead from Nietzsche and Heidegger, presents a 
significant challenge to political theory with its contention that metaphysical 
foundationalism is a facile and impermissible ground for understanding. The effect of 
this critique on politics is particularly acute, for it implies that no consistent ground for 
ethics or political responsibility can be said to exist. The result is a postmodern 
dilemma, an inability to conceptualize an ethics that transcends the particular moment. 
Yet Patoika, despite his allegiance to the Heideggerean critique o f metaphysics, 
proposes just such an ethics. He posits a “moral attitude” that is neither ahistorically 
absolute nor entirely relative. It is not governed by a metaphysical reality nor is it 
subject to human will or whim. PatoCka’s understanding o f ethics stems from a 
fundamental ontology and a phenomenological relationship o f the human to the world 
as a whole. Patodka stakes out, with his discussion of the ethical content o f taking an 
interest in one’s own being (or caring for one’s soul), a space in-between the two poles 
of the debate over foundationalism. He argues that the dilemma of a choice between 
postmodern relativism and metaphysical absolutism is a false one. Contemporary 
critique is compatible with a classical concern for ethics.
With contemporary thought, the question of foundations becomes an explicit 
theme — it is dealt with as a philosophical problem in its own right.1 Postmodern theory 
makes this problem particularly acute because it challenges, not only traditionally 
metaphysical conceptions o f meaning, but also the very notion of the need or possibility
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of a foundation in political and social thought at all. Pato£ka’s thought has as its central 
axis the attempt to demarcate a ground for a politics, and a  life, that represents a morally 
consistent alternative to either o f the two poles o f the foundationalist issue. He makes a 
claim for a ground that is non-foundational, a morality without metaphysics. Yet is this 
a tenable position? Can the existence o f such a ground be defended philosophically? An 
answer to these questions demands an exploration of the concept of the foundation in 
Patocka’s work, and a search for the ultimate source for the meaning that he sees as 
unconditional in human life even though it does not rest upon a naive metaphysics.
What Jan Patodka describes as his foundation is the intuitive human experience of 
reality that finds it meaningful in a non-relative sense. Abandoning an objective, 
transcendental source, meaning becomes something problematic; a new mode of 
meaning is uncovered that, without succumbing to relativism, must understand itself as 
conditional on the relationship o f the individual to the world and to his own being.
As political philosophy, Patodka’s contention is that we can and must speak of 
ethics, but only within a framework characterized, not by a concrete foundation, but by 
problematicity. Political life, he states at one point, is “a permanent uprootedness, lack 
of foundation.”2 Interestingly, Pato£ka borrows an English phrase to describe the limits 
of the political realm: politics does not properly permit hope for what he terms the 
“happy end.”3 Instead, politics is an historical endeavor that should take its lead from 
the principles found in the early Greek polis. It should allow for, rather than seeking to 
end, free and conflictual interaction.
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Despite the fact that political life is described as lacking foundation, it is not 
accurate to refer to Pato£ka as anti-foundationalisl — as does, for example, Richard 
Rorty.4 Even as the spiritual twin of politics and a risky and uncertain endeavor, 
“[p]hilosophy searches for founding.”5 Although the “spiritual person” must forego 
metaphysical certainty, he or she is not reduced to indecision and immobility. 
Philosophy properly searches for founding, but it is true philosophy only insofar as it 
understands the character of what it hopes to find.
In Europe and the Post-European Age, Pato£ka characterizes the promise of 
philosophy with his description o f ancient Greek thought as a fundamental breakthrough 
in the way the world is understood. Pointing to presocratic thinkers such as Heraclitus 
as well as to Socrates, Pato£ka depicts the opening up o f a new perspective. This 
breakthrough, however, does not consist in an answering o f questions. Rather, it further 
complicates things. Its basic characteristic is a “deepening” o f the horizon o f the world, 
an introduction o f a new situation in which a searching lostness regarding questions of 
good and evil shifts from being our “fate” to our “mission” in life. The world speaks to 
man differently now -- he is no longer philosophically naive. “It is no longer an 
undamaged world..., but an ambiguous world.”6 Naive and comforting mythical 
demarcations between gods and man disintegrate; the cosmos is deepened and for the 
first time revealed in its all-encompassing depth. Now, Patodka notes, man must 
recognize himself as a question — “Who am I?” — and he must learn to expect that an 
answer will come only from himself.7
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It is this insight into the ambiguity o f the human condition that characterizes the
limits of any foundation to which we may aspire. We have true access only to
immediate reality, never to the whole of reality that it presupposes. The concept of the
“whole” of reality plays a key role in Patodka’s phenomenological philosophy, of
course. As an experiential horizon, however, the whole does not exist as a concrete
phenomenon. It is not an entity upon which we can ground our activity. It is,
nevertheless, our ontological directedness toward this “whole” that defines our
humanity. The whole is itself no foundation, but rather a “presupposition” o f our
founding activity, o f our search for understanding. Without a sense of a whole we would
be frozen in nihilism, unable to move. PatoCka explains his position in a passage from
Europe and the Post-European Age that deserves to be quoted at length:
Man stands with one leg in the immediacy o f reality, in givenness, but 
that givenness fully lays open the content o f its reality only at the point 
when it is not taken as what it passes itself off to be, but when we are 
able to gain support and foundation together and in terms o f  the whole.
The universe revealed in this way is an actual foundation, and only this 
foundation founds in the true sense of the word....If we stood on both feet 
in reality, on the ultimate soil o f the all-encompassing whole, we would 
never be exposed to wandering, to vain hopeless groping in circles; then 
our path would be consistent and clear, continually meaningful, never 
recurring. This we cannot guarantee nor achieve. But we can procure 
immediacy with a question mark and attempt to bring our path, our steps, 
from one immediacy to another, from one experience to the next, from 
one thought to another, in such a way that they will be unified and will 
not be destructive of each other. Then it also forms a sort o f ground upon 
which it is possible to move. The final foundation, in view of which we 
experience and we think, i.e., we are in a human way, thus forms the 
presupposition for our concrete assigning o f reasons, for the action of 
founding. Philosophy searches for founding.8
Human activity does not take place on the sure and eternally continuous footing of a
metaphysical foundation. Instead, we move from immediacy to immediacy, from one
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interaction with the immediate world to another. If we do so, however, in such a way 
that we do not live only for those immediacies but rather in search o f a fuller 
understanding o f the whole that all immediate phenomena presuppose, then we evoke a 
certain consistency and unity that is itself able to serve as a “sort o f ground upon which 
it is possible to move.”
This “consistency,” as Patodka has argued, is not characteristic of modem 
Western civilization. The universal civilization that developed out o f the roots of 
Europe, which has been called a new form of supercivilization, suffers from confusion, 
or rather a misplaced sense o f security, with regard to its foundations. The creation of 
the modem supercivilization — and its crisis — we will recall, was connected to the 
problem o f metaphysical philosophy in the contemporary world. The age in  which we 
live is a “post-European” age, not simply because o f the end o f European hegemony, but 
because the age is post-metaphysical. Traditional metaphysics has, over a course of 
centuries, been abandoned for science and rationality. Yet as Patodka concludes in his 
essay on the “Supercivilization,” this process was less an abandonment o f  metaphysics 
than a “negation” o f it. The result was a negative metaphysics that attempted to 
reproduce reality by non-metaphysical, that is, scientific, means. Yet rather than 
overcoming metaphysics, this attempt merely succeeded in repeating its mistakes in 
rationalistic form. Following Husserl, PatoCka takes issue with the use of science as a 
replacement for metaphysics, as a new foundation. His approach is not to discredit 
science itself, but to argue for the necessity of understanding its limitations.
The process o f the passage from metaphysical forms o f thought and life 
to nonmetaphysical cannot be capped by attempts that are negatively
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metaphysical, consequently impoverishing man in regard to the 
possibility o f possibilities; its consummation can only be a division of 
these possibilities, a measurement o f their autonomy. New society cannot 
be founded on illusions; nor can it be founded on the illusion that we 
have a direct access to reality and that (at least in its basic characteristics) 
we understand the whole. Negative metaphysics rested mainly on the 
metaphysicalizing of science; the de-metaphysicalizing o f science does 
not mean the de-realization o f science, the claim that it doesn’t capture 
reality (of objects), but merely that it doesn’t capture it as a whole and 
directly, but rather merely partially and schematically.9
The problem o f modem society, then, is that it has long sought a new foundation to 
replace that which has been discredited. This is the state of the “post-metaphysical” age; 
despite the twilight o f metaphysics, modem European civilization has sought to replace 
the traditional metaphysical means of political organization with quasi-rationalist means 
that replicate the goals of metaphysics rather than revealing a genuine alternative to 
them.
In his writings on the philosophy of history, PatoCka argues that properly 
historical action is “free” action primarily in that it rejects the goals and ends inherent in 
traditional metaphysics and its scientific descendent. It rejects the need for a foundation 
that is solid and irrefutable. In giving up certain forms o f metaphysics, modernity did 
not cease to search for the irrefutable. Indicative of this end, as Pato£ka puts it in the 
fifth o f his Heretical Essays, is the fact that modem civilization consistently yet vainly 
seeks to treat history as a problem to be solved. “Modem civilization suffers not only 
from its own flaws and myopia but also from the failure to resolve the entire problem of 
history. Yet the problem o f  history may not be resolved, it must be preserved as a 
problem” (emphasis mine).10 The key to the positive possibilities of modem, rational 
civilization, then, is an understanding of history that recognizes it as a problem that
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cannot be solved. It is an understanding o f historical activity as activity grounded in our 
freedom from a search for objective and metaphysical foundations. Philosophy searches 
for foundations and politics requires a ground, but in order for either to succeed the 
nature o f that foundation, that ground, must be recognized as problematic.
Pato£ka expresses his vision of the ground upon which political society can form 
in a text accompanying the Czech edition of Europe and the Post-European Age. In this 
text, entitled “The Pattern of History,” the foundation of political society is tied, not to 
the notion of the preservation o f life that is the foremost characteristic o f liberal society, 
but to the preservation o f freedom as a possibility that takes precedence over the simple 
preserving o f life. The concept that captures this dynamic is Patodka’s concept of 
history:
This means, however, that history is and will be only insofar as there are 
people who do not want to merely “live,” but are truly willing, in their 
detachment from mere life, to lay down and preserve societal 
foundations o f mutual respect. What is founded in this way is not a safe 
securing of life, but freedom, i.e., possibilities which exceed the level of 
mere life. These possibilities are in essence o f two forms, namely the 
responsible care for the other and an expressed relation to being, i.e., 
truth. In these relations man is neither dependent nor a consumer, but in 
the essential sense a builder, founder, expander, preserver of society -- of 
course, as has already been said, never without exposure to danger. This 
building is the building of a world which is founded in the non-visible 
region, but it must be made into a visible and lasting form in order to 
bear human life and to offer to man the possibility to be historical 
henceforth and always anew."
What is required is the building of a concrete and “visible” society, yet one grounded in
the non-visible region. This is the region that is the ultimate source for human meaning.
It is PatoCka’s challenge to describe it without recourse to the foundationalism that he is
determined to avoid.
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The Problem of Meaning
In the Heretical Essays on the Philosophy o f  History the concept o f  a foundation 
for historical action is subsumed under the question o f meaningfulness. “Does History 
have a Meaning?” is the title o f the third essay; in it, he seeks to inquire to what degree 
history, in the specific, ontological way in which it is defined, is dependent upon a 
foundation in meaning. The postmodern perspective grounded in the Heideggerean 
critique o f metaphysics, o f course, is clear in its rejection o f a transcendent meaning of 
history. But does this mean, Pato£ka wishes to ascertain, that history can make no claim 
to meaning at all? Contrary to what one would expect from an anti-foundationalist, 
Patocka concludes that history is dependent upon meaning. As he puts it in response to 
the solution offered by Nietzschean nihilism: “An authentic life in utter nihilism, with 
the knowledge o f the meaningless o f the whole, is impossible, becoming possible only 
at the cost o f illusions.”12 But the meaning that characterizes historical (or 
philosophical) man, Patodka is clear to point out, is of a distinctly different character 
than the accepted, positive meaning o f prehistorical or metaphysical man. The essential 
characteristic of history remains the rejection, or the “shaking,” o f naivete. Yet this 
shaking is not a rejection of all meaning; its counterpart is the positive formulation of 
the freer, more demanding meaningfulness epitomized by political life.
PatoCka’s analysis o f the source o f meaning in this chapter makes his work 
explicitly relevant to the contemporary problem of foundationalism in political theory. 
Insofar as a society is grounded in a given and unshakable meaning, as in “prehistoric” 
civilization, then a positive, concrete foundation is presumed. The shaking o f meaning
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in Pato£ka’s philosophy o f history is consistent with a critique o f that foundationalism — 
yet Patocka is not simply an anti-foundationalist. He argues coherently that meaning is 
essential to human life, particularly political life. A meaningful ground upon which we 
can move and progress is possible, but it is dependent on a fuller understanding of both 
our being and our relationship to the world as a whole. Thus Pato£ka attempts to 
respond to the problem of foundationalism by centering it in a philosophical approach 
informed by contemporary ontology and phenomenology. His philosophy moves 
in-between the Husserlian search for a foundation in a pure phenomenological approach 
to reason, and the (early) Heideggerean approach o f avoiding any foundational 
temptation entirely.
Pato£ka wishes to illuminate a “soil” upon which it is possible not only to move 
but also to live in community, to construct a viable politics; yet he commits himself to 
this task under the stricture of a critique of metaphysics. What are his results? Patodka 
concludes that the meaning upon which human history properly unfolds is problematic 
meaning. To understand meaning as problematic, to accept even the possibility o f a total 
absence o f meaning, is to begin to understand humanity in terms o f our actual 
experience o f it. Thus Pato£ka concludes that meaning lies in the “seeking which flows 
from its absence,” and that this dynamic first appears in the Greek world as a “new 
project o f life” instituted by Socrates.13 As Pato£ka explains it, Socrates struggled not 
with a lack of meaning, but with the problematicity o f meaning (based partly on the 
possibility o f its absence). It is precisely via our grasp o f this problematicity, entailing 
the realization that meaning is not simply and objectively there but is something that
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can be won or lost, that we are able to experience meaningfulness in its genuine, human 
sense.
PatoCka’s unwillingness to posit a concretized metaphysics means that it is
impossible to conceive of meaning as something autonomous, as independent of being.
To do so, he argues, would be tantamount to abandoning the question o f meaning’s
source: “To have recourse to a metaphysics means to treat meaning as something
ready-made and to give up for good the question of its origin (not in a
temporal-empirical but in a structural-philosophical sense).”14 It is the “origin” o f
meaning that we are interested in, however, for this points us to the ultimate foundation
for which philosophy searches.
Rather than searching for a static source of meaning, Pato£ka asks us to think
about meaning non-objectively -- in relation to being. Things, and the values we attach
to them, attain their meaning only in terms of our understanding o f them.15 It is not the
things themselves to which we must look for the origin o f meaning, it is to our sense for
them. The basic determinant of this sense for things, he continues, is our “openness” to
the world, our willingness and ability to understand things in relation, not to other
things, but to the world as a whole. The source of meaning, then, to the degree it can be
located at all, is in our self-conscious movement through life.
Things have no meaning for themselves, rather, their meaning requires 
that someone “have a sense” for them: thus meaning is not originally 
lodged in what is [beings, things] but in that openness, in that 
understanding for them; an understanding, though, which is a process, a 
movement which is no different from the movement at the core of our 
life.16
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In this way, therefore, it is clear that the source o f meaning is in us; it is we who bestow 
meaning on things via our relationship to them.
To leave the discussion of meaning at this point would be a mistake, however, 
for Pato£ka wishes to demonstrate that what he is describing is something quite other 
than the idea that we create meaning and that it is in our power to do so. Meaning is not 
relative to our subjective desires, or, as he puts it, “the bestowal o f meaning on things is 
not a function o f our will and whim.”17 Even as beings possessed o f understanding, we 
have no power to keep things from appearing meaningless in certain situations, just as 
we are unable to prevent other things from appearing meaningful. The same beings, in 
fact, can “manifest themselves now as meaningful, now as meaningless, signifying 
nothing.” And what does that mean, he concludes, “if  not the problematic nature of all 
meaningfulness?”18 Meaning is problematic because it is never guaranteed; attempting 
to make it so, to absolutize it, contradicts its very nature. The significance of the 
problematicity of meaning, then, is that it “warns us that we should not yield to the 
inclination to absolutize particular ways of understanding meaning.”19
Yet to be discussed in PatoCka’s analysis is the source of that openness for 
things and for the world that has been denoted as the origin o f meaningful relations. As 
I noted earlier in this section, Pato£ka finds the source of meaning to be located in the 
activity o f searching for meaning, which was best expressed in the Socratic approach to 
life. But what is the initiating factor for the Socratic mode of being? It is, he argues, the 
experience o f the loss o f meaning.20 It is the experience o f the loss of meaning that 
forces us to abandon objective, simply-given conceptions of meaning. Once we
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understand that the meaning we once took for granted is in fact tentative, we can return
to it only with a much greater degree o f awareness. It will “no longer be for us simply a
fact given directly in its integrity; rather, it will be a meaning we have thought through,
seeking reasons and accepting responsibility for it.”21 The result is that something new
emerges via our experience o f loss o f meaning.
It means that there emerges a new relation, a new mode of relating to 
what is meaningful; that meaning can arise only in an activity which 
stems from a searching lack o f meaning, as the vanishing point of being 
problematic, as an indirect epiphany. If we are not mistaken, then this 
discovering o f meaning in the seeking which flows from its absence, as a 
new project o f life, is the meaning of Socrates’s existence. The constant 
shaking o f the naive sense o f meaningfulness is itself a new mode o f 
meaning, a discovery o f its continuity with the mysteriousness of being 
and what-is [beings] as a whole.22
A new mode o f meaning — a human mode — arises as we act to shake ourselves free of
the given. Whereas meaning grounded in a naive metaphysics relieves us of the
responsibility o f acting so as to ensure meaning ~  given meaning is there no matter how
we act — Socrates’ existence demonstrates the consistency and meaningfulness of an
attitude that refuses foundations just as Socrates denied true knowledge.
This disquisition on the source of meaning accurately reflects the heart of Jan
Patocka’s philosophizing. He seeks an understanding of human reality that allows for a
coherent ethics and politics, that gives us a soil upon which we can move, but not at the
cost o f positing a “solid ground” or explicit foundation. Yet is it clear that his approach
to meaning and to foundationalism is entirely non-metaphysical? Even in the passage
just cited, Patodka refers not only to the “new mode o f meaning” that defines the
Socratic life, he also refers to the continuity that this new mode o f meaning has with the
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“mysteriousness” o f being and beings as a whole. In doing so, in speaking o f  an 
appreciation for “beings as a whole” or the “world as a whole” as inherent to the 
openness that invites meaningfulness, one is forced to ask whether a new foundation is 
tacitly being created ~  one simply further removed and more shrouded in mystery than 
other, more explicitly metaphysical foundations.
The critique to which Pato€ka’s work is most susceptible, in the end, is not that 
his work falls too heavily on the side of Heidegger or anti-foundationalism, though 
some have made this suggestion. The clarity and urgency o f Patodka’s commitment to 
ethics and to transcendence denies it. Instead, it is the contrary critique -- the critique 
that Derrida levels against all those who would try to avoid religious dogmatism without 
giving up the language o f moralism and metaphysics ~  that is the most penetrating. It is 
the argument that, despite protestations to the contrary, Pato£ka verges on a form of 
metaphysics to a degree sufficient to undermine his intentions. The implications of this 
critique are troubling. If  Pato£ka is shown to be just another metaphysician then 
credence is lent to the conclusion that it is simply impossible to speak of a coherent 
political morality without falling into metaphysics. If  this is the case, then we are 
reduced to speaking about ethics in an entirely relative manner, in eliminating the type 
of general principle evoked by Patodka in both Charter 77 and in his use o f Platonic 
symbolism.
Although Jacques Derrida’s portrayal of Pato£ka, in his lecture-series published 
as The Gift o f  Death, as a Christian thinker with designs on a political transformation of 
Europe on a Christian-messianic model was highly inaccurate, he makes a second, more
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reasonable argument in this text that must be taken more seriously. In his second 
chapter, Derrida indicts any attempt (including Heidegger’s) to use religious 
symbolization while trying to avoid religion or, as he puts it, any attempt that tries to 
create a “non-dogmatic doublet” of religious dogma.23 The critique is a subtle one that 
will perhaps become clearer if rephrased. In terms of the discussion of this chapter, 
Derrida appears to argue that, regardless of the degree to which one decries all forms of 
dogma, one is still metaphysical and dogmatic if the possibility of an absolute source of 
meaning is even considered. For Derrida, meaning is and can only be relative or 
situational.
While the force of Derrida’s critique in The Gift o f  Death is inappositely placed 
on an interpretation of Patodka as a closet Christian thinker — which he is not -- it is 
nonetheless true that the Czech philosopher speaks of an “absolute” meaningfulness 
without which life is impossible.24 The relevant question, therefore, given the argument 
that the meaningfulness of which we are speaking is not relative, is whether there exists 
a source for this meaning that is equivalent to a foundation. While Derrida is incorrect 
in surmising that Patocka derives meaning from a foundational faith in a  Supreme 
Being, his cause is taken up and advanced in a more insightful way by one o f Patocka’s 
own students, the Czech scholar Ivan Chvatik.
Chvatik, in an essay on “The Heresy o f Jan Patodka in Reflections on the Crisis 
of Europe,” contends that Pato£ka does, in the end, allow himself to rely upon a 
metaphysical foundation. What Chvatik points to, however, is not religious imagery but 
rather the philosopher’s use o f the symbol o f a “vanishing point” o f meaningfulness.
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This symbol, he attests, amounts to the positing o f  a quasi-concrete source o f meaning, 
and thus a basic foundationalism.25 Chvatik argues that, while his teacher denies any 
search for an objective source o f “absolute meaning,” he nevertheless engages in such a 
search, merely cloaking his goal in “mystery” and “darkness.” For Chvatik, the symbol 
of the “vanishing point” — a translation of the unusual formulation “ubezny bod' in 
Czech — is evidence o f Patodka’s positive Platonism. Although the philosopher has 
meticulously developed an ontology rather than a metaphysics as the basis for his 
thought, Chvatik holds a Heideggerean line: “meaning may not be identified with 
being.”26 It is not permissible to derive from the reality o f our being any but relative 
meaningfulness arising in a concrete situation.
Patocka, however, would dispute this argument. When he speaks of the concept 
of “good” having meaning “as the goal and vanishing point o f everything,” he adds that 
this is only true insofar as there exists “motion.” The motion to which he refers is 
human activity in the form o f an exploration o f oneself and o f reality. It is by our 
acceptance of a mode o f living as self-examination that a consistency is revealed. It is 
not being itself that is the source o f meaning but our search for being. As Patodka 
describes it: “Actually we are dealing only with the uncovering of meaning that can 
never be explained as a thing, which cannot be mastered, delimited, grasped positively, 
and dominated, but which is present only in the seeking o f being.”27
Though it is difficult if not impossible to counter effectively a consistent 
skepticism such as Chvatik’s, there are two points in Patodka’s favor. First, there is a 
compelling logic to his argument. It is neither being itself, conceived (incorrectly) as a
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constant entity, nor even our constituting of being that is the source o f meaning, it is 
rather the responsibility o f the search which we accept as we come to realize that 
meaning is uncertain or potentially even wholly lacking. The accepting o f  this 
responsibility, which is not equivalent to being but merely a possibility inherent in our 
being, is a problematic proposition which, at bottom, has no metaphysical anchor or 
ballast. The mysterious vanishing point is not a point, but it is a possibility that is 
consistently ours and independent o f relative particularities. By putting the source of 
meaning firmly in the center of the motive process, rather than in any certainty o f result 
to which we can point prior to beginning our quest, Pato£ka comes as close, I think, as 
is possible to a solution to the question o f the foundation of meaning with which it is 
possible to live.
The second point in support o f Patocka and in contrast to Chvatik’s 
Heideggerean skepticism is contained in the argument that merely relative 
meaningfulness cannot provide the stability needed for human life to unfold. Relative 
meaning, it has been argued, cannot stand by itself on a base o f total meaninglessness. A 
fundamental meaninglessness of the whole would not permit relative meaning to exist 
independently — it would drag such meaning into its wake, making life impossible. “In 
its practical unfolding, life cannot rest on a relative meaning which itself rests on 
meaninglessness, since no relative meaning can ever render the meaningless meaningful 
but, rather, is always itself dragged into meaninglessness by it.”28 Humans, he 
concludes, “cannot live in the certitude o f meaninglessness.”29
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The dogmatic belief in meaninglessness, in addition, is itself a truth and a
certitude that contradicts the tenor of its own rejection o f absolute meaning. The
experiential truth is that we are never certain of meaning or o f meaninglessness, but we
can experience a consistency that transcends the particular when we accept a foundation
that is not like any other foundation ~  a foundation of possibility that understands that
the essential core of human reality is a “mystery” that we will never fully unravel.
And, ultimately, is there not at the very core o f reality itself something 
like the mysterious and the mystery?... Is not the infinite depth o f  reality 
possible only because we cannot see its bottom, and is not just that a 
challenge and an opportunity for humans in their reach for meaning 
which is more than the flowering and perishing o f the lily o f the field in 
the eyes of the gods?30
The Patockan shaking of naive meaning, therefore, winds its way in-between the poles
of a concrete, metaphysical meaning on one hand and an utter meaninglessness or
nihilism on the other. The appeal to mystery or a “vanishing point” cannot be simply
dismissed as a metaphysical Platonism hidden by smoke and mirrors. It is patently
closer to experiential reality than either of the two alternatives which it opposes.
Patodka’s conclusion is thus ironic; man can only achieve the foundational
absoluteness necessary to allow him to live insofar as he rejects the naive
meaningfulness that posits itself as the source of meaning — that posits itself as a
concrete foundation. “Thus the shaking o f naive meaning is the genesis o f a perspective
on an absolute meaning to which, however, humans are not marginal, on condition that
humans are prepared to give up the hope of a directly given meaning and to accept
meaning as a way.”31 This is, Pato£ka maintains, an approach to meaning that is both
more demanding and more free than its dogmatically certain alternatives. It also
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provides, he argues further, evidence of the inherent connection between philosophy and 
politics.
Meaning, Politics, and Conflict
The debate over foundationalism in theories of politics and ethics can be reduced 
to a simple question: whether “meaning” is to be understood as entirely relative and 
situational, or, to the contrary, whether there exists a means o f persuasively analyzing 
meaning in human life in such a way that it can be seen to have a source that is not 
relative. Only in the latter case could we speak of meaning, and thus o f values and 
ethics, in a way that transcends the particularities of a specific historical situation. And 
political thought, or political science, inherently requires us to think not solely in terms 
of particularities, but in terms of general principles. It is for this reason that Chvatik 
concludes that Pato£ka’s thought “cannot be a guideline for political action and cannot 
found a political science,” and it is for the very same reason that I disagree with him. It 
is certainly true that Pato£ka’s thought is not suitable as a straightforward guideline for 
political activity; it is not the type of political thought to which one can look for specific 
help in establishing a constitutional order. Yet it is not accurate to insist that it cannot be 
used in establishing a founding set of principles that will act as a guide for a science of 
political order. At the very foundation of any political order must be an understanding 
of human meaning and its limitations. Politics, inasmuch as it is tied to the 
contingencies of historical reality, must ground itself not in visions of absolute meaning 
and grand plans of a society that embodies it, but in a persuasive depiction of the limits
309
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
of human meaning, limits beyond which politics may not trespass in its construction of 
political society.
The conceptual framework set forth in Pato£ka’s work — one grounded in the 
“shaking o f accepted meaning” — leads to a meaningfulness that is demanding but 
appropriate to man’s social being. This human meaningfulness constitutes a form of 
self-understanding that is coincident not only with the origin o f philosophy but also 
with the origin of politics. What Patodka has sought to describe breaks new ground 
analytically and conceptually while appealing to symbolism long established. The 
Czech philosopher does not pretend to uncover a new human experience; rather, the 
experience is a familiar one and the subject of human speculation throughout the ages. 
The radical questioning o f naive meaning, which may be precipitated by a perceived 
loss of meaning, opens the individual up to the possibility o f a “conversion” in the 
Platonic sense. It is the experience of the cave-dweller in Plato’s “Allegory o f the Cave” 
who “turns” from a reality o f shadows to one of truth experienced.32
Yet PatoCka’s work, we should recall, is undertaken in the context o f a 
philosophy of history. The experience in question is precisely that which has been 
described as separating the “prehistoric” mentality from the “historic.” Only in the light 
of a rejection of simply given meaning can human activity take on the character of 
action that is historically continuous with both past and future humankind. The 
character of this activity, as I have stressed, is conducive not only to individual 
self-reflection, it is also conducive to the activity o f politics. Thus it is not coincidental 
that the thematic differentiation o f philosophy in Socrates took place in concert with an
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uncovering o f a science o f politics as a theme in human life. Pato£ka’s work explicitly
stresses this connection just as it implicitly leads, contrary to Chvatik’s conclusion,
toward the illumination o f principles directly relevant to political thought.
It is not only individual life which, if  it passes through the experience of 
loss o f meaning and if it derives from it the possibility and need for a 
wholly different self-relation to all that is, comes to a point o f global 
“conversion.” Perhaps the inmost nature o f that rupture — which we 
sought to define as that which separates the prehistoric epoch from 
history proper -- lies in that shaking o f the naive certainty o f  meaning 
which governs the life o f humankind up to that specific transformation 
which represents a nearly simultaneous — and in a more profound sense 
really unitary — origin o f politics and philosophy.33
The “unitary origin” of politics and philosophy reflects the connectedness of the two
fields. Politics is a mode o f activity in which inheres the possibility to turn philosophy
“into the practice o f life itself.”34
This is not to say, however, that politics as a realm o f activity is to be ceded to
philosophers. It is the insight inherent in philosophy as Pato£ka describes it -- the
understanding o f freedom and problematicity — that he wishes to show is also crucial to
our practice o f the very human and problematic activities proper to the center of the
polis. Patocka wishes to elevate the practice of politics to a level above that of reliance
on slogan, dogma, and distortion, but he does not suggest a philosophical elevation of
politics as a means to a solution o f its problems. To the contrary, rather than elevate
politics to a higher, philosophical plane, he seeks to bring philosophy back down to a
human level. PatoCka is acutely aware that the inconstant nature o f human beings leads
to unpredictability -- an unpredictability that has not been eliminated by the advances of
science and behavioral studies nor would be eliminated if  philosophers were to rule.
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Rather, philosophy must accept the problematic nature o f reality as something with
which it much deal instead o f try to overcome. In just the same way politics must deal
with the problems that arise when humans attempt to live and act on a basis of freedom.
“Just as in acting politically humans expose themselves to the problematic nature of
action whose consequences are unpredictable and whose initiative soon passes into
other hands, so in philosophy humans expose themselves to the problematic being and
meaning o f what there is.”35
As a human endeavor, politics must resist the siren song o f an objective
metaphysics of meaning even as it strives for transcendence. Genuinely political activity
transcends the particularities of present desires or physical needs. In doing so, it opens
itself up to its greatest possibility, the possibility o f becoming historical activity. Such
activity is not arbitrary, it is invested with a meaningfulness that is both human and
transcendental; it is the meaningfulness o f a significant activity that unifies and expands
human possibilities. As Pato£ka describes it:
In the community, the polis, in life dedicated to the polis, in political life, 
humans make room for an autonomous, purely human meaningfulness, 
one of a mutual respect in activity significant for all its participants and 
which is not restricted to the preservation o f physical life but which, 
rather, is a source of a life that transcends itself in the memory o f deed 
guaranteed precisely by the polis. It is in many ways a more risky, 
dangerous life than the vegetative humility on which prehistoric 
humanhood depends.36
Politics is an activity “significant for all its participants” precisely because it is an
activity that transcends itself. With this analysis Pato£ka provides a basis for the
analysis and differentiation of political activity, a means of distinguishing political
activity, activity proper to the polis, from the activities of merely physical life.
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The model o f politics, of the polis, that PatoCka describes is grounded in an 
attitude o f “mutual respect” guaranteed by the willingness o f all participants to risk by 
giving up the security o f naive meaning. Politics in this sense, like philosophy, is a 
matter of struggle. To conceive of it otherwise is to begin to hope for a solution that 
does not require risk, that is given rather than fought for. It is in this sense that Jan 
Patocka, following on the work o f Heidegger, evokes the name o f Heraclitus and his 
symbol of polemos, or conflict, in bringing the Heretical Essays to a close. The spirit o f 
the polis, and thus the spirit o f politics, he argues, is conflict. Although Patodka evokes 
Heraclitus most distinctly in the final pages o f the sixth and last “Heretical” essay, “War 
in the Twentieth Century and the Twentieth Century as War,” this brief discussion does 
not adequately describe his understanding of the concept.37 Polemos is discussed 
analytically and in the context of the polis earlier in the Heretical Essays, in the second 
essay on “The Beginning o f History.”
The institutional model of the polis, Patodka contends, is a place o f human unity 
and possibility that emerges from the insight defining both philosophy and politics. That 
insight is one evoking struggle and problematicity and, in this chapter as throughout the 
Essays, Patocka argues decisively that this struggle is a unifying factor. It binds 
individuals rather than separates them. Polemos is the spirit o f the polis, by which is 
meant not the spirit o f the Greek polis as an historical event, but the spirit o f free 
politics itself. Conflict, for Patodka, binds the activity o f political life to philosophy as 
the struggle against the fall into an acceptance of given meaning. Struggle is a
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presupposition o f life as problematic, and it manifests itself in the political community 
as conflict.
The spirit o f the polis is a spirit o f unity in conflict, in battle. One cannot 
be a citizen — polites — except in a community o f  some against others, 
and the conflict itself gives rise to the tension, the tenor o f the life o f the 
polis, the shape o f the space o f freedom that citizens both offer and deny 
each other ~  offering themselves in seeking support and overcoming 
resistance.38
The conflict of which Patodka speaks is not a destructive force. To perceive it this way
is to misunderstand fundamentally the political intent o f the Heretical Essays.
Polemos, as it is conceived in these essays, is constructive rather than destructive
of community, and it is an appropriate symbol for Patodka’s political thought, one that
stands with no contradiction beside the Socratic theme o f  care for the soul. Conflict is,
for example, the source o f law for it represents the one power that all individuals truly
seeking a just and unified community have in common. In the polis “Polemos is what is
common. Polemos binds together the contending parties, not only because it stands over
them but because in it they are at one. In it there arises the one, unitary power and will
from which alone all laws and constitutions derive, however different they may be.”39
Contrary to popular belief, common beliefs and ideologies passed from one individual
to another do not unite but divide. The unity of a free state is not founded upon ideology
but upon the struggle against its dominance. It is this commitment to struggle and
acceptance of conflict that is the one force to which all parties may equally lay claim.
Conflict and struggle make possible free thought and provide a stronger foundation for
political unity than systems grounded in mere “coalitions o f interests.”
Thus polemos is at the same time that which constitutes the polis and the 
primordial insight that makes philosophy possible. Polemos is not the
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destructive passion o f a wild brigand but is, rather, the creator o f unity.
The unity it founds is more profound than any ephemeral sympathy or 
coalition o f interests; adversaries meet in the shaking of a given meaning, 
and so create a new way o f being human — perhaps the only mode that 
offers hope amid the storm of the world: the unity o f the shaken but 
undaunted.40
With this analysis Patodka effectively ties his appeal o f “Wars of the Twentieth 
Century” — which was directed at his “shaken but undaunted” students — to his overall 
attempt at a philosophy that is inherently political. Thus the dramatic, quasi-Nietzschean 
appeal to a “solidarity o f  the shaken” and the references to war and the insight that 
originates in periods o f  “darkness,” are shown to have a foundation in a more sober, 
broadly political analysis o f conflict and the free polis.41
It is important, in concluding this chapter, to take note of the fact that Pato£ka’s 
use of polemos once again draws from a source in the work o f Heidegger. This is, in 
fact, particularly important given that Heidegger made use o f the concept in a text often 
cited as evidence o f a proclivity toward political absolutism — evidence that Heidegger 
was, in a word, creating a philosophy that led toward the fascism he briefly embraced in 
the 1930s. Heidegger’s analysis o f polemos is found in An Introduction to Metaphysics, 
the series of lectures he delivered in 1935 at the University o f Freiburg.
In contrast to PatoCka’s use of the term, however, there is a difficult ambiguity 
in Heidegger’s writings that results in problems. First o f all, in An Introduction to 
Metaphysics Heidegger does not provide a sufficient analysis o f polemos, and as a result 
leaves a degree o f uncertainty that many are willing to resolve by referring to 
Heidegger’s use of the term Kam pf in his “Rectoral Address” infamous for its evocation 
of National Socialism.42 This, o f course, evokes a second and related problem.
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Heidegger’s discussion o f polemos comes in the context of his nationalistic writings of 
the thirties, making it difficult to disassociate from his ill-fated political involvement. 
Pato£ka’s use of the symbol also had a political context. But in stark contrast to 
Heidegger, it was a context of an unambiguous struggle for truth and freedom, a 
struggle against totalitarianism that was explicit in its rejection o f violence.
Though Pato£ka does not refer to Heidegger in his discussion o f polemos, the 
reference is implicit. Heidegger had written in An Introduction to Metaphysics that 
“Conflict does not split, much less destroy, unity. It constitutes unity....”43 It seems that 
Patocka is taking a Heideggerean insight -- though without citing him — and developing 
it in the direction o f political thought. Interestingly, the argument that has been made 
that if a political theory can be said to exist in Heidegger at all it is to be found centered 
in the brief, largely undeveloped contention that Heraclitian conflict is the source of 
unity in the polis. In a 1981 article on Heidegger and community, Gregory Schufreider 
argues that it is Heidegger’s use o f the notion of polemos that enables him to express the 
formation of unity in the polis without abrogating difference or individualism. He 
writes:
This struggle, which allows opposition while at the same time keeping 
the opponents unified, draws together as it sets apart, joins opponents 
together in their difference, while letting that difference prevail within 
unity. Polemos is, accordingly, thought [of] as a basic trait o f being itself 
in that it unifies into unity what tends apart, and not in such a way that 
difference is annulled, which is why it remains that “hidden harmony”
Heraclitus himself commends as superior (Fragment 54): the covert unity 
o f opponents joining-together in their difference.44
As a trait o f Heidegger’s conception o f being, then, polemos becomes part o f a political
theory, since community is “properly unfolded in a communication o f struggle, a
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unification preserving difference, since we are then considering a community comprised 
of individuals.”45
Though Schufreider states that this notion may point toward a “‘political’ 
philosophy” in Heidegger, he admits that there is “not much to go on” and that this 
certainly should not be construed as an attempt to suggest that Heidegger shows a 
“propensity toward democracy.”46 What I would like to suggest is that Jan PatoCka takes 
a lead from Heidegger’s analysis of polemos but does not follow the German 
philosopher toward a disdain for democracy. To the contrary, Patodka directly applies 
conflict to questions o f democracy by conceiving o f the polis as primarily a political 
unit, rather than the all-encompassing community described by Heidegger.
As a model for politics, the assumption of a freedom and equality among 
citizens at the center o f the polis is the fundamental core o f  what Patodka envisions as a 
democratic state, infused with the insight of freedom and philosophy and accepting 
polemos as an animating and uniting force. This assumption, however, is justified 
through the phenomenological analysis o f PatoCka’s philosophy -- it is not justified by 
appeal to a transcendent ideal acting as a source for our political values. Beyond the 
freedom and human dignity inherent in the human as an ontologically aware being, 
however, there is little in the way of values that can be posited as natural to humanity in 
an ahistorical sense. This is to argue, in other words, that the values that inform our 
political self-organization are, like the political societies in which they exist, products of 
historical action. It makes little sense to speak of human rights based on a principle of 
freedom if the society with which you are concerned is what Pato£ka would term
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“prehistorical,” that is, if  the society does not originate from a thematic understanding 
of freedom as a human possibility.
Politics, particularly the politics o f Western states steeped in the democratic 
tradition, must recognize these limitations if they are to function effectively and 
humanly. It must understand, in sum, that its animating principle is problematicity. For 
democratic politics to seek to eliminate problematicity and conflict is for it to abandon 
freedom.
Conclusion
Pato£ka’s discussion o f the form o f the Greek polis is not conducted in order to 
advocate the details of its institutional structures; his political thought does not attempt 
to analyze competing forms o f government or develop an ideal type o f  institution. The 
question is rather one o f principles. In the movement from a discussion o f Pato£kan 
philosophy to one o f politics, one notion stands out as fundamental to the ground upon 
which a sustainable political life may be built. The notion, inherent in the use of 
polemos as a symbol of a unified democratic community, is roughly as follows: to the 
degree to which a state makes its goal the seeking o f an objectified or systematic 
solution to the problems of social being -- symbolized by Pato£ka in dreams of a “happy 
end” -- it relinquishes its hold on freedom, it ceases to care for its soul.
The goal in terms o f democratic politics has been expressed succinctly by Ivan 
Chvatfk, Pato£ka’s student, who captures the spirit o f Pato£ka’s political thought when 
he concludes that: “The main trait o f a functioning democracy is balance — something 
which should be supported so there will be no more ‘better tomorrows’ in democratic 
societies.”47 The promise o f a “better tomorrow” was something with which
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Czechoslovakia was quite familiar during the years o f communist rule. It was the false 
promise of a future utopianism that served to justify present repression. This is not a 
promise foreign to Western ears, however.
Pato£ka understood with Husserl, better than Husserl, in fact, that the Greek 
notion o f rationality was the guiding principle o f Western life.48 Yet he recognized, as 
Chvatik writes, that rationality is always “the rationality o f finite beings who look at 
problems from particular viewpoints.” While this does not imply relativism, as we have 
seen, it should be clear that it does not permit absolutism, whether in the name of a 
totalitarian or a democratic state. Because rationality is the rationality o f finite beings, 
Chvatik continues, “it is impossible to ultimately reconcile their views, to resolve 
conflicts once and for all. Those who try to do so in the hope of attaining truth, justice 
and prosperity, no matter how deep their beliefs, capitulate to totalitarian traps 
inasmuchas (sic) they have yielded to the will to possess and live happily thereafter.”49 
The dream of producing a “better tomorrow” is the dream o f overcoming 
problematicity. It is the dream of answering the Socratic question and therefore 
equivalent to a project of metaphysical speculation.
In his final completed work, the lengthy essay entitled “On Masaryk’s 
Philosophy of Religion,” Patoika summarizes the nature o f the task before man in terms 
that bring his analysis of meaning together with his views on the polis. He writes:
Man stands in front o f an enormous task: not to reclaim meaning for 
itself, not to pick up the demand for the meaningfiilness o f the universe 
for reasons o f his own advantage, but on the contrary to understand 
himself as a being existing out of meaning and for meaning, living 
therefore, in order for a meaningful world to originate, opening himself 
such that meaning, whose basis “is” outside o f beings, settles and
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increases itself in it (the world). To understand himself as the recipient o f 
an unshakable gift, to which nothing relative is comparable, as a being 
which cannot and may not call for an even happier end after a happy 
beginning, that “happyend” (sic) which philosophy construes from Plato 
to Kant.50
Our task is not to search for meaning that will solve our problems for us, but rather to 
initiate meaning in the world. The result will not be an end to problematicity, however. 
There can be no such end to human striving. Our condition is inescapable. But insofar 
as we work to initiate meaning within the limits o f our humanity, we extend those limits 
incrementally. We become more fully human, we maximize the potential o f our nature, 
if you will, as we open ourselves to possibility via a self-reflective attitude and 
historical activity. The means toward this end, Patodka came to realize in his later 
works, was to understand the nature o f the political unit most conducive to the pursuit 
of human possibility, and to illuminate its principles with the aim, not of a system 
designed to solve the problem of history, but of an institution geared toward truth and 
the initiation o f meaning in human life.
A Critical Perspective 
It is Jan PatoCka’s achievement in philosophy to have offered a vision o f human 
reality that represents, not only an internally consistent philosophy, but also a viable 
alternative to the political theory of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. His work is 
first and foremost a direct response to the primary critique of postmodern thought, that 
is, the critique of the dominance o f “metanarratives,” including all forms o f historical 
determinism. As a student of Heidegger and a victim of Marxism no less should have 
been expected of him. But Pato£ka was also a dedicated student o f Platonic thought. He
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rejected, therefore, the alternative o f a radical relativism o f meaning. PatoCka was an 
anti-foundational philosopher who recognized that philosophy was all about searching 
for foundations. What the philosopher must understand, however, is that his search is 
not for a foundation in the sense of an objective, given form o f knowledge or meaning. 
The philosopher, on the Socratic model, rejects the hope for such knowledge at the 
outset. Thus what he is seeking is a degree o f consistency and a sense of 
meaningfulness, a ground upon which it is possible to construct a polity.
In order to locate this perspective critically, it will be instructive to consider the 
way in which this work is likely to be received by various interests in the field o f  
political theory. Patodka’s work is certainly relevant to all political theorists interested 
in the relation between the care o f the individual soul and the illumination of the being 
of society; it is o f particular relevance, however, to groups within contemporary theory 
who have a direct stake in the questions which PatoCka seeks to answer. Among these 
groups are natural right theorists represented by Leo Strauss and his students, 
continental theorists in the tradition of either Husserlian phenomenology or 
Heideggerean ontology, postmodern liberals represented by Richard Rorty, and 
continental postmodernists represented by Jacques Derrida among others. This list, of 
course, is by no means exhaustive; significant critique could come from within the 
traditions of Marxist thought and liberalism, and both common ground and critique 
could be elicited from the tradition of philosophy o f history, and here I would 
particularly mention the work of Eric Voegelin.51 But in terms o f locating this work 
critically, it will be most useful to place it in it’s most immediate context, that is, the
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context o f theory that directly reflects upon questions o f the ultimate foundations of 
human social being.
For proponents of natural right in politics or for students of Leo Strauss, it is 
likely that this body of work will be judged to have significant shortcomings. Primary 
will be the contention that PatoCka’s work, with its Heideggerean influences, verges on 
historicism, that there is an insufficient commitment to the notion o f an ahistorical, or 
“natural,” sense of right. For PatoCka, human beings and the historical worlds they 
inhabit are wholly original, they are not naturally heirs to a meaning that is passed, 
unchanged, from age to age. A concept of right that does not take account o f history, he 
would argue, is tantamount to a form o f accepted meaning. And Pato£ka is emphatic 
and consistent in arguing that genuine human possibility — and a genuine politics — can 
only emerge to the degree we are willing to shake ourselves free of the grip o f such 
objective or simply given meaning.
Pato£ka is clearly with Strauss, on the other hand, in his rejection o f relativism 
as a solution to the problem o f right.52 Yet whereas Strauss frames the problem in terms 
that are black and white, PatoCka is explicitly interested in exploring the grayness of the 
situation — its problematicity. Strauss writes that “to reject natural right is tantamount to 
saying that all right is positive right, and this means that what is right is determined 
exclusively by the legislators and the courts of the various countries.”53 Patodka rejects 
this way of phrasing the problem; it is not the case that we must choose between 
ahistorical truth or a relativism o f right.54 His work explores a human reality that is too
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contingent and variable to admit to such a dichotomy. Human reality is far more of a 
problem than Western philosophy since Plato has generally been willing to admit.
Besides a challenge from theorists dedicated to solidifying the foundations of 
Western thought, Pato£ka’s work is also subject to a challenge from those who wish to 
abandon foundations altogether. Pato£ka will be unsatisfying to the committed 
anti-foundationalist for his consistent critique of nihilist relativism and his conclusion 
that philosophy correctly — and necessarily — searches for foundations. Indeed, while 
postmodernist thinkers such as Richard Rorty and Jean-Francois Lyotard have argued 
that philosophy in a grand sense is no longer viable, that it can no longer function as a 
means to ground social activity,55 Pato£ka philosophizes in a classic, political style. He 
makes a model o f Socrates and uses the metaphor of “care for the soul” to encapsulate 
his concerns.
Postmodern thinkers, then, will criticize this work for its reliance on classical 
thinking. One could argue that Pato£ka is, despite his “negative” Platonism, still 
something of a Platonist. Jacques Derrida in fact goes further than this, finding in 
Patocka a Christian foundationalism that makes him indistinguishable from a 
traditionally metaphysical thinker. As I indicate in my discussion of Derrida in the 
appendix to this work, however, this reading is unfounded. A more defensible reading, 
and one which contrasts sharply with Derrida’s, is that of Richard Rorty. Rorty, 
interestingly, reads Pato£ka as a true anti-foundationalist. Yet even as he puts Patodka in 
the postmodern tradition, Rorty is troubled by the centrality of Socrates and Plato in the 
story. Pato£ka, he writes, “gave his heroes, Socrates and Plato, too much credit.”56 He is
323
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
too much o f a classical philosopher, too interested in speaking o f the soul, truth, and 
absolute meaning to be welcomed by postmodernism without reservation.
It is in the middle o f the divide between postmodern relativism and approaches 
that stress ahistorical foundations that Patodka can be most directly situated, then. As a 
means to navigate this divide, the Czech philosopher makes use of, first the 
phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, and second, the ontology o f Martin Heidegger. Yet 
as I argued in Chapter Two, students of these two schools will also be prompted to find 
fault with Patodka’s work. He cannot be called a devotee of Husserl or o f Heidegger 
because he is not a true follower o f either one. Patodka does not simply apply the 
methods and assumptions o f  either thinker.
For a phenomenologist, Patodka’s work is insufficiently precise in terms of its 
conceptualizations. Above all it lacks the Husserlian commitment to mathematical rigor; 
when the Czech philosopher describes his work as “phenomenological philosophy,”57 he 
means to say that his hope is not to replace philosophy with phenomenology — Patodka 
does not share the Husserlian goal o f a philosophy that responds to the Cartesian hope 
for “apodicticity” -- but rather to pursue philosophy on grounds informed primarily by 
phenomenological insight. The approach to Heidegger is similar, and thus the 
contemporary Heideggerean thinker will also not find satisfaction. Patodka wishes to 
use Heideggerean insight, to explore the questions o f being and history without seeking 
to definitively answer either one, but within the limits prescribed by attention to the 
“concrete human” in his “corporeal world.” Thus Patodka does not follow Heidegger 
into the depths o f his exploration o f ontological understanding, and he does not hold the
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Heideggerean line in avoiding Platonic symbolism or serious attention to the teaching of 
Socrates. Patodka is also willing to put off the genuine scholar o f  Heidegger by mixing, 
for example, the early Heidegger of Being and Time with the later work on technology 
and the “fourfold” (das Geviert).
Patodka’s work can be characterized in this way: he believed that he was 
carrying on the philosophic enterprise in the wake o f these two thinkers. That is, he was 
taking their insight and developing it in ways that they did not envision, and perhaps 
may not have objected to. Patodka remains a true philosopher in his application of 
Husserl and Heidegger to the Socratic concern for the soul. Ontology, for Patodka, is a 
philosophy o f the soul. It is a philosophy that perceives that “authentic, transcendent 
being” in humans is something different from transient opinion. Following Socrates, 
Patodka situates his ontology, that is, his care for the soul, in the polis. And in this way 
he concludes in the Heretical Essays that “philosophy must be at the same time care for 
the soul (epimeleia tes psuches), ontology and theology — and all that in the care for the 
polis, for the optimal state.”58
With this discussion it is possible to place the work of Jan Patodka on the critical 
map. I have attempted to demonstrate in this study that Patodka’s work presents us with 
a viable, and in many ways preferable, alternative to the approaches I have been 
discussing. No one o f the criticisms I have been laying out is fatal to this philosophy; 
Patodka adequately defends himself against all o f them in the course of his work. In 
addition, he offers a benefit to which none of the other perspectives can attain.
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The political theory o f  Jan Patodka is particularly deserving o f attention for the 
seriousness with which it attempts to illuminate the murky ground between the more 
polarized alternatives on the scene. He has, I have demonstrated, offered an internally 
consistent attempt to solve a primary dilemma of contemporary political thought. He 
has sought to bridge the divide between those seeking to shore up foundations and those 
seeking to tear them down. His work sought a conception o f meaning that on the one 
hand was neither relative nor nihilistic, and on the other did not amount to a new form 
of simple, given meaning or o f “true” knowledge that could be passed from one to 
another instead o f continually achieved in the active pursuit o f human possibility. The 
effect of this work was to demonstrate that the postmodern critique of foundationalism 
and metaphysics does not imply the impossibility o f a coherent and consistent political 
ethics and democratic theory.
Although Patodka’s work is not without its drawbacks, its accomplishments for 
contemporary political theory are evident. He allows the political theorist to speak of 
politics and ethics while remaining faithful to the contemporary insight into human 
historicity, finitude, and contingency. He is, in other words, able to speak o f concepts 
such as justice without either anchoring those concepts to a single metaphysical 
narrative, or to the contrary allowing them to drift among an endless variety of 
particular meanings, thus stripping them of any coherency or power to bind together a 
society in an orderly fashion.
Yet whereas Patodka’s work is an attempt in a positive direction, it is not an 
entirely successful attempt. There are a number of shortcomings that, beyond the points
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of contention mentioned above, will stand in the way o f a positive reception o f this 
work on a large-scale. First, and in direct contrast to the philosopher’s contention that he 
seeks universal elements of human experience, there is a sense that this work is only 
narrowly applicable. Attendant to this criticism is a larger and more significant point for 
Patocka’s reception as a political theorist. This concerns the degree to which, if  taken as 
a model for political action in history, the Patodkan framework may take on the very 
utopian quality of which he is so critical in his analysis of Marx or Enlightenment 
thinkers such as Comte. Both points require some explanation.
Beginning with the first point, it is significant that, in the second o f his Heretical 
Essays, Patodka argues that his work “should not be understood as an idealization of the 
Greek polis''' — this in spite of the fact that he attributes nothing less than “the very 
beginning of history in the proper sense of the word” to the rise o f this institution.59 The 
truth is, however, that Patodka does idealize the polis. He does not, as he explains, 
idealize its historical development — as if it arose suddenly and out o f selfless devotion 
to the common good -- but he does place an inappropriate importance on the event of 
the polis. It is only here, he contends, in this age and in this institution, that humans first 
dare to shake given meaning and accept upon themselves the responsibility and 
understanding that meaning is a product of their living in both concreteness and 
transcendence; it is not a gift bestowed upon them from without. And this is done in 
such a way as to attain “a universal significance.”60
Patodka is, in this way, very much a political theorist, for his analysis locates the 
ontological categories that define humanity -- freedom and the possibility of historical
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action — in the emergence of a political institution. Yet there is a strong sense in which 
this analysis has a reductive quality. When the polis is held up as epitomizing human 
possibilities, it has the effect o f denying these possibilities to individuals or societies not 
lucky enough to exist in the historical wake of Greek civilization.
The aspect of Patodka’s philosophy o f history that most reflects this reductive 
quality — it is the aspect most surely to draw criticism from contemporary academia 
both within the West and without — is its Eurocentric framework. Based on Husserl’s 
work in his Crisis o f  European Sciences, Patodka’s outline o f history makes it an 
entirely European affair. Non-European civilizations, because they did not benefit from 
the Hellenic experience o f the polis, are relegated to the status o f “prehistorical” 
societies. The spirit o f history, Patodka argues, is the spirit o f Europe and its 
descendants.
With this idealization of the Greek polis, not merely as an institutional and 
spiritual model but as an historical event tied to a spirit that is particularly European, 
Patodka eliminates the possibility o f finding experiences in nonwestem cultures that, to 
varying degrees, can be considered equivalent. In doing so he reduces unnecessarily the 
scope of his investigations and closes himself off to possibility. Patodka’s work on the 
polis as a model for freedom and history is o f such significance for political theory that 
it would be unfortunate to see it discounted for its neglect of comparative analysis. 
Patodka is right when he argues that there is something unique about the Western model 
o f politics and philosophy, but he does himself a disservice when he frames his
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investigation in a way that precludes a truly comparative exploration o f  the universality 
of his ontological explanation of history.
It is when the question o f a positive application of this work to concrete political 
reality arises that the second and more serious point becomes impossible to ignore. One 
may argue that, despite the attention paid to problematicity in human life and the 
requirement that the polis never relinquish its grounding in free and equal conflict, it 
remains conceivable that, given a sufficient solidarity of “spiritual people” able to 
understand being and history, the construction o f a perfectly balanced polis may seem to 
be within the realm of possibility. To the extent that Patodka’s work leaves us with this 
hope it leaves us with a view o f political reality that could justly be called utopian. This 
question is in fact brought to the fore when Patodka notes that his model of politics and 
philosophy can have a truly historical effect on Western civilization only at the point 
when we “turn from accidental rule to the rule of those who understand what history is 
about.” If  politics is to succeed it will be because the good, the “shaken” who come 
together in solidarity, can organize a political order around themselves. If this is in fact 
a conclusion to which the Heretical Essays lend themselves then the problem of 
utopianism is quite real.
Political reality, as James Madison pointed out in The Federalist Papers, points 
to an inescapable fallibility in human being. “If men were angels,” he writes, “no 
government would be necessary.”61 This is a fact o f the human condition which, on one 
hand, is implicit in Patodka's work; human being and his involvement with history are 
forever problematic, never ideal. Yet in another light, Patodka seems to neglect this
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reality at the most crucial moment — the moment o f political organization. It is 
inevitable, as Madison points out, that humans will fail to live up to their potential and 
the polis will not long be ruled by a cadre o f Aristotelian spoudaioi or otherwise 
“spiritual” people. This is a pragmatic reality that Patodka’s analysis of being fails to 
take up as it is applied to the realm of politics.
It is in light o f this that the warning o f Ivan Chvatik which I quoted above, to the 
effect that Patodka’s work may not serve as a guideline for political action, is well 
taken. He is correct in pointing out that Patodka’s ontological portrait of human being is 
not suitable as a straightforward guidepost for political activity. Patodka himself was 
clear in demarcating the limits of his thought at the end of his sixth and final Heretical 
Essay. He argued there, in the same breath as he spoke of the special role of those “who 
understand” and who are capable of “conversion” or “m e ta n o ia that his notion of a 
“solidarity of the shaken,” which is a driving force behind his conception of a politics of 
truth, “will not offer positive programs but will speak, like Socrates’ daimonion, in 
warnings and prohibitions.”62 Patodka sees his philosophy as leading to a “spiritual 
authority” that would not propose solutions to everyday problems but would rather 
become the spiritual power that could drive the political world toward the restraint it 
lacks. In doing so, in analyzing the nature o f human being in society and leading the 
reader toward a reappraisal of the foundation upon which his own understanding of 
politics is based, Patodka hopes that his work may help to render impossible the 
pernicious forms o f ideological politics with which we are all too familiar from the 
century just past.
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As I have argued, however, Chvatik is wrong in insisting that a connection 
between this work and a science of political order is impossible to establish. Such a 
connection does exist, but it is not without limitations that must be clearly recognized. 
Patocka’s analysis o f the interrelationship between philosophy and politics leads, on the 
one hand, to principles that could be truly transformative for political theory as they 
persuasively illuminate the character of the ground upon which the very concept of 
politics was built and continues to stand. It is insufficient, on the other hand, as a more 
traditional work of political theory; it cannot replace, but only supplement and act as a 
corrective to theory that aims at the construction o f a framework for concrete activity or 
constitution building. Patodka’s work is directed toward an exploration o f human 
possibility and the effect an understanding o f  our possibility could have on the realm o f 
politics. In focusing on possibility it neglects probability, however, the probability that 
humans will neglect their being, rather than care for it. If  one were to seek, contrary to 
the philosopher’s own advice, to derive a “positive” political program from his work, a 
door would be opened to the danger that an individual o f great conviction might see fit 
to jump the gun, to become so convinced of his own “understanding” that he can see the 
possibility of a just society only in the case that he and his followers undertake to rule 
unequivocally over those who do not understand.
Patodka’s achievement for politics suggests that we focus, not on theory of a 
clearly foundational character, but on the development o f a universal ground for politics 
that rests on a non-foundational ontology, on an understanding o f human being based in 
its possibilities. It may be, in the final analysis, that Czech President Vaclav Havel is
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correct in his contention that a politics o f freedom and democracy will have its most 
universal appeal when it justifies itself, not on foundations such as those implicit to 
either liberal or socialist politics, but on the basis o f an ontological and 
phenomenological understanding o f humanity that rejects abstraction and the pull of 
ideology. As political theory, the work o f Jan Patodka goes a long way in providing this 
kind of understanding.
End Notes
'On (anti)foundationalism as a theme in contemporary thought and its relation to 
political theory, see the essay “What difference does anti-foundationalism make to 
political theory?,” by Michael Brint, William G. Weaver and Meredith Garmon, New 
Literary History 26, no. 2 (Spring 1995) 225-238. The authors note that foundationalism 
as a theme has penetrated numerous academic disciplines and is central to the thought o f 
such figures as Heidegger, Gadamer, Derrida, Richard Rorty, Stanley Fish, and W. V. 
Quine.
2Patodka, Heretical Essays, 38.
3The phrase ‘happy end,’ interestingly, appears in contemporary Czech 
philosophy as a concept. Rather than attempt a translation, the English phrase -- 
sometimes even written as one word, ‘happyend’ — is used in Patodka and elsewhere to 
depict a utopian longing, an eschatological hope. A political lesson o f  Patodka’s 
thought, as Ivan Chvatik has expressed it, must be the realization that democracy should 
abandon the hope for such a ‘happy end,’ recognizing instead that history is ruled by 
struggle and problematicity. Ivan Chvatik, “Solidarity of the Shaken,” 166.
4Richard Rorty, “The Seer of Prague,” 38.
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I0Pato£ka, Heretical Essays, 118.
“Patofika, “Osnova dSjin” (The Pattern of History), in Europe and the 
Post-European Age, 100.
I2Pato£ka, Heretical Essays, 59.
l3Ibid., 61.
uIbid„ 56.
l5O f values, for example, PatoCka writes the following: “values mean nothing 
other than that being is meaningful, and they indicate what ‘gives’ it meaning: truth 
means that beauty is intelligible and accessible to understanding and explanation; 
beauty means that the emergence of being in the human world manifests the mystery of 
being as something perennially enchanting; goodness that the world may include an 
unselfconscious or self-forgotten favor and grace. So it is with the entire infinite variety 
of values that constantly address us,...” Ibid., 55.




20Heiddeger’s analysis of anxiety is helpful here, as is Plato’s Parable o f the 
Cave. They are comparable on at least one level: both entail the possibility or necessity 
of return from a confrontation with a loss of immediate meaning. A new type o f 
meaning, PatoCka argues, emerges from this confrontation. He characterizes that 
meaning as “wonder,” as the discovery that there is being beyond mere beings, albeit 
being that appears as no thing — as nothing. See Ibid., p. 60.
21 Ibid.
-Ibid., 60-61.
23See Appendix, pp. 386-87.
24On the flaws in Derrida’s interpretation see ibid.; on PatoCka’s discussion of 
“absolute” meaning, see Heretical Essays, 75.
25Ivan Chvatik, “Kacifstvi Jana PatoCky v uvahach o krizi Evropy,” A Report for
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the Center for Theoretical Study, CTS-96-02, (January 1996), 11.
“ Ibid.





32See Plato, The Republic, Book VII, 514A-519D.




37Here, we should recall, Patodka is speaking directly to his discouraged 
students, and the Nietzschean tone he adopts does not well reflect the tenor of his 
understanding either of polemos, or of the goal of philosophy in general. See my 




4'Indeed, Patodka’s discussion, in the sixth essay, o f the “great phenomenon of 
fighting for peace” as something akin to an “eschatological” longing can be read as a 
relevant commentary on Nietzsche’s controversial suggestion that we should “love 
peace as a means to new wars — and the short peace more than the long” in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra. Rather than evoking violence, both Patodka and Nietzsche seem to be 
evoking struggle as a means to prevent the atrophy o f the spirit that is most directly to 
blame when totalitarian or fascist movements are able to take hold.
“ Richard Wolin, for example, after condemning Heidegger’s use of the term
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Kam pf in his “Rectoral Address,” concludes that Heidegger’s later explanations of 
Kam pf as polemos amount to “transparent, post fetum  apologetics.” Richard Wolin, The 
Politics o f  Being: the Political Thought o f  Martin Heidegger, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1990) 90.
43Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim, 
(New Haven, Yale University Press, 1959) 62.




47Ivan Chvatik, “Solidarity of the Shaken,” 166.
48Patodka understood that Husserl’s conception of reason, as with his ideal for 
philosophy, was overly determined by his desire to develop a philosophy capable of a 
Cartesian certainty. Patodka therefore pursued a renewal o f a more authentically Greek 
understanding o f reason, centered in his commitment to the differentiation of the 
Platonic symbolism of “care for the soul.”
49Chvatik, “Solidarity of the Shaken,” 166.
50Patodka, “Kolem Masarykovy filosofie nabozenstvi” (On Masaryk’s 
Philosophy o f Religion), in Trl studie o Masarykovi (Three Studies on Masaryk), ed. 
Ivan Chvatik and Pavel Kouba (Prague: Mlada Fronta, 1991),117.
5II consider Eric Voegelin and Jan Patodka to be in many ways on the same page 
in terms of the goals o f their theorizing. This is not to say, however, that Voegelin 
would not find much to criticize in Patodka, and perhaps vice versa. In fact, a detailed 
analysis of the differences in the methodological and historical approaches used by 
these two Central European thinkers in their attempts to illuminate the relationship 
between being or consciousness and history would be o f great value to political theory. 
It would require a major theoretical inquiry, however, beyond both the scope of this 
study and the purpose o f this critical appraisal.
S2“Humans cannot life in the certitude o f meaninglessness” presupposed by 
genuine relativism, Patodka writes. See Heretical Essays, 75.
53Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History, (Chicago: University o f Chicago 
Press, 1953), 2.
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S4Strauss does exhibit, however, some particular affinities with the Patodkan 
approach, nowhere more so than when he characterizes the Socratic vision in terms very 
reminiscent of Patodkan phenomenology. Strauss writes that: “All knowledge, however 
limited or ‘scientific,’ presupposes a horizon, a comprehensive view within which 
knowledge is possible. All understanding presupposes a fundamental awareness of the 
whole: prior to any perception of particular things, the human soul must have had a 
vision of the ideas, a vision o f  the articulated whole.” (Ibid., 125) The images of the 
“horizon” and the “awareness of the whole” prior to the perception o f individual things 
seem to betray a continental, Husserlian influence that is at the heart o f Patodka’s work. 
Yet the development o f a theory of natural right based on a perception o f a horizon o f 
human knowledge, Patodka would claim, is tantamount to offering an answer to the 
Socratic question, which is the question of the whole.
5SThis argument is made by Nancy Fraser and Linda Nicholson in their essay 
“Social Criticism without Philosophy: An encounter between feminism and 
postmodernism,” in Postmodernism: A Reader (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1993), 415-432.
56Richard Rorty, “The Seer of Prague,” 40. See also my discussion o f this essay 
in the Appendix, below, pp. 373-76.
57See footnote 22 in Chapter Three, above.
58Patodka, Heretical Essays, 104.
59Ibid., 40-41.
“ Ibid., 41.
61 Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed. 
Clinton Rossiter (New York: Penguin Books, 1961), 322.
“ Patodka, Heretical Essays, 135. See also Chapter Five, above, pp. 249-50.
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APPENDIX 
A REVIEW  OF THE LITERATURE
The philosopher Jan Pato£ka remains a relatively unknown figure in academic 
circles in the English-speaking world — nowhere more so than in the United States. His 
name and work is most often mentioned in relation to Vaclav Havel, the Czech 
president who has often invoked the late philosopher in his writings. Although 
Patocka’s work is crucial to an understanding of Havel’s self-described “antipolitical” 
approach to politics,1 it has not been examined in great detail or with sufficient 
coherence by students o f political thought in the West. The studies that do exist are 
varied, yet they share a common trait: they tend to dismiss the validity o f PatoCka’s 
attempt at resuscitating the insights o f the ancient Greek world via the approach o f 
twentieth century phenomenology and ontology. Rather than analyzing and judging this 
attempt on its own merits, the preferred approach in the literature is to tie Patodkan 
philosophy to one or another stream of already-established philosophical thought, this 
even though, to sustain such an interpretation, it is necessary to argue that he is 
inconsistent, that he switches back and forth between different modes o f thought. These 
interpretive efforts do not do justice to Patodka’s work; they fail to deal with the 
philosopher’s intention, which is to synthetically analyze various modes of philosophy 
that share, not a single method, but rather a common insight into human reality. The 
result is a philosophy that implicitly resists categorization; its goal is not methodological 
consistency but truth, the truth o f human social and political being that is a factor o f our 
ability and willingness to accept and to understand our reality.
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The primary problem behind the paucity o f thoughtful, considered literature on 
PatoCka relates first o f  all to the lack o f availability o f his work, particularly in English 
translation. Having spend most of his working life as an “unsuitable” philosopher under 
fascist or communist governments, Jan Pato£ka was unable to pursue his career at the 
university in Prague, let alone publish his philosophical work free o f censorship. Many 
of the writings available today exist only through the efforts of his students, who 
painstakingly (and illegally) collected, transcribed and catalogued his texts and lectures. 
It is a consequence o f communist censorship that there exists relatively little o f his work 
in published form, even in the original Czech. While great strides have been made since 
the 1989 “Velvet Revolution” toward publishing his corpus in his native language as 
well as in French and German, it is only very recently that we have seen small steps 
towards a presentation o f his work to the English-speaking public.2 Without doubt, the 
lack of a compendium of Patodka’s works in English is the major factor behind the 
relative absence o f a critical literature on the Czech philosopher. One aim o f this work is 
to begin to make up for this shortcoming.
Yet another reason for the marginal status of PatoCka’s thought, however, may 
have to do with the nature of one of the first o f Patodka’s texts to appear in English. 
“Wars of the Twentieth Century and the Twentieth Century as War,” the last of the 
Heretical Essays in the Philosophy o f  History, was first published in English translation 
as a separate article, without the other five essays and accompanying writings that form 
its context, by the journal Telos, in 1976. The language o f this essay, often reminiscent 
of the later Heidegger, is full o f  symbolism designed to shock the reader and to 
encourage a continuation o f the struggle of those dissidents already buffeted by the
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shock of life under Czechoslovak totalitarianism in the 1970s. It’s evocation o f the 
concept of polemos as the Heraclitian “father o f all” and its citation o f the work of Ernst 
Jlinger, for example, have led readers to the erroneous conclusion that Patodka, 
despondent over the crushed hopes o f the Prague Spring, had turned away from his 
earlier, Socratic convictions and towards a reactionary, Nietzschean call to irrationalism 
and war.3 The reception o f  this article in the West, which was conditioned by it’s being 
published independently o f the texts which form its context, seems to have also 
contributed to the lack o f serious consideration o f Patodka’s work by political 
philosophy.
The paucity of published material is not the only problem that faces an 
interpreter o f Patodka’s work, however. Patodka is a complex philosopher whose texts 
present something o f a minefield for analysts unfamiliar with the phenomenological and 
historical context in which he writes, or simply unwilling to consider his arguments on 
their own terms. The result, even among those with access to a sizable selection of his 
texts, is inconsistent and inaccurate interpretation. As I will demonstrate, the existing 
literature either fails to appreciate or implicitly rejects Patodka’s primary goal -- that of 
outlining an approach to philosophy that rejects the metaphysical trap o f assuming a 
concrete, “given” foundation for human life and knowledge, yet without succumbing to 
an anti-foundational nihilism or rejection of all grounds for ethics in politics. The Czech 
philosopher’s critics by and large pass over this goal and interpret him instead in terms 
of the standard categories o f Western thought.
Patodka’s work does not conform to the categorizations o f contemporary 
philosophy, however, it in fact directly challenges them. Patodka’s thought engenders
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disagreement as to its status as classical or postmodern, conservative or radical, Platonic 
or Heideggerean. Most contemporary analysts, having decided upon their own 
preferences in terms o f these dichotomies and others, interpret Patodka accordingly.
This very act, however, betrays the essence o f Patodka’s philosophical project: while 
the Czech thinker consciously remains open to the validity of certain insights offered by 
a variety of philosophical schools or periods, yet he is uncompromisingly determined 
not to fall prey to the temptation o f adopting the rigid outlines and limiting assumptions 
which define a school or an “-ism.”
In attempting to place him within a particular tradition, Patodka’s interpreters are 
providing him with a philosophical foundation, depicting him as, for example, a 
“Masarykan humanist” or, alternately, an anti-foundationalist in the postmodern 
tradition. The theme o f a foundation is indeed at the center of Patodka’s work. It is 
crucial to his political philosophy, for it concerns the basic understanding upon which 
the construction of community can take place. Tracing this theme through the literature, 
however, it is evident that there is little or no agreement as to the philosophical ground 
of Patocka’s thought, if  in fact one exists. Rather, one finds directly contradictory 
arguments and interpretations that need to be sorted out and themselves clarified.
To the extent that Patodka is known in the academic world o f the West, it is 
primarily for two things: first, he is recognized to have been a phenomenologist of the 
first rank, a student o f Husserl’s and Heidegger’s and an interpreter o f the divide 
between them.4 Second, he is remembered as a dissident who paid a Socratic price for 
his involvement with politics, as the premier Czech philosopher of this century who 
inspired dissident thought in communist Czechoslovakia and himself became a
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spokesman, late in life, for the dissident human rights movement Charter 77.5 The two 
most ambitious examples o f analysis and interpretation o f Patodka’s work in English 
focus primarily on these points and, in doing so, fail to deal directly with the broader 
and more significant issue o f Patodka’s critical perspective on the question o f a 
foundation for life in community, in the polls. Erazim Kohak and Aviezer Tucker have 
both written a significant amount of material on Jan Patodka ~  the philosophical 
biography o f the former still remains the primary source for readers o f English seeking 
an introduction to Patodka’s thought. Other significant, but shorter, works of 
interpretation, such as Jacques Derrida’s The Gift o f  Death, which appeared in English 
in 1995, and a short article by Richard Rorty, do focus more specifically on the question 
of foundations, with Derrida arguing that Patodka presupposes a fundamentally religious 
foundation, but Rorty concluding to the contrary that the Czech philosopher’s stance is 
fundamentally anti-foundational.6 Before proceeding to these “postmodern” 
perspectives, a closer look at the work o f Kohak and Tucker is required.
Erazim KohAk
Without the dedication and commitment o f Erazim Kohak, it is fair to say, 
Patodka would continue to be practically unknown in the English-speaking world. As a 
Czech emigre and professor at Boston University, Kohak translated and published the 
vast majority o f the works which we now have in English. A phenomenologist o f  some 
renown himself, Kohak has also written extensively about Patodka as one o f the most 
significant o f the successors of Edmund Husserl.7 Kohak’s “Jan Patodka: A 
Philosophical Biography,” with which he introduces his published collection of
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Patocka's selected writings, remains the major example o f interpretive work on the 
Czech philosopher in English. It is a broad and thorough overview and interpretation of 
Patodka as a philosopher, and required reading for anyone hoping to become familiar 
with his philosophy and bibliography. As an interpretive essay, however, it is not 
without its shortcomings.
Primarily, Kohak views Patodka as a Czech thinker in the tradition of “Czech 
moral humanism,” a tradition in which Edmund “Husserl, a friend and fellow-student of 
[philosopher and first Czechoslovak president T.G.] Masaryk’s, was also rooted.”8 
Beyond Masaryk and Husserl, this tradition extends back through the figure of 
Comenius (Jan Amos Komensky), 1592-1670, the Czech philosopher and contemporary 
of Descartes’ known to the Western world primarily for his pedagogical teachings. 
While Patodka did write extensively about both Comenius and Masaryk — he spent 
more than a decade doing archival work in the Masaryk Institute and Comenius Archive 
while barred from University teaching by the communists — and certainly appreciated 
the moral orientation of their philosophies, it does not follow that he fits into a 
“tradition” bounded by these two great figures. Kohak brings to his interpretation o f 
Patocka a strong feeling for Christian humanism, a strong sense that the “moral 
maturity” of T.G. Masaryk and the harmony with the world o f Comenius, grounded in 
love and blending a Protestant faith in God with an Enlightenment belief in humanity, is 
the appropriate response to the “crisis” o f modem man described by Husserl in his later 
writings. While it was in fact this sense of a crisis that helped propel the young Patodka
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into his academic vocation, it is a mischaracterization o f his philosophical response to 
the situation to view it as a step in the path of Czech moral humanism.
Kohak’s presentation of Patodka also presents a problem in terms of a more 
substantive bias. Kohak is a phenomenologist, making him eminently qualified to 
analyze Patodka’s work. Yet, in his (nearly-exclusive) focus on the phenomenological 
elements of this work and his stress on its potential application toward a renewal of 
moral humanism in the world, Kohak neglects and misconstrues the centrality o f a 
concept of politics in Patodka’s work. Not only is the political aspect of Patodka’s 
thought downplayed, it is explicitly denied a place o f significance. “Jan Patodka, after 
all,” writes Kohak, “had never been.. .a political philosopher.”9 In his defense, however, 
it seems clear that Kohak here conceives of political philosophy along the lines o f 
philosophy that has been subordinated to mundane, political considerations. Understood 
in this way, politics and the organization of the polis would certainly not be in the same 
category with the philosophical quest of the individual towards greater understanding -- 
but this is not the way in which Jan Patodka understands politics. For Patodka, the 
political and the philosophical are inextricably intertwined — the polis is the home o f 
philosophy and its raison d ’etre is politics. Politics is “the realm of the discovery of 
freedom and the ground of truth.”10 It is the activity via which philosophy and freedom 
are made actual. In reflecting this understanding, Patodka’s overall project most 
certainly falls within the realm of political philosophy. These two elements are primary 
shortcomings in Kohak’s philosophical biography, which is otherwise a complete and 
coherent presentation deserving of consideration.
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Erazim Kohak prefaces his philosophical biography by describing what he sees 
as “the basic tension underlying modernity”: the tension between two contradictory 
traditions and conceptions o f reality." In the Enlightenment tradition, to which Edmund 
Husserl belongs, reality is understood as familiar and accessible to understanding; the 
contending tradition, which he “superficially” designates as romanticism and associates 
with Martin Heidegger, finds reality to be essentially other, alien and exceeding all 
understanding.12 Only in the context of medieval Christianity, o f a God who allows for 
an intelligible world yet is himself radically beyond understanding, could both forms o f 
understanding coexist, suggests Kohak. In the modem world, after the death o f God, 
they can only contradict. Jan Patodka, as student and interpreter o f both Husserl and 
Heidegger, has a foot in each tradition, Kohak argues, and he seeks to bridge the chasm 
beneath his feet.
Kohak presents this dichotomy in order to delineate two “basic insights,” two 
modes of perceiving reality that are “irreducible yet irreconcilable.”13 Patodka, he 
argues, moves between these two poles, seeking to synthesize them; his interpretation of 
Husserl and Heidegger forms the context o f this synthesis. For Kohak, Patodka is most 
properly understood as situated somewhere in-between these poles, primarily oriented 
towards the Husserlian understanding but also influenced (to different degrees in 
different historical circumstances) by the Heideggerean ontological critique. The use of 
Heideggerean, rather than Husserlian language represents a “shift” in Patodka’s work 
that for Kohak is essentially a movement away from the Husserlian Enlightenment pole, 
which Kohak prefers, and towards the Heideggerean.
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Kohak is convinced that his dichotomy is appropriate and that its two poles are 
not reconcilable; and so he suggests that religion, conceived so as to allow room for an 
understandable world but a radically transcendent God, may provide the answer (a 
theme to which I will return shortly). Although the basis o f this description of a tension 
underlying modem thought — a tension between a conception o f reality as 
fundamentally comprehensible and one that sees in it only a nihilistic absence of 
meaning — is relevant, and his argument that Patodka is o f fundamental importance as 
the “interpreter of the dialogue between Husserl and Heidegger” is quite correct, it is not 
the case that Patodka himself would describe Husserl and Heidegger as representative of 
the two poles. The former pole, dominant in Western philosophy for two millennia, is 
exemplified not only by Enlightenment humanism but also, and more emphatically, by 
metaphysical constructions that posit a transcendental source o f meaning that is 
objectively comprehensible, as in certain formulations o f the concept o f a divine Being. 
The latter pole is most commonly represented in Patodka’s writings by the nihilistic 
prescriptions put forth by Nietzsche. Husserl and Heidegger, though they may err on 
either side of this dichotomy, represent for Patodka affirmative responses to the 
presence o f this tension; they do not stand for the two poles themselves. The most 
insightful response to this problem that Patodka identifies, however, is not modem at 
all. It is rather the response symbolized by Socrates. Thus Patodka’s work, particularly 
in regard to politics and the polis, focuses on this ancient view o f reality and the way in 
which it has been progressively distorted, as much if  not more than it focuses on the 
distinctions between Husserl and Heidegger. Patodka would remind us that philosophy
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is inherently historical, and it was in ancient Greece — most specifically in the figure of 
Plato’s Socrates ~  that the groundwork for an authentic perception o f reality was laid.
Thus for Patocka there exists primarily a dichotomy between thought which 
surrenders its freedom to the surety o f metaphysics, and so betrays the insight of 
Socrates at its core, and modem nihilistic reactions to the dominance o f metaphysics 
which entirely reject it, thus similarly misconstruing reality by refusing to consider the 
validity of the experiential essence o f metaphysics that Patodka would like to 
resuscitate. Husserl and Heidegger represent alternatives to that dichotomy (each valid
to some degree though neither entirely successful), they do not represent the dichotomy 
itself. So while Patodka does indeed interpret the dialogue between these two thinkers, 
in this Kohak is correct, I believe it to be less than faithful to the spirit o f Patodka’s 
thought to focus primarily on this modem division. It is not Patodka’s goal to simply 
find a way to bridge Husserl and Heidegger; his goal is a greater one ~  to renew in both 
philosophy and politics an insight uncovered in antiquity by approaching it with the aid 
o f contemporary phenomenological method, in its Husserlian and its Heideggerean 
varieties.
Kohak correctly locates the motive force behind Patodka’s early philosophy in 
the work of Edmund Husserl, particularly his work on the Crisis o f  European Sciences 
and Transcendental Phenomenology.1* The perception o f a crisis in Western 
rationalism, also an important theme in the philosophy o f T.G. Masaryk, is central to 
Husserl’s philosophy -- especially so in his later period when the young Jan Patodka is 
one of his closest and most dedicated students.15 The crisis itself, Kohak explains, is
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essentially the failure o f “science, the most refined form o f Western reason,” to lead to 
moral growth in Western humanity.16 The task of Western philosophy o f the last 
century, he continues, is to understand why this has occurred. In a variation on the 
fundamental dichotomy of modem thought that he presented in the preface to his 
philosophical biography, Kohak groups the historical responses to this problem into two 
categories: the superficial and the structural. The superficial responses refer to those 
schools of thought that still expect moral growth to come. Here one finds both Classical 
Marxism, ever faithful to the goals of the revolution, and, surprisingly, Classical 
liberalism, which “attributes the failure to a failure o f nerve and will.”17 On the other 
side of the coin, those who respond structurally find the fault lying in Western 
rationalism itself. Here are the Romantics, running the gamut from the positive in 
Tolstoy to the negative in Nietzsche — the central stream being a critique of rationalism 
and technological reasoning.18
As Kohak reads him, Edmund Husserl’s diagnosis provides the possibility o f an 
alternative, one that remains on the side o f rationality, but attempts to renew in it a sense 
of humanity and a facility for moral judgment. It is at this point that Patocka takes up 
the task begun by Husserl in his Crisis. Erazim Kohak’s description of this progression, 
and his interpretation of Jan Patodka, point towards his own preference for a humanistic 
solution to the dilemma he has outlined. This implicit preference in Kohak’s 
interpretation is exemplified in three points that distinguish his approach: first is his 
conclusion that Patodka is the philosophical heir of Husserl and Masaryk (as well as o f 
Comenius) and thus innately connected to their Enlightenment humanism, second is the
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substance o f his criticism of Patodka as inconsistent, as moving back and forth between 
embracing the world and reacting against it, and third is his explicit suggestion that the 
best source for a philosophical solution to the problem, with which Patodka’s work 
would be compatible, may be Christianity (this despite Patodka’s analysis o f religion 
which cites its shortcomings in relation to philosophy.) It is on these points that the 
interpretive work o f Erazim Kohak is at its weakest, often contradicting clear textual 
evidence.
In analyzing Patodka, in judging his alternating focus on Husserl and Heidegger, 
his use of language that seems at one point hopeful and humanistic, at another dark and 
foreboding, Kohak concludes that the Czech philosopher is, in the end and throughout, 
most consistently a thinker in the mold o f Husserl and T.G. Masaryk. As he puts it:
. Though in the course of his philosophical career Patodka was to deal 
intensively with Plato, with Aristotle and his heirs, with Comenius,
Herder, Kant, Hegel, and especially Heidegger, as well as with numerous 
other thinkers, he remained throughout a critical heir o f Husserl — and of 
Masaryk, two men who, for all their differences, were, as Husserl 
recognized at the end o f his life, rooted in the same philosophical 
tradition.19
This is the tradition o f “Czech moral humanism” to which the Moravian-born Husserl 
belonged, according to Kohak, along with Masaryk. It appears most clearly in Masaryk, 
with his stress on moral maturity through education and religious faith. In Husserl, 
Kohak sees a corresponding attempt to rescue rationality, to reintroduce to it a respect 
for value-judgments and a potential for human growth.
Kohak does make clear, it should be noted, that it would be a  mistake to reduce 
Patodka entirely to this or its opposite pole; he is neither simply a Husserlian nor a
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Heideggerean thinker, but one who is genuinely heir to both.20 Kohak is quite correct, 
here, yet in his analysis, Patodka is described not as staking out a genuinely independent 
position, distinct from the conclusions o f the two German thinkers, but as being a 
thinker of two “strands,” one more Husserlian and one with a more Heideggerean 
persona. The latter strand surfaces, according to Kohak, during historical periods of 
discouragement and hopelessness, such as in the darkest days o f Czechoslovak 
communist “normalization” in the 1970s. Yet “if we consider Patodka’s work as a 
whole,” Kohak concludes, “it is definitely the ‘Husserlian’ strand that is more consistent 
and dominant.”21 It is also his implicit conclusion that the Husserlian strand is 
preferable.
Kohak considers Patodka, therefore, to be o f two minds, a charge which a full 
consideration of Patodka’s philosophy will show to be unwarranted. Kohak’s conclusion 
is reflected in the major criticism that he levels against the Czech philosopher’s corpus 
as a whole: that there occurs an unfortunate “shift” in both Patodka’s idiom and, more 
importantly, in his perception of reality, his perception “o f the context of human 
striving.”22 The notion that there is a shift, a “pronounced discontinuity in Patodka’s 
thought,” is meant to explain the perceived difference between Patodka’s stress on 
caring for the soul, living in truth and other ethical concepts, and his striking words in, 
for example, the last o f his Heretical Essays in which he subordinates the symbol of 
“the day” to that o f “night” and speaks of Heraclitus’s polemos, often translated as 
“war,” as the father o f all.23 In these later writings, according to Kohak, Patodka’s 
perception o f reality has been altered or conditioned by the vicissitudes o f the
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totalitarian situation in which he exists. Whereas he once perceived our human context, 
the world, to be supportive of human moral conduct, in the periods o f strife he altered 
his perception o f the world, coming to see it as “hostile to human efforts,” and “alien.”24 
This points to the conclusion that there effectively exist two Patodkas, one a Husserlian 
or Masarykan humanist (whose thought is but a step away from a Christian solution), 
and a second, who has seen his hopes for moral advancement crushed and has turned to 
a more pessimistic and Heideggerean reading of being in stark contrast to his earlier 
work. Such a reading, however, is flawed. Above all, it does not accord with Patodka’s 
overall body o f work, which is on the one hand inherently wary of the metaphysical 
content o f “Enlightenment humanism” and on the other firmly insistent that elements of 
Heideggerean insight and symbolism are not incompatible with a goal of moral 
comportment.
To be fair, Kohak is clear in stating that he finds a broad consistency in 
Patocka’s writings, locating it in the philosopher’s understanding o f the “goals” of 
human striving, thought not in his perception o f the context of that striving. He, for 
example, defends Patodka against the misinterpretation of those who find in the later 
writings a one hundred and eighty degree turn away from moral humanism and would 
accuse Patodka of becoming “a splenetic ultrarightist, glorying in orgiastic visions of 
war,” a tragically erroneous interpretation which Kohak attributes only to “a number of 
Western readers, including Czech readers living in the West.”25 And yet Kohak’s 
reading shares something in common with these readers’ — the perception that 
Patodka’s later, political writings are less a part of his true philosophy than a
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consolatory reaction written for his students, a striking out against the injustice of the 
historical situation in which he found himself. Kohak’s attempt to defend the later 
writings on this point is muted somewhat by this similarity.
Kohak’s wish to see in Patodka a humanist o f Masarykan dimensions, that is, a 
humanist with a basic sense of the transcendental origin o f human values, comes into 
conflict most directly with Patodka’s Heretical Essays. With these late texts it becomes 
impossible to interpret Patocka as a thinker intent on grounding human society on a 
shared faith, a universal understanding, or a common set of morals determined for us by 
a presence greater than our own. Their content treats freedom as a struggle, as an 
acceptance o f the possibility that enlightenment may come from out o f the darkness and 
not from the day. As Kohak notes, Patodka often speaks o f freedom as a struggle against 
the world; from this he assumes that, for Patodka, the world, the “other,” is necessarily 
“radically alien.”26 Here we have the core of Kohak’s problem with Patodka’s 
philosophy -- it’s conception o f human life as struggle, rather than as harmony. Simply 
put, Kohak’s phenomenology o f the subject’s encounter with other humans and with the 
world -- combined, his preferences suggest, with a degree o f religious faith — leads him 
to the conclusion that love and harmony have an ontological primacy over struggle.27 
Patodka’s invocation o f phenomenology as justification for the primacy o f struggle in 
human life is unwarranted; though not illegitimate, it cannot be claimed to be “an 
eidetically necessary result” of a phenomenology based on experience o f the other,” 
Kohak argues.28
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How then, does Patodka come to such conclusions? According to Erazim Kohak, 
the answer is historical. As I have noted, Kohak finds in most o f Patodka’s work a 
“vindication o f Husserl’s — and Masaryk’s — Enlightenment humanism.”29 Yet this 
“vindication” is not bom out in Patodka’s work because the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 effectively crushed all existing hope. With the loss of hope and 
the onset o f depression, Kohak argues that Patodka assumed the role o f consoler for his 
discouraged students: the Heretical Essays, with its invocation ofpolemos, “follows the 
ageless strategy o f all consolatory writings, giving up all worldly hope and calling up 
internal sources of strength.”30 Though Kohak does not explicitly doubt the sincerity o f 
these writings, he implies that they represent a calculated response to a situation, rather 
than the truly reflective work of Patodka’s other writings. Thus historical circumstances 
bring out in Patodka a more Heideggerean idiom, one that, though Kohak must admit is 
irreducibly present in the texts, is not genuinely reflective o f the lifelong project o f the 
Czech philosopher.
This critique is interpretive, it draws less from clear evidence in the texts 
themselves than from Kohak’s own preference for the idiom o f those works of 
Patodka’s that are more compatible on the surface with a Christian humanism. Although 
Patodka does express admiration for certain aspects and goals o f the Christian 
worldview, he cannot embrace its dogmatic tenants and, when he turns from an implicit 
to an explicit exhortation o f struggle, Kohak is clearly disappointed. He in fact seems to 
be urging Patodka, or at least the reader, to “discover Being, in love rather than in 
strife.” “[W]hy not the religious option?” he asks elsewhere, as a means to resolve the
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dilemma o f a world simultaneously accessible to understanding and yet undeniably 
possessed of something that exceeds it.31
Grudgingly, Kohak recognizes that Patocka was not a believer, and that his 
reasons for this stance were fundamentally philosophical. Without rejecting Christianity 
out of hand, Patodka resisted what he saw as a temptation to abandon philosophy for 
faith in the solidity o f a divine Being. Instead, he sought to answer the dilemma by 
means of rigorous reflection, by philosophical means. He sought access to a 
foundational understanding of humanity, meaning an understanding that was coherent 
enough to serve as a ground for a morality resistant to nihilistic relativism. This 
understanding, however, was to be no solid foundation in itself, it could not be a final 
crutch upon which man could lean and which man could simply accept unquestioningly 
-- no such foundation exists in human life, Patodka firmly insisted.
Erazim Kohak’s approach to Patodka is philosophical, but it is not political. It is 
worth asking, and is itself quite revealing, whether it would be possible to found a truly 
democratic, nonhierarchical politics upon mutual love without struggle. His 
understanding of the “context of human striving,” as Kohak calls it, denotes a crucial 
element o f competition in the free relations o f the polis. The freedom that defines the 
polis is precisely freedom from simple or naive understandings of the human condition 
-- understandings that have been at the heart o f Western politics since the inception of 
metaphysics. Patodka’s critique o f Masaryk stems from the fact that Masaryk’s 
philosophy (and politics) is founded upon such a metaphysics. For Masaryk, 
“Democracy is not only a state form, but that theistic metaphysics which responds to the
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moral nature o f human reality.”32 As such it is hampered by the lack o f “independent 
philosophical thinking,” meaning thinking able to free itself from dependence on 
assumptions that, whether positivistic or religious, rest on metaphysical foundations. 
Kohak’s interpretive work is, in the end, subject to the same critique as that leveled 
against Masaryk. It seeks to rest on a metaphysical foundation to secure its deepest 
convictions and goals. Patodka’s approach to philosophy is broader Kohak depicts it to 
be. His search examined life in community and history as much as it did the 
phenomenological aspects of the relationship between subject and object or subject and 
“other.” It embraced all o f these aspects, and an effective analysis o f his work must do 
likewise.
Aviezer Tucker
As noted above, Aviezer Tucker’s approach to Patodka’s work suffers from a 
similar shortcoming as Kohak’s -- it seeks to find in Patodka’s thought something that is 
not present, in this case, a conception o f truth encompassing a concrete set of ethics and 
human rights upon which to base politics. Though his focus is primarily on Patodka as 
dissident and Charter 77 activist, Tucker attempts to read Patodka’s and Havel’s texts 
for their insight into a discussion on “the relationship between philosophy and politics 
generally, and concretely on the relationship between phenomenology and its moral and 
political consequences.”33 Tucker’s work on this topic consists o f a number of articles 
on both Patodka and Havel, as well as on the Czech intellectual scene in general. Much 
of this is contained in a book published in Czech translation and entitled: 
Phenomenology and Politics: From J. Patocka to V Havel. The focus o f this book is
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Charter 77, the human rights document published by the then-dissidents Havel, Patodka 
and Jin Hayek. It is the question of human rights, or o f ethics generally, as a necessary 
consequence o f political philosophy that most captures Tucker’s attention. This question 
colors Tucker’s interpretation o f Patodka, leading him to praise the Czech thinker as a 
humanist for those parts o f his oeuvre that lend support to ethics, and damn him as a 
reactionary for those parts (such as the later Heretical Essays) that seem to abandon 
ethics for a form o f Heideggereanism.
Interestingly (but inaccurately), Tucker is even more convinced than Kohak of 
the inconsistency o f Patodka’s work; even more than Kohak he sets up Patodka’s 
Heideggerean work as a straw man against which to contrast the normatively superior 
humanistic or Platonic work. He also comes to the conclusion that historical 
circumstances account for the variation in the material, claiming that the 
disappointments o f the Communist era produced drastic changes in the substance and 
content of his writings, thus explaining the texts that seem less than Platonic. This 
interpretation essentially denies the validity o f Patodka’s attempt to draw upon both 
ancient and modem, both Plato and Heidegger in an effort at understanding the human 
condition by making use of the insights of both while avoiding the shortcomings of 
either. Tucker, consistently with other interpreters, would focus upon one strand in 
Patodka’s thought while criticizing that which might conflict with it -- this in lieu o f the 
more challenging course o f examining the professed project on its own terms.
In the introduction to his book, Tucker accurately notes that the interpreters of 
Vaclav Havel tend to read the Czech president in line with their own philosophical
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predispositions. In other words, he accuses them o f lacking objectivity, of making Havel 
into something he is not, something predetermined by their own partialities and 
intellectual biases. Tucker is quite correct in this analysis; unfortunately, he succumbs to 
the same temptation in his reading o f Jan Patodka. Tucker reads Pato£ka as a dissident 
and human rights activist, seeking in his work a firm foundation for the rights and 
morals associated with Charter 77, Patocka’s single explicit venture into the realm of 
dissident political action. Tucker looks for an “anchor” in the Czech philosopher’s 
position, a solid grounding for ethics and rights upon which one could found political 
society without ambiguity. Yet Patodka’s philosophy, at its core and consistently 
throughout, rejects the vision o f an anchored existence, preferring to understand man as 
a free being who lives authentically when he accepts a “life without an anchor.”34 
Tucker is o f course not oblivious to the evidence in Patodka’s work that points away 
from his preferred interpretation. It is true that Patodka’s writings indeed vary greatly in 
tone and content; the relative influence of Heidegger, e.g., is clearly present more in 
some texts than in others. Yet it is a mistake to conclude, as Tucker does, that Pato£ka is 
somewhat schizophrenic, having two distinct personas: one Platonic, humanist and 
supportive of human rights, and the other Heideggerean and reactionary, with a more 
relativistic perspective on ethics.
Tucker’s book is most impressive when it focuses on the concrete philosophical 
links between PatoCka’s texts and those of Husserl and Heidegger.35 Tucker notes 
specific sections in Heidegger’s Being and Time as well as in Husserl’s work, where 
particular Pato£kan concepts have their origin.36 This analysis helps clarify, for example,
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the degree to which Patodka’s use o f the metaphors o f “earth” and “sky” draw upon the 
similar use o f such metaphors in Husserl and Heidegger, and the degree to which 
Patocka makes them his own by also using them poetically, rather than strictly 
phenomenologically. In fact, as Tucker notes, it is not entirely clear “where Patodka uses 
‘the earth’ as a poetic metaphor, and where it is a given phenomenon.”37
In Tucker’s analysis, it is Plato and Heidegger that form the two essential poles 
of Patocka’s philosophy. This is, o f course, in contrast to Kohak, who reads Patocka in 
modem terms, as a thinker primarily trying to bridge the gap between Husserl and 
Heidegger. For Tucker, the modem pole of Patodka’s thought is clearly dominated by 
Heidegger over Husserl. In light o f this, Tucker’s work is valuable as it points out, e.g., 
the relationship between “care for the soul” and “care” (Sorge), and “ living in truth” and 
“Being-in-truth” in Patoika and Heidegger, respectively. He argues, almost without 
exception, that Pato£ka uses the terms differently than did Heidegger. “Patodka’s ‘care 
for the soul,”’ for example, “stresses the importance of recognizing finitude, but 
otherwise bears little resemblance to Heidegger’s ‘care.’ It is much closer to Socrates’ 
than to Heidegger....”38
Although Tucker’s work is helpful in discussing these links, his evident 
antipathy for Heidegger detracts somewhat from any sense of objectivity. A 
considerable amount o f time is spent repeating the arguments o f Wolin, et al., to the 
effect that Heidegger’s philosophy has an inherent connection to National Socialism.39 
At one point, though perhaps not without irony, Tucker refers to Heidegger as the “evil 
genius o f phenomenology.”40 Yet in the end, Tucker is unable to conclude one way or 
the other whether Patodka’s work suffers from similar faults. Pato£ka uses
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Heideggerean terms in a Socratic sense, making him more of a Platonic humanist most 
of the time, but there are periods when Pato£ka is faithful to Heidegger, making him a 
clear reactionary. This type o f analysis, I would argue, does not accurately portray 
Patocka and is representative o f several significant faults in Tucker’s work as a whole.
Primary among these weaknesses is Tucker’s focus on Pato£ka as human rights 
activist, with its implication that human rights are the essence o f Pato£ka’s philosophy, 
the key to his “life in truth,” and so to his political philosophy. Tucker’s argument 
proceeds from the claim that Pato£ka’s work is “metaphysical.” This is in fact the 
fulcrum o f the analysis: the argument that the human rights movement Charter 77 
sprung from metaphysical foundations in the philosophy o f it’s spokesman, Jan Patodka. 
Tucker argues that Pato£ka “pushed Heideggerianism toward humanism and gave 
morality a primary ontological status. He also adopted, following Kant, absolute and 
universal ethics.”41 These “absolute and universal ethics” would serve, then, as a “basis 
for political philosophy and political action.”42 All of this results in what Tucker calls, 
surprisingly, Patodka’s “metaphysical system.”43
The conclusion that human morality is championed by Pato£ka in the form of 
such a system is indeed surprising because, without doubt, it contradicts a basic tenant 
of his actual writings. PatoSka is convinced, to the contrary, that the assumption of 
metaphysical foundations in life results in an existence that is less than fully human 
because it is not truly philosophical, it does not experience life as an inquiry, but rather 
accepts it as simply given and rests complacently on those assumptions. But Tucker, in 
basing his inquiry on the event o f Charter 77 and the notion o f human rights, and from
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there moving to Patoika’s philosophical texts instead o f the other way around, makes
clear his intent on finding such a “system” o f rights in those texts. Tucker believes, with
Richard Wolin, that there simply must be a concrete foundation in absolute moral
principles or human rights for a politics of authenticity to succeed.44 This is perhaps a
defensible position, and even logical if one looks only at the Charter 77 texts, but it is
not consistent with the whole o f Patodka’s philosophy, which attempts to use the
ontological insight o f Heidegger while retaining a focus on the inherent connection
between politics and ethics, yet without reverting to the traditional solution o f a
metaphysics o f morals.
One benefit o f Tucker’s focus on Charter 77, os opposed to Kohak’s broader
focus on phenomenology, is that it points a spotlight on one o f the more interesting, and
potentially problematic, elements o f  Pato£ka’s work: namely his apparent adoption of
Kantian ethics. In one Charter 77 text entitled, “The Obligation to Resist Injustice,”
Patocka writes that
The idea o f human rights is nothing other than the conviction that even 
states, even society as a whole, are subject to the sovereignty o f moral 
sentiment: that they recognize something unconditional that is higher 
than they are, something that is binding even on the, sacred, inviolable, 
and that in their power to establish and maintain a rule o f law they seek 
to express this recognition.45
This is what Tucker refers to as “Patodka’s Kantian formulation of ethical absolutism,”46
and in this he appears to be correct. Tucker concludes, as I have noted, that Pato£ka has
adopted a positive conception o f absolute ethics which serve as a foundation for human
rights. Yet he makes this argument even while approvingly citing a French
commentator, Valerie Lowit, whose understanding of PatoCka’s morality is different.
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Lowit sees morality in Pato£ka’s philosophy, not as a positive construct, but as a
negative reaction to untruth. In Tucker’s words, Lowit argues that:
.. .PatoCka’s ontologically primary “ought” is a morality that precedes 
ethics in its modem or Kantian sense. This presupposed and presumed 
morality is revealed in the “no!” of Socrates’ daimon and Antigone, this 
negation reveals the primary positive ontological morality that was 
accepted unreflectively in the world of myth, just as nothingness reveals 
being and Plato’s metaphysics reveals its negation — Heideggerean 
ontology.47
In this interpretation, which is more faithful to Patodka than Tucker’s, morality is an
ontological phenomenon that is explicitly prior to Kantian ethics. It speaks through the
negative, the “no” of the daimon, rather than through the positive of assumed universal
rights. But, as Tucker notes in response to this position:
Nevertheless, when required to articulate this primordial morality, in the 
Charter 77 documents which he authored, Patodka used the Kantian 
formula. Either, by the end o f his life, Pato£ka changed his earlier 
position and primordial morality became close to Kantian ethics, or (and 
this is more probable) when forced to articulate clearly what cannot be 
articulated clearly, Patoika chose the readily available Kantian 
formulation.48
The question o f the relationship between Pato£ka and Kantian ethics is still unresolved 
and will need to be revisited further along in this work. Tucker, however, has made the 
suggestion that that the Kantian formulation o f Charter 77 may not be representative of 
Patocka’s philosophical position on morality, which “cannot be articulated clearly.” 
Instead, it may be an exoteric formulation, considered expedient and perhaps necessary 
for the type o f action represented by Charter 77. Here Tucker seems to find this 
explanation plausible, that Pato£ka’s dissident reversion to an unambiguous Kantian 
morality is not representative of his philosophical position, and I think that this
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conclusion is persuasive. In spite o f this insight, however, Tucker continues to insist on
the presence o f an absolute metaphysical morality of human rights in the Czech
philosopher’s work, a morality that Tucker “articulates clearly” in locating it’s core in
the notion of human rights. The correct answer, I would argue, is far more tentative and
uncertain, befitting the human condition.
Tucker’s work is also flawed in its interpretation of the two “poles” that appear
to demarcate PatoCka’s work. Tucker effectively divides the work into a dominant
humanism with Platonic roots, and a “quite disturbing” perspective that is reactionary in
its Heideggereanism. The two faces of PatoCka are exemplified in two main texts: Plato
and Europe and the Heretical Essays in the Philosophy o f  History. Tucker claims that
the first text exemplifies Patodka’s humanism and his commitment to human rights,
while the second text is pessimistic and Heideggerean.49 The decisive element in this
dichotomy is the understanding of the concept of truth.
In Plato and Europe, PatoCka agrees with Plato that pure, absolute, and 
eternal truth is obtainable, and that the way to obtain it is through 
dialectics. In Heretical essays, PatoCka agrees with Heidegger that truth 
is relative and evasive, and that nothing can be done to achieve it.50
In fact, neither claim is accurate. Patodka is not a relativist even in his most
Heideggerean moments, nor is he an absolutist in his most classical or Platonic. The
perception of two poles in Patodka’s work is not, however, inaccurate -- it is Tucker’s
description of the philosopher’s relationship to those two poles that is inaccurate. As
Erazim Kohak recognized, an understanding of the world founded upon metaphysics
and a nihilistic relativism do indeed form two poles in Patoika’s thought, or rather they
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form two “limits” — both explicitly excluded as deformations o f reality on either side.51 
Patodka’s most basic insight is the recognition that the reality o f human existence 
conforms to neither o f these extremes, but lies somewhere in-between them. Tucker, 
however, concludes that both o f these poles are present in Patofika’s work, surfacing at 
different times in different essays. In Plato and Europe, “he was a humanist,” writes 
Tucker, while in Heretical Essays, “he is reactionary” and a Heideggerean relativist.52
As I demonstrate in the body of this study, Patocka remained consistent 
throughout his life in his fundamental rejection of both relativism and it’s opposite, the 
assumption o f an absolute knowledge accessible to man through metaphysics. He was 
neither an anthropocentric humanist nor a reactionary, considering both to be forms of 
escape from the problematicity and historicity o f human existence. Humanism, along 
with much o f Enlightenment thought, Pato£ka considered to be essentially a form of 
metaphysics. In an essay entitled “The Harmonism of Modem Humanism,” only 
recently published in the original Czech, Pato£ka is resoundingly critical of secular 
humanism. This modem form o f thought, he argues, aims perpetually towards human 
harmony; it is, as he calls it, a harmonism that conceives o f ethics as, e.g., a system of 
moral postulates. Ethics is postulated as a system o f metaphysical truth that can enable 
man to achieve harmony. For Patodka, however, ethics, or “moral striving,” must be 
understood as “the striving o f concrete, historical people.” Ethics are to be uncovered in 
the “actual history o f the engaged person.”53 The modem humanist, in seeking harmony 
and uninterrupted growth, is a “man of harmonism,” and “a closed, ready being, simple 
and entirely transparent.”54 When Tucker writes that “[i]n his Platonic moments,
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Patocka is an optimistic humanist, believing that truth is achievable through 
philosophical argumentation,”55 he decidedly misrepresents Pato£ka’s philosophical aim 
o f explicating the absence o f an ultimate harmony, an achievable truth in human life.
For Patodka, truth is nothing if  it is not problematic, particularly so for the philosopher.
Tucker’s interpretation of the Heretical Essays as reactionary by virtue of their 
Heideggereanism is similarly flawed. Two components o f this interpretation exemplify 
Tucker’s tendency to overextend his analysis. Neither Patodka’s discussions o f 
medieval European history nor his conclusions as to the dangers in adopting a scientistic 
view o f human being are accurately portrayed by Tucker. Patodka does not argue that 
Medieval Europe was a spiritual ideal, nor that the development of science “suddenly 
destroyed” this “wonderful spiritual culture.”56 The element o f exaggeration inherent in 
Tucker’s descriptive analysis lends support to his thesis that Patodka’s work moves back 
and forth between two extremities, two poles, but it does not serve to accurately portray 
the philosophy of the Heretical Essays.
Tucker’s interpretation proceeds from a desire to explicate the connection 
between the Charter 77 affirmation of human rights and the philosophy of its primary 
author, Jan Pato£ka. Its conclusion is that, despite occasional forays into the realm of 
reactionary opinion attributable to the vicissitudes of the historical situation, Pato€ka 
was a philosopher of human rights. That is, his philosophy of ethics in the form o f 
universal, enumerated rights is primary, and precedes any philosophy o f politics in 
importance. As Tucker describes it,
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Pato£ka held that human authenticity is “life in truth,” the uniquely 
human potential to witness the grand presence o f truth. Life in truth can 
be achieved through the practice o f the Socratic method. The public 
conduct of Platonic dialogues requires the protection o f human rights 
(freedom of speech, print etc.). Therefore, to live authentically, human 
beings must live in a state that guarantees the conditions (human rights) 
for search for, and life in, truth. These human rights are universal and 
absolute and every just state must be founded on them. In Patodka’s 
philosophy politics is subservient to ethics, and ethics guarantees 
authenticity. The political level was the least fundamental for Patocka, it 
is there only to guarantee the more important levels of ethics and 
authenticity as life in truth.57
Here Tucker argues for the primacy o f an enumerated ethics over politics in Pato£ka’s
philosophy; I would contend precisely to the contrary, that the philosophy o f politics in
Patocka’s work stresses the fact that freedom, the ground upon which a truly human life
unfolds, requires that our historical action, our political action, not be governed by a
form of metaphysics such as a universal, enumerated system o f morality. The absolute
morality o f which Pato£ka speaks in the Charter documents is not, as Tucker would
have it, expressed in a given set o f rights or freedoms upon which all societies must be
based in order to achieve authenticity. The ethical politics sought by Tucker, as well as
by Patocka, cannot be guaranteed through a system; it is a more tentative and hard-won
achievement that results from the commitment to freedom for others as well as for
oneself and from the openness to the transcendent and nonobjective nature o f the world
as a whole that is determinative of our comportment as humans.
Rather than a foundation for politics in human rights (or humanism), PatoCka’s
political theory points to an institutional formulation reflective of a philosophy that is
grounded, neither in the particular things o f the world nor in a transcendent being or
Idea, but in an openness to the world as a whole. Such a formulation would consist o f a
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democratic community o f equals united in the idea of the polls and in the perception 
that unity presupposes and is guaranteed by a measure of free conflict. A philosophical 
clarification o f its foundations -- foundations that are, in a sense, non-foundational in 
their grounding in freedom from theoretical constructs and material objects — will offer 
the possibility of resetting democratic practice on what PatoCka believes to be its proper 
footing. In this way, as the Heretical Essays on the Philosophy o f  History testify, the 
sense of crisis that has plagued modem man for more than a century can be addressed 
without a reactionary reversion to the politics o f the pre-modem period. Tucker is right 
in asserting that the properly ordered polis must guarantee the right of its citizens to 
freedom of speech, but he is mistaken in claiming that Pato£ka’s philosophy can be 
distilled into a system o f ethics based upon human rights of this type.
Postmodernism, Foundationalism, and Religion 
Although both Kohak and Tucker avoid the issue of foundations directly, each in 
effect argues for a form o f humanistic foundation, for an anchor via which human life 
can gain a degree of certainty as a weapon against the pull of nihilism and relativism. It 
is with thinkers working in the postmodern tradition, however, that the question of 
foundations is dealt with specifically. I refer here to interpretive essays on Patocka by 
Richard Rorty and Jacques Derrida, both of which recognize that the question o f the 
foundation is at the heart o f Patodka’s philosophy. Interestingly, and perhaps tellingly, 
these two renowned postmodern thinkers come to opposite conclusions. While Rorty 
points out that the Czech thinker, as an non-metaphysician, must reject foundations, 
Derrida argues to the contrary that his thought has a fundamentally religious foundation,
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a grounding in the notion o f an “absolute being.” Clearly this question requires further 
exploration.
Rorty and Derrida, like Kohak and Tucker, resist Pato£ka’s attempt to forge a 
coherent path in-between the traditional foundationalism o f  Western thought and the 
anti-foundationalism o f contemporary, postmodern work. The former concludes that, in 
effect, Pato£ka is postmodern, while the latter makes o f him a traditionalist, albeit one 
with a difference. Both Rorty’s view of the Czech philosopher as an anti-foundationalist 
and Derrida’s charge o f traditionalism for a perceived reliance on religious themes are 
misguided. While Rorty’s account is often accurate, he goes too far in setting Patodka in 
the anti-foundationalist camp. Derrida, on the other hand, comes to a conclusion that is 
explicitly contradicted in many o f PatoCka’s other texts, texts one can presume were 
unavailable to Derrida. For all o f the iconoclastic qualities o f their writings, Rorty and 
Derrida approach Patocka through standard philosophical categories, even if 
postmodern ones. Yet Pato5ka’s approach, which developed in relative isolation from 
the academic trends o f the postwar West, begins from a position that is a step beyond 
the simple dichotomy between the traditional and the postmodern perspectives. Central 
to this study o f PatoCka is an assessment of the feasibility and success o f this attempt.
To begin this assessment, we must consider the arguments o f Rorty and Derrida in 
greater detail.
The theme of the foundation is presented most clearly in a short essay written for 
The New Republic by Richard Rorty, the American philosopher often considered one of 
the most important o f postmodern thinkers. Rorty’s short article, a book review of the
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collection o f essays in English edited by Kohak, the Heretical Essays, and Plato and
Europe (both in French translation), is merely a brief overview of Patodka as the model
for Vaclav Havel and the other Czechoslovak dissidents o f the ‘60s and ‘70s, yet it
manages to elucidate the core issues in Patodka’s thought in a way unmatched by
Kohak’s or Tucker’s longer analyses.
While Rorty agrees with Erazim Kohak that Pato£ka is most immediately
significant as an interpreter of the dialogue between Husserl and Heidegger, he
disagrees with him in concluding that, in this dialogue, “PatoCka is mostly on
Heidegger’s side.”58 Yet a fundamental difference between the two remains for Rorty:
while Heidegger, after his experience with National Socialism, abandoned his interest in
politics and in resuscitating Western institutions, Pato£ka remained a political thinker
who thought those institutions could be freed from their reliance on metaphysics and
infused with freedom.
Heidegger found the difference between democracy and tyranny 
philosophically uninteresting, insignificant compared to the titanic drama 
of the self-destruction o f metaphysics. Patodka threw himself, as soon as 
he was asked, into what turned out to be a mortal struggle for democratic 
freedom.59
Although he overstates the degree to which PatoCka is on “Heidegger’s side,” Rorty is 
correct in pointing to this fundamental difference between the goals of the Czech 
philosopher and his German instructor.
In Rorty’s reading, it is Pato£ka’s Heideggerean critique o f metaphysics that 
stands out, making the Czech more of a Heideggerean than a Husserlian thinker.
Though Patodka was something of a crusader for democracy as a dissident, Rorty argues
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that he could not be thought o f as a philosopher o f human rights, meaning the “sort of 
philosopher who wants to give democratic institutions and hopes a ‘firm philosophical 
foundation,”’ for the simple reason that if  one rejects metaphysics, one must reject all 
such foundations.60 For Rorty, Patodka conforms to this line o f reasoning. His critique 
of metaphysics makes him an anti-foundationalist. In this, Rorty notes, he stands quite 
apart from “Straussians like Allan Bloom” and others who “insist on metaphysical 
foundations for political choice,” on a “moral reality” reflected in the institutions of 
democracy.61 Still, Rorty does not ignore Patodka’s moral language or his evocation of a 
moral foundation in the texts o f Charter 77. Rather, he conceives o f Patodkan moral 
sentiment as responding to an elemental and non-metaphysically grounded sense of 
human obligation; in this Rorty dismisses much of Patodka’s ontological philosophy, 
implying that it is an over-complication o f a simple human reaction -- the call of 
conscience.
The solution to the trap of choosing between “absolutism” and “relativism” 
(metaphysics and anti-foundationalism) lies in understanding the term “absolute” in a 
different sense. For Rorty, Patodka is responding to a sense of absolute obligation, our 
conscience, that is in no way “objective.” It lacks any kind o f solid foundation, making 
it something of a “leap in the dark.” “For Patodka,” Rorty writes, “the unconditionality 
o f the call o f conscience has nothing to do with the notion of a moral demand being 
legitimated or underwritten by something factual, something ‘out there.’”62 Rorty thus 
reads Patodka to be a thorough postmodern in his rejection o f all metaphysical support 
for moral action. Conscience is directed simply by a shared humanity, a shared sense of
377
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
dignity and resulting obligation. Any more solid grounding or understanding than this 
does not exist for Rorty. In a critique of Patocka, Rorty finds the seeds o f the conditions 
for social conscience to be varied and widespread. As such, Patodka’s focus on being 
and consciousness, on positive versus negative forms o f Platonism, is superfluous and 
inordinate. Too much emphasis is placed on Socrates and Plato, on the position of 
philosophy in Patodka’s thought as an absolutely central force in history.
Rorty’s position is in distinct contrast to the conclusions o f both Kohak and 
Tucker. Kohak explicitly reads Patodka to allow “no facile escape into an 
‘anti-foundationalism.’ Choose we m ust...,” he writes. While the choice alluded to by 
Kohak, judging by the content of his analysis o f Patodka, does in fact rest on a 
quasi-religious metaphysical foundation, the point is nevertheless well taken. Patodka’s 
moral and philosophical conviction seems incomparably more solid than Rorty’s 
non-foundational call of conscience. Rorty, in reducing this philosophy to a simple call 
of conscience, leaves one with no conceptual apparatus at all to analyze, to compare 
against one’s experience of reality.
The reality o f the matter is that Patodka is never so simplistic in his rejection of 
foundations. It is not the concept of the ground, the foundation in and o f itself, with 
which he takes issue, but the concept of the unproblematic, solid ground that we 
artificially posit in our desire for a simple answer to our most difficult questions.
Patocka conceives o f philosophy itself as the development of the theme of the 
problematic; within the boundaries of an understanding of problematicity, he argues, it 
is appropriate to philosophy to seek something permanent, but only as long as it is
378
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
understood that the ground sought is never simple and concrete, but always 
problematic.63 Rorty’s anti-foundationalism thus goes beyond the limits o f what Patodka 
seeks, to the point that it verges on the relativism which Patodka explicitly denies. This 
analysis provides an invaluable counter-position to those of Kohak and Tucker, but it 
does not adequately respond to Patodka himself.
Though his article is brief, Rorty clearly disagrees with the conclusion that Plato 
and Europe and the Heretical Essays are in some way contradictory. Unlike both Kohak 
and Tucker, Rorty sees no inconsistencies between these two texts, no significant 
distinction between the content or conclusions o f one and the other. In this he is 
absolutely correct and so perhaps the most clear-sighted of Patodka’s American 
interpreters. But rather than analyze and contest the fine points o f Patodka’s philosophy 
on its own merits, Rorty is content to be dismissive o f it as an over-complication o f an 
apparently self-evident human faculty. Yet the faculty o f conscience to which he refers 
and which, he must presume, is sufficient to serve as a stabilizing and ordering force in 
human society and politics, remains an undifferentiated concept in his account, not 
rigorously explained or defended. As such it is insufficient as a conceptual undergirding 
for a theory of politics. Patodka’s work yet needs to be examined on its own terms and 
in its political context.
Derrida’s Gift o f  Death 
Contemporary postmodernism again weighs in on Jan Patodka in the figure of 
Jacques Derrida, whose The Gift o f  Death speaks primarily to the Czech philosopher 
and the postmodern question o f the ground or foundation of his political philosophy.
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Yet, as I have noted, Derrida comes to precisely the opposite conclusion as Rorty — 
namely, that Patocka’s work is in fact predicated on a foundation that is explicitly 
metaphysical, the foundation o f religious faith in a supreme being. Though an 
interesting piece of deconstructive analysis, Derrida’s perspective on Pato£ka is 
unfortunately more distorting than enlightening.
Derrida’s The Gift o f  Death is a reflection on the notion of responsibility and its 
ethical and political contexts. This analysis, or deconstructive critique, o f the concept of 
responsibility in Europe is conducted via an examination of two texts that focus on the 
subject: Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling and its story of the sacrifice o f Isaac by 
Abraham, and the fifth of Jan Patodka’s Heretical Essays in the Philosophy o f  History, 
entitled “Is Technological Civilization Decadent, and Why?” The question of 
responsibility is for Derrida a political question as well as a philosophical one. “It 
concerns,” Derrida claims, “the very essence or future of European politics.”64 His 
analysis deconstructs the notion of responsibility in the West based on its genealogy and 
its connection to Christianity.
In a review of The Gift o f  Death, Andrew J. McKenna noted that, for Derrida, 
Western philosophy is marked by a “crypto-theology.” It strives to anchor meaning in 
principles that are unassailable. Derrida’s analyses, writes McKenna, “regularly uncover 
presuppositions about foundations and primacies, points of origin and authoritative 
presences that correspond to nothing other than a Supreme Being, however veiled or 
unapproachable.”65 In doing this, Derrida claims to be exposing the “logocentrism” of 
Western thought. In The Gift o f  Death, Derrida proceeds along just these lines,
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indicting, in the course of his argument, not Gnly Patodka’s work but that o f most recent 
philosophy that has attempted to remain open to experiences typically of interest to
religion.
In Patodka, Derrida claims to uncover a presupposition that amounts to the 
presence of an Absolute Being as the foundation for human responsibility. This 
presence, he goes on to argue, forms the basis for a political project that seems, as 
Derrida describes it, disturbing at best and tyrannical at worst. Derrida’s analysis with 
respect to Patodka and Christianity, however, his placement of Patodka into a 
“crypto-theological” framework with concrete political goals, is misguided in several 
respects. Like other Western readers, Derrida declines to judge the work o f Patodka on 
its own terms, that is, to seriously examine the attempt to find a philosophical path 
between the traditional metaphysics o f which postmodernism is critical, and the 
relativistic inability or unwillingness of postmodernism to make moral and ethical 
prescriptions or judgments. Instead, Derrida places it from the start into a derridean 
framework, concluding that Patodka’s work, particularly his political thought and his 
conceptualization of responsibility, are determined by a relationship to Christianity.
The relationship to Christianity that Derrida uncovers is based on a close reading 
of several passages from one chapter o f the Heretical Essays; the conclusions drawn 
from those passages, however, expressly contradict the tenor of Patodka’s philosophy 
and present a distorted view of his nuanced relationship to Christianity. Lastly, it must 
be noted that Derrida’s political conclusions in regard to Patodka’s philosophy, which 
vaguely insinuate a desire to transform European politics along theological lines, are
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unsupported and, in fact, insupportable even if  one were to focus exclusively on the 
Heretical Essays and ignore the rest o f Patodka’s written work. In the end, the reader of 
Derrida sees that these conclusions fit into a larger, preconceived indictment o f all 
contemporary philosophy willing to remain open to traditionally religious or theological 
symbolization. This type of philosophy, Derrida argues, “consists o f proposing a non 
dogmatic doublet o f dogma” that thinks religiously without a formal religion.66
Derrida’s analysis in The Gift o f  Death focuses on the concept o f responsibility, 
which he rightly notes is central to Patodka’s philosophy. In the Heretical Essays and 
throughout his written work, Patodka links responsibility to the human being’s 
conscious acceptance of his or her life in freedom, absent any metaphysical anchor to 
act as ballast and deliver us from the full weight o f the burden o f responsibility. This 
achievement, this “accomplishment” o f life that is our coming to terms with it rather 
than seeking to escape or avoid it, is at the heart o f Patodka’s notion o f responsibility. 
The distinction here is between an authentic and an inauthentic life, with the former 
denoting responsibility and the latter the attempt to escape it.67 In Chapter 5 of the 
Essays, however, Patodka adds to this distinction a second dichotomy that is also 
related, if more peripherally, to human responsibility — that o f the opposition between 
the everyday and the exceptional, the profane and the sacred or orgiastic. This 
dichotomy represents another possibility for humans to avoid responsibility, by 
becoming in some way “enraptured” or caught up in the unordinary, the passionate or 
sacred. This type o f human activity is, as Patodka explains, a fundamentally different 
phenomena, but one no less dismissive o f human responsibility:
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Face to face with this phenomenon [of the orgiastic] we tend to forget the 
entire dimension o f the struggle for ourselves, forget responsibility and 
escape, letting ourselves be drawn into a new, open dimension as if  only 
now true life stood before us, as if this “new life” had no need to care for 
the dimension o f responsibility.68
Religion, far from being the demonic or sacred itself, Patodka argues, in fact emerges
“where the sacred qua demonic is being explicitly overcome. Sacral experiences pass
over [into] religious as soon as there is an attempt to introduce responsibility into the
sacred or to regulate the sacred thereby.”69 Thus Derrida is correct when he notes that, in
Patodka, “Religion is responsibility or it is nothing at all.”70
It is this second distinction discussed by Patodka upon which Derrida seizes and
upon which he builds his “genealogy” of responsibility. For Derrida, this distinction of
the sacred versus the profane becomes primary, and the foundation for what he feels is
the kernel o f Patodkan responsibility, i.e., that the most profound form of responsibility,
and so the preferred form, is that which comes through religion. Drawing upon
Patodka’s discussion o f the gift o f faith from God to man that distinguishes Christianity,
Derrida goes on to conclude, purportedly on the basis o f the text, that the most profound
form o f responsibility is thus given as a gift from the absolute other, from God. Derrida
thus implies a subordination of philosophy to religion, o f philosophy to a supreme being
who is the source o f human responsibility. This subordination, however, is counter to
rather than consistent with the philosophy o f Jan Patodka as he presented it throughout
his life.
The primary source of Derrida’s conclusions is a passage in the Fifth essay in 
which Patodka appears to argue that Christianity, the mysterium tremendum, represents
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the most profound source o f responsibility, only requiring to be thought through.
Derrida quotes the passage in full in both his first and second chapters. Patodka writes:
By virtue o f this foundation in the abysmal deepening of the soul,
Christianity remains thus far the greatest, unsurpassed but also 
un-thought-through human outreach that enabled humans to struggle 
against decadence.71
Here Derrida reads the text to argue that that human responsibility reaches its peak with 
Christianity. Yet Derrida’s reading of this passage is decidedly one-sided. Patodka does 
indeed praise the Christian deepening o f the soul, but he does so in the context o f a 
discussion that is fundamentally historical. At the point in question, Patodka is 
comparing the relative influence in Western history of Platonic metaphysics and 
Christianity in terms o f their effect on human responsibility. Christianity, historically 
speaking, had the greatest effect, as yet unsurpassed. This does not mean, however, that 
Patocka necessarily considers it a model to emulate. Dogmatic Christianity is weighed 
down by its metaphysical foundations; what success it has via its theoretical treatment 
of the soul is counteracted by its metaphysical foundations. While Christianity 
represents the greatest historical success for Western man in his struggle against 
decadence, it is not the outreach to which Patodka appeals, particularly in regard to 
politics, for the precise reason that it continues to rest on metaphysical foundations. The 
“thinking through” that has not yet occurred in Christian theology has to do with those 
very foundations.
Patodka is a critic of both Platonic metaphysics and dogmatic Christianity in 
terms of their effect on human responsibility; neither lead the human to accept 
responsibility for his own life because both rest to some degree upon a supreme Idea
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and a Supreme Being, respectively. Historically, Patodka argues, Christianity has 
provided the most profound perspective on human responsibility, but it nevertheless 
must remain secondary to the philosophical experience. The philosophical experience to 
which he refers, importantly, is not the experience o f Platonic metaphysics. Patodka 
makes a fundamental distinction between the Platonism of the Idea as absolute object 
and the figure o f Socrates in Plato’s early dialogues. The philosophy to which Patodka 
appeals is based on a mode of understanding drawing most directly upon the insight of 
Socrates, an understanding that was not significant historically because it rapidly 
degenerated into Platonic metaphysics. It is this “premetaphysical soil”72 o f philosophy 
which Patodka is attempting to resuscitate with the help of contemporary 
phenomenology and ontology, and it is this soil that is the genuine source o f human 
responsibility, despite the historical success o f Christianity. The outline o f this argument 
appears most clearly in Patodka’s writings on “Negative Platonism,” which is discussed 
in greater detail in Chapter Three o f this study. Derrida fails to appreciate or chooses to 
ignore this important distinction, and so comes to the conclusion that, for Patodka, 
Christianity represented an advancement over Platonic thought in terms of the 
understanding of responsibility, an advancement that Patodka aims to see through to its 
conclusion by “thinking through” Christianity and finally “emancipating” it from both 
Athens and Rome.73
The most surprising aspect o f Derrida’s interpretation of Patodka is the political 
project that he presumes (inexplicably, for the texts in no way support such a project) to
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be an implicit aim o f the text. Upon citing the passage quoted above, Derrida comes to
the following conclusions:
One should understand that in saying that Christianity has not been 
thought right through Patodka intends that such a task be undertaken; not 
only by means o f a more thorough thematization but also by means o f a 
political and historical setting-in-train, by means of political and 
historical action; and he advocates that according to the logic of a 
messianic "schatology that is nevertheless indissociable from 
phenomenology.... What has not yet come about is the fulfillment, within 
history and in political history, and first and foremost in European 
politics, of the new responsibility announced by the mysterium 
tremendum. Only on this condition will Europe have a future, and will 
there be a future in general, for Patodka speaks less of a past event or fact 
than he does of a promise.74
Surely this is an astounding charge to level at a professor o f philosophy whose only
direct political involvement concerned speaking out in favor of basic human rights and
the principle of truth in politics. It is further astounding because it is supported not by
textual evidence but by the faulty conclusion that Patodka is speaking of a concrete
promise rather than o f history. In fact, the text clearly indicates that Patodka was
speaking historically,75 and Derrida can present no evidence (for none exists) suggesting
that Patodka truly advocated concrete “political and historical action,” let alone action
“according to the logic o f a messianic eschatology.” The historical action towards which
Patocka does aim consists in the transformation o f  individual souls along Socratic
guidelines, not in the transformation of societies along messianic-religious guidelines.
As this study has demonstrated, Patodkan philosophy explicitly rejects
“messianic eschatology,” though it does not abandon consideration o f the experience o f
transcendence — including the symbolization o f  the “divine” in human life. Patodka also
does not perceive of Christianity as Derrida suggests, that is, as a progressive but still
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insufficient improvement upon the understanding o f existence contained in Platonic 
metaphysics. Instead, his texts show that he considers both Christian and Platonic 
metaphysics to be attempts to understand and symbolize the human condition that, 
despite whatever validity their prescriptions may have, nevertheless rest upon 
foundations that provide an escape from the predicament of human responsibility 
through the positing o f a transcendent objective. Patodka’s philosophical project does 
not seek to “emancipate” Europe from Athens; to the contrary, it seeks to delve more 
profoundly into Greek philosophy, primarily into the figure o f Socrates and his 
injunction to live in truth and to care for the soul.
In the second chapter of The Gift o f  Death, Derrida backs away somewhat from 
his specific political rhetoric, but proceeds to extend the scope of his argument to 
encompass a broad swath o f contemporary philosophy that, if not explicitly religious, is 
at least so in spirit. In the course of his discussion, Derrida recognizes the numerous 
connections between Patodka’s work and the work of Heidegger, yet he is also quick to 
distinguish the two. The distinguishing characteristic for Derrida is what he sees as 
Patodka’s “essential Christianity.”76 Whereas Heidegger analyzes Christian themes on 
an ontological level, Patodka takes those same themes and re-Christianizes them.77 By 
this Derrida means that these themes, including the concept of responsibility, are 
understood by Patodka as resting upon the foundation of a supreme being. Whereas 
Heidegger believes that “the origin of responsibility does not in any way reduce, 
originarily, to a supreme being,” Patodka “deliberately takes an opposite tack.” He “is 
no doubt convinced,” argues Derrida, “that there is no true binding responsibility or
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obligation that doesn’t come from someone, from a person such as an absolute being 
who transfixes me.”78
Derrida’s conclusion is mistaken. The evidence from Patodka’s writings, 
specifically his centrally important “Negative Platonism,” makes readily apparent his 
perspective. Patodkan philosophy, particularly his concept of responsibility, explicitly 
eschews a foundation in a concrete, transcendent being. Although Christianity 
represented a profound development by virtue of its plumbing of the depths o f the 
human soul and its recognition of the problematicity of human life, it nevertheless 
provided for itself an escape into non-problematicity, away from responsibility, in the 
figure o f the supreme being. Patodka at one point describes Christianity as the 
“contemporaneous seeing of problematicity and attempt to escape it.”79 As Patodka sees 
it, a supreme being, conceived of objectively, represents an escape route from the full 
reality o f human problematicity and responsibility. It is not the perception o f a 
transcendental reality that constitutes the origin of metaphysics, and so the beginning of 
the decline o f philosophy; this occurs, rather, when the “living force of 
transcendence...is transformed, with a fatal inevitability, into a transcendent, 
supramundane reality, a transcendent deity.”80 The divine element o f human life, which 
Patodka recognizes as a component of reality, cannot be conceived o f in objective terms. 
Derrida’s conclusions in this regard are simply not tenable in light o f the evidence in 
Patodka’s overall work.81
Derrida retreats somewhat in his second chapter from his charge o f the essential 
Christianity o f these texts and, in doing so, greatly expands the scope of his critique to
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include even Heidegger himself. He turns from the dichotomy o f Christian versus
non-Christian to a more subtle distinction: that o f philosophy that thinks religiously
without being religious. Derrida writes that “[t]he fact that Christian themes are
identifiable does not mean that this text is, down to the last word and in its final
signature, an essentially Christian one, even if Patodka could himself be said to be. It
matters little in the end.”82 What matters is the “logic” o f these themes, revolving
around the notion o f a gift; it is a logic, claims Derrida, that does not require the “event”
of a revelation, only the ability to conceive of such an event, to “think the possibility” of
it. This point is crucial, for it permits a religious discourse “to be developed without
reference to religion as institutional dogma.”83 It is a case o f having one’s cake and
eating it too, of philosophically thinking religious themes without having to admit that
one is religious, that one accepts dogma. This is a significant charge, based on what
Derrida admits is a “subtle and unstable” difference; nevertheless, Derrida is ready to
conclude that the discourses of Levinas, Marion and “perhaps” of Ricoeur also can be
said to be in a similar situation to that o f Patodka. Derrida takes the analysis further,
however, arguing that
in the final analysis this list has no clear limit and it can be said, once 
again taking into account the differences, that a certain Kant and a certain 
Hegel, Kierkegaard of course, and I might even dare to say for 
provocative effect, Heidegger also, belong to this tradition that consists 
o f proposing a nondogmatic doublet of dogma, a philosophical and 
metaphysical doublet, in any case a thinking that “repeats” the possibility 
of religion without religion.84
This is perhaps the most interesting point in The Gift o f  Death, but, as Derrida notes, it
requires a good deal of further analysis, analysis that Derrida does not provide.
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This analysis, as with the work in the concluding chapters which mostly 
concerns Kierkegaard and the ethics o f the sacrifice demanded o f him by God, 
essentially rest upon the conclusions arrived at through an interpretation o f Jan Pato£ka 
-- an interpretation which is, as we have seen, inherently flawed. Derrida’s critique of 
the concept o f responsibility shows that concept to be founded upon a direct relationship 
to an absolute Other, to a supreme being. Though he argues that this is something 
different from a relationship to a transcendent objectification -- the Platonic Idea, for 
example — it is clear that in Patodka’s analysis any notion o f a supreme being is 
excluded as such an objectification, as a metaphysical means o f escape from authentic 
human responsibility.
Patocka’s philosophy attempts to arrive at a different conception o f 
responsibility than the one outlined by Derrida. In a certain sense, there is something to 
Derrida’s point that Patoika’s thinking concerns the possibility o f religion without its 
dogmatic elements. It concerns the recognition of transcendence in human reality, an 
inexplicable sense of the whole that might very well be symbolized through the term 
divine. It’s very aim, however, is to resist thinking of that phenomenon as a 
metaphysical entity, as a being upon whom we base our justification for ethics.
O ther Commentaries 
It is unfortunate that there does not as yet exist, in the English-language 
literature, a published interpretive work of significant length that does justice to Pato£ka 
by dealing with him on his own terms, that does not try to shape the contents o f his 
work into a form more acceptable to the author. This is not to say, however, that there
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are no interpreters o f Patoika with an open perspective towards the actual aims of this 
Czech philosopher. Most of those interpreters, however, do not work in English. A good 
deal of analytical work exists, for example, in both Czech and French, but has appeared 
in English only in the form of miscellaneous articles, introductions or summaries. It is 
important, though, to note the themes stressed in some o f this literature, for it is here 
that questions relevant to Patocka’s political perspective are approached, and in ways 
often more faithful to the original intent than that which we have seen thus far.
One o f the most balanced voices from contemporary philosophy is that of Paul 
Ricoeur, long an admirer of Patodka and his work in phenomenology and political 
thought. Though Ricoeur is not the author o f a major work on Patodka, his introduction 
to the French edition o f the Heretical Essays (translated for the English edition) 
demonstrates his appreciation for the Czech philosopher’s goals and illustrates the fact 
that European philosophy more generally has for some time looked seriously at this 
work and found it to be eminently worthy o f consideration. Ricoeur’s essay exemplifies 
the twin concerns o f many Continental analysts, the first being phenomenology, for 
which Patodka was well known, and the second being the political implications of his 
focus, in the later essays, on the role of history and politics within an overall 
philosophical approach to human existence.
In terms o f his methodology, Ricoeur notes the influence o f Husserl and 
Heidegger, as well as the degree to which Patodka’s work is “heretical” with respect to 
theirs. Instead o f pointing with other analysts to how he is “Husserlian” or 
“Heideggerean,” Ricoeur sees an interpretive effort that moves in a direction
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independent o f both o f these philosophers. It is an effort, further, that he recognizes as 
inherently political. Patodka’s Heretical Essays begin with an exposition of Husserl’s 
concept of the “natural world,” but then quickly proceed to critique Husserl for his 
lingering Cartesian idealism and his inability to reach the meaningful historicity of 
humans and their concrete action in the world.85 Here Patodka is with Heidegger, 
finding the ontological concept o f “openness” to being and to the world as a whole to be 
prior to the mental phenomenon of our consciousness. But Heidegger’s preoccupation 
with the unconcealment o f being proves also to be insufficient to the task of 
understanding humanity in its daily movement and pursuit o f freedom, in its activity 
within a community. Human existence encompasses more than the movement towards a 
philosophical understanding of being, such as Heidegger undertakes. Our openness, 
Ricoeur notes, “exposes man and his freedom,” it makes the history of philosophical 
mankind concurrent with a fundamental problematicity, a problematicity that is 
particularly relevant in the movement of man within the world and the community.86
Patodka’s Heretical Essays aim to analyze the condition of European mankind in 
relation to all o f its distinctively human activity, not simply its intellectual or its 
ontological strivings. Thus Ricoeur writes that these essays “trace the 
quasi-simultaneous origin in western Europe o f politics, philosophy, and history,”87 
three topics that are inextricably intertwined in Patodka’s explication of philosophy. The 
humanity o f philosophical man -- or “historical” man, meaning Western man since the 
breakthrough o f self-reflective philosophy in ancient Athens -- is in large part a measure 
of his understanding o f and relation to the problematic nature of his own existence, his
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acceptance o f life in its fmitude and its fundamental uncertainty. Ricoeur stresses both 
the philosophical and the political in Patodka’s work: for the individual there is a 
process akin to metanoia, or conversion, in which he or she comes to accept the loss of 
metaphysical meaning, but without falling into a nihilistic meaninglessness. Rather, 
there is an “access to the quality of meaning implied in the search itself,” a meaning the 
accompanies the Socratic care for the soul which is a “meaning within the condition o f 
problematicity.”88 The properly political element comes, Ricoeur notes, with the 
reflection on the possibility o f transferring “from the individual to the whole o f  
European society the meditation on the relation between meaning, nonmeaning, and 
searching.”89 Relative to this transfer, Patodka explicitly discusses the notion o f  the 
“solidarity o f the shaken,” the phenomenon o f Czechoslovak dissident life in which 
those individuals with a genuine understanding o f  their situation came together, amid 
persecution and uncertainty, to stand against the untruth around them.
Ricoeur is by no means alone in emphasizing the political in Patodkan 
phenomenology. Czech criticism in particular is acutely conscious of the political 
implications o f  this work, and for obvious reasons: Patodka plays a role in the Czech 
public consciousness as both a national philosopher and a political dissident, and his 
compatriot in the latter endeavor, Vaclav Havel, still resides in Prague Castle as 
President. Yet this does not mean that there is agreement as to how to interpret his 
philosophy. Czech criticism also reflects abiding debate between those who seek in 
philosophy a more traditional foundation for ethics and those who reject such bases in 
favor o f a foundationless postmodernism. In essays by the Czech philosophers Miloslav
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Bednaf and Ivan Chvatik, both students o f Patodka, there is a similar recognition o f the 
relevance o f this philosophy to the democratic future o f the Czech Republic and the 
future o f democratic governments in general. Both emphasize the goal, in Patodka’s 
work, of a genuine restoration of the free space in society for politics, the agora as 
Chvatik refers to it. Yet their conceptualizations o f this space reveal a fundamental 
difference as well, a difference that discloses the presence of both poles of 
interpretation, the traditional and the postmodern, among even Patodka’s students.
For Bednaf, the emphasis is placed on the connection between ethics and 
politics, a connection he sees at the heart of the Platonic standpoint. This 
“ethical-political” interpretation of Plato’s surfaced, according to Bednaf, in the figure 
of the first Czechoslovak philosopher-president, T.G. Masaryk, who transformed it into 
a “practical ideal of religious democracy.”90 In a manner reminiscent o f Erazim Kohak, 
Bednar stresses a fundamental continuity between Masaryk and Jan Patodka. For 
Bednaf, however, it is the Platonic influence that is the common bond, making 
Patocka’s philosophy o f history “the philosophical pendant and extension of Masaryk’s 
religious-ethical concept of politics.”91 Chvatik, by contrast, would reject all notion o f a 
“religious-ethical” foundation in the philosophy of Patodka. To the contrary, he stresses 
the “real danger of totalitarianism” in attempting to realize a concrete vision of society 
based on moral values.92 Chvatik’s interpretation belongs to the Heideggerean or 
postmodern pole of contemporary thought. It is rather Patodka’s interpretation of 
Heraclitian conflict, not a commonly shared ethical foundation, that can be a source of 
unity and a bulwark against totalitarian politics.
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Despite their conflicting interpretations as to the values (or lack o f them) 
inherent in Patodka’s philosophy, both Chvatik and Bednaf agree that this philosophy 
has as an implicit aim the restructuring o f the fundaments o f democratic politics in the 
West. Bednaf writes, for example, that “this fundamental challenge for Europe and all 
democracies cannot be solved without appropriate spiritual and moral grounds.”93 He 
finds the contribution of Czech philosophy, meaning primarily the Masarykan and 
Patockan interpretations of Plato, to be a cogent attempt at providing those grounds. 
Chvatik also speaks of a legitimization o f democratic politics, but from a different 
perspective, drawn nevertheless from Patodka. For him the democratic agora must be 
open to competing and conflicting views, it’s creation should embody “the struggle to 
preserve the possibility to struggle (i.e., to live).”94 This institutionalization of conflict 
will provide a unifying force and is the appropriate ground for democratic societies, 
Chvatik argues. The hope for a society founded on moral values, the “hope of attaining 
truth, justice and prosperity,” is likely to dissolve into totalitarianism. “The main trait of 
a functioning democracy is balance ~  something which should be supported so there 
will be no more ‘better tomorrows’ in democratic societies.”95
Of the two, Chvatik’s description is closer to the vision o f democratic society 
implicit in Patodka’s philosophy. Bednar’s evocation o f a moral ground for society 
comes too close to the traditional metaphysics from which Patodka was trying to 
distance himself. Yet Chvatik himself is forced to admit that Patodka is not as 
Heideggerean as Heidegger himself — he does not entirely abandon, for example, the 
notion of a meaningful center in human existence that can act as a moral compass.
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Chvatik would follow Heidegger in destroying metaphysics and thus leave aside talk o f 
morality in politics, instead relying on our understanding o f our own finite being, i.e. 
death, to serve as the source of meaning in our lives, and so he criticizes Patodka for 
continuing to use the language of morality and for recognizing a unifying center in 
human being.96 Patodka continues to speak o f the world as one o f good and evil, but he 
assumes for himself and his philosophy the task o f understanding and describing the 
content o f that world in phenomenological terms ~  as something fundamentally 
non-metaphysical. He seeks to recognize good and evil but in a phenomenological 
manner, without falling back upon a metaphysical construct for support. For Chvatik, 
this is a flaw in his work, a contradiction. But Patodka’s argumentation is convincing, 
for the experience o f morality in life is a phenomenon that may impossible to discount 
as valid. Whether Patodka succeeds in the philosophical task that he sets for himself is 
the question to which this study has been directed.
Regrettably, the literature on the political philosophy of Jan Patodka is erratic 
and largely underdeveloped. It is lacking primarily in two ways: first, an exposition of 
this work as political thought is required that does not substitute the biases of the author 
for those of the Czech philosopher, and second, an explication of this philosophy in 
relation to the question o f the foundation of human social and political being, and of 
humanity in general. I have attempted, with this study, to fill this gap.
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